Giovanni Reale



The Systems of The Hellenistic Age

A History of Ancient Philosophy

Edited and Translated by John R. Catan

A History of Ancient Philosophy

III. The Systems of the Hellenistic Age

This one

LTYT-H79-6DK2

Published by
State University of New York Press, Albany

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For information, address State University of New York
Press, State University Plaza, Albany, N.Y. 12246

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Reale, Giovanni.
The concept of first philosophy and the unity of the metaphysics of Aristotle.

Translation of Il concetto di filosofia prima e l'unità della metafisica di Aristotele.
Bibliography: p.
Includes indexes.
1. Aristoteles - Metaphysics. 2. Metaphysics.
3. First philosophy. I. Catan, John R. II. Title.
B491.M4R413 110 79-13867

ISBN 0-88706-027-7

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Giovanni Reale

A History of Ancient Philosophy

III. The Systems of the Hellenistic Age

EDITED AND TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD ITALIAN EDITION

John R. Catan

State University of New York Press

ALBANY

The American edition and translation is dedicated to my brothers

Paul and Bob

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FOREWORD

The third volume of the *History of Ancient Philosophy* contains the treatment of the systems and philosophical schools of the Hellenistic Age. The period of time covered is approximately from the age of the great exploits of Alexander the Great to the end of the Pagan Era, a period which scholars of philosophy have often neglected and scarcely appreciated because of a series of prejudices of various kinds (which we will explain) and also because of the real paucity of evidence. We have complete works only of very few philosophers and for most of them we possess only fragments and testimonies, gathered and arranged in more recent times.

We have sought to evaluate the philosophical systems which began and developed in this period by reading them according to a new vision and by taking into account the results of some recent studies which overturn most of the traditional schemata in which they were imprisoned.

We have begun from the great expedition to the East by Alexander and from the analysis of the revolutionary consequences that it produced. Greece was in the grip, then, of the greatest spiritual crisis in its history, because of the downfall of the *polis* and hence of the ancient moral and spiritual values. It was this very crisis which unexpectedly made the great messages of Plato and Aristotle unintelligibile to the point that they became incomprehensible even within their Schools. The post-Platonic Academy and the post-Aristotelian Peripatos rapidly lost the meaning of their metaphysical discoveries, and even the speculative dimension. As a result they were unable to give an appropriate message to their epoch. In a similar way, the Schools founded by the *minor* Socratics were also in decline. Although they developed some ideas in accordance with the needs of the new era, these Schools were unable to defend themselves and hence to ground their positions and make them prevail.

Therefore the innovative spiritual messages came from the new Schools which developed at the end of the fourth century before the Common Era. They came from the Garden of Epicurus, the Porch of Zeno, and the sceptical movement initiated by Pyrrho.

We followed the final developments of the Socratic Schools until their disappearance and sketched the progressive decline of the first Academy and the first Peripatos. We then explained the birth and development of the three great movements, which are like three powerful forces according to which the thought of this era developed, namely, Epicureanism, Stoicism, Pyrrhonic and Academic scepticism, and finally we concluded with Eclecticism.

Common to all of these systems was the attempt to overturn the

results of the Platonic *second voyage*, as we will see, and consequently to construct a materialistic vision of reality. These systems used concepts and speculative models already elaborated in the Presocratic period which, as we will see, produced some serious aporias. We will not, however, insist on the speculative, logical, and metaphysical inadequacies of these systems, as is often done, because this approach ends by becoming an obstacle to understanding them. We will show, in fact, that the ethics of these systems *jut out* clearly beyond the *physics* which is supposed to be its support. The *physics* itself, in its turn, *juts out* beyond the *logic*. Actually, the ethics of these systems is the real key. Hence it is necessary to read and interpret these ethics within parameters somewhat different from the usual ones.

Therefore, the question arises: if the logics and the ontologies which should be the ground of ethics are objectively inadequate (they do not provide any ground but, on the contrary, derive and even find their own ground in ethics), then what is the source from which these new ethics arise?

According to our thesis—we will have the opportunity to prove it solidly—these ethics are, so to speak, authentic *secular faiths*, although extensively reasoned. They spring from intuitions about the meaning of life which were first emotionally grasped and then systematically and rationally developed.

It is for this reason that the teachings of these Schools endured almost uninterruptedly for about half a millenium, which was much longer than all the other Schools. They were able to speak in a clear and accessible way, addressing *faith* as well as *reason*. They said which spiritual attitude man should have in relation to things, to other men, and to the Gods in order to reach happiness. It is again this fact which explains why, notwithstanding the differences between their respective logics and physics or even notwithstanding their sceptical negation, the different Schools nevertheless agreed on some fundamental moral principles and how to define the *sage*. Finally, it is this same reason which explains why the founders of the Schools of this age were raised almost to the level of Gods. Actually they became, in a certain sense, the *saints* of secular faiths and religions.

The maturation of the thesis developed and argued in this volume occurred over many years. We have studied the post-Platonic Academy (especially Speusippus and Xenocrates) for a long time as we edited our commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, *Aristotele: La Metafisica* (Naples: Loffredo, 1968) who, as it is well known, continually argued with Platonists. We were also concerned with the first Peripatos in the volume *Teofrasto e la sua aporetica metafisica* (Brescia: La Scuola, 1964) in which we also presented the first Italian edition with commentary of the *Metaphysics* by Theophrastus. We were concerned with ancient and

middle Stoicism in our work *Aristotele, Trattato sul cosmo per Alessandro* (Naples: Loffredo, 1974), which for a long time was suspected of containing Stoic influences, especially of Posidonius (but which in our view has to be attributed to the Peripatos). We will consider in an expanded way, in other works, some of these matters which are presented here summarily.

Giovanni Reale

PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION

It gives me great pleasure to introduce the American translation of the third volume of my *History of Ancient Philosophy*, published between 1975 and 1980, of which there have already been numerous editions in Europe, and where it has also achieved a large following among scholars, as well as with a quite exceptional success with the reading public.

Professor John Catan (who has previously translated and published in America my work on Aristotle: *Il concetto di filosofia prima e l'unità della Metafisica di Aristotele* [*The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980]) has appropriately wished to begin the translation of the entire work, beginning from volume three concerned with the thought of the Hellenistic Age, and I am in complete agreement with him, for a number of reasons which I list below.

In the first place, at this time in the cultural sphere of anglophones a synthesis of the great philosophies of this era (the Academy, the Peripatos, the Stoa, the Garden of Epicurus, Scepticism, and Eclecticism) is lacking. In other languages as well, there is no work that gives a framework for the philosophical problematic relative to this period from the great conquest of Alexander the Great to the end of the Pagan Era. Therefore, the present volume tries to fill that lacuna, which is by no means small.

In the second place, among scholars at the international level there has been a great renewal of interest, as never before, in all the schools and principal philosophical figures of this period. This period of thought has been basically rediscovered and evaluated in all its various aspects. The epicenter of this intense labor is found in Italy (even if notable signs and documents of this labor of imposing rebirth is evident in all parts of the philosophical world). Just limiting ourselves to Italy where, as we have said, the most significant contributions have been made, we will mention the most important examples. The "Italian Institute for Philosophical Studies" has initiated the publication of a series of volumes dedicated to "The School of Plato" (under the direction of M. Gigante), in which is published and edited for the first time all the fragments and the testimonies (with commentary) of all the Platonists of the Hellenistic Age (published by Bibliopolis of Naples), of which the first volumes have already appeared. Moreover, the same "Institute" has also published a series of volumes dedicated to "The School of Epicurus" in which for the first time there will appear much of the Epicurean material discovered in the villa of the Pisoni at Herculaneum. Some volumes have already been published (again by Bibliopolis). Among this material there has been published the catalog (*Catalogo dei papiri di Ercolano*,

Naples: Bibliopolis, 1979). Mention must also be made of the valuable journal *Cronache Ercolanesi*. The work of Epicurus has a new and valuable edition under the direction of G. Arrighetti (Turin: Einaudi, 1973²) which supersedes in many ways the old edition of H. Usener, and contains as well the abundant material from the Herculaneum papyri. Again in Italy the valuable *Glossarium Epicureum* of H. Usener has been published (under the editorship of M. Gigante and W. Schmid, Rome, 1977), which was for a long time out of print and required re-editing. To all of these must be added the studies and editions of the ethical fragments of Epicurus under the editorship of C. Diano and many of the works of E. Bignone, who has written excellent commentaries in addition to his fundamental work on Epicurus: *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro,* Florence, 1973². But the contributions to our knowledge of the other philosophical schools of this period have undergone a remarkable development in Italy. A short time ago, the first edition of the fragments of Pyrrho (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1981) under the editorship of F. Decleva Caizzi, in addition to a series of critical studies on the Sceptics, became available. With respect to the Socratic Schools of this period, the first edition of all the fragments and testimonies has been done by G. Giannantoni in an imposing work of scholarship (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 4 volumes, in a co-edition with Bibliopolis of Naples, 1983). Let us also remember that the work of translating all the fragments of the ancient Stoics has been systematically accomplished only in Italy. In what concerns, finally, the understanding of the thought of the Peripatos immediately after the death of Aristotle, and especially of Theophrastus, in which we ourselves have authored a complex work of detailed research on the metaphysics, we have offered a totally different interpretation from the classical ones of Zeller and Ross in the volume *Teofrasto e la sua aporetica metafisica*. This work has been translated by J. R. Catan, and will be published in the future.

Finally, I wish to say a word again about the meaning of the philosophical thought of these schools of the Hellenistic Age. To the men of today, who seem to have lost all the ancient certitudes, most of the philosophies treated in this volume can give a sense of great peace in the measure in which they demonstrate that when everything *seems* to be lost, in reality it is not lost since the possibility of salvation for man *always* lies within himself: it is sufficient to know this to make it emerge. Reading this volume the reader will discover again, on the basis of the texts themselves (fragments and testimonies), that not only are the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle very rich but that *all* Greek thought is a truly inexhaustible mine of suggestive intellectual stimuli.

I want to thank Professor Catan for his indefatigable labor, and I wish the same success for his translation that the original achieved in Europe.

A final word on the significance of the adjective "ancient" used in the

title to refer to the *History of the Philosophy of the Greeks*. They are a very long distance in time from us; indeed because they are so, they are no longer valued today. But there are also those "ancients," things which, on the contrary, are actually in the present, or even more so than that. These "ancient" things of which we speak are like the roots of a plant or the surgings of a fountain or the adamantine seeds of life. And such is indeed "ancient" philosophy: it is the root of our thinking, of our own western culture.

Zeuxis, an ancient Greek painter, asked why he painted so slowly, replied: "because I paint for eternity." Thucydides, in the publication of his own historiographic research, presented the work as "a possession for eternity." The same thing (and with greater reason) can be said also of the thought of the ancient Greeks. It is a *possession for eternity*. It is a possession which, if it were lost, would eliminate the very possibility for western culture to remain intact. The Greeks, in conclusion, have been and will remain the foundation of the thought and culture of the West.

After the third volume, which is now being presented, the following order, which is chronological, will be followed: I, II, IV, and V (the Indices, Lexicon, and Bibliography).

Giovanni Reale
Milan, 1984

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

The translation of Professor Reale's monumental Italian work *Storia della filosofia antica*. III. *I sistemi dell'età ellenistica*, Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1980[3], in five volumes, is being inaugurated with the publication of volume three, the remaining four volumes to follow at approximately one-year intervals. As Professor Reale has mentioned in his preface to this edition, the remaining volumes will appear in their original order.

I have consulted Professor Reale and his wife Signora Reale throughout. For ease of comprehension, I tried to render Professor Reale's thought in less complex syntax than that found in the Italian language, so I frequently departed from the Italian style (although it does have a subtlety and beauty of its own). My previous translation was generally quite well received, but I have profited from constructive remarks in reviews of the book, for which I am grateful. In the translation of texts from the Greek or Latin I have used the admirable *Loeb Classical Library* rendition, usually with alterations to keep it in line with Professor Reale's Italian versions, although I did compare all translations with the originals in difficult cases. I have indicated my great debt to various translators in the backnotes. There are, of course, some sources which have not been translated into English, for example, Photius, Eusebius, Stobaeus, and Aetius, as well as others. In those cases, I followed closely the Italian text, which Professor Reale used. I gave a modern flavor to the long quote from *Philosophies for Sale* of Lucian, because of its clearly jocund style, and also to some of the Lucretian texts of the *De rerum natura*, from which I eliminated the archaic language of the Loeb translation.

My fondest hope for the series is that it be read by thoughtful people, both in and out of university settings. I strongly agree with Professor Reale's comment that the Greeks are at the source of our Western culture with the addition, of course, of the other great traditions of the Hebrew Bible, the Christian New Testament, and the Qu'ran.

It seemed appropriate, because of the timeliness and universality of the content of Hellenistic philosophy, to avoid some appearances of narrowness in the Italian original. First, I used the abbreviation "CE" (for the *Common Era*) instead of the more traditional "A.D." (for the *Anno Domini*, which tends to accent the Christian view of things) in recognition of the fact that so much of Western thought resulted from the confluence of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim contributions. I occasionally departed from the letter of this rule, where appropriate, by using the phrase "Christian Era," which has as its traditional antithesis the "Pagan Era." Sometimes I used the phrase "human being" or "person"

as well as "man" in the translation for the Italian "uomo" to avoid the appearance of sexism, which has unfortunately become attached to the term "man" in the latter part of the twentieth century. I also alternated, in my translation of the Italian "virtù," between "virtue" and A.D.J. Adkins's admirable "human excellence." Finally, in order to avoid Christian theological meanings attendant on the term "God" when it is capitalized, hence to be guilty of anachronistic usage in the Hellenistic period, I decided it would be simpler to capitalize the term in the plural as well, thus "Gods," and in that way serve notice that the capitalization of the singular indicates no theological position derived from Christianity.

To help the reader, I have included a complete bibliography of the books and journal articles used in the text as well as an index of names and an index of Greek terms and finally an index of classical sources cited. I was forced by the chronological order of publication to give general cross-references to other volumes of the series. I apologize if this causes the reader any inconvenience. Finally, I have also placed abbreviations used in the notes, with their full bibliographical information, in the back material.

It remains only to thank those who have been of help to me, although any faults of the translation are my sole responsibility. A special word of thanks to the Director of *State University of New York Press*, Mr. William Eastman, and the Editorial Board of the Press, for their immediate enthusiasm and confidence in the value of the project. To Melody Brinkman, who performed the mind-boggling task of setting up the conversion codes to use the Greek font as well as being of inestimable assistance because of her knowledge of English grammar and style, my sincere and heartfelt thanks. Professor Anthony Piccione of *State University College at Brockport*, who read the manuscript in its entirety for English grammar and style, as well as for his gift of friendship my profound thanks. Professor Michael Fox, who shared his keen philosophical interest and friendship, thank you. Also to Professor Reale, whom I met after fourteen years of correspondence in New York City in 1983, under trying personal circumstances, I wish to extend my sincerest gratitude and best wishes for the continued success of his work. His stature as a scholar is only surpassed by his "magnanimità." I also owe a note of thanks to the publishers, *Vita e Pensiero* of Milan Italy, for permission to translate.

It gives me great pleasure to dedicate this volume to my brothers Paul and Bob, who have given me their love and affection these many years. Finally, a word of congratulations to Father Joseph Owens C.Ss.R. on his 75th birthday, and my gratitude for his patient help and support dating back to my graduate days.

Finally I could not have accomplished the task of translation without the help of an *Apple III*™ microcomputer and the word processing

software *Word Juggler*™ from Quark Engineering of Denver, Colorado as well as the marvelous *Printer Optimizer*™ from Applied Creative Technologies, Inc. of Arlington, Texas. The latter, in the person of Bill, was especially helpful in the early stages of setting up the capacity to print Greek within the English text and later in programming a special EPROM for us, thank you. Thanks is also due to Hal Leader, owner of Printing Prep Inc., our typesetter, for his willingness to typeset the volume directly from my diskettes and to Mr. Jeffrey Straw the typesetting programmer for Printing Prep Inc. The arrangement has been most satisfactory or more accurately of great utility since it will cut the work of proofreading, as well as eliminating the re-keying which greatly adds to the expense of printing.

J. R. Catan
Adams Basin, New York
1984

«ἐν τῷ Κρανείῳ ἡλιουμένῳ αὐτῳ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπιστάς φησιν, 'αἴτησόν με ὃ θέλεις'. καὶ ὅς, 'ἀποσκότησόν μου', φησί.»

"Once while Diogenes was sunning himself in the Kraneus, Alexander stood over him and said: 'Ask of me whatever you wish.' And Diogenes replied: 'Leave me to my sun.'"

Diogenes Laertius 6.38

«Οὐδὲν ἱκανὸν ᾧ ὀλίγον τὸ ἱκανόν.»

"Nothing is sufficient to someone for whom a little is not enough."

Epicurus *Sententiae Vaticanae* 68

«Σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἔξειν κἂν Διὶ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο.»

"The flesh cries out to us: do not hunger, do not thirst, do not be cold; if anyone has these things and hopes to continue to have them, he can vie in happiness even with Zeus."

Epicurus *Sententiae Vaticanae* 33

«καὶ ἐκείνων [*scil.*, τῶν ἀγαθῶν] τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν μὴ διαφέρειν τῆς θείας εὐδαιμονίας, μηδὲ τὴν ἀμεριαίαν ... διαφέρειν τῆς τοῦ Διὸς εὐδαιμονίας, καὶ κατὰ μηδὲν αἱρετωτέραν εἶναι μήτε καλλίω μήτε σεμνοτέραν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς εὐδαιμονιάν τῆς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν.»

"The happiness of good men is not different from the happiness of the divine, nor does the happiness of the moment differ from the happiness of Zeus and in no way is the happiness of Zeus preferable, neither is it more beautiful nor more valuable than the happiness of men of wisdom."

Chrysippus *Fragment* 54 von Arnim 3

1. The spiritual consequences of the revolution produced by Alexander the Great

The great expedition of Alexander the Great and the conquest of the Orient (334-323 BCE) produced a revolution which would be of enormous importance. It was important not only for the political consequences which it provoked, but also for the whole series of concomitant changes in ancient convictions which characterized a radical shift in the life of the spirit of the Greeks. It was an event which produced an epoch in the strongest sense of the term, since it closed one era and opened a new one.

We shall see in detail the nature of the factors in this new era. They acted in specific ways, resulting in the sudden disappearance of the philosophical problematic of Plato and Aristotle as well as the loss of a good deal of interest in them. These factors gave birth to new problems, new categories, and new criteria for their solutions and, in short, to a spiritual climate radically different from the classical one.

Certainly the most important recorded factor in this sense was the collapse of the polis. Already the father of Alexander, Philip of Macedon, had begun to constrict the chief arteries of the Greek city-states, skillfully increasing in strength some political entities, which already existed, in order to accomplish his plan of Macedonian hegemony over Greece. If Philip had respected the city-state, then he had done so only in a formal way, since his intent was to eliminate its freedom for the purposes of his own rule. But Alexander went far beyond Philip, destroying the city-state in every sense, every formal and substantial mark of its freedom, in order to achieve his grand plan for a universal divine-right monarchy by bringing together not only city-states but different countries and peoples as well. But if Alexander did not succeed in implementing his grand plan, or in giving a political structure to his immense conquests extending over three continents, it may be that the spirit and the times were not ready, as well as because of his unexpected death at an early age in 323 BCE. Nevertheless, Alexander's political policies delivered such a blow to the city-states that they were never able to recover from it. After 323 BCE, political power passed from the shattered authority of Alexander to new reigns which developed in Egypt, Syria, Macedonia, Pergamum, and thus the Greek city-state ceased definitively to take an active part in history. The new rulers centralized all power in their own hands and did not tolerate any limitations. They almost totally identified themselves with the state, consequently rejecting all forms of political freedom.

So it was that the unexpected destruction of the fundamental spiritual values of classical Greece came about, concerning which Plato in the *Republic* and Aristotle in the *Politics* had for a time theorized, mythologized, hypostatized, and raised to the highest heights. Just as these works were surprisingly beyond the grasp of those who witnessed the

revolution of Alexander, so their meaning and their vitality were judged to be irrelevant and out of step with the times.

2. The development and diffusion of the cosmopolitan ideal

It becomes easy to comprehend the spiritual collapse which the revolution of Alexander provoked, because the Greeks of the Classical Age, as we know, had always considered the city-state as the only measure of the moral life. It was a life beyond which men could not conceive their own existence either in relation to others or to themselves since they had almost entirely identified *man* with *citizenship*. Men, from their status as citizens, became simply *subjects*. They ceased to appreciate the ancient civic virtues because all the decisions regarding public affairs were made without their contributions. The life of the new states developed independently of their wills, so the motives for their ancient passions fell and they unexpectedly experienced an absence of meaning in their lives. The "capacities" that count were no longer the ancient civic "virtues," but a knowledge and technique that could not be attained by all because they required special knowledge and special capacities. In any case, these capacities lost their ethical content and acquired a professional content. Thus the administrators of the public welfare became functionaries, soldiers became mercenaries, and in addition there were those who were born who were no longer either like the citizens of old or like the new technocrats. They assumed before the state an attitude of neutral disinterest when it was not an outright aversion. We will see, then, that philosophy explains these realities in an explicit way. It places the state and politics either among neutral or morally indifferent entities or even among morally negative things because they are sources of ambitions, passions, and so are useless preoccupations and disturbances. A background to this revolution in the ethical and political classical realities is provided by a radical conceptual reinterpretation of ethical and political values. Further, the new philosophical perspectives will be even more advanced and bold with respect to the new historical realities; they will be at least as great, more advanced, and audacious with respect to the old historical realities, although in an opposed sense, as were the *Republic* of Plato and the *Politics* of Aristotle in their own period.

Finally, it is important to stress another analogy. A universal and divine-right monarchy could not be concretely achieved by Alexander and the Hellenistic rulers because they developed political structures which were unstable and without moral force. Thus, after the city-state, the Greeks did not create a new vital political form as a substitute capable of inspiring a new moral and political ideal. Greece would even lose, in 146 BCE, all its freedom by becoming a Roman province, and the long desired ideal of Alexander, in an even higher form, would be achieved by

the Romans with their ruling power. Just as Greek history, so also Greek philosophy saw new concrete possibilities beyond the city-state and its negation and took refuge in *cosmopolitanism*, surpassing once again the limits of history, considering the whole world its city and including in this city, with the Stoics, not only human beings but the Gods as well.

While the cosmopolitanism of the old Socratic schools was chiefly a paradox maintained in antithesis with reality and the predominant thought of the time, the cosmopolitanism of the Hellenistic Age, on the contrary, became the dominant thesis of the age without any real or ideal antithesis.

3. The discovery of the individual

The rupture of the identification of man and citizenship can moreover be explained positively rather than negatively. A human being could no longer be confined to the city-state, to the *ethos* of the state, and to its values as providing the content of an authentic life. Nor could he be constrained by the force of events and closed in upon himself. Rather, he discovered in himself new and profound energies, new moral content, and new purposes for living. In this way, ***man discovered himself as an individual.*** Bignone has explained this point well: "The civic education of the classical world produced citizens; the age of Alexander developed a culture which shaped individuals. In the great Hellenistic monarchies the bonds and relations between man and the state continue as more strict and irresistible. The new political forms, in which power is held by only one or a very few, consistently concedes more to everyone to develop their own view of the good life and the good moral person. But even in the city-state, as in Athens (at least in form), the ancient legal institutions remain, but the ancient civic life languishes. It still seems to survive as if it is the same reality, but weakened and fearful, held within a consciously repressed reaction without a profound assent in the souls of men. The individual is now free to experience himself as individual. The adventurer in search of his fortune is a literary type which the new poets such as Menander, Theocritus, Herondus based on reality and pictured with special vivacity and sympathy. The new monarchies of Asia and Egypt with their rise to fast fortunes and fabulous wealth provide an opportunity for every singular boldness, for every industrious quality to flourish. They attract the most varied spirits as well, through the ease of travel and commerce, in penetrating the East, offering them a momentary and shifting homeland full of people who had as supreme Gods fame, money, or adventure. Everyone evaluates, no longer as a member of a city-state into which he is born, sharing its fortune, grandeur, and misfortune but rather with intelligence, the interior genius of his spirit. *Now man seems to be everything: a unique construct*

with his own values and his own destiny, answering to himself alone."[1]

These remarks of Bignone must be integrated by stressing that this discovery and new domination of the *individual* sometimes degenerates into *individualism* and *egoism*, of which we would have paradigmatic examples especially in the ethics of Epicurus and Pyrrho.

There is a final point which is important enough to be worth stressing again in this regard. The distinction of the individual from the citizen, and in certain cases the disappearance of the civic sense, had a result in philosophy, as is well known to scholars, that is, the radical distinction and clear separation between *ethics* and *politics*. Classical ethics, as we know, was necessarily based on the presupposed identity of man with citizenship and, hence, it was established on the basis of political thought or even directly subordinate to political thought. An ethics, for both Plato and Aristotle, not culminating in politics or politics not ethically grounded was unthinkable. Now for the first time in history moral philosophy in the Hellenistic Age, thanks to the discovery of the individual, was structured in an absolutely autonomous way, basing itself on human nature as such considered in its singularity. The tendency to individualism and the yielding to egoism of which we have spoken are indeed the exaggerations and exacerbations of this discovery.

4. The equalization of Greeks and barbarians and the breakdown of ancient ethnic prejudices

The expedition of Alexander also was destined to shake to its foundations, if not to destroy entirely, that deeply rooted ethnic prejudice of the Greeks, because of which they conceived themselves as superior to barbarians not only in the quantity but also in the quality of their native endowments. They considered that they alone were (φύσει) (by nature) free, and considered, on the contrary, barbarians as incapable by nature (φύσει) of culture, as having an incapacity for free action and, as a result, as being "slaves by nature" (φύσει). Alexander pursued, and not without success, the enormous enterprise of assimilating the conquered barbarians and bringing them to equality with the Greeks.

In 331 BCE he had thousands of young barbarians instructed in the basic canons of Greek culture and he had them trained in the art of war to prepare new fresh forces for his military campaigns. In 324 BCE he ordered soldiers and Macedonian officials to marry with Persian women: ten thousand Macedonian soldiers and groups of officials were united in nuptial ceremonies to Persian women in Syria. These are some of the most striking examples which illuminate the ideal of the equality of peoples that was frequently confirmed in the Hellenistic Age.

Together with the presupposed ethnic prejudices, the radical distinction of the sexes would also fall. Women would achieve some rights

which law had denied them until then. Epicurus would welcome into his Garden some women to philosophize, and would not even disdain to open the door to some *hetairas*, who were desirous of finding internal peace of soul. With the fall of the presupposition of the existence of differences "by nature" (φύσει) between man and man, the theoretic basis for any justification of slavery would also fall. In fact philosophy, if it tolerated slavery as an historical fact, did not neglect to contest it on the theoretical level: Epicurus would not only treat slaves with familiarity, but he would help in their education; the Stoics taught that the only true slavery is the slavery of ignorance. Freedom of knowledge can be grasped by either slave or king: the two last great Stoics were, in point of fact, the slave Epictetus and the emperor Marcus Aurelius.

5. The transformation of Hellenic culture into Hellenistic culture

The Hellenic culture, by spreading among many races and many peoples, became *Hellenistic*. This diffusion inevitably involved in addition to a loss in profundity, a parallel loss in purity. By coming into contact with different traditions and beliefs, Hellenistic culture had to assimilate these elements in a more and more accentuated way. The influence of the East was felt in a very profound way, which would be verified in detail, beginning with Pyrrho and, at least in certain respects, by the Stoics themselves.

The new centers of culture like Pergamum, Rhodes, and especially Alexandria, with the establishment of its imposing library and museum thanks to the Ptolemies, ended by placing Athens itself in the shade. In fact, the center itself of culture ended by shifting to Alexandria which, because of its favorable geographic position, absorbed the spiritual energies coming from three continents and elaborated in its intellectual circles a new culture with its own style which was named after the city as Alexandrian culture.

Also from Rome, militarily and politically victorious, but itself engulfed by Hellenism, new cultural energies would be released charged with Latin realism, contributing in relevant ways to create and spread the phenomenon of eclecticism. The most eclectic of the Greek philosophers were those who had the most intense contacts with the Romans.

6. The addition in breadth and loss in depth of Hellenistic philosophy

As in general Hellenic culture, by becoming Hellenistic, lost its original vigor and its primitive force, so philosophy also lost in depth what it gained in breadth. The loss belongs properly in the dimension of the theoretical and hence in its speculative power and vigor. The gain

belongs instead in the incomparable number of persons to whom philosophy, essentially identified with the problem of living, could communicate an authentic message. Philosophy had become, in fact, the source from which Hellenistic man obtained those values which first had their origin in the polis and in its religion. Philosophy offered new content for the life of man's spirit, it illumined consciences, it helped man to live, and he learned to be happy even in the tragic age in which he lived, in which all the ancient values seemed to be subverted.

The philosophers of the Hellenistic Age were necessarily moralists, great moralists; they were "professors" of an ethical belief-system, and they were in their way its heralds and disseminators.

But what is the precise nature of the loss of the theoretic dimension of Hellenistic philosophy? In our view it is summarizable in a phrase: Hellenistic philosophy almost totally lost the meaning of the "second voyage" embarked on by Plato and brought to completion by Aristotle. Hellenism thus lost the sense of transcendence, of meta-physics, of the spiritual, and could only think, therefore, with sensibly derived categories *limiting them to physical or material beings*. For metaphysics it substituted *physics*, understanding it, in the Presocratic manner, as a theory of *physis*. It even turned and took from the speculations of the Presocratics their ontological concepts as the basis for understanding the things of this world. But—and this is the point to stress—the moral philosophy of Hellenism did not arise from concepts which were borrowed from the Presocratics, since, as the reader of this *History of Ancient Philosophy* knows well, no ethics either were or could possibly be grounded on the categories of the Presocratics. It was rather from an immediate attitude toward life which each of the great heads of the schools grasped intuitively. Afterwards they developed it theoretically, taking the available Presocratic categories and using them, in a polemical antithesis with Platonism and Aristotelianism. Thus the Presocratic categories were simply subsidiary instruments of clarification and justification. It is for this reason, as we will see, that the moral concepts jut out decisively either beyond the physical doctrines or beyond the logical doctrines of the various Hellenistic schools and take on decisively autonomous value with respect to them.

Actually, what matters for Hellenistic philosophy and its followers is not *sophia* but *phronesis*. It is important in the resolution of the problem of life. Actually only a small part of what they said and wrote outside of this problem has autonomous value and specific significance. Nevertheless, in resolving the problem of life, the philosophers of this age created something truly imposing and exceptional: Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Scepticism established models of life by which men continued to be inspired for another half a millenium, and which then became a true and proper spiritual paradigm forever.

7. The revival of the Socratic spirit

The conception of philosophy as the "art of living," that is, as practical wisdom, must necessarily return to the Socratic position.

Some clarifications, however, are necessary in order to grasp the meaning of this "return to Socrates."

Actually, the Socratic schools are all the schools established by the disciples of Socrates, both the "minor" schools and that "major" one, namely the school of Plato (and in a certain sense even that of Aristotle). But as already the minor Socratics, so also the philosophers of the Hellenistic Age consider the metaphysical and speculative developments of Plato (and Aristotle) as deviations from Socraticism and as useless and hence deceptive superstructures. Nevertheless, as we shall see, not even the minor Socratics satisfied the spirit of the Hellenistic Age: they fell in fact into the opposite excess for which they reproached Plato, insofar as they eliminated almost entirely the logical and ontological component. They thus deprived their system of any possibility of *giving an account of itself* and *critically justifying its own assertions.*

Therefore the philosophers of the Hellenistic Age searched for a middle position between the two they judged to be extremes. It is not difficult to recognize, nevertheless, from the point of view of a moral vision of life, that the philosophers of the Hellenistic Age were closer to the minor Socratics, insofar as they took from them numerous ideas and developed them in various ways. From the point of view of the structure of their systems, they were closer to Plato and Aristotle because they would recognize that an ethics cannot be established without constructing a vision of nature and being which Socrates, as we know, maintained was impossible for human beings. The Socratic spirit prevailed, however, even in this recovery of the "physics" (which is an authentic "ontology"), since it was subordinate to ethics and was not considered as an end in itself.

Epicurus was clearly inspired by the letter as well as the spirit of Socrates in defining philosophy as a spiritual medical art which cures the evils of the soul and in declaring everything else useless verbiage.

The Stoics were also radical Socratics who, by identifying virtue with the activity and increase of *logos* present in human beings, returned to a rigorous intellectualism and the doctrine of moral virtues as science.

The Sceptics themselves were considered to be Socratics; their scepticism seems to be a development of the doubt and ignorance proclaimed by Socrates.

But profoundly Socratic above all was the conviction which was like a minimum common denominator for all the systems of the Hellenistic Age according to which the true philosopher is such only if and to the degree that he achieves a complete coherence (a "harmony" and an

"accord," said Socrates) between doctrine and life, or better yet, between theory and a way of living and dying. A philosopher is not only one who can think and construct systems, but is chiefly one who can live and die in harmony with his system. A system of ideas and a system of life ought to completely "mesh." The chief products of philosophers of this epoch were not only their books but also their ways of living and dying; nevertheless they personified the complete agreement and coherence between doctrine and life which Socrates, in a paradigmatic manner, was the first to have realized.[2]

8. The ideal of *autarcheia*

The new philosophical conceptions, even though they were manifested in diverse forms in different schools, presented common traits and identical attitudes. For the most part they sought an ideal of life which any man could follow by using the resources solely found within himself. The idea, which was already Socratic, and which some of his followers had already taken to the first stage, i.e., the *idea of self-autonomy*, now became dominant. And this is easy to understand: in an epoch in which all is in ruins and rapidly changing, men cannot call upon other men or upon some things as a support or guarantor of security. They must search and find what they need in themselves and only in themselves. This is the ideal of complete autonomy. In fact, the philosophers of this epoch extended the requirement of total liberation even to Destiny, Chance, and the Inevitable. Pyrrho put aside Chance with absolute indifference and complete insensibility. Zeno and the Stoics sought to free themselves from Destiny by pre-empting it, that is, by making the will of Fate their will. Epicurus laughed at Destiny and rejected it as an empty belief. Man, or better the individual, is thus freed from every dependency and becomes quasi-absolutized.

9. The ideal of *ataraxy*

Even the moral goals to which all Hellenistic philosophical schools aspired were fundamentally identical. All wanted to teach how to be happy and all identified happiness with something more negative than positive, more renounced than acquired, implying the cutting back and elimination of human needs more than their enlargement, more their rejection than their acceptance. All agreed in affirming that happiness is to be found in *ataraxy*, that is, in tranquillity of spirit. Pyrrho sought tranquillity of spirit in complete *renunciation*, in complete *indifference*, and in a state of *insensibility*; Zeno sought it in *apatheia*, in *imperturbability*, that is, in the suppression of all passions of the soul. Epicurus, finally, sought it in *aponia*, that is, in the *suppression of physical pain*, and

in *ataraxy*, that is, in the *elimination of all disturbances of the soul.* But it is clear that to deprive man of human passions is to deprive him of a great part of his life.

Moreover, many philosophers, in order to achieve this tranquillity, praise the simple life and they discover the peacefulness of the countryside and the trees, the return to uncontaminated nature and solitude as well. Even the motto of Epicurus and the Epicureans is "live hidden!" This motto is a most profound reversal of the classical view.

10. The ideal of the Sage

The *ideal of the sage*, which at times was even raised to a mythical apex, is also common to all the Hellenistic schools (and consequently is one of the things taught). The sage was the man who is the possessor of all the virtues, which the new philosophies recognized as necessary in order to live happily, because he was a human being at the highest level of happiness. The sage, the new philosophies agreed, was not envious of the Gods because his happiness *did not differ qualitatively from that of the Gods*. The pleasure that Zeus enjoyed in eternity, said Epicurus, cannot be other than that which we achieve in time, but which, even in time, we can achieve in a perfect way, as we will see. The Stoics repeated the same concept in other words: our human excellence, in which happiness consists, is only correct reason, which is identical to the reason of Zeus, and this we will also see in detail.

Strengthened by this divine wisdom, the sage has nothing to fear on earth: even among the flames—this was a common paradox of all the Hellenistic schools—the sage could be happy. He could be so because he is in a better position, with respect to wisdom, to almost spiritually annul pain itself which is the effect of the flame. And since the concept of the supersensible is lost, it is impossible to speak of a real immortality, of a beyond; so these philosophers declare that the aim of man is fully achievable in the here and now. The only happiness which exists is on earth, but (and this is very indicative) it is a curious happiness, attainable (as we have already hinted at and which we will see better in the course of the exposition of the doctrines of each school) by means of the most radical renunciation of that which is most properly terrestrial.

11. The deification of the founders of the great systems of the Hellenistic Age

A final point to be mentioned is both characteristic and indicative of the Hellenistic Age. All of the heads of the schools approached or achieved, in a remarkable way in their actual lives, the theoretical ideal which they desired and praised. Because of this, among their contemporaries and

then for entire centuries, they were the object of enormous admiration and enthusiasm.

The follower of Pyrrho, Timon, writes:

> This, Pyrrho, this my heart desires to know, Whence peace of mind to you does so easily come. Why among men are you *like a God* standing revealed?[3]

Several centuries after Timon, Sextus Empiricus writes:

> O, Pyrrho, that you appear *as a great marvel*, that no one is greater, as *an extraordinary being, different from all others*, you have dared to argue vigorously against all the philosophers with, O, what burning desire![4]

The birthday of Epicurus was consecrated and was celebrated solemnly by his disciples.

We read again about Epicurus in an ancient testimony:

> The life of Epicurus was a model for others, for its gentleness and deeply felt peace it stimulated legends.[5]

Lucretius again, much later, also writes:

> Who is able with mighty mind to build a song worthy of the majesty of nature and these discoveries? Or who is so potent in speech as to devise praises fit for his merits, who by his own intellect winning and gaining such treasures has left them to us? None would be found, I think, of the sons of mortal men. For if we must speak as this very majesty of nature now known to us demands, *he was a God*, noble Memmius, *a God he was who first discovered that that reasoned plan of life which is now called Wisdom, who by his skill brought life out of those tempestuous billows and that deep darkness and settled it in such a calm and in light so clear.*[6]

Epictetus writes of Chrysippus, second founder of Stoicism:

> O the great good fortune! O the great benefactor who points the way! To Triptolemus, indeed, all men have established shrines and altars, because he gave us as food the fruits of cultivation, but to him who has discovered, and brought to light, and imparted to all men the truth which deals not with mere life, but with a good life—who among you has for that set up an altar in his honor, or dedicated a temple or a statue, or bows down to God in gratitude for him? But because the Gods have given us the vine or wheat, for that do we make sacrifice, and yet because they have brought forth such a fruit in a human mind, whereby they proposed to show us the truth touching happiness, shall we fail to render thanks unto God for this?[7]

We surely find ourselves faced with men who knew how to say to their own age the words which needed to be said. It is a message that did not endure for only a brief period, but it survived whole centuries and even to the extroverted men of today (who live in a crisis which is, in certain respects, like the crisis of Hellenism because they live at a time in which there is a true overturning of their system of values), if sensibly heard, would have a clear message to communicate.

First Part

The Decline of the Minor Socratic Schools and the Schools of Plato and Aristotle

«ὅμοιοι δὴ καὶ οὗτοι τοῖς ἀρχαίοις
Ὁμηρικοῖς, οἳ μικρὰς ὁμοιότητας
ὁρῶσι μεγάλας δὲ παρορῶσιν.»

"These philosophers are like the old interpreters of Homer, who see small resemblances but neglect great ones."

Aristotle *Metaphysics* N 6.1093a26-28

First Section

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINOR SOCRATIC SCHOOLS AND THE REASONS FOR THEIR DECLINE AND DISAPPEARANCE

«Ἐρωτηθεὶς [*scil.*, Πλάτων] ὑπό τινος 'ποῖός τίς σοι Διογένης δοκεῖ'; 'Σωκράτης' εἶπε, 'μαινόμενος.'»

"Plato, on being asked what he thought of Diogenes, replied: 'He is a Socrates gone mad.'"

Diogenes Laertius 6.54
Elianus *Var. Hist.* 14.33

I. Diogenes "The Dog" and the Development of Cynicism

1. Diogenes and the radicalization of Cynicism

The founder of Cynicism was Antisthenes, as we have seen in the first volume.[1] Nevertheless, Diogenes of Sinope[2] may be named its most typical representative as well as being a quasi-symbol of this spiritual movement. In fact, Diogenes not only carried the implications arising from Antisthenes to their extreme consequences, but he grasped them with such a rigor and radical coherence that they became the substance of his life, which for entire centuries would be considered as truly extraordinary. Diogenes shattered the classical image of Greek man and his novel proposals were immediately recognized as a model. In fact, the Hellenistic Age (and in part the Imperial Age itself) would recognize in Diogenes's example the expression of the correct completion or, although extreme, at least of an essential part of the needs of the age. The famous phrase "I am seeking a man,"[3] was announced by Diogenes while walking with a lit lantern in broad daylight. Clearly he meant by this provocative and ironic act: search for a man who lives according to his authentic being, search for a man who lives beyond all exteriority, beyond all conventions, or beyond all of the rules imposed by society and beyond the caprice of destiny and fortune, search for one who has discovered his true nature and lives in conformity with it and thus is happy.

Diogenes Laertius writes:

> [Diogenes the Cynic] announced loudly and repeatedly that the Gods had given to men the means of living their lives easily, but this had been taken away from man's awareness. ...[4]

Indeed what Diogenes proposed was to bring back to man's awareness that easy means of living, and to show that human beings always have at their disposal what they need in order to be happy *provided they know how to accept the real limits of human nature.*

The nature of man for Socrates (as we have amply seen in the first volume) was his "soul," understood as intelligence and moral sense.[5] Previously in Antisthenes this perspective, although it was always clearly affirmed, at the same time fluctuated,[6] whereas in Diogenes the naturalistic conceptions (as well as the materialistic) took the leading position. Indeed the echo of the Socratic doctrine on the soul is heard again: Diogenes indicated the aim of the moral life in the phrases the "harmony of the soul" and the "health of the soul"[7] as well as "physical exercise" itself, about which we will speak below.[8] However, such affirmations were emptied of their content. On the one hand, he emptied them by destroying all the coherence *in science and culture* which, for

Socrates, was the only nourishment of the soul. On the other hand, he emptied them in the measure in which the elementary needs of man's *animal nature* are satisfied in his eyes in order that this animal nature might become the basis on which human beings ground the correct rules for living.

We will examine the first point in what follows. Mathematics, physics, astronomy, and music for Diogenes were "useless and unnecessary."[9] The constructions of metaphysics for him were also absurd. The Platonic Ideas do not exist because they are not witnessed to by the senses and by experience.[10] But even Socratic dialectic with its conjoined ironic and maieutic method, as well as its implications, was abandoned. *The concrete mode of living* (the existential concern, we might say in modern terminology) came before all theory and rational method. Certain behaviors and certain paradoxical actions, such as going around in the daylight with a lit lantern or entering a theater when others were leaving,[11] were used by Diogenes as maieutic means. They were preferred to both intellectual paradox and conceptual weapons. Cynicism, with Diogenes and after Diogenes, became the most "anti-cultural" of the philosophies that Greece and the West have known.

There is clear indication in a testimony which is preserved by Theophrastus, who knew the thought of Diogenes well, concerning the second point mentioned above. It speaks of the preference for the animal aspects of man over the spiritual and volitional as a rule of life:

> There is a story told by Theophrastus in his dialogue *The Megarian* that one time [Diogenes] saw a mouse running here and there aimlessly (not looking for a place to sleep nor did it have a fear of the dark nor did it seek any of those things which are [*scil.*, commonly] desired) and in this way it discovered the remedy for its difficulties.[12]

Hence, it was an animal which pointed out to the Cynic the way to live: a life without goals (without the goals which society proposes as necessary), without need of a house or a fixed residence, and without the comfort or the conveniences offered by progress.

Here is how Diogenes put it into practice:

> According to some, [Diogenes] was the first to fold his coat because he had to sleep inside it; and he carried a knapsack in which he kept his food; he used indifferently any place for any use, for eating, for sleeping, or for conversing. And then he would say, pointing to the portico of Zeus and the Hall of Processions, that the Athenians had provided him with places to live in. ... He had written to someone to try to procure a small house for him. When this man was a long time about it, he took for his abode the tub in the Metroön, as he himself explains in his *Epistles*.[13]

The criterion of life for the Cynic was the behavior of an animal interpreted by human reason: and the behavior of an animal, if correctly understood by reason, revealed that, indeed, almost all the things which human beings seek and make are determined by social conventions and, hence, are unnatural and, perhaps, superfluous.[14]

It is hardly necessary to stress that this resultant position is strongly aporetic or, at the very least, highly ambiguous: in fact, it is not the life of an animal as such, but rather it is ***reason which interpreted that life*** which is the true criterion. Moreover, there is quite a gap between the behavior of an animal and a human being. The abyss is formed by freedom and choice, making human nature incommensurable with animal nature.

But Diogenes was to some degree aware of the difference, so much so that he posited freedom as the principle and goal of his life-style. In fact it is written:

> The model of his life, he [*scil.*, Diogenes] asserted, was Heracles, ***who put nothing before liberty*** (ἐλευθερία).[15]

Nature and liberty for Diogenes, far from being opposed, would seem to coincide. Moreover, the central concepts of his thought express nothing other than the way in which this freedom was exercised, or the means for achieving it or defending it.[16] Let us fully examine these concepts.

2. *Parrhesia* and *anaideia*

In the first place, Diogenes proclaimed ***freedom of speech*** (παρρησία):

> Asked what was the most beautiful thing among men, he said: "Freedom of speech."[17]

The Cynic says whatever he thinks to anyone, even in the most caustic way without any discrimination, whether he is talking to an ordinary man on the street, or to a famous philosopher, or to a powerful ruler. Diogenes's cutting replies to Plato, Philip, and Alexander the Great were well known in antiquity.

Here is one of the most eloquent examples written by Diogenes Laertius:

> The Stoic Dionysius says that after Chaeronea he was captured and taken to Philip. When Philip asked him who he was, he replied: "A witness to your insatiable greed." For this he was admired and set free.[18]

Together with ***freedom of speech*** Diogenes proclaimed ***freedom of actions***, a freedom indeed taken to the limits of frankness and beyond to

license (ἀναίδεια). By this liberty of action he tried to demonstrate the mere conventionality and hence the non-natural character of certain Greek customs and ways; but more than once in this attempt he really went beyond even the most elementary bounds of decency. (The aporetic identification of the animal nature of man with the freedom about which we have spoken above is undoubtedly at the base of the indiscriminate *anaideia* of Diogenes.)

The point is expressly made in what follows:

> It was his habit to do *everything* in the full light of day, even things concerned with Demeter and Aphrodite.[19]

Reproached once because he ate in the market-place, he replied:

> It was also in the market-place that he was hungry.[20]
>
> He loved to discuss and he concluded in the following way: "If to eat a meal is not strange, neither is it strange in the market-place. But to eat a meal is not strange; therefore, it is not strange to eat a meal in the market-place.[21]

But the *anaideia* of Diogenes went well beyond being an objection to the conventional rules imposed by Greek society, as is shown in these further testimonies:

> During a feast certain people threw bones to him as they would to a dog. Diogenes urinated on them as a dog does.[22]
>
> One time someone brought him into a sumptuous house and warned him not to spit. Diogenes then, having cleared his throat, spit in the man's face, saying that he was unable to find a worse place.[23]
>
> He was accustomed to masturbating in public and he said: "Would that hunger could be as easily placated by rubbing my belly."[24]

This last testimony, actually, does not have that perverse meaning which, at first glance, one might be led to attribute to it. It fits within a polemic, already begun by Antisthenes, against Eros and Aphrodite. Antisthenes wished to "toss arrows at Aphrodite," that is, to destroy the illusions in which men clothe the pleasures of love in order to show their vanity.[25] Diogenes, with this intentional gesture, moved to the limits of frankness hoping to achieve his objective, and the words with which he accompanied the action are its most eloquent confirmation.

Here are some judgments about Diogenes which not only reveal the theoretical foundations of the *anaideia*, but define in a clear manner the essentially anarchic spirit of Cynicism. Cynicism begins from a sound and motivated objection to whatever depends solely on conventions, but then in its impetuosity goes on. It radically loses its sense of the limits

and ends in crushing underfoot and sweeping away, in addition to the conventions, "nature" itself:

> He would ridicule the well-born, reputation, and similar distinctions, judging them obvious accoutrements of vice....[26]
>
> He did not find it strange to steal things from the temple or to eat the flesh of any animal; nor did he hold for any impiety ***in eating human flesh***, as this was clear from the practices of foreign peoples.[27]

Diogenes referred to the well-known doctrine of Anaxagoras as the reason for this last assertion according to which ***everything is in everything*** in the sense that the elements of all things are contained in everything, because the flesh of an animal cannot ***naturally*** be distinguished from that of a human.[28] This shows ***abundantly*** the presence of consequences which result from the nearly complete loss of the true meaning of the Socratic concept of the ***psyche*** which, however, Diogenes not infrequently used.[29]

3. The practice of discipline (*askesis*) and work (*ponos*)

The method that could lead to freedom and virtue and hence to happiness was summarized, for Diogenes, in the two essential concepts of "discipline" (ἄσκησις) and "work" (πόνος). The method involved the practice of living consistent with strengthening the physical and spiritual through work imposed by nature together with habituating man to the power of pleasures and, in fact, of "scorning" them:

> [Diogenes] used to say that training is two-fold, spiritual and physical. In the constant exercise of physical training thoughts are formed that very rapidly secure the actualization of human excellence. Physical training is part of and belongs with spiritual training. Sound physical condition and power are fundamental elements for the health of body or soul. He would present evidence in order to demonstrate that physical training contributed to the achievement of human excellence. He would point out that both simple craftsmen and great artists have acquired extraordinary ability through constant exercise of their art and that flute-players and athletes achieve their pre-eminence due to assiduous and unremitting concern. And if they were to shift their concern to the soul, they would achieve as a consequence results which are concrete and useful, because nothing, he maintained, can be achieved in life without strenuous practice. Hence by eliminating useless effort, a man who chooses the labors demanded by nature lives happily; ignorance of the necessary effort is the cause of human unhappiness. The very contempt of pleasure itself for anyone used to it is a very sweet thing. And just as those who are accustomed to a life of pleasure feel badly when they change over to a contrary way of life, so also those who

> are trained in the opposite way, with greater ease despise the pleasures themselves.[30]

This *contempt of pleasure*, which had previously been praised by Antisthenes, was fundamental in the life of the Cynic since pleasure not only softens the physical and mental, but puts it in danger. Pleasure erodes freedom by making human beings, in various ways, the slave of things and other men. Hence it makes impossible the achievement of that *autarcheia* and *apatheia* which is the supreme aspiration of the wise man. Freedom from passions, for Diogenes, was no less fundamental than detachment from pleasure. With reference to it he said:

> Foolish men are slaves of their passions, just as the servant of his master.[31]

4. *Autarcheia* and *apatheia*

From what we have said so far, it is clear that for Diogenes the highest ideal was self-sufficiency, the not-having-any-need, that "autarcheia," "apatheia," or "indifference" to all things already praised by Antisthenes. Diogenes Laertius writes:

> Sometimes [Cynics] only eat vegetables and on every occasion they only drink fresh water; all lodgings are fine, even a barrel, in which Diogenes lived, who used to say that *it is proper to the Gods to need nothing and to those who are like them to need very little*.[32]
>
> He would praise those who were about to marry and then who did not, those who intended to begin a sea voyage and then did not, those who were going into politics and then backed off, those who wanted to start a family and then did not do so, and those who prepared to live with the powerful and then refrained from going.[33]
>
> One time seeing a child drinking out of his hands, he threw away his cup from his knapsack saying: "A child has given me a lesson in simplicity." He also threw away his bowl when he saw a child who had broken his bowl take the lentils in the hollow part of a piece of bread.[34]

But the meaning of Diogenes's notion of *autarcheia* is expressed better than in any other way in the following episode, which is truly astonishing and emblematic:

> Once while Diogenes was sunning himself in the Kraneus, Alexander stood over him and said: "Ask of me whatever you wish." And Diogenes replied: "Leave me to my sun."[35]

In the presence of the enormous power of Alexander, Diogenes did not acknowledge anything that it could give him. He was sufficiently happy

with the sun, the most natural thing at the disposal of everyone, or better, he was satisfied in the profound conviction that Alexander's power was useless, since happiness comes from within a man and not from without him.

Also his objection to the institution of marriage and his substitution for it of the free cohabitation of men and women was undoubtedly connected to his frustrated desire for autarchic independence:

> Diogenes was asked at what age it was best to marry. He replied to the question in this way: "When you are a young man not yet, and when you are an old man never at all."[36]
>
> He acknowledged wives held in common, recognizing no marriage but the mutually agreed upon coming together of man and woman. Consequently, he also thought that sons should be held in common.[37]

Naturally the Cynic sage did not have any need for a city or for a state. As a matter of fact Diogenes, while acknowledging the usefulness of an ordered community called the city-state,[38] maintained that the only authentic commonwealth is that which is as wide as the universe itself and, hence, he proclaimed that he was a "citizen of the world."[39]

Finally, Diogenes maintained that the sage has no need of divine assistance, nor of an extraterrestrial reward; he need only believe that divinity exists and that "everything is filled with his presence."[40]

It is clear that, on the basis of these convictions, Diogenes, in order to live, would have to ask from others whatever he needed and even to beg for it. But he did not ask for his necessities with humility but with boldness and even with arrogance, as though those he asked owed it to him:

> Being in need of money, he spoke to his friends saying that he was not asking for a hand-out but the *return of what properly* belonged to him.[41]

Moreover he justified his attitude with this line of reasoning:

> Everything belongs to the Gods; the wise are friends of the Gods; the goods of friends are held in common. Therefore all things belong to the wise.[42]

Perhaps from the beginning Diogenes adopted the term "dog," for purposes of self-definition. Diogenes was proud of this epithet by which his enemies singled him out for contempt, and explained that he was called a dog for these reasons:

> I wag my tail joyfully for those who give me anything, I bark at those who give nothing, and I bite the rascals.[43]

He was questioned about what breed of dog he was and he explained it as follows:

> When I am hungry I am Maltese, when I am satisfied I am a Molossian, of these breeds hence which most people praise, but with which nevertheless they do not possess the courage to go hunting through fear of the work involved. So neither can you live with me, because you are afraid of suffering.[44]

5. Diogenes and the Hellenistic Age

Diogenes was a spokesman for many of the attitudes of the Hellenistic Age even if, as we have seen, in a one-sided way. However, his contemporaries understood this and they erected, as is told, like a funerary monument, a pillar which supported a dog made of Parian marble with the inscription:

> Even bronze gives in to time and age, but your glory, Diogenes, will remain intact for all eternity, because you alone taught mortal men the doctrine that *life is enough in and of itself* and you showed the easiest way to live.[45]

The life of self-sufficiency: here is the message which human beings of the Hellenistic Age were drawn to through Diogenes and they conceived and deepened it in various ways. Even in the Imperial Age thoughtful men continued to be attracted by this message: men such as Dion of Prusa [*viz.*, Chrysostom], Plutarch, Epictetus, and the Emperor Julian manifested great interest in and esteem for Diogenes. The most lively presentation of Diogenes and his thought arose precisely in the Imperial Age. It is found in Lucian of Samosato (second century CE), who in his famous and indeed quite polemical *Philosophies for Sale* showed a solid understanding of the Cynic message. He used the literary form established and popularized by the Cynics, grasping and expressing the spiritual key to our philosopher in an effective way. A reading of the amusing dialogue of Lucian would better confirm what we have said here about our philosopher.

> *Hermes*: You with the knapsack and sleeveless tunic, come and walk around the room. I am selling a virile philosophy, a life which is the best and most courageous, a life of freedom: who wants to buy?
>
> *Buyer*: Hey auctioneer, what are you saying? Are you selling a free-man?
>
> *Hermes*: Yes, I am.
>
> *Buyer*: Aren't you afraid that you will be charged with selling him as a slave, or even summoned to the Areopagus?

Hermes: He doesn't mind being sold, because he thinks that he is totally free.

Buyer: What can be made of someone who is so filthy, ragged, and poor? Maybe he can be made to hoe the earth or carry water?

Hermes: You can also make him into a doorman who would be more faithful than a dog. In fact: he is everything a dog is even to the name.

Buyer: What country is he from and what does he know?

Hermes: Ask him; it's better that way.

Buyer: I am afraid of his sullen, hard-dog look; if I go near him he might bark or even bite me: Look, he has a big stick and his brow is furrowed and he is scowling in a threatening and angry way.

Hermes: Relax; he is a domesticated dog.

Buyer: First tell me, friend, where do you come from?

Diogenes: From everywhere.

Buyer: What do you mean?

Diogenes: That I am a citizen of the world.

Buyer: Whom do you follow?

Diogenes: Heracles.

Buyer: Why don't you put on a lion's skin? You already have the club.

Diogenes: This cloak is my lion-skin. Like Heracles I make war on pleasures; not like a conscript but as a volunteer whose task is to clean up human life.

Buyer: Terrific business! But what do you really know and what is your business?

Diogenes: I am a liberator of men, the physician of their passions: in short, I am the prophet of truth and plain-speaking.

Buyer: Very good, O prophet: and if I buy you what kind of training will you give me?

Diogenes: If I take you on as a trainee, you will be divested of your luxuries, I will immerse you in poverty, and in this cloak. I will oblige you to labor, to be fatigued, to sleep on the ground, to drink water, to eat any food that is there. If you have some money and you want to listen to me, throw it into the sea. Give no thought to wife, children, or country, they will be as nothing to you: leave your father's house, live in a tomb, or an abandoned tower, or even in a barrel. Carry a knapsack full of lupins, and a notebook crowded with writing; and under these conditions you will say that you are happier than the Great King. If they scourge you or torture you, you will say that it is no great pain.

Buyer: What are you talking about? No pain when I am scourged? I do not have skin like the shell of a turtle or a crab.

Diogenes: You will follow the maxim of Euripides, with a slight revision.

Buyer: What maxim?

Diogenes: Your heart will suffer, true; but not your tongue. The characteristics that you ought to have are these: be impetuous and bold, insult everyone equally, without any respect for ruler or private citizen, and thus all will admire you and consider you courageous. Let your speech be barbarous, have a grating voice like a dog, have a sullen look and walk oddly, everything consistent with being a savage beast: do not be modest, decent, moderate, or blush. Go to the most frequented places and there keep to yourself and disdain everyone, keep away from friendship, hospitality, which would ruin what you control. Do in public what others would be ashamed to do in secret, the most ridiculous satisfaction of your libidinous desires. Finally, when you feel like it eat a raw octopus or squid. This is the happiness that I promise you.

Buyer: Get away, such a life is filthy and bestial.

Diogenes: But it is easy, and everyone can do it with practice: you don't need education and doctrine and other trifles, but this is a short cut to fame. And even if you are inept, a shoemaker, a butcher, a blacksmith, a tax-man, you will become a man soon enough if you show yourself to be bold and impudent and are skillfully insulting.

Buyer: Take off, I don't need you: but maybe you could stand in for a sailor or sometime for a gardener. If he is willing to sell you for no more than two obols ...

Hermes: Take him, we are glad to be rid of him, he is so annoying, insulting, and preachy. He throws everyone into an uproar, he is a demon incarnate.[46]

6. Crates of Thebes and other followers of Diogenes

The most well-known of the followers of Diogenes and, at the same time, one of the greatest exponents of the Cynic movement was Crates of Thebes.[47]

He stated that wealth and reputation (or, if you prefer, the desire for wealth and reputation) are not good or valuable. For the sage they are evil and a disvalue; on the contrary, their opposites *poverty* and *ignominy* are goods and values because only he who lives a poor and ignominious life can achieve autarcheia, the state of not-needing-anything. Here are some significant testimonies about Crates:

> [Crates] sold his inheritance, for he belonged to a distinguished family, and he received about two hundred talents which he distributed to his fellow-citizens... . Diocles relates that Diogenes persuaded Crates to abandon his field to the pasturing of sheep and to throw into the sea any money that he had.... He was persevering in his resolve, not allowing his parents to sway him when they came to visit him, and he would drive them away with a stick. Demetrius of Magnesia tells a story that he consigned his money to a banker on condition that if his sons turned out to be ordinary and uncultured men they would receive their money, but if they became philosophers it was to be given to the people; because his sons, if they were dedicated to a philosophical life, would have need of nothing.[48]

Further on Diogenes writes:

> *Ignominy* and *poverty* he declared to be his country, which Fortune could never take captive. He was, he said, a fellow-citizen of Diogenes, who defied all the plots of envy.[49]

Besides living in poverty and ignominy, Cynics, for both Crates and Diogenes, must also be stateless: the city-state, in fact, was only an apparent and perishable benefit, since it could be at any moment destroyed and could not offer the sage that secure refuge which he needed to be happy:

> When Alexander asked him if he would like his native city reconstructed, he replied: "What purpose would that serve? It would be nothing but an opportunity for another Alexander to destroy it!"[50]

And here is an even more explicit passage from one of his tragedies:

> My country has not one tower nor one roof, but where it is possible to live well, in every place in the universe, there is my city, there is my home.[51]

Crates must have repeatedly and specifically denounced the vanity of the goods of the world and ripped through the delusions (τῦφος) in which they are wrapped.

He says in a fragment come down to us:

> The goods of the world are full of delusions (τῦφος).[52]

Much later the emperor Marcus Aurelius, in exposing the vanity of things, again appealed to Crates:

> When we have meat before us and other edibles we receive the impression that this is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this [esteemed] Falernian [wine] is only a little grape juice; and this purple robe some sheep's

> wool dyed with the blood of a shell-fish. Such then are these impressions, and they reach the things themselves and penetrate them and so we see what kinds of things they are. Just in the same way ought we to act all through life, and where there are things which appear most worthy of our approbation we ought to lay them bare and look at their worthlessness and strip them of all the words by which they are exalted. For outward show is a wonderful perverter of the reason, and when you are most sure that you are employed about things worth your pains it is then that it cheats you most. Consider then what Crates says of Xenocrates himself.[53]

The exact words of Xenocrates are not known to us, but from the tenor of the passage, however modified by the Neostoicism of Marcus Aurelius, the sense of the denunciation that Crates made about the "outward show of things" can be extracted. Therefore, even the reply which Crates gave to the question about the advantages which accrue from philosophy is very clear:

> A quart of lupins and to care for nothing.[54]

"A quart of lupins" means the bare necessities of life, and "to care for nothing (τὸ μηδενὸς μέλειν)" means to be concerned and to be content with the bare necessities of life and consider everything else as vain and useless.

It seems, in addition, that Crates was expressly arguing against hedonism, maintaining the view that no life could be happy if happiness were identical with pleasure. In fact, he used to argue that in no stage of man's life does pleasure outweigh pain and the total balance of every human life always registers more pain than pleasure.[55]

In particular then, he, as well as his predecessors, proclaimed the necessity of avoiding the pleasures of Eros, which, more than any others, disturb the impassivity of the sage and, with incredible sarcasm, he writes in one of his couplets:

> Hunger calms love [eros], if not, time; if nothing can be obtained from these two remedies, a garrote.[56]

The Cynics, as we have previously said, objected to the institution of matrimony, or rather of marriage as it was traditionally conceived. Crates instead married, but with a woman named Hipparchia who had embraced the ideas and life of Cynicism and succeeded, consequently, in living a true and authentic "Cynic marriage," a marriage, that is, which overturned all the values which society imposed legally on marriage. Diogenes Laertius writes:

> Hipparchia too, sister of Metrocles, was attracted by the doctrines of

> this school. Both were born at Maroneia. She became enamored of the theories and the life-style of Crates and scorned all her suitors. She was indifferent to their wealth, origins, and good looks: for her Crates was everything. She would threaten her parents with her suicide if she were not given to him in marriage. Crates then was asked by her parents to dissuade the girl from her plan and he tried in every way. In the end, because he could not manage it, he got up and took off all his clothes and said: "Here is your spouse, here are his possessions; make your choice thereupon. For you will not be my spouse unless you adopt my way of life." The young woman made her choice instantly and adopted the same mode of dress and went around with her husband and lived with him in public and went out to dinners with him.[57]

But that this "Cynic marriage" was only a confirmation of the school's teachings, and a total disvaluation of the institution of marriage on the part of Crates, is confirmed by two episodes in which the Cynic ideal of *anaideia* was taken to extreme limits: taking his son, as soon as he came of age, into a brothel he told him "that was how his father married";[58] and he gave his daughter "in a trial marriage of thirty days."[59]

Cynicism with Crates had taken on a warm humanity and philanthropy which was totally absent from the Cynicism of Antisthenes and Diogenes. He was always ready to give good advice to whomever was in need of it; in fact he often did not even wait for people to come and ask him, but on his own initiative he would go to those who needed him. Because of his affable manner and the wisdom of his advice, no doors were closed to him, so that he was nicknamed the "Door-opener" (θυρεπανοίκτης).

Here is some significant testimony. Diogenes Laertius writes:

> He was also called "the Door-opener" because he entered into every house to give good advice.[60]

Apuleius writes:

> Crates, the follower of Diogenes, was venerated by his Athenian contemporaries as a tutelary God of the home: no home remained closed to him, for however much the place would be secluded in which the head of the family was found, Crates used to enter at the right moment as arbiter and judge of all the quarrels and domestic strife.[61]

In Plutarch we read:

> The philosopher Crates, who used to go into every house, was received with honor and goodwill and he was called the "Door-opener."[62]

The emperor Julian later said that:

> He used to enter the houses of his friends, without being invited or otherwise called, in order to reconcile members of a family, even if it was apparent that they were deeply at odds. He would not reprove them harshly, but in a soothing way, in a manner which was non-accusatory towards those whom he was correcting, because he wished to be of service to them as well as to those who were just listening.[63]

Crates's sentiment of warm humanity, total availability towards others, and philanthropy, however, did not derive from the principles of Cynicism (which lead, rather, to individualism and to misanthropy), but it came from his temperament and character which by nature were very serene. Plutarch writes:

> Crates, with his knapsack and coat, spent his life laughing and celebrating as though at a festival.[64]

The following prayer (which is evidently based on the prayer of Solon) expresses perfectly the fundamental appeal of our philosopher and the spirit which animated him:

> O Mnemosyne, O Olympian Zeus's dazzling progeny,
> Muses of Pieria, listen to my prayer:
> give frequently bread for my stomach and give it
> without slavery which makes life miserable....
> Give me something useful, not pleasing to my friends.
> I do not want magnificent riches,
> the happiness of a beetle, the abundance and riches of the ant,
> but I want a share in justice and to have portable riches,
> justly acquired, of value for the exercise of virtue.
> If I were to obtain these things, Hermes and the chaste Muse, I would be content
> not with wasteful luxury, but with the health of virtue.[65]

Among the pupils of Diogenes, all were inferior to Crates. First we will mention Philiscus, who, according to ancient testimony, would seem to be the author of the tragedies which were attributed to Diogenes. These tragedies were parodies about the classical themes of Greek tragedy and were thus presented as vehicles of Cynic doctrines.[66]

Onesicritus, who admired the doctrines of the Cynics but did not practice their way of life, was also well-known. He took part in the expedition of Alexander to the East and he maintained that he recognized in the eastern Gymnosophists some similarities with the Cynics.[67] Diogenes Laertius writes of him:

> His [*scil.*, Onesicritus's] activity resembles that of Xenophon. As Xenophon went on the campaign against Cyrus, so did Onesicritus go with Alexander; one wrote the *Education of Cyrus*, the other the *Education of Alexander*; the one was written in praise of Cyrus, the other of Alexander. Even the manner and style were not dissimilar, but obviously the imitation is inferior to the original.[68]

Monimus[69] was a disciple of Diogenes and Crates who acquired a kind of notoriety, so much so that the comedic writer Menander mentions him and attributes to him the maxim:

> All human thought is useless.[70]

He composed some *Poetic Trifles* (παίγνια), like Crates, in which he mixes the serious and the jocund (which will remain characteristic and typical of Cynic literature).

Finally, we mention Metrocles, who was a brother of Hipparchia (and hence a brother-in-law of Crates),[71] with whom Cynicism took on a decisively pessimistic tone, in clear contrast with the serene optimism of Crates. We are told that Metrocles burned his own writings, exclaiming:

> These are phantoms of the dreams of the world beyond.[72]

It is also written that he died a suicide, by hanging himself.[73]

7. Cynicism up to the end of the Pagan Era

The power and the capacity of the dissemination of Cynicism are based, in large part, on the endowments of temperament and character of the men who professed it. In particular, it is based on the exceptional vigor with which they translated their thought into the substance of their life and their manner of living into a paradigm, that is, as a manifestation of the union of the ideal and the real. It is evident, hence, that only men of extraordinary personality such as Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates would have been able to guarantee the result; but it is likewise clear that men of such moral fiber and intelligence could not but be rather rare and that, if missing, Cynicism would slowly languish and consequently even become contaminated.

Moreover, it should be stressed, both from the point of view of the doctrine and from the point of view of living, that with Diogenes and Crates Cynicism was pushed to the extreme limits, beyond which there was no hope of further development. The later Cynics after Crates, consequently, had no possibilities to develop other than these: either to hold on firmly to the positions of Diogenes and Crates, or to reject them. The explanation of why the second alternative would become almost inevitable is because the positions of Diogenes and Crates were extremes and, as such, difficult to maintain.

Throughout the third century a certain number of thinkers who professed the Cynic doctrine are mentioned: Bion of Borysthenes,[74] Menippus of Gadara,[75] Cercidas of Megalopolis,[76] Teles of Megara,[77] Menedemus.[78] In all of them the tendency to soften both the doctrine and its actual living, precisely in regard to its more specific traits, is clearly recognizable.

However, in their attitude toward the benefits of the goods of fortune and of wealth, we stress that Crates was even more moderate than Diogenes. He, as we have seen, sold his possessions and renounced his patrimony, but he did not accept the condition of a beggar and he recognized the necessity for the minimal possession of material goods.[79] Bion would seem to be clearly inconsistent with the principles; and with the maxim "the goods of friends are held in common" he concealed his abuses.[80] Menippus, if the report which has come down to us is worthy of belief, we know used to lend money for a day taking high interest and in this way "acquired great wealth." This practice provoked a conspiracy which ended in the taking of everything from him (and because of which he hanged himself).[81] Cercidas was concerned in his thinking about the need for having a sum of money sufficient for the basic necessities of life.[82]

Bion's attitude toward pleasure involved a so-called softening of hedonistic Cynicism, but this way of speaking is certainly excessive, yet suggestive. The anti-hedonism of the Cynic masters, as we have seen, was pushed even to the extreme condemnation of the pleasures of eros as something which in the clearest way undermines the ataraxy and autarcheia of the sage. Bion himself, in his life, largely acted contrary to this teaching, as well as denying it in his doctrinal pronouncements.[83] Cercidas defined two kinds of eros: one which was distinct from the *the sexual drive* and the other which was connected to the turmoil of the feelings. It is sufficient for the sage to avoid the latter, because that is the one which compromises apatheia; the former, instead, is satisfied by a streetwalker with a few coins and "without caring for anything."[84] The bleakness of this position of Cercidas is evident. Since it is quite difficult to repress the erotic impulses, Cercidas said in essence that they were to be limited to the satisfaction of purely physical need. This means, as is clear, to give satisfaction to whatever in human beings is purely animal and to suppress carefully those aspects which differentiate him from the animal.

The attitude toward the State and toward rulers also changed notably. Bion seems to have been a friend of the ruler Antigonus of Gonatus and Cercidas was himself a militant politician and, as it seems, fairly able.[85]

Finally, it is to be stressed that the criticisms of popular and traditional religion[86] by the first Cynics in order to defend a higher and purer vision of the divine now tended to degenerate, for example with Bion and

Cercidas, into atheism and in general seem to lose their original meaning.[87]

In this period the productions of the Cynics acquired definitive literary form, which consisted in a mixture of the serious and the facetious: parody was used not in order to obtain comic effects for their own sake but in order to oppose more effectively those conventions and those rules of society which the Cynics maintained were deceptive. It is to Bion, it seems, that the codification of the *diatribe*, which was to meet with great success, must be attributed. The diatribe was a short dialogue of mostly popular appeal and ethical content. It was essentially the Cynicization of the Socratic dialogue. The compositions of Menippus became its true literary models (Lucian was largely inspired by them; the Latin satire of Lucilius and Oratio made use of techniques basically having their origin in the Cynic writings, which indeed *ridendo castigant mores*).[88]

In the last two centuries of the Pagan Era Cynicism languished. There is only one name of a Cynic author known from this period: Meleagro of Gadara (whose activity is placed at the beginning of the first century BCE), who was, however, of little importance.[89]

The crisis of Cynicism during this period resulted in the first place from the causes mentioned above, but they were undoubtedly determined by social and political conditions including the *ethos* of the Roman spirit which was dominant by this time and which rejected both the Cynic doctrine and life-style.

The judgment of Cicero is quite eloquent:

> The system of the Cynics must be rejected as a whole, because it is contrary to modesty, without which nothing upright can exist, nor any moral rightness.[90]

The history of Cynicism was not yet finished: it arose again in the Imperial Age, as we shall see in the fourth volume.

8. The value and limits of Cynicism

Cynicism, chiefly in the formulation given to it by Diogenes and Crates, as we have already mentioned, fulfilled some of the basic needs of the Hellenistic Age and, for this reason, it had a long career like so many of the great philosophies born in this tormented era.

The Cynic denunciation of the three great delusions that vainly agitated human beings, that is, *the desire for pleasure, the attachment to wealth, the lust for power*, and the firm conviction that these lead men always and only to unhappiness, will have an influence both on the Stoa of Zeno and the Garden of Epicurus as well as the scepticism of Pyrrho and will become a "common-place" repeated for entire centuries. The elevation of *autarcheia* and *apatheia*, understood as the essential condi-

tion for wisdom and hence for happiness, will even become the chief moving-force of Hellenistic thought.

The short vitality which Cynicism displayed in comparison with Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism was due to its extremism and, hence, to its basic disequilibrium and its real intellectual poverty.

The extremism of Cynicism consisted in its opposition to conventions and the values enshrined in traditions. *Cynicism lacked any suggestion of positive alternative values* since it pursued practically almost nothing positive in a systematic way.

The basic disequilibrium of Cynicism was due to its reduction of human beings, in the ultimate analysis, to their animal nature. Cynicism maintained as essential (and hence to be satisfied) almost solely animal needs or, if you prefer, the needs of the uncultured man. But for a time, it proposed to the sage a model of living, for the accomplishment of which spiritual energies were necessary that went well beyond those of a purely sentient nature or which human beings in an uncultured state could possess. They demanded the higher powers of the spirit, of the Socratic *psyche*, which little by little Cynicism lost almost entirely.

Finally, the intellectual poverty of Cynicism consisted not only in the rejection of science and culture, but also in the reduction of the properly speculative aspects of its message to such a point that it was incapable of justifying itself theoretically. The felt intuition of the validity of its own message was the authentic and sole foundation of Cynicism.

Again the ancients had defined Cynicism as the "short-cut to virtue."[91] But in philosophy, we can rightly say with Hegel that there are no quick ways, that is, short-cuts. In fact, Stoicism, which more than all the other Hellenistic philosophies appropriated as its own the essential appeal of Cynicism, lengthened out considerably "the way to virtue." But owing to this "mediation" and search for a way of giving a full account of itself and its own affirmations, it conquered men's hearts in a greater measure than Cynicism and it radically supplanted Cynicism itself.

II. The Decline and End of the Cyrenaic School

1. The development and diffusion of Cyrenaicism

We have seen, in the first volume,[1] that it is difficult and indeed almost impossible to distinguish the doctrines which may be attributed to the founder of the school from those which the first pupils added to them. It is certain, in any case, that the first pupils of Aristippus will only analyze and systematize the teaching of the master. Probably in this work of systematization the grandson of Aristippus himself, who as we know had the same name, played an essential role. Here is some evidence (concerning which scholars have at times called attention) which clearly is in support of this hypothesis:

> Aristippus was a friend of Socrates and founded the school called the Cyrenaic, from which Epicurus derived his exposition of the ultimate end. Aristippus had for the whole of his existence a soft life and a love of pleasure and never argued openly about the ultimate goal, but he said that the foundation of the possibility of being happy was to be placed in pleasures. And because he did nothing other than to speak of pleasure, it arose that those who were with him supposed that he taught that the end of life consisted in living pleasurably.[2]
>
> Aristippus had among his many other followers his daughter Arete who, having given birth to a son, called him Aristippus. Those who were called Metrodidatta were directed by her to philosophical reasoning. They stated clearly that the end or goal consists in living pleasantly, introducing the concept of pleasure and movement. They said, in fact, that there are three states of our constitution, one by which we are sad, like a storm on the sea; another by which we enjoy, like the rippling of a breeze, pleasure is a soft motion, like the breath from a favorable wind; the third is an intermediate state, because we neither enjoy nor suffer, it being like tranquillity. He said we have sensations of only these affections.[3]

In any case, whether or not the evolution of the school is indicated by this testimony, it is to be noted that the first Cyrenaics developed doctrines which were perfectly homogenous and coherent with the ideas of the founder of the school.

On the contrary, the next group of Cyrenaics broke the unity of the doctrine and even went as far as to worsen and to negate the very principle on which the doctrine of the school was based. The extreme ambiguity of Cyrenaicism which, as we have seen, is in essence a Socraticism which destroys the true Socrates (a kind of lunatic Socraticism like Cynicism even though different in form and substance), must necessarily reach these conclusions. The Cyrenaic school, in its attempt to disentangle the aporias which arise from this ambiguity, divided into three

currents, respectively, headed by Hegesias, named "the death persuader," Anniceris, and Theodorus, called "the atheist." We must now examine their thought.

2. Hegesias and his followers

Hegesias and his followers[4] maintained the principle of the school that the goal of life is pleasure, but they affirmed that pleasure was something which was not attainable except in a few instances and, hence, was not in our power. In fact they even came to hold that pleasure is something *relative and non-objective.*

That only pleasure was good and pain evil and that only pleasure could give happiness seemed clear to Hegesias, *since for him there existed no other values independent from pleasure and utility*:

> There is no gratitude, friendship, or doing good, hence these things are done by us not for themselves but for reasons of utility, apart from which not even these can exist.[5]

But if it is true that pleasure seems to be the only benefit, it is likewise true that it escapes us and that its contrary always predominates in our lives:

> The body in fact is full of a thousand sufferings, the soul suffers with the body and is subject to disturbances and fortune renders vain much of what we hoped for. ...[6]

Neither can we say that wealth produces pleasure, given that it is enjoyed when it is enjoyed by either the rich or the poor. According to Hegesias it does not even weigh heavily in determining the amount of pleasure, freedom, nobility, wisdom, or their contraries, for the same reason.[7]

In fact, Hegesias and his followers, as we have already mentioned, even opposed the notion that pleasure was anything *naturally* determined in an objective way and maintained instead that it was something *relative*, just like sensations:

> They held that there was nothing naturally pleasant or unpleasant: it happens through rarity, novelty, or satiety that some are pleased and others not. ... They also devalue sensations, because they do not lead to certain knowledge, but they do whatever seems to them to be reasonable.[8]

On the basis of these premises, Hegesias and his followers concluded, therefore, that *happiness is unachievable and that life is indifferent*:

> Happiness ... is unachievable. Life and death are to be accepted

> without preference. ... For the foolish to live can be advantageous, for the sage it is *indifferent*.[9]

Therefore death must not be feared in any way, because it does not separate us from any benefits, but it does separate us from evil. This notion led to Hegesias's nickname, "death persuader."[10]

A sage, then, does not busy himself in seeking unrealizable pleasure and non-existent happiness, but lives to avoid evil by means of *indifference* (ἀδιαφορία):

> The wise man will not have so much advantage over others in the choice of goods as in the avoidance of evils, making it his end to live without pain of body or mind. This then, they say, is the advantage accruing to those who make no distinction between any of the objects which produce pleasure.[11]

There is no place at all in this "indifference" for friendship: Hegesias claims, in fact, that the sage must do everything for himself, for he ought not to consider any others as worthy as he is (no sacrifice for others, according to our philosopher, is worth what it costs).[12]

The revival of the Socratic doctrine of the involuntariness of faults with its related ethical and pedagogic corollaries throws a little light on the bleakness of these conclusions:

> They say [*scil.*, Hegesias and his followers] that errors should be excused, since no one makes mistakes willingly but is forced to by some passion. It is not necessary hence to hate men, but rather to teach them.[13]

But it is the revival of a motive which is not included in the context of the Hegesian sayings.

With Hegesias Cyrenaicism has already destroyed itself.

3. Anniceris and his followers

Anniceris and his followers[14] agree with Hegesias about the analysis of pleasure, but, contrary to him, they admit the existence of other values in addition to pleasure. They hold that these values, specifically, friendship, gratitude, honoring parents, love of country would contribute to happiness. Diogenes Laertius writes:

> The followers of Anniceris in other respects agreed with the followers of Hegesias, but admitted that friendship and gratitude and respect for parents do exist in real life, and that a good man will sometimes act out of patriotic motives. Hence, if the wise man receive annoyance, he will be nonetheless happy even if few pleasures accrue to him.[15]

Anniceris, hence, agrees that the principle of friendship is essential to life, and not only for reasons of *utility*, but also because of the sentiment of benevolence:

> A friend should be cherished not merely for his utility—for, if that fails, we should then no longer associate with him—but for the good feeling for the sake of which we shall even endure hardships. Nay, though we make pleasure the end and are annoyed when deprived of it, we shall nevertheless cheerfully endure this because of our love towards our friend.[16]

It is evident that the values to which Anniceris appealed went beyond Cyrenaicism. In particular, then, in what concerns the requirements relative to friendship, he essentially depends on Epicurus who, as we will see, assigned to friendship an important role.

4. Theodorus and his followers

Theodorus[17] tried to develop an intermediate position; he placed the goal not in pleasure as such but in joy, that is, not in pleasurable sensations (in the pleasure of the moment) but in a state of the soul which is not possible to achieve without wisdom. Here is an explicit testimony of Diogenes Laertius:

> He considered joy and grief as the goal: the one brought about by wisdom, the other by folly. Wisdom and justice he called goods, and their opposites evils, pleasure and pain being intermediate to good and evil.[18]

He rejected as values both friendship and patriotism, which were accepted, as we have seen, by Anniceris. Diogenes Laertius writes:

> Friendship he rejected because it did not exist between the wise and the unwise nor between the wise; with the former, when the want is removed, the friendship disappears, whereas the wise are self-sufficient and have no need of friends. It was reasonable, as he thought, for the good man not to risk his life in the defense of his country, for he would never throw wisdom away to benefit the unwise.[19]

The distinction introduced by Theodorus between "joy" and "pleasure" (and especially the identification of the former with wisdom) is shown to be nevertheless quite fragile and even strongly ambiguous. In fact "wisdom" for our philosopher consists in giving an account in which he is allowed to do whatever he judges useful and whatever he has a desire to do, ***without being held to account either to the laws or to the conventions***. The Cynic notion of ***anaideia*** is thus present in Cyrenaicism:

> It is allowable to steal, to commit adultery, and to be sacrilegious but at the appropriate time: none of these things is in fact based on nature once the opinion has been removed which exists by the agreement of the stupid. The sage should openly indulge in those things for which he has intense desire without any hesitation.[20]

Together with *anaideia*, Theodorus also accepted the Cynic *parrhesia*, that is, the absolute freedom and frankness in speech with anyone, as handed down to us from many sources. Here are two eloquent examples:

> And yes, do we not admire Theodorus of Cyrene, a not negligible philosopher? Being threatened one time with the torture of the cross by King Lysimachus he said, "Make these terrible threats, I beg you, to your courtiers: to Theodorus it really doesn't matter whether he rots on the ground or in the open air."[21]
>
> To Lysimachus who asked him: "Why don't you leave this land spurred by envy?" [*scil.*, Theodorus] replied: "Not by envy, but by the values of my nature, for which my land does not have sufficient scope."[22]

It is also recorded, finally, that Theodorus denied the existence of the Gods, rejecting all the opinions expressed by the Greeks about them, and, because of this, he was nicknamed the "atheist."

Diogenes Laertius writes:

> Theodorus was one of those who rejected all views about the Gods.[23]

Cicero states:

> Also regarding this problem, most men affirm the existence of the Gods as that which is fully conformed to truth and to which all of us apply ourselves under the guidance of nature. Protagoras, on the contrary, doubted it, *as well as Diagoras of Melas and Theodorus of Cyrene who also denied it.*[24]

As we have already mentioned above,[25] the Cynic Bion, too, adhered to this conception.[26]

5. The end of Cyrenaicism

The school of the Cyrenaics, in its first phase, as we have seen, lost in great part the Socratic message, while in the second phase it lost its own identity in addition to whatever of the Socratic message was left from the first phase, even if it meant rejecting the requirements from which it had arisen. It lost its identity for the following reasons. Aristippus had essentially taught that the good is pleasure, pleasure is a positive enjoyment and not the absence of pain, pleasure is the pleasure of the moment.

Now, as has been well noted, "these three views are eliminated each in turn: Theodorus rejected the third, Hegesias the second, Anniceris did not pay much attention even to the first."[27]

Then the complete overturning of the joyful feeling for life which belongs to Aristippus, by the bleak desire for death in Hegesias, the "death persuader," is particularly eloquent and almost paradigmatic. The message of life turns into the message of death:

> Death separates us from evils, not from good things, if we are concerned with the truth. It is this concept which is discussed so fully by Hegesias the Cyrenaic whom, it is said, King Ptolemy stopped from teaching in the schools because so many who listened to him spontaneously committed suicide.[28]

On the other hand, the final message of Cyrenaicism was taken up by Epicurus, who had rethought and made hedonism attractive with such depth and originality that he entirely eclipsed ancient hedonism.

All these reasons taken together, which we have summarized, produced the irreversible disappearance of the school of the Cyrenaics.

III. The Dialectical Developments of the Megaric School and its Dissolution

1. The development of the Megaric doctrines and their characteristics

As we already pointed out in the first volume,[1] the Megaric school was chiefly concerned with dialectic and its eristic aspects. It did not neglect moral doctrines, but, as we will see, in this area it did not achieve results which were important or original. The Eleatic component of the doctrine had the dominant role in that part which was properly Socratic and, consequently, the Megarics conducted polemics that were more backward-looking and almost never forward-looking.

Theodore Gomperz has written about this issue: "If we were to compare the great philosophies of Athens to the requirements of a victorious army, the Megarics would be represented as the sharpshooters who never cease to disturb or upset the enemy by confusing the rear guard and hindering the forward advance. What the thinkers of Megara have always proven to be well-prepared and quick to accomplish is seeking out the weak points of the Athenian philosophical constructions, following step by step with penetrating criticism the journey of the dogmatic schools, from the Aristotelians to the Stoics and the Epicureans."[2] The judgment of Gomperz is for the most part correct and his expression of it effective; however, he does not emphasize a point which is, on the contrary, essential. The criticism and polemics of the Megarics have almost always an archaic flavor. Beneath their apparent audacity and novelty there is, in reality, a conservative and even reactionary sentiment, in the Eleatic sense. They are fundamentally supported by the conviction that Eleatic ontology is insuperable and that dialectic of the kind modeled on Zeno is the only possible form of dialectic and its only valid type.

There is no surprise, then, in the fact that the Megarics directed their polemics especially against Plato and Aristotle, namely, against the doctrines of those philosophers who had established the radical overturning of the Eleatic ontology, against the Platonic *theory of Ideas* and the Aristotelian doctrine of *potentiality*, which provided explanations, respectively, for multiplicity and becoming and which solved the Eleatic antithesis between logos and experience.

Actually, there are two speculative principles which the Megarics tried to defend: 1) that *multiplicity does not exist* (neither apparent plurality nor the metaphysical plurality of the Platonic world of Ideas); 2) that *no type of movement exists* nor, in general, change. Their principal arguments were dialectically aimed to support the first or the second of these principles. It is, however, to be stressed that sometimes (and in fact in some representatives of the schools rather frequently) the dialectical argu-

ments would not be expressly connected to the goal which we have mentioned. Sometimes they would even be forgotten and become a mere exercise in empty virtuosity and, hence, would be mere eristic arguments. Even from this point of view, the archaic quality of the Megaric dialectic is undeniable and in part even reactionary, as we said previously.

The most famous and admired names among the Megarics are Eubulides, Alexinus of Elis, Diodorus Cronos, and Stilpo, who among all of them was the most famous and admired.

2. Eubulides and the Megaric "paradoxes"

The eristic motive seems to predominate in Eubulides[3] (of whom the famous orator Demosthenes was a listener), as can be seen from the seven dialectical arguments that were to be attributed to him.

An ancient comic writer has said of him:

> Eubulides the Eristic, who proposed sophistic horns [*scil.*, dilemmas] and confounded the orators with false and pompous arguments, is gone with the vulgar and useless chatter of Demosthenes.[4]

These arguments have already been given the following names in antiquity: 1) the *Liar*, 2) the *Disguised One*, 3) the *Electra*, 4) the *Veiled Figure*, 5) the *Sorites*, 6) the *Horned One*, 7) the *Bald Head*. We want to briefly refer to them beginning with the most consistent ones, since they were famous in antiquity, and some are still of interest to ancient as well as contemporary logicians.[5]

The arguments named the *Sorites* or the "heap," as well as the *Bald Head* raise the same difficulty and they are directly inspired by an analogous argument formulated previously by Zeno of Elea.[6] We can extract the following composite formulation from the many variations which have come down to us. If two grains are a few, even three grains are and so also four, and the same can be said successively for every amount of grains since there is no criterion on the basis of which we can say that there are many grains or a heap: therefore, it is not possible to say how many kernels of corn are needed to constitute "a heap." Analogously, if I pull out a single hair that does not make me bald-headed, and neither does it make me so if I pull out a second, and then a third, and so on, lacking, in short, a criterion which will establish how many hairs a man must lose before it can be said that he is bald. It is clear that these two arguments are aimed, as is the argument of Zeno on which they are modeled, against all doctrines that admit multiplicity (and hence are reductions to absurdity in favor of the One-Good of Parmenides). In fact, the essential characteristics of multiplicity, if these indeed existed, would have to be the quantities of *many* and *few* which, on the contrary, the reasonings of the "*Heap*" [*Sorites*] and the *Bald Head* show to be indeterminable and, hence, non-existent.[7]

The argument named the *Liar* can be formulated in this way: of one who lies and says he lies, can we say that he lies or that he tells the truth? The liar who says that he lies would at the same time both lie and tell the truth; but this is contrary to the principle of non-contradiction and hence is absurd. Even this argument, probably, as the preceding ones, is intended to eliminate multiplicity. It shows that multiplicity and the propositions of discursive logic (which structurally supposes multiplicity) flounder in insuperable contradiction that, in a paradigmatic way, is shown in fact in the passage that expresses the paradox of the Liar.[8]

The arguments named the *Electra*, the *Veiled Figure*, and the *Disguised One* all pose the same difficulty, expressed in a different way. To the question whether Electra knows or does not know her brother Orestes, who was raised away from her, when he is introduced to her as a stranger, one can respond in either a negative or affirmative way. But in both cases one is refuted. If one replies no, one is wrong on the basis of the argument that Electra knows that Orestes is her brother. If one says yes, one is wrong on the basis that she is ignorant that the one standing before her is Orestes. Analogously, if one is introduced to a veiled figure of his father and is asked if he knows or does not know his father, the answerer can be refuted whatever he answers. If he says yes, he is refuted on the basis that the one who is introduced, insofar as he is veiled, cannot be known for who he is. If he says no, the one who proposes says that it is impossible that he does not know his own father. Here it is clear that the structure of the argument plays on the ambiguity of the meanings of the term *to know* (in order to avoid the two paradoxes, it is sufficient to make use of the verb "recognize" to see clearly that one of the two meanings in which the same verb "to know" was used is involved); however, it does not seem to have the aim of refuting a pluralistic ontology.[9]

The argument named the *Horned One* is even more captious. The questioner asks if someone has or has not lost his horns and they are permitted only to respond with "yes" or "no." If they respond with "yes," then it is objected that they had them previously; if the answer is instead "no," then it is objected that they still have them (and that, hence, they were or still are horned).[10]

Eubulides, with these arguments, clearly aimed at a display of virtuosity for clearly eristic motives, exactly as the Sophists described by Plato did in the *Euthydemus*.[11]

His follower Alexinus, who the ancients tell us was "enamored of controversy," was thought even to deserve the nickname of Elenxinus, which by a slight modification of his real name came to express his mode of arguing (Ἐλεγξῖνος from ἔλεγχος, which means refutation), and the craving for controversy which distinguished him.[12]

3. Diodorus Cronos and the polemic against the Aristotelian notion of "potency"

Diodorus, nicknamed "Cronos,"[13] was indeed a formidable dialectician. But his arguments reveal a greater seriousness and consistency compared to those of Eubulides. They reveal especially an awareness of the theoretical warrant for the objective that he wished to destroy, which consists in the negation of becoming in all its various forms.

Naturally, in order to defend anew this Eleatic thesis (the most typical of the Eleatic theses), he had to take into account Aristotle, who more than any other philosopher had contributed to its demise by using to advantage the categories of *potency* and *act*. Every form of becoming is impossible, said the Eleatics, because all forms of becoming presuppose a passage from *not-being* to being (or conversely). But as not-being does not exist, so neither does becoming. Aristotle in refutation shows that the Eleatic position leads to these absurd consequences. Because it conceives being in a monolithic way as a mere actuality always and everywhere realized while being is, on the contrary, also *potential* or *possible* (the potential is not absolute not-being, but not-being-in-act) and becoming is a process from potency to act, that is, from a mode of being to another mode of being, as we have seen in the previous volume.[14]

Well then, Diodorus develops some arguments against motion in general, inspired by Zeno; and he plays his decisive game by trying to weaken the notion of *potency*, using arguments already tested by his predecessors, but adding some new ones. We will limit ourselves to an analysis of his polemic against the notion of *dynamis*, because the other arguments imitate a Presocratic form, while those against potency have a much more profound meaning showing that Diodorus had understood perfectly that the Aristotelian discovery was such as to eliminate Eleaticism.

The reasoning which the Megarics used was essentially this: if *potency* is being, then it is identical with *act* (because being can only be *equal to being*) and hence *there is potency only when there is act*. Aristotle himself (who responded to the Megarics and descended into open conflict with them) writes:

> There are some thinkers, for example the Megarics, who hold that *there is only potency when there is act* and *that when there is no act there is never any potency*. For example those who are not building—according to them—do not have the potency to build, but only those who are building and at the moment in which they build; and they say similarly for all the other cases.[15]

Then Aristotle points out the absurdity that follows from such an identification: *a)* If potency could not be distinguished from act, no one could possess any *art* (art is a potency, it is a capacity to be actualized)

unless one were to be found actually using it (the builder, when he stops building even momentarily, would lose his art, and so on). *b)* Nothing *sensible* (hot, cold, sweet, or bitter) could exist (the sensible is a potentiality or a capacity to be sensed), unless it came *to be sensed in act. c)* No one could be said to possess *the power of sensing* (which is the capacity to sense) unless *one is actually sensing* (who ceases even momentarily to see and hear would become blind and deaf). *d)* Whatever is not actual would be impossible (he who is on his feet could not be seated anymore and he who is seated could not stand up again).[16]

But Diodorus was not discouraged by anything and merely strengthened the dosage, by restating the thesis not only of the identity of act and potency, that is, between *possibility and reality*, but likewise between *possibility and necessity*. For Aristotle what is potential is only that which can be brought to actuality and does not (*de iure*) involve any impossibility (absurdity), even if (*de facto*) it may not be brought to actuality.[17] For Diodorus, potentiality and possibility are only that which both in principle and as a matter of fact, and hence *of necessity*, can and will be brought into actuality.

Cicero writes:

> He [*scil.*, Diodorus] in fact maintained that the possible is only what is true now or will be in the future, and whatever happens in the future he said was necessary, and whatever will not happen he declared impossible.[18]

> But let us return to the discussion of Diodorus, who wrote περὶ δυνατῶν, in which he seeks to establish the definition of the possible. Hence Diodorus believes that the possible is only whatever is true in the present or will be in the future. This principle is connected to the following theses: nothing happens which is not of necessity; whatever is possible is already or will be; the future cannot change the past from true to false. But the immutability of the past is clear, while that of the future in certain cases has not appeared and [only] for whatever can be doubted.[19]

In other words, if the past is necessary, it must have been necessary even before it became past. The same is true if the reasoning looks to the future: the *possible* is whatever *necessarily* will be (otherwise it would be a not-possible, that is, an impossible).

There is hardly any need to emphasize that the reduction of *potentiality* to *actuality* (that is, to reality), and hence to *necessity*, involves, besides the denial of becoming, the negation of temporality itself. Insofar as temporality is enclosed in the chains of necessity, the future is, from this ontological perspective, *already determined* like the past and like the present. Hence the thesis of Parmenides is re-imposed according to which being neither *was* nor *will be*, but simply *is now*, in an absolutely immutable present.[20]

The argument of Diodorus was named κυριεύων λόγος, that is, the "ruling," the "victorious," the "irresistible," or the "irrefutable" argument.[21] Actually, he did not in fact vanquish the Aristotelian position. For a thing to be possible, it does not necessarily have to be actual, *de facto*; it is sufficient that it be *de iure* actualizable, namely, that it does not imply any logical-ontological contradiction.[22]

It is important to stress, moreover, that such a doctrine implies, on the moral level, an ironclad determinism and therefore that a human being does not act freely because he lacks the possibility. It does not seem, however, that Diodorus examined the relations between ethics and ontology carefully. Even in him the Eleatic-dialectical component has clearly conquered all.

4. Stilpo and the final affirmations of Megaricism

Stilpo[23] was the exponent among the Megarics who developed more fully a polemic against the presuppositions of discursive logic, which is proper to every form of pluralism, including Platonic pluralism.

The principle of identity alone is valid according to which what is expressed in the predicate is the same concept expressed by the subject. It can be hence correctly said that *Socrates is Socrates, the good is the good, the musician is the musician*; but it cannot be said that *Socrates is good and musical*, nor can it be said separately that *Socrates is good* and *Socrates is musical.*

Simplicius writes:

> Also the philosophers called Megarics, by assuming as evident the proposition that things whose definitions are diverse are themselves diverse, and that the things which are diverse are separate between them, believe they have shown that anything at all is separate from itself. In fact, since the definition of Socrates musical is other than Socrates and the definition of Socrates white is other than Socrates, even Socrates would be separated from himself.[24]

Plutarch expressly attributes this last argument to Stilpo. Only an identity can be predicated of an identity. In fact, if we say *Socrates is good* or *the horse runs*, and what we say is true, we will have identified "Socrates" and "good," the "horse" and "the running," and we can no longer say of any other thing that "*it is good*," or of any other animal that "*it runs*."[25]

To understand these arguments, we must remember that the copula "is" is being understood by the Megarics in the sense of "it is identical" or "it is equal" (*man* is good in the sense of: *man* = *good*). Hence the Megaric logic ignores the achievements of Aristotelian logic and the distinctions between substance and categories, substance and accidents

(between the subject which is the subject of inherence and the qualities which belong to the subject), and discoveries and distinctions which are such as to cut off at the root all the difficulties raised. The Megaric logic is based completely on the Eleatic logic, which admits only the existence of Being-One as identical to itself. Strictly speaking, the Megarics ought not only to have held that the judgments of identity like "man is man," "good is good," "musician is musician" are the only valid ones but they ought to have denied even the possibility itself of a ***plurality of identical judgments*** (***man***, ***good***, ***musician*** are diverse things and, hence, multiples) and they should be reduced to the affirmation of a single identical judgment: ***being is being*** (or the One is the One).

Stilpo conducted, moreover, an explicit polemic against the Platonic theory of the *Ideas*. Diogenes Laertius writes:

> Being quite good in argument, he even denied the validity of the Ideas. He said that when one affirms man [*scil.*, the Idea of man] he does not mean any particular man, neither this one nor that one; because in fact why should he mean the one rather than the other? Hence neither does he mean this particular man. So also for vegetable [*scil.*, the Idea of vegetable] is not this particular vegetable because vegetable existed ten thousand years ago; hence this is not vegetable.[26]

This reasoning means: assuming the existence of the Ideas, any one of them does not designate either this or that thing in particular (the Idea of man does not designate either this man here or that man there) and, therefore, it does not refer to any of them. Hence the Ideas do not play the role for which they were introduced (that is, they do not entirely guarantee the unity of the multiplicity, they do not mediate unity and multiplicity).[27]

Let us remember that the anti-Platonic polemic was already begun by Brison who belonged to the circle of Euclid, and by his disciple Polixenus,[28] to whom the so-called "third man" argument against the theory of Ideas is expressly attributed by the ancients and against which Plato himself had already responded in the *Parmenides*.[29] If we introduced the ***unique Idea of man*** by starting from the plurality of empirical men in order to explain the unity of this multiplicity, well then, on the basis of the same reasoning, we could say that it is necessary to introduce a new man (the third man) who should be the reason for which there is a man and the ***Idea of man*** and ***empirical men***, and then, for the same reason, a further Idea of man from which all of them derive the essence of man, and so on to infinity. Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that the entire *Parmenides* (or at least the first part) is aimed at the Megaric logic and ontology.[30] Therefore, Stilpo does not show that he has understood the answer that Plato had given to the questions arising

from the Megaric school from its inception concerning the relations between the One and the Many, just as Diodorus shows that he did not understand the role of the Aristotelian doctrine of potency in the solution of the problem of change and becoming. For such reasons as these we claim that these philosophers represent the "Eleatic reaction," because they did not go *beyond* the solutions of Plato and Aristotle, but are to be placed *prior* to them.

Some of Stilpo's moral notions have also been handed down to us. He held that the sage is sufficient to himself, hence in order to safeguard his autarcheia, the sage has no need of friends. Moreover the sage, according to Stilpo, should not only be above his needs but should even be at the point of not even feeling these needs. Insensibility (ἀπάθεια) is hence the ideal of Stilpo.[31] Some have seen in these doctrines a precise Cynic influence;[32] others have, on the contrary, stressed that they were derived from a presupposed metaphysical anti-pluralism.[33] Levi writes, for example, that the ontological theories of the Megarics "include necessarily an ethico-religious orientation toward life witnessed by the few, but significant, notices which are the natural presuppositions of the teaching of Stilpo. It can be observed that the ascetic mysticism of positive religion, in order to accentuate the abyss that divides the Creator from creatures (to which are denied a certain reality), affirms that the universe and finite beings that make it up are nothing in comparison to the Being which is supremely real, also expresses a certain evaluation of life, and fixes a determined norm for conduct. With a greater reason, then, can it be said of Megaricism that it also affirms in a certain sense not relatively, but absolutely, the unreality of everything which is not One-Being, Good, and Divine."[34]

Levi may be correct; however, it is certain that, even if Stilpo and the Megarics did present their ethical teaching in this spirit, their contemporaries hardly understood it and considered the ethical teachings of the other schools more attractive and substantial. Moreover, the contemplation of the truth which for the founder of the school was the contemplation of the One-Good slowly became almost a total dialectical negation of plurality. This negation, in the measure in which it implied or left in the background that which was positive which he wished to defend, must fatally lose all ethical content even when it did not degenerate (as we have seen it in Eubulides) into mere eristic.

5. The end of the Megaric school

Stilpo was a strong personality and had exceptional dialectical skill. Diogenes writes of him:

> For invention of arguments and for the sophistic capacity he sur-

> passed so many others that almost all of Greece was attracted to him and joined the Megaric school. On him Philippus of Megara said these very words: "From Theophrastus he attracted to himself Metrodorus, the theorist, and Timagoras of Gela, from Aristotle, the Cyrenaic philosopher Clitarchus, and Simmias; from the dialecticians, he gained over Paeonius from Aristides Diphilus of Bosphorus, the son of Euphantus, and Myrmex, the son of Exaenetus: these last two had come to refute him but became his devoted followers." And besides these he won over to his school Phrasidemus the Peripatetic, an expert in the study of nature, and the rhetorician Alcimus, the first orator in all Greece. Crates also and many others he conquered and finally, together with these, he even carried off Zeno the Phoenician.[35]

But these were the final successes of the school. Megaricism with Stilpo nearly exhausted all its capacities: the ethical doctrines which were taught by the new Hellenistic schools with a different intellectually vital charge and with a different effectiveness completely put in the shade the teachings of the Megarics, while Scepticism (to which nevertheless Megaricism furnished many arguments since Pyrrho, founder of Scepticism, had among his teachers a Megaric), with even more coherent reasonings, used that criticism and that dialectic for which the Megarics were so much admired.

It is nevertheless correct to acknowledge that the Megaric school has mostly been undervalued. Plato had recognized that the problem which had surfaced was a serious problem, and, after having discussed it throughout the *Parmenides*, returned to it again in the *Philebus*:

> That the ***many*** are ***one*** and that the ***one*** are ***many*** is a wonderful thing to profess.[36]

Aristotle, in the *Metaphysics*, as we have seen, replied expressly to the Megaric objections.[37] Some of the logical problems of the Stoics were drawn from Megaricism and Epicurus himself argued with Stilpo while, as we have said, the Sceptics freely derived their arguments from them. But subsequently the interest in this school was spent almost completely. Only in the modern era did thinkers like Herbart, Bradley, and Hartmann reconsider some of the basic problems. Only in the modern era has philosophical historiography shed light on the philosophical and historical significance of the doctrines of the school.

In order to return to the general theme that we have developed, we will say, in conclusion, that the second Megaricism of the "Socratics" preserved very little of the views of Socrates. Socratic dialectic developed in an eristic sense, but lost its own character as ironic-maieutic and for the most part even its ethical goal. The ultimate phase of the Megaric school therefore is more a continuation of the Eleatic school rather than

a continuation of the Socratic school. Certainly many of its successes, especially its longevity, must be due, as we have already pointed out, in addition to the appropriateness of the problems it raised, to the extraordinary appreciation that the Greeks had for the eristic-dialectical virtuosity of which the Megarics were the acknowledged masters.

IV. The Rapid Dissolution of the Elean-Eretrian School

We have already discussed, in the first volume,[1] the rapid dissolution of the school of Phaedo of Elis and the passing on of its heritage to Menedemus and to his friend Asclepiades of Phlius, who brought it to Eretria, which is why the school has the name Eretrian (or also in order to recall its origin, Elean-Eretrian). Diogenes Laertius writes:

> His [Phaedo's] successor was Plistenus of Elis, who was succeeded a generation later by Menedemus of Eretria and Asclepiades of Phlius, who came over from Stilpo. Until then the school was Elean, but from Menedemus on it was called Eretrian.[2]

Again:

> Menedemus was sent by the Eretrians to the garrison at Megara, he visited the Academy of Plato and he was so attracted that he abandoned military service. Asclepiades of Phlius took him away, and he lived at Megara with Stilpo, where they both listened to his lectures. From there they sailed to Elis, where they joined up with Anchipylus and Moschus, followers of Phaedo. Then down to their time it was called the school of Eretria, from the city to which my subject belonged.[3]

The doctrines of Menedemus, insofar as it is possible to deduce them from the testimonies about him which have reached us, are an echo of those of his masters. In them are joined both the Megaric dialectic and the ethical content of the school of Phaedo.

In dialectic Menedemus excelled to such an extent that the ancient evidence says he did not have any rivals "in linking together his thoughts" and that "he could twist any argument and find objections with ease" and he was obviously "the prince of eristics."[4] In this sphere he was largely inspired by Stilpo, as we can extract from the evidence of Diogenes:

> As they say, he [*scil.*, Menedemus] did not admit negative propositions, but he analyzed them all into affirmatives, but of those he admitted only the simples, rejecting those that are not simples, I mean hypothetical and complex propositions.[5]

As did the Megarics, Menedemus rejected the Platonic theory of Ideas, as can be derived from this testimony:

> The followers of the school of Eretria deny that qualities would be something essentially general; they hold that they exist in individual concrete objects.[6]

(These *common substantial qualities*—let us note—can be nothing other

than the Platonic Ideas.)

Menedemus was more interested in ethics than the Megarics, even if he is indebted to them for some moral concepts, like that of the unity of the good, more than to the school of Phaedo:

> Of one who said that there are many good things he asked how many were their number and whether he believed that there were more than a hundred.[7]

He denied that the good and the useful (the physical) are identical and held that the good is knowledge of virtue.

Here is a testimony which puts in relief his moral sensibility and the general orientation of his ethics:

> One time he heard a certain person say that the greatest good is to get all you want; he replied that an even greater good is to desire the right things.[8]

Menedemus did not have any followers who could have continued the school. Absorbed in political activity and even through a kind of neglect, he did not care about the one or the other. What follows was written about the carelessness of the master:

> They say that he [*scil.*, Menedemus] hated the customary labor and was indifferent to how the school was doing. No order could be seen in his school, nor were benches placed in a circle, but where anyone was, walking or sitting, he listened to the lesson and Menedemus behaved in the same way.[9]

All this, joined to the evident lack of originality of thought, caused the school to vanish with Menedemus. The Elean-Eretrian school did not contribute greatly to the development of philosophical thought. It is of interest almost exclusively for the history of the diffusion of the ideas which developed in the Socratic circle and the history of the diffusion of philosophical culture in general.

Second Section

THE FIRST ACADEMY AND THE RAPID DESTRUCTION OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE "SECOND VOYAGE"

«παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν θεολόγων ἔοικεν ὁμολογεῖσθαι τῶν νῦν τισίν, οἳ οὔ φασιν, ἀλλὰ προελθούσης τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι.»

"The ancient theologians seem to agree with some contemporary thinkers, who deny (that the good and the beautiful are in the principles): according to them the good and the beautiful are manifested only when the nature of things is in a condition of advanced development."
Aristotle *Metaphysics* N 4.1091a33-36

I. The Platonic Academy, its Aim, its Organization, and its Rapid Decline

The foundation of the Academy, as we have already said, was almost certainly made in the years immediately after the first voyage of Plato to Italy. The philosopher knew perfectly well that the unusual Socratic method of teaching, imparted in public places and gymnasia to everyone who desired to benefit by it, was necessarily bound to the inimitable personality of the master. Hence it was something unrepeatable. In addition, conceived as it was outside of any kind of regulation whatever, it risked dissipating its own effectiveness and frustrating its own benefits.

Moreover, being different from Socrates, Plato looked to a clearly articulated political goal. Convinced of the uselessness of his immediate participation in political activity, for reasons which we have already touched on, the philosopher had developed a plan of rather vast scope: he intended to prepare *indirectly* through philosophy the "true" future politicians, namely, men who would gradually renew the State at its roots. It was necessary, hence, *to establish a true and authentic school*, a living community, analogous to the Pythagorean brotherhood, that would be dedicated to the education and formation of those who would become members, according to a well-devised plan of study and according to a systematically determined method.

In order to realize this goal, Plato acquired a plot of land and a building that would remain the secure property of the school, and he gave to the school itself a clear juridical status.

Because the laws of the Athenian state were far from foreseeing the possibility of the kind of community which Plato had in mind to construct, the philosopher chose the unique way that at the time would allow him the legal execution of his plan: he had his Academy recognized as a *community consecrated to the worship of the Muses and Apollo, the head of the Muses*. A community of study that assembled to cultivate the highest knowledge would rightly be thought of by the Greeks and, in particular, by the Athenians under the general conception of a community sacred to the worship of the Muses. In this way something truly novel and of incalculable importance arose in the history of Greece and the West. That Platonic institution proved to be a living community which, in more than one respect, deserved to be called, if not the first university in the world, although as we shall immediately see with the correct and necessary limitations, at least a predecessor which in some way prefigured what would later be called a university.[1]

Wilamowitz-Moellendorff has correctly emphasized[2] that the members of the Academy were not students in the modern sense of the word, because they were established as a quasi-brotherhood. On the other hand, the Academy was not an enclave separated from the world, rather

it was supported by both young and older men. Everyone contributed to the financing of the expenses of its activities and must, presumably, have taken some meals in common. Probably there were no written statutes of the school, and all the regulations depended on the person who was at the head. In addition, the ultimate aim of the Academy was not the pursuit of knowledge and science only in the abstract, but also for their ethical and political applications in the concrete.

Only by keeping in mind all we have said above about Plato will the aim of the Academy be completely intelligible. If we keep in mind the ethical, political, and educational aim of the Academy, then what Jaeger says in this passage is correct: "The knowledge, which according to Socrates makes men good, and *that which is commonly called scientific knowledge, are distinct.* The former is creative and can only be attained by those that have a fundamental affinity to the object to be known, namely, the good, the just, and the beautiful. There is nothing to which Plato, right down to the end of his life, was more passionately opposed than the statement that the soul can know what is just without *being* just. *This, and not the systematization of knowledge, was his aim in founding the Academy.* It remained his aim to the end, as is shown by this letter that he wrote in his old age: *Let there be a communion* (συζῆν) *of the elect, of those who, once their souls have grown up on the atmosphere of the good, are able by virtue of their superior equipment to share at last in the knowledge that is 'like a light kindled by leaping fire.'* It seems to him, Plato says, that the search after this knowledge is a thing not for the mass of mankind, but only for the few who, with a slight hint, can find it for themselves."[3]

However, even though the ethical, religious, and political goals of the Academy are incontestable, as well as the absence, at least at the thematic level, of the idea of the systematic unity and organization of all the sciences, nevertheless it is not correct to affirm categorically, as Jaeger does, that "the modern Academy and university cannot have taken their tradition from Plato."[4] In fact, for the first time, as Jaeger himself acknowledged and emphasized, famous people, even strangers of diverse backgrounds and opposed intellectual positions, met in the Academy. Beyond the Socratic area of interest, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy made a triumphal entry. Eudoxus, who was said to be the head of a school of mathematics and astronomy, was a guest of the Academy. We have, in addition, testimony that proves the presence in the Academy of medical men from Sicily.[5] All these people with their teaching stimulated a series of quite fruitful debates in the school which must have been regulated in some way. Hence, although not on a purely programmatic level, but *de facto*, and for just a short time, this meeting of diverse men and teachings within the Academy *likewise produced the concourse of the sciences which they cultivated. The various members of the Academy could*

for the first time hear together these diverse views, their confrontations, and their encounters as had not been possible prior to that time. And, in this sense, there is nothing to prevent the recognition that the Academy of Plato may be credited with having anticipated in certain respects, perhaps in an unconscious way (with respect to the diverse aims mentioned above), that confluence of the sciences which much later universities would seek and realize in a conscious and systematic way. With good reason, then, posterity will correctly choose the name of the Platonic Academy in order to designate an institution in which the various forms of knowledge were cultivated and elaborated on the highest level.

Yet it is true that the Academy, soon after the death of Plato, rapidly lost this characteristic, constantly narrowing its own interests into a restricted vision which lacked originality. But the fault was with the successors to Plato, who would not only not be able to develop the work of the master, but also would not be able to preserve it intact. The Old Academy immediately deviated from Plato, developing only some aspects of Platonism, separating them from all the rest, and thus deforming them irremediably.

The political concern and interest rapidly grew weak until they were extinguished, both on the practical and theoretical level; nor was it possible after the revolution initiated by Alexander to keep them alive. The mystical-religious interest took a different direction from that which Plato had given to it.[6] The metaphysical and dialectical interest of the school rapidly degenerated and hence grew weak in a scholastic vacuum. The ethical interest remained robust, but with little original results. Although most of the interest in the mathematical and astronomical sciences was quenched rapidly, when cultivated they were not given the essentially propaedeutic function that had been assigned to them by Plato.

The great light shining from the Academy, with the death of Plato, dimmed; the task of illuminating the minds of men of the Hellenistic Age fell to the other schools. But, in order to understand the indisputable success of the new schools, we must see in a detailed way how the men of the Old Academy in large measure destroyed Platonism without knowing it or willing it.[7]

II. Eudoxus of Cnidus, an Astronomer Guest of the Academy

1. The immanent nature of the Ideas

Although the astronomer Eudoxus[1] intervened in the philosophical discussions of the Academy while Plato was alive, as we know, he did not hesitate to take up decisively unorthodox positions on two essential points which irreparably compromised the meaning of Platonism.

In the first place, Eudoxus maintained an interpretation of the relations between the Ideas and things, which in the most eloquent way shows that he did not accurately grasp the meaning of the Platonic "second voyage." Aristotle in fact writes that, according to Eudoxus, the Ideas are the causes of things "through the mixture."[2] And Alexander commenting on this passage writes:

> Eudoxus also, among the friends of Plato, maintained that every reality was due to the mixture of the Ideas in the things that have their being in relation to them.[3]

It is obvious that Eudoxus, with this doctrine, tried to solve the problem of the relations between the Ideas and things, which, as we have seen, was very difficult to do in the context of the Platonic ontology. This problem was just stated in the *Phaedo*, and then examined thoroughly in the *Parmenides* and in succeeding dialogues, but was never resolved in a satisfactory manner. But the solution of Eudoxus is the worst possible one. In fact, as Aristotle had already objected, the Ideas, in order to be able "to mix" with things, must be *corporeal*, since the mixture takes place only among corporeal elements. And certainly Eudoxus did not state in so many words that the Ideas were bodies themselves, but he assumed a position which involved, in order to be correctly maintained, the corporeal nature of the Ideas; better, he held a position which showed that, at bottom, he did not grasp the meaning of the immaterial, since the immaterial cannot be "mixed" with the material.[4]

2. The hedonism of Eudoxus

Moreover, the distance of Eudoxus from Platonic ethics was likewise as striking. He maintained, in fact, that *pleasure* is the *good*, and he deduced this from the fact that all beings tend toward pleasure, spontaneously. Aristotle writes explicitly:

> Eudoxus ... identified pleasure with the good, because he saw that all beings aspire to it, both those which have reason and those which do not. And he said that all things choose whatever is convenient and whatever is the good above all; and that the fact that all tend to the same thing means that it is the highest good for all (in fact each

> thing finds that which is good for it, as it finds its nourishment), and that hence what is good for all things and that at which all things aim is the good. His arguments were credited more for the virtue of his character than for their own value. In fact he was thought to be extraordinarily moderate; and therefore it seemed that he did not say those things because he was a friend of pleasure, but that it was so in truth. And he believed that what resulted was no less clear from studying the opposite of pleasure: in fact pain was in itself a thing to be avoided for all things, and hence its contrary must be singularly desirable. And he said that it is at most an object of choice which we choose not because of another or in view of something else; and pleasure is by common consent of this nature; and no one asks for what end he is pleased, insofar as the pleasurable is desirable for itself. In addition, if pleasure is added to something good, and makes it more desirable, as for example if it is added to an act of justice or to a temperate act; but only the good can be increased by the good.[5]

It is clear, from the principal arguments adduced, that Eudoxus was concerned especially with the ***physical and animal nature*** of man (that nature which man has in common with animals), completely neglecting the purely spiritual nature of man, that is the soul, whereas both Socrates and Plato had opposed the soul to physical nature by showing that in it and only in it the true nature of man can be found. Eudoxus came to the positions of the Cyrenaics and anticipated Epicurus, and so he is to be placed completely outside of the Platonic sphere.

The distrust that Plato nurtured for Eudoxus and the disagreements that existed between them[6] were well founded. The scientist Eudoxus really did not understand the philosopher Plato.

III. Heraclides Ponticus, Head of the Academy during the Absence of Plato

1. The neglect of intelligible reality

No less indicative are the deviations from Platonic doctrine which can be verified in Heraclides Ponticus, who enjoyed the great esteem of the master, to the point that he received the charge of substituting for him *pro tempore* as head of the Academy on the occasion of Plato's final voyage to Syracuse.[1] It was only by a small margin of votes, after the death of Speusippus, the nephew and first successor to Plato, that he did not become the third head of the Academy.

Heraclides also did not seem to be concerned with the problems aroused by the doctrine of the Ideas, nor in general with any of the themes clustered around the notion of the "second voyage." Pesce is correct when he says that "according to the extant testimonies, the philosophy of Heraclides not only did not seem to demand, but seemed to directly exclude the reality of the intelligible essences."[2]

First he defended a type of atomistic doctrine, or better a middle position between Pythagoreanism and Atomism, according to which all things are composed of "bodies without junctures," that is, of indivisible bodies or atoms, which contrary to the atoms of the school of Abdera "were capable of being affected," and therefore were able to enter into reciprocal relations in a way that was not a simply mechanical one.[3] It is understood that a theory of this kind renders useless the admission of the existence of the Ideas.

Another difference between Heraclides and the Atomists was his admission that the atoms combined through divine intervention, and thus was the cosmos established. It was a God who, contrary to the Platonic Demiurge, must be conceived as the immanent world-soul. Cicero writes about this issue:

> Heraclides Ponticus, apart from the puerile foolishness of which his books are stuffed, wavers between a conception tending to identify the divine with the world and a conception tending to identify God with a divine mind. But he does not hesitate afterwards in holding that the planets are divine, to strip the divine of every perceiving capacity, and to attribute to it a changing nature in order then freshly to enumerate among the Gods, in this same book, heaven and earth.[4]

And this, as can easily be seen, is what remained of Plato when the world of the Ideas and the Demiurge are eliminated.

2. The conception of the soul

Thus having lost the meaning of the Platonic intelligible being, Heraclides conceived the soul in a fantastic manner, as made up of sidereal and luminous material. Souls, before entering into bodies, reside in the Milky Way and form the innumerable points of light that we see.[5] Therefore, in the conception of Heraclides, the soul is once more a material being, although a star.

What has been said explains well how the mysticism and the religious character of Heraclides, lacking the advantage of the "second voyage," can only turn to being of the same type as the mystical and religious character of the mysteries. Specifically, Heraclides appeals more often to the Prophets Zoroaster[6] and Albarus,[7] and to philosophers such as Pythagoras and Empedocles than to Plato.

There circulated two different versions concerning his death, but they were identical in meaning: he wished, after his death, to receive divine honors.[8]

3. The rejection of the geocentric view

We cannot conclude our study of Heraclides without mentioning that, on a purely intuitive basis, he denied that the earth was the center of the universe and that it was immobile, but he held that it turned on its axis from West to East.[9] Copernicus will record him (together with Icetus and Ecphantus) as one of his precursors.

IV. Speusippus, First Successor to Plato

1. The rejection of the Platonic Ideas

The mark of the extent to which the meaning of the authentic message of the Platonic metaphysical component became misunderstood and lost in the Academy is given correctly by those who confront the discussion of the problems relative to the intelligible world and who try to solve the aporias that it stirs up. In the first place, it is shown in the immediate successor to Plato, Speusippus, who was Plato's nephew, as we have already said.[1]

Indeed, Speusippus did not admit the existence of the Ideas nor even the existence of ideal Numbers, but he reduced the whole of the Platonic intelligible world simply to *mathematical entities*: in addition to sensible entities, in fact, he only admitted the existence of numbers and mathematical objects, approaching the Pythagoreans's position, in this way, in a noticeable measure.

Referring to the thought of Speusippus, Aristotle says clearly:

> There are those who do not think there are Ideas, either without qualification or as identified with certain numbers, [but think] that the objects of mathematics exist and that numbers are the primary realities.[2]

The Stagirite also says that the reason Speusippus was driven to this view was because he did not succeed in overcoming the difficulties which were lodged against the theory of the Ideas:

> In fact those who admit only the existence of mathematical entities in addition to sensible realities have abandoned the ideal Number and only admit mathematical Number because they perceive the *artificiality* and the *difficulty* of the doctrine of the Ideas.[3]

Scholars have usually and correctly noted this decidedly unorthodox straying of Speusippus, but they have not always pointed out its true significance. Let us see it in detail.

When the ideal Numbers and the Ideas are eliminated, there yet undoubtedly remain the mathematical and geometrical entities which, as we already know, are the lowest level of the hierarchy in the Platonic intelligible world, almost an intermediary zone between the sensible entities and the superior ideal entities. Such mathematical and geometrical entities, indeed insofar as they are intelligibles, are understood as ontologically different from sensible things (that is as ungenerated, incorruptible, immutable, cognizible only by thought) and hence "distinct" and "separated" from them.[4] And if, after this reform, the position of Speusippus is certainly not reduced to mere Pythagoreanism, it is only

because of that "separation" that is not to be found in the Pythagoreans, and that he still accepts from Plato, though he thins it out to the point that it vanishes. Actually, the mathematical and geometrical entities are less capable of imparting the meaning of the supersensible, since while they possess the essential characteristics of the supersensible they do retain some qualities of the sensible, like ***multiplicity*** (there are many single mathematical numbers, ones, twos, threes, fours, etc., while the Ideas are unique; there are many geometrical triangles, many squares, etc.). Moreover, geometrical entities imply a space, though an ideal one.

Hence, the reduction worked out by Speusippus really compromises, in actuality, the great Platonic discovery of the supersensible to the point of making it disappear almost entirely in its final meaning. The meaning of the "second voyage" is by now almost forgotten.

2. The levels of reality

The distance that separates Speusippus from Plato is clearly evidenced by the differences and by the clear distinctions in the hierarchical levels of the realities which he proposed. In addition to the One as principle, about which we shall speak later, he also admits:

(1) ***numbers*** (mathematicals);
(2) ***magnitudes*** (geometricals);
(3) ***soul***;
(4) ***sensibles***.[5]

As is clear, in this schema there is no room for the Idea-Numbers, nor for the Ideas, in general, nor even for the Demiurge, who was a clearly teleological entity and, as such, decisively outside of the onesided mathematicizing categories to which Speusippus reduces metaphysical discourse. The ***world-soul***, instead, is maintained, but with a different relevance and function.

But there is more. Plato, as we have seen, had interpreted the levels of reality in function of the ***principles of analogy***, chiefly in function of the categories of ***limit*** and the ***limitless*** (the limit understood as form, the limitless as matter: as intelligible matter in the intelligible world, as ***chora*** or sensible space in the sensible world). He moreover had always firmly upheld the conviction that all of reality on all its levels depended upon a Primary Principle. Speusippus abandoned even this explanation of reality, as Aristotle informs us:

> He [*scil.*, Speusippus] assumed ***diverse principles*** for each kind of substance: actually the principle of numbers is different from the principle of magnitude, and still different from the principle of the soul....[6]

Aristotle moreover emphasizes the error of this position, since, he says, that to assume diverse principles for diverse realities means to reduce the universe to a series of episodes,[7] as happens in a poorly constructed and disconnected tragedy which is without unity.[8] The Stagirite again points out against Speusippus, in a Platonic spirit, that the admission of diverse principles for diverse realities signifies an admission that the universe is badly governed, since a well-governed universe must revolve around a ***single principle***.[9]

But what we have said will be even clearer from the explanation which follows.

3. The highest principles of reality

Plato, in his "not written doctrines," as we know, had placed at the top of the hierarchy of the intelligible world the One, by deriving the ideal Numbers from it in union with a Dyad of great and small (the indeterminate intelligible). Speusippus accepted in part the doctrine of the One as principle (though betraying it throughout, as will be apparent below), but he substituted for the Dyad of great-small the principle of ***multiplicity***,[10] probably because, after eliminating the Idea-Numbers and the Ideas in general, and having to deduce primarily the mathematical numbers, ***multiplicity*** and not the Dyad seemed to him to be a more suitable principle in scope.

Nevertheless, as we have already said, Speusippus did not know how to develop the deduction of the succeeding realities in a unified way beginning from these supreme principles. Domenico Pesce has proposed the following exegesis, which would preserve Speusippus from the charge of ontological disunification. The levels of the real listed above could be understood and explained in this way:

(1) number;
(2) number + extension = magnitude;
(3) magnitude + movement = soul;
(4) soul + corporeity = sensibles.[11]

Then he explains his interpretation: "the One and multiplicity ... though identical in themselves, by acting on every level of reality on different material give rise to successive levels of reality. With greater precision, however, it could be said that multiplicity and matter ***are the same thing, and so only the One remains exactly identical***, because the other principle is multiplicity at the first level, extension at the second, movement at the third, and corporeity at the fourth."[12] Unfortunately this subtle exegesis does not seem to be confirmed by the texts: in fact, it is Aristotle himself who expressly says that for Speusippus not only was the material principle ***different*** for different realities, but that ***even***

the formal principle was different, and especially that Speusippus deduced magnitude from the *point* "which *is not the one*, but *similar to the one*"[13] and from *a different matter* which *is not the multiple* but "which is *like the multiple*."[14] So it does not seem possible to preserve Speusippus from the charge of ontological disunification, and therefore Aristotle can correctly raise the objection that the levels of reality admitted by him cannot influence each other and cannot depend on each other:

> In fact, even if number did not exist, conceding the doctrine of those who admit the existence only of mathematical entities, there would, nonetheless, exist magnitudes; and even if these magnitudes did not exist, nonetheless, the soul and sensible bodies would exist. But the facts show that reality is not a series of episodes, like a bad tragedy.[15]

But there is another point which indicates in an eloquent way the measure in which the message of Plato became lost. From the *Republic* to the *Timaeus* and even in the "not-written doctrines," Plato has repeatedly said that the first principle is the Good: in the *Republic* the Good is the highest of the Ideas, the One is undoubtedly the Good, and even the Demiurge who constructs the world is essentially good. Speusippus, on the contrary, denies that the primary principle is identical with the Good, maintaining that the Good and the Beautiful exist only in that which is derived from the principle, as happens for example in plants and animals: seed is not good or beautiful, neither is the source which would correspond to the principle, but only the developed organism, that is the completed being.[16] We know that Speusippus maintained this thesis in order to avoid, by identifying the One with the Good, having to identify consequently the principle of plurality with evil.[17] But the cure was worse than the disease: in order to eliminate a dialectical difficulty, Speusippus ended by eliminating at its root one of the most powerful Platonic intuitions, the intuition with which, for the first time in Western thought, the Good was posited as the source of being.[18]

Lastly, let us note a final peculiarity of the thought of Speusippus. He not only separated the One from the Good, but furthermore he even separated Intelligence from the One and the Good. Aetius writes:

> Speusippus said that God is Intelligence, which is neither identical with the One nor with the Good, but it has an individual nature of its own.[19]

And other testimony explains that the nature of this Intelligence consists in its being *a vital force which rules things*.[20] The Intelligence must be identical, therefore, with the world-soul, a position which distinctly prefigures one of the most famous doctrines of the Stoics.[21]

4. Knowledge

After what has been said, it will come as no surprise to the reader that the epistemology of Speusippus takes up an anti-dualistic position. The intelligible entities are grasped by an intellectual cognition, while sensible entities are grasped by a sensible perception having cognitive value.[22] Plato, as we know, instead denied to sensation and to sensible perception intellectual knowledge, denying that there could be true knowledge of sensible things, and reserving the nature of true knowledge to dialectic and intellection, as able to grasp the world of the Ideas.

With respect to intellectual knowledge, Speusippus developed certain aspects of Platonic dialectic, which previously aimed at determining the essential relations (positive and negative) which join the various Ideas together. He affirmed, in an original way, that we can know a thing only by establishing *the totality of its positive and negative relations which join it into an organic whole with all the others.* Aristotle writes, alluding to Speusippus:

> Some hold that it is impossible to know the differences of one thing with respect to another thing without knowing every one of these; but without the differences—they say—it is not possible to know any definable thing, since one thing is identical to that from which it does not differ and is diverse from that from which it differs.[23]

This is a highly audacious notion of knowledge which anticipates in some way Hegel and Bradley, as is well known.[24]

5. Ethics

In ethics Speusippus must have shared some Platonic notions, but tempered considerably their asceticism.

He stated that the supreme good of human beings was virtue because it was the good of the soul, but he held also as goods, although inferior ones, even the positive qualities of the body, like health and similar ones, and as evils the things which are contrary to these.[25] He also argued against Eudoxus, who maintained that pleasure was a good.[26] But what deserves to be heavily underlined is the general definition that Speusippus gave of happiness as "the complete system for the achievement of the things which are *conformed to nature.*"[27] In fact the return to *conformity with nature* will become the password of all the Hellenistic schools. Here, in Speusippus, nature is at least in part somewhat Platonic; in the Hellenistic schools, instead, it will turn again into the Presocratic *physis*, and even to a *nature* conceived in a clearly materialistic mode, as we will see.

V. Xenocrates, Second Successor to Plato

1. The tripartition of philosophy

Speusippus was a scholarch of the Academy, as we said, for only eight years. He was succeeded by Xenocrates (who defeated Heraclides Ponticus but by a narrow margin), who, on the contrary, ruled the school for a quarter of a century.[1] With his ability to teach and numerous writings, he left a strong and enduring imprint. It is no mistake, hence, that he came to be considered the greatest exponent of the Old Academy.

It is sometimes claimed that Xenocrates is closer to Plato than even Speusippus, but this would be a mistake, insofar as such a similarity is quite relative. In fact the authentic spirit of Plato no longer substantially lives in the doctrine of Xenocrates. Further, it undergoes deformations which, even if they are less crippling than those that we have encountered in the doctrine of Speusippus, are, however, quite notable.

First, the ***tripartition*** of philosophy which Xenocrates worked out is very indicative. He tried to give systematic form to this perspective according to which Platonic thought had developed. He divided philosophy in fact into 1) ***physics***, 2) ***ethics***, and 3) ***dialectic***. The distinctions were implicitly present in Plato, who to the ***physics*** of the ancient Naturalists and to the ***ethics*** of Socrates would have added ***dialectic***, and would have joined them all into a grandiose system.[2] But the first to propose the tripartition, as the ancient sources themselves recognized, was Xenocrates.[3]

The distinctions were to have a lengthy posterity and they were used all throughout the Hellenistic Age, for over five hundred years, in order to fix the boundaries of philosophical knowledge. The Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Eclectics distinguished philosophical science into logic, physics, and ethics. The Sceptics also directed their corrosive criticism against the schemas and doctrines of logic, physics, and ethics.

However, Xenocratean tripartition in a word did not grasp nor reveal the true lines of force of Platonic philosophy, but rather veiled them, because it hid the line of force essential to Platonism, namely ***metaphysics***. In fact it would be sufficient to reread the *Phaedo* in order to verify the radical break that Plato made with ancient physics by means of his "second voyage." It would also be sufficient to consider the central books of the *Republic* and the immediately succeeding dialogues in order to realize that Platonic dialectic includes an authentic metaphysics, in the measure in which it expresses the ascent from the sensible to the supersensible, and in the measure in which its ascending and descending procedure is connected to the conception of the structure of the supersensible (and hence is connected to the results of the "second voyage"). The schema of Xenocrates ought to have therefore fundamentally emphasized what Aristotle called "first philosophy" and posterity

"metaphysics" and to have distinguished 1) metaphysics, 2) physics, 3) ethics, and 4) dialectic or logic. But such distinctions, apparently, were never made, not even in the post-Aristotelian Peripatos, where they should have been easier and more obvious.

In any case, the fact that Xenocrates included without differentiation in his "physics" the science of *nature*, of the *primary principles*, of the *divine*, and of the *soul*, as we said above, indicates that, like Speusippus, he was not by this time in a position to adequately understand the Platonic sense of the "second voyage." At this time the supersensible was threatened by being confused with the Presocratic *physis* and, in the ultimate analysis, the reasons for positing the immaterial were not fully understood.

The undisputed success that the Xenocratean tripartition had in the Hellenistic Age, which was characterized by materialism and immanentism, is nothing if not a very eloquent verification of what we have just said.

2. The doctrine of knowledge

We know nothing of the dialectic to which Xenocrates had devoted so much of his attention.[4] We have, on the contrary, information about his epistemology which, in large part, changes the Platonic epistemology.

Plato, as we know, in function of the presuppositions of the complete correspondence between the levels of knowledge and the levels of being, had admitted two fundamental epistemological perspectives of "science" and "opinion" or *doxa*. Science referred to the intelligible world and doxa to the sensible world. Plato admitted as truth in the absolute sense only science. *Doxa* was, for Plato, mostly false, and when it was true, it was so accidentally. Xenocrates proposed a new distinction among the spheres of being and, consequently, he changed even the differences among the forms of knowledge. He distinguished three different levels of the real: 1) the realities which exist outside the heavens; 2) the realities constituted by the heavens themselves; 3) the realities which are enclosed within the sphere of heaven.[5] The distinctions resonate with the Platonic forms, but chiefly repeat in a very clear way the famous Aristotelian schema. The reproduction is accomplished by strongly emphasizing the cosmological characteristics of the schema more than those which are metaphysical and ontological. The realities which are outside the heavens are the intelligible realities. Heaven is conceived as a mixture of the sensible and the intelligible. The realities which are inside of the sphere of heaven are the sensibles. To these three spheres of reality there correspond three kinds of cognition respectively: 1) The simple noetic cognition, 2) the doxastic representation, 3) the sensory perception. Moreover, Xenocrates declared that noetic cognition is *scientifically true*,

because it has the intelligible as its object. Sensory cognition is instead ***empirically true***, because sensory perception as verification of the empirical is always true. The doxastic representations, on the contrary, can be either true or false. In fact the heavens are realities insofar as they are both intelligible (through the law which governs them) and sensible (because they are seen, and hence have matter) and as a consequence can give rise to error, indeed, in virtue of the mixture of the two elements.[6] It is clear, in any case, that, for Xenocrates, *doxa* is more valuable than sensations and has an autonomous sphere, which is more than it had with Plato.

3. Physics (the doctrine of the principles)

Speusippus had eliminated the ideal Numbers and the Ideas for the benefit of mathematical numbers, reducing them to the mathematical numbers, as was said above. Xenocrates repudiated the position of Speusippus and searched for a middle way between this and the Platonic position by maintaining what follows:

> The Ideas and Numbers have the same nature, and all the remaining things—lines and planes, until we come to the substance of the heaven and of sensible things—derived from them.[7]

Hence, the *ideal Numbers* absorb into themselves all the reality of the intelligible world and they explain all sensible and celestial things. Those realities which constitute the supercelestial sphere, of which we spoke in the preceding paragraph, are therefore the ideal Numbers, and the other two spheres derive from them.

Since the ideal Numbers are a plurality which as such must be explained, that is deduced, from what are they derived? Xenocrates accepted the Platonic "not-written doctrines" reviving and reinterpreting the doctrine of the two supreme principles of the "Monad" and the indefinite "Dyad of the great and small."[8] According to Xenocrates these principles, in combination with each other, provided an origin (an origin, be it noted, not chronological in nature, but atemporal or ideal) for the ideal Numbers.[9] Xenocrates derived ideal Figures next from the Numbers[10] (using probably the concept of indivisible line and perhaps the concept of "indivisible magnitude") according to a procedure which the documents do not allow us to reconstruct in any detailed way, but according to an uninspired schema that Aristotle did not tire of denouncing as absurd.

Also in the cosmos of Xenocrates, as in that of Speusippus, there is no place for the Demiurge. Under the influence of Aristotle, he conceived the world as eternal,[11] and therefore assumed a non-literal interpretation of the narration of the *Timaeus*: even the generation of the world is *outside time* as well as that of the ideal Numbers.

Xenocrates (as Speusippus) maintained instead the doctrine of the world-soul, which he derived from the supreme principles of the Monad and the Dyad, and he defined it as a ***self-moving number***, which is however not identical with the Supreme Intelligence which, we will point out, is the One according to Xenocrates.[12]

Human souls, which are likewise self-moving numbers, are conceived Platonically as incorporeal, as immaterial intelligences coming from outside of the body, as immortal and eternal. Xenocrates even held that not only is the rational part of the soul eternal, but the irrational part as well.[13]

4. The religious interpretation of the cosmos

What we have said so far does not characterize the thought of Xenocrates in a complete way. He interpreted, in an emphatically religious key, ontology, cosmology, and ethics. We have seen what a massive presence the religious component had in the Platonic system. In this respect Xenocrates is a faithful follower of his teacher, but we will see that this is true only in the letter and not in the spirit, because the religiosity of Xenocrates is by this time different from that of Plato.

First, as we have expressly written, he not only identified the Monad with the Intellect, but he called it Zeus, the supreme male divinity, father, and ruler of the universe. In an analogous way he identified the Dyad with a female divinity, the mother of the Gods.[14]

Not only are the two supreme ontological principles understood by him in a mythico-religious way, but he understood in the same way even the three substances or the three spheres of reality into which he had divided the universe. He identified these substances with the three Fates: he called them Atropos [Inevitable] (the sphere of the intelligible), Lachesis [the Disposer of Lots] (the sphere of the heavens), Clotho [the Spinner] (the sphere of the sensible).[15]

In addition to the heavens, which was naturally called a divine being, the planets were also considered as divinities. Cicero writes:

> Xenocrates said that the number of the Gods was eight, of which five carry the name of the planets, a sixth was joined to the fixed stars that would in that way constitute the loose member of a single indivisible body, the seventh and eighth, finally, would be identified with the sun and moon respectively.[16]

Physical elements themselves were considered by him to be divinities.[17] Even animals, in his view, possess a certain kind of divinity.[18]

The religious vision of the cosmos clearly involves an atmosphere more mystical than rational.

A final proof of what we have been saying is to be found in the doctrine

of the daimons, which Xenocrates developed beginning from a Platonic reference.[19] The daimons are intermediary beings between the Gods and men who act in a special capacity in the sacrifices and in the oracles. They are beings more powerful than men, but less than the Gods, and contrarily to the Gods they are beings who can be either good or evil. What the ancient legends relate about the contests and the struggles between the Gods, their passions, their actions should in actuality be attributed not to the Gods but to the daimons. The daimons are souls liberated from their bodies.

As has been correctly emphasized, the daimonology of Xenocrates has a three-fold significance: 1) a religious significance, insofar as the daimons are mediators between men and Gods and thus have a dominating part in worship and in oracles; 2) a psychological significance, because they are human souls who are liberated from bodies by death; 3) an ethical significance, because the conflict between good and evil is carried on through them both on earth as well as in the celestial sphere.[20]

This daimonology would have a well-known influence on Stoicism and then on all pagan philosophy of a religious nature and, in particular, on Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism.

5. Ethics

Xenocrates wrote a great deal on ethics, showing, in this way, that he was sensitive to the new spiritual needs of the times. We will see, in fact, that in the systems of the Hellenistic Age ethics was the dominant and pervasive interest.

From what little has been written by him in this matter, we can say that he fixed the schema to which all the ancient Academics would later adhere.

In particular, Xenocrates contributed in an effective way to fix the "table of goods" or values (evidently inspired by Plato's *Laws*), the table in compliance with which a human being lives as he ought to live and achieves happiness.

As primary good he places the spiritual good of *virtue*: the *primary good*, but note, not the *only good*, as the Stoics on the contrary maintained. As the second good he proposed the positive qualities of the body (health, for example) and as third good he posited external advantageous things (instrumental goods).

In order to achieve happiness the inferior goods are not sufficient; for this the primary good is necessary. Nevertheless, virtue, although it is the necessary condition for obtaining happiness, cannot give *complete happiness*, where the other goods are lacking. The inferior goods, hence, even though not necessarily giving happiness, nevertheless give to happiness its completion.[21]

At the bottom of this table Xenocrates placed "nature" itself, ***physis***,[22] as had already been done by Speusippus and again as Polemon would but with even more emphasis just as all the philosophers of the Hellenistic Age.

VI. The Final Representatives of the Old Academy: Polemon, Crates, and Crantor

After the death of Xenocrates, in the middle of the following century, the Academy was dominated by three thinkers who would produce a change in the intellectual climate which would make the old School of Plato now almost unrecognizable. They were Polemon, who was for a long time head of the School; Crates, who succeeded to the headship after Polemon, but for a very brief period; and Crantor, companion and follower of Polemon. In their writing and in their teaching as well as in their way of life, they now reflect the needs of the new epoch. These are the needs to which the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Sceptics gave a decisive voice which is more vibrant and true, whereas what was left in them from Plato becomes deformed by the new perspectives.

1. Polemon

What has been handed down about Polemon in this regard is very suggestive in more than one respect.[1] Descended from a noble and well-to-do Athenian family, he spent a dissolute youth indulging in intemperance of every sort, but he was converted by Xenocrates on a day in which Xenocrates happened to be speaking about moderation. From then on philosophy transformed Polemon completely. He acquired a firmness, a strength of character, a composure, a constancy, and a moral perseverance such that he became famous.[2] This incident is even recounted about him:

> When a rabid dog bit him on the thigh muscle, he did not even pale; when the news went about of what had happened, the city was in an uproar, but Polemon remained undisturbed.[3]

The incident is significant, because it states in an eloquent way that by this time even in the Academy philosophy had become a *doctrine and a way of life*, just as in the new Hellenistic Schools that were asserting themselves, namely the Sceptics, the Epicureans, and the Stoics. It is, moreover, to be emphasized that such a story would figure suitably in the biography of a Cynic or of a Pyrrhonic or a Stoic sage. Indeed in their notion of "imperturbability" there is demonstrated one of the fundamental achievements of wisdom, as we have already said in part and as will be apparent more fully further on.

But there is more. Not only in the practice of life but also in doctrinal affirmations Polemon is in sympathy with the spirit of the new Schools. Here is an eloquent testimony:

> Polemon used to say that we should exercise ourselves with concrete facts of life *and not with mere dialectical speculations* in order to avoid

> being like someone who has memorized a handbook on musical harmony but has never practiced it, and hence is able, indeed, to win admiration for dialectical ability, but is utterly at variance with himself in the ordering of his own life.[4]

As can evidently be seen, this means no more nor less than *the renunciation of Plato and the return to the pre-Platonic positions*, that is, to those positions that the minor Socratics had taken. Of the three parts of philosophy distinguished by Xenocrates—physics, dialectic, and ethics—only the last was of interest to Polemon by this time.

And the criterion of the moral life for Polemon, as it was for Speusippus and Xenocrates earlier, is indicated *in physis*, in nature, in *life according to nature*. Polemon dedicated to the notion, in fact, a book in which he must have developed that conception taken now as the basis of ethics by all the Hellenistic schools.[5]

Speusippus and then the Academy also maintained that there are natural goods, that is, spiritual goods like virtue, and subordinated to them bodily goods. Simple happiness can be achieved through virtue, but for *complete* happiness it is also necessary to have the inferior goods.[6] This is a position, clearly, that the Stoics firmly opposed.

2. Crates

The position of the last scholarch of the Old Academy, Crates,[7] ought not to have been dissimilar to that of Polemon, to whom he was closely linked, as Diogenes Laertius writes:

> In life they not only had the same interests and did the same things, but even up to their last breath they became more and more like each other, and when they died they were entombed together.[8]

3. Crantor

Crantor, who died while Polemon[9] was still alive, took up "physics," by writing a commentary to the *Timaeus*, maintaining the notion that we have already seen in Xenocrates. It is the notion that the account of creation by the Demiurge should be understood only as an expression of the imagination of Plato for didactic purposes, and hence that it should not be taken literally.[10] The generation of the soul and of the world would be interpreted not in a chronological sense, but in a meta-temporal sense. This story would illustrate nothing more than the ontological *structure* of both.

Crantor elaborated, in addition, the doctrine relative to the table of values *by also including pleasure*. In the first position he placed virtue, in the second he placed health, in the third pleasure, and finally in the

fourth wealth.[11] In this evaluation of pleasure he was perhaps affected by Epicurean influence.

We must mention Crantor's work *On Pain*, which is perhaps the first work of the literary genre of the consolation which was later to have such a wide diffusion. In it the philosopher probably analyzed the meaning of physical and spiritual pain.[12] This was also completely in sympathy with the attitudes of the new era.

Finally, contrary to the Stoic position, Crantor clearly rejected the doctrine of *apatheia*, which we will discuss shortly, and instead he maintained the doctrine of the *moderation of passions*, as Cicero writes:

> For we are not sprung from rock, but our souls have a strain of tenderness and sensitiveness of a kind to be shaken by distress as by a storm. And it is not ridiculous of the famous Crantor, who held the foremost place of distinction in our Academy, to say, "I do not in the least agree with those who are so loud in their praise of that sort of insensibility which neither can nor ought to exist. Let me escape illness: should I be ill, let me have the capacity for feeling I previously possessed, whether it be knife or forceps that are to be applied to my body. For this state of apathy is not attained except at the cost of brutishness in the soul and callousness in the body."[13]

VII. Conclusions Concerning the Old Academy

After the death of Crates, Arcesilaus took over the direction of the Academy, at a time very close to the last three thinkers we have mentioned. Arcesilaus clearly broke with the tradition *by taking decisively sceptical positions*. In reality, after the progressive loss of the meaning of the Platonic "second voyage" and the rapid forgetting of all the novelty to which it was bound, the Academy by this time did not have anything to propose.

The abstruse metaphysical deductions regarding the theory of principles and ideal entities upheld by Speusippus and by Xenocrates became exhausted quickly through their exaggerated abstraction.

The mystical and the religious expansion produced by Heraclides and by Xenocrates himself from some references found in Plato, especially from the final period, could not find immediate favor in an age wholly turned toward immanence, and which tried to reduce all to a material *physis*. Only at the end of the Pagan Era and with the later developments of pagan philosophy in the Common Era does that tendency find its suitable soil.

In ethics (apart from the affirmation of the principle according to which *physis* is the foundation of action) the Old Academy had little to say. The more audacious and caustic sceptical positions of the Epicureans and Stoics will know how to attend much better to the needs of their contemporaries.

Thus the voice of Plato is extinguished within the very walls of the Academy: only with Middle Platonism and chiefly with Neoplatonism would it be possible to hear it again and to understand it again. But that would be accomplished at the time when the Hellenistic schools would be ending, and especially in the first centuries of the Common Era.

Third Section

THE FIRST PERIPATOS AND THE RAPID LOSS OF THE MEANING OF THE METAPHYSICAL DIMENSION

«... πολὺ τὸ οὐχ ὑπακοῦον οὐδὲ
δεχόμενον τὸ εὖ μᾶλλον δὲ
πολλῷ πλεῖον....»

"There are many things which do not obey nor receive the good, indeed this happens in the majority of cases...."

Theophrastus *Metaphysics* 11a14-16

I. The Aristotelian Peripatos, its Organization, and its Rapid Decline

The foundation of the Peripatos, as we have said in the previous volume, coincides with the return of Aristotle to Athens, and hence occurred around 335/334 BCE.

The Aristotle who returned to Athens after thirteen years absence was no longer the simple Platonic dissident, and hence not acceptable by many of the members of the Academy: he was at this time a very renown philosopher, and was the teacher of Alexander the Great. He was a man whose reputation no one, at this time, could deny. Moreover, the man who returned was profoundly aware of being the authentic heir of Plato. He was unique in the sense that he had the ability to carry forward, in a critical yet constructive way, the Platonic discourse which, in the Academy, the self-styled faithful followers of Plato were moving more and more heavily in the direction of compromising.

Jaeger says it well: "It was the recollection of Plato that made him see in this return [to Athens] something more than a mere outward condition of any really wide influence. He thereby announced himself publicly to all the world as the successor of Plato."[1]

For this reason, he did not hesitate to set up a new school in opposition to the Academy of Xenocrates, secure in setting it up that he had the intellectual power to establish it on his own, just as his teacher Plato had done in the case of the Academy.

But Aristotle was a resident alien, and Athenian law did not permit him to own a house or land. For this reason he established his school in a public gymnasium, the Lyceum, which probably had in its immediate vicinity a building and garden.

Many philosophers were accustomed to present their teaching while walking; but in the Aristotelian Lyceum such a custom must have had a special meaning, since the school itself was called the "Peripatos" and its followers "Peripatetics." In Greek, in fact, as we already said, Peripatos means an *ambulatory* and Peripatetics are *the ones who walk*.[2]

Of course with the first successor of Aristotle, Theophrastus, the building and the garden became the property of the school. In reality, even Theophrastus was a resident alien, but Demetrius of Phalerum, who was a well-liked follower of the Peripatos and who achieved remarkable political power in Athens, caused a special ruling to be adopted by which he was allowed to give the building and the garden of the school as a gift to Theophrastus.[3] The will of Theophrastus reveals that the building must have been fairly large, with a library, a museum of natural history, and a little temple.[4]

It is probable that Aristotle himself had developed the general plan of studies in addition to the regulations of the school. The general organi-

zation of knowledge that he mapped out, and which we have examined in detail, must have likewise furnished the exact framework according to which he organized the courses and lessons. Besides the theoretical, practical, and productive sciences which are properly philosophical, the natural sciences would make their triumphal entrance into the Peripatos, that is, the analysis and classification of particular facts, the thrust of research into the empirical dimension. Aristotle himself conducted imposing research into physiology, biology, and zoology. Theophrastus, who together with his other colleagues must have given regular courses from the beginning of the school, established the science of botany. Thus, at least while Aristotle remained alive, the Peripatos as a whole surpassed the Academy, not only the Academy of Xenocrates, but the Academy of Plato himself, both in the horizontal dimension, that is, through the ordering and reduction of a great number of the sciences to a unity, and in its vertical dimension through the depth of the reinterpretation of speculative problems.

But as the magical moment of the Academy remained limited to the period in which Plato was alive, so also the magical moment of the Peripatos ceased a little while after the death of Aristotle. In fact, the two great thinkers were to have an identical destiny: Plato was ill-served by his successors in the Academy and so also was Aristotle let down by his successors in the Peripatos. Because historians have frequently not recognized this analogous fate adequately, we must help it emerge in detail from the background of history.

It was not difficult to recognize the unreliability of the followers of Plato, because no one of superior talent stood out in charge of the Old Academy. The mediocre attempts made by the Academics in trying to analyze the Platonic discourse reveal their inadequacy in a clear enough manner.

Instead the immediate successor of Aristotle, Theophrastus, was a person of the first rank, a formidable researcher, an encyclopedic mind whose breadth of knowledge competed with Aristotle himself. Theophrastus followed very closely the intellectual development of the Stagirite, since the period at Assos and Mytilene; then he renewed and reinterpreted all the Aristotelian themes and in some cases seemed to go beyond the conclusions of Aristotle. And thus the image of Theophrastus as a faithful follower of Aristotle ended in obscuring the historical truth and does not allow us to see that in the Peripatos of Theophrastus a discontinuity with the Aristotelian Peripatos stands revealed. Consequently, it is not impossible to understand how even with the second successor to Aristotle, Strato, a follower of Theophrastus, that the Peripatos had already forgotten the doctrines of Aristotle almost in their entirety.

The truth is that Theophrastus was only a quasi-faithful follower of the master. In Aristotle, as we have seen, two interests although distinct

lived together; one is the philosophical and speculative and the other is the scientific. The Stagirite expanded his genius in both directions in truly creative and exceptional ways. On the contrary, the interests of Theophrastus were chiefly scientific, and his genius was creative only in this direction. Thus the foundation of botany was his greatest success. Instead in the precisely philosophical area, he did not have sufficient ability to think in a way that was really autonomous and creative. He repeated Aristotle, reinterpreted particular points, introduced innovations; nevertheless, not only did he not achieve something which was fundamentally new, but he essentially lost that speculative energy of Aristotelianism without which many problems fade, and so lose their consistency and structure. In conclusion, the thought of Theophrastus, while revealing an imposing scientific range which is wholly comparable to that of Aristotle, also reveals, when critically tested, a weakness in the speculative and philosophical dimension which in certain issues ends by being almost inconsistent.

These facts are what enable us to understand why Strato took refuge in physics, after the death of Theophrastus, and why after Strato the scholarchs of the Peripatos tended to turn toward empirical science. But this is a gradual shift which began indeed with Theophrastus himself, who had not been able to consciously rework the final meaning of the philosophy of Aristotle.

Let us see in detail the way in which this loss on the part of Theophrastus occurs.

II. Theophrastus and the Loss of the Speculative Component

1. Metaphysics

The measure in which Theophrastus[1] lost the meaning of the speculative dimension or metaphysics is exactly revealed in his brief treatment of first philosophy (to which was given by posterity the title of *Metaphysics* by analogy with the content of the Aristotelian work on first philosophy), which contains a series of problems or aporias without solution.[2]

Though maintaining some of the Aristotelian terminology and certain formulas which apparently repeat analogous formulas of the Stagirite, Theophrastus, frequently without explanation, in this work reduced the original conceptual meanings themselves in a manner and in a measure such as to gravely compromise the original Aristotelian metaphysical system (just as Speusippus and Xenocrates had compromised the original metaphysical system of Plato).[3]

As we have shown in detail in the preceding volume, the metaphysical area of interest of the Stagirite was characterized by four dimensions or components: 1) in the first place, Aristotle had defined metaphysics as a *theory of primary causes and principles*; 2) in addition, he showed that metaphysics was also an ontology, that is, a *theory of being*, since the causes and principles which metaphysics inquires into are the causes of the whole of being; 3) in the third place, he showed that metaphysics was also a *theory of substance*, insofar as substance is the nucleus of being, the first of the meanings of being, and hence the foundation of any further meanings of being; 4) finally, Aristotle had defined metaphysics also as theology, that is, as a *theory of God and of the divine*. The divine is the primary and supreme cause; the divine is the supreme being and primary substance. We have in addition seen that the four definitions of metaphysics, far from mutually excluding each other, are among themselves in the context of Aristotelian argument, in a relation of complementarity, so that one opens into the other and all flow into the theological dimension. In fact, if the inquiry into the causes and principles did not lead to God or to the divine principle, it would be reduced to a mere inquiry into physical principles and hence it would be physics and not metaphysics. If the theory of being was a theory limited to the sphere of sensible being alone, and did not posit the problem of supersensible being, it would be again a physics and not a metaphysics. The same is true for the theory of substance, which can indeed be a metaphysics only if and in the measure in which the problem is posited as an inquiry concerning divine substance. This was, therefore, the speculative area of interest for the Aristotelian metaphysics.[4]

Well then, what remains, in Theophrastus, of all this complex and

multiformed play of components? How has the speculative area of interest for philosophy been reduced in Theophrastus?

1) In his metaphysical treatise, the Eresian firmly maintained the description of metaphysics as a ***theory of the primary causes and principles***, and he emphasized in fact the difference between it and the special sciences, since they begin from principles in order to leave from them and proceed to that which is derived from the principles. Metaphysics, instead, begins from things in order to move toward the principles:

> Things are founded entirely on their ruling principles. What happens here [i.e., in metaphysics] is the very opposite of what happens in the other disciplines. In these sciences, in fact, the parts that come after the ruling principle are more powerful and complete. And perhaps this is also for a good reason: for here [i.e., in metaphysics] the concern is fundamentally about the principles, while, in the other sciences, the inquiry proceeds from the principles.[5]

2) On the contrary, ***the ontological dimension is already lost almost completely***. Let us note also that not only is the complex problematic of the multiple meanings of being and their interrelations lost, but in large part the subject of being itself as well. The first Peripatos, hence, did not understand any longer the full meaning of the question of being: it was the question which Aristotle had said is and was the eternal question of philosophy.[6]

3) Theophrastus also lost the meaning of the complex problematic concerning substance. Aristotle had devoted not only a large part of his *Metaphysics* to substance, but had written expressly about it:

> Indeed, the question which was raised long ago, is still and always will be, and which always baffles us—"*What is Being*?"—is in other words "*What is substance*?"...And so for us too our chief and primary and practically our only concern is to investigate the nature of "being" in the sense of substance.[7]

In the *Metaphysics* of Theophrastus some of the terms were lost which in Aristotle were strictly bound to the problematic of substance, while in the use of other terms, which were also connected to the subject of substance, their use became rare. The same term *ousia* in Theophrastus is given a later and new cosmological meaning, which indicates the substance of the totality of the universe. Now, this is highly significant in relation to Aristotle's doctrine of substance. As we saw previously, it was anything but material definitively organized in its particularities and clear in all its presuppositions and corollaries. It offered abundant material to formulate problems or aporias. Evidently, the fact that Theophrastus did not even touch this problem area shows that his interest is by this time undergoing a notable change from that of his teacher.[8]

4) On the contrary, this work of Theophrastus still presents metaphysics as theology, that is to say, as a doctrine of supreme, immutable and immobile, intelligent and supersensible realities. Metaphysics, for him, remains, at least nominally, still the science which is above astronomy (which is the highest part of physics), because it seeks to determine the primary movent and the supreme ends which escape astronomy. The Eresian writes:

> If...astronomy makes a contribution to our knowledge, but *not* about the primary principles of nature, the supreme reality must be *something prior to and other than the objects of astronomy*. In effect, the method [of metaphysics], as some say, is not a method proper to physics or at least not entirely so.[9]

Moreover, what follows is to be kept in mind. God, even for Theophrastus, is spoken of as *Mind*, *Nous*, although scarcely emphasized.[10] But God is no longer the center of interest for the Eresian. In fact he puts him forward as a dialectical hypothesis, even tending toward the possibility of explaining the movement of the heavens in function of their intrinsic animation, just as the movement of animals is explained in function of their soul, without recourse to the immobile movent.

> In fact being in motion, in general, is a characteristic peculiar to nature and, above all, to the heavens. Hence, even if activity is the essence of anything, and a singular thing when it is active, that is, in movement, as are animals and plants (which if they were not so would be such through homonymy alone), then it is clear that the heavens, in their rotary movement, move in virtue of their very essence; if they were separated from this and were at rest, it would be the heavens only by homonymy. The rotary movement of the universe is, in fact, like its very life. Hence even if the life in animals does not require an explanation or is to be explained only in this way, may not the heavens too and the heavenly bodies need explanation, or does not their movement need explanation or is it explained only in a certain way?[11]

The hypothesis then was left to fall by Theophrastus; but even as it was formulated it is most eloquent, because it insinuates the idea that the immanent soul of the world is enough to explain cosmic movements: an idea which moves in the direction which the Stoa will hit upon.[12]

But there is more. Once having lost the problematic of being and substance, the metaphysics of Theophrastus *tends fatally to be restricted to a form of cosmology*: the causes and principles and God interest Theophrastus no longer as explanations of being and substance, but simply as explanations of the physical world.

In the course of writing about the aporias, never once does he say,

when he speaks of principles, *of what things* are they the principles. Much less does he say that it is a question of the principles of being and substance. When Theophrastus speaks of principles and of causes, he thinks, more than of any other, of the causes and principles that *move the heavens*, or the causes *of the universe and of the world*. Being and substance *no longer are a formally autonomous problem* regarding cosmology. For Theophrastus the question at the core of metaphysics is aimed at *explaining the world in all its particularity, the world as the world.*

It is clear, then, that some particulars preoccupied him: the ocean tides, humidity and drought, the transformation of the elements, the horns of the deer, the rudimentary organs in some animals, the mode of copulation of the gray heron, the life of animals which live but one day, the phenomenon of generation and of nutrition of animals and others like them. These aforementioned problems *belong for him at the core of first philosophy*. And, analogously, the particular emphasis that he gave to the question of *ephesis* (natural tendency) and of the relations between the heavens, their movements, the movent, the moved movents, desire, and the soul become clear. In fact his interest is *particularly in reducing cosmological problems to the criteria of the senses*, notwithstanding the explicit affirmations made at the beginning of the work in which he says that metaphysics is a science of the primary and supreme reality, intelligible and immobile; but then the discussion of the succeeding questions takes that other direction. What we have been saying constitutes full confirmation of the fact that all these aporias which have a cosmological nature and root have a real emphasis and value for him, while the other and more properly metaphysical aporias are for him lacking in weight or are rather insignificant.

Hence, in Theophrastus, metaphysics is strongly "cosmologized" and its field of interest is reduced to only one dimension, namely the inquiry into the causes which explain the universe, the physical and celestial world. God exists and supersensible substances exist, but to Theophrastus they are only of interest (and problematically so) as *causes of the universe* and not in and of themselves.

Metaphysics as an *inquiry into the causes of the universe as universe* seeks their limits, their mutual relations in which they have their reality, and seeks the limits of teleology and of the tendency to the better: here is to what "first philosophy" is actually reduced, or better, the "science of the highest realities," for Theophrastus, at least, as it has come down to us.[13]

Therefore, Theophrastus is far from being faithful to Aristotle, since the foundations themselves of metaphysical argument are what, in his writings on first philosophy, have been compromised.

The examination of a final point will complete our interpretation.

Theophrastus, as well as Aristotle, conceived the universe as eternal,

ingenerate, and incorruptible. (If you wish, indeed, he had defended the Aristotelian thesis against Zeno and the Stoa.[14]) However, in the universe of Theophrastus (even if ingenerate and incorruptible), ***an immense area is void of finality and teleology and hence devoid of the tendency toward the better.*** In fact not only is the dis-teleology emphasized which rules this area of the universe, but ***new explanations are presented which take on a decidedly mechanistic coloration.***

Theophrastus, no longer explains disteleology as a resistance that matter has to form, but rather as a ***haphazard thing resulting from the mechanical movement of the stars.***

In the fourth chapter of his *Metaphysics* we read:

> On the other hand it is difficult to assign an account to each class of things, linking them to their final cause, in all cases: in animals, and in plants, and in the air-bubble itself. ***Unless it happens by reason of the order and change of other realities*** that all manner of forms and various kinds arise from the things in the air and on the earth. As a more important example of these things, some point out the seasons of the year, on which the generation of animals, of plants, and of fruits depend, the sun being as it were the principal generator.[15]

In the ninth chapter, after having pointed out various examples of realities which do not involve an end, Theophrastus adds:

> But the greatest and most obvious example is in connection with nutrition and birth in animals; for there are facts about these which are not for any end, but are coincidences and due to external necessities. For if they were for the sake of the animals, they would always be uniform and unvaried. Besides, one could ask in the case of plants and still more of inanimate things that have a determined nature, as it seems both in respect of shapes, forms, and powers, what is the goal of these things. The supposition that they do not have an explanation is absurd, and especially for those who do not wish to extend this same supposition in the case of the more prior and higher things. For this reason, there seems to be a kind of plausibility in the view that after all ***it is by chance and by the rotation of the universe that these things acquire certain forms or differences from one another.***[16]

Finally in the same chapter, a little further on, we again read:

> But if such is the purpose of nature, it is clearly this: ***that there are many things which do not obey the good and which do not receive it, and this, nevertheless, occurs in the greater part of the cases.*** In fact the animate world is a small part, while the sphere of the inanimate is unending; and only a small part of inanimate things are better off than they would be if they never existed.[17]

Hence, if there is a vast area in which realities and phenomena are not

produced for a purpose, that is in view of a meta-empirical *telos*, but only by *accidental coincidences* and through *extrinsic necessity*, that is, by the motion of celestial bodies, then the sublunary world (which is the sphere of *nature*, true and proper) is entirely or almost entirely devoid of the tendency toward the better. Then order predominates, as Theophrastus explicitly declares, only in the area of the heavens and mathematical entities.[18]

If this is so, it can no longer be said, with Aristotle, that *the heavens and nature depend on God. Nature is almost separated from the primary principle, contrary to the very intentions explicitly declared by Theophrastus in the first chapter.*

And this tendency to strongly limit teleology and to explain mechanistically the facts of inanimate nature and much of the phenomena relative to plants and animals means that the writings of Theophrastus anticipate, in a surprising manner, that which, for other reasons, will be the type of explanation of nature proposed by the Epicureans.[19]

The bridges to the metaphysics of Aristotle have been rotted out. And it is clear why, immediately after Theophrastus, in the Peripatos, metaphysics or first philosophy is no longer a subject which is pursued, and physics will take its place.

2. Physics and psychology

An analogous observation can be made, although in a limited way, with respect to the physics and the psychology of Theophrastus. He raised difficulties or aporias, but frequently did not solve them. In addition, these doubts or aporias, although expressed in Aristotelian terminology, betray tendencies antithetical to Aristotelian philosophy.

With respect to physics, he raised difficulties about some points concerning the doctrine of movement and the doctrine of place, as well as the doctrine about fire. Fire, for Theophrastus, does not seem to be an element like the other three (earth, air, and water), because it does not exist in itself, but only in a substrate, that is, in something which is burning. In general, he tends to exclude any teleological explanation in the physical inquiries. Moreover (and even this is a departure from Aristotle), he tends to provide for various phenomena *a multiplicity of explanations*, especially when it is a question of particular phenomena.[20]

Of interest also are the aporetic starting-points of his psychology.[21] The Eresian accepts the Aristotelian doctrine of the potential intellect and the agent intellect, and he also accepts the Aristotelian point of view that the agent intellect is *in the soul*.[22] But in reply to the aporia, previously raised by Aristotle, namely whether the intellect is always in act, he writes:

> Hence what are these two natures? And what is the nature, again, of this principle which acts as a substrate and is connected with the active principle? The intellect, in fact, is a kind of ***mixture*** of an active principle and a potential principle. If therefore the moving intellect is inborn, from its origin it would act and do so continuously; but if it appears later, with the concurrence of what principle and how is it generated? It would seem hence to be ungenerated, since it is certainly incorruptible. In this case, why is it immanent, why does it not act continuously? And why the forgetfulness, deceit, and error? Doesn't all this point to its nature as a ***mixture***?[23]

In this passage it is evident that, as some scholars have correctly pointed out,[24] the idea of a "mixture" risks compromising the non-material nature of the intellect and in some way makes it a material entity (a mixture occurs in fact usually among material elements).

The same tendency is revealed in another passage of Theophrastus according to which the activity of thinking is conceived as a ***movement*** of the soul. We read in fact, in a fragment:

> These views are approved also by the leader of the followers of Aristotle, Theophrastus; in the first book on his work *On Motion*, he declares: "On the one hand, the tendencies, the desires, the fits of anger are movements dependent on the body and this is their principle, but for whatever is concerned with judgment and speculations, it is impossible to carry them back to other things: it is, on the contrary, in the soul itself that their principle is found; it is their act and their goal; if it is true that the intellect is something better and more divine, it comes to it [*scil.*, the soul] from the outside and is absolutely perfect." Then he continues: "With respect to these last activities, ***it is sufficient to ask if it excludes from its definition movement, why then is it agreed to conceive of it also as involving movements***."[25]

The incapacity of Theophrastus to grasp the meaning of metaphysics is, therefore, also evident from all this, as well as the tendency to restrict the whole speculative problematic to the physical dimension.

3. Logic

The corrections carried out by Theophrastus on the logic of Aristotle were very penetrating and constructive. He was, as judged by specialists in logic, almost wholly effective in bettering it.[26]

The Eresian demonstrated, for example, that in addition to the four modes which Aristotle admitted for the first figure of the syllogism another five were also to be admitted.[27] He corrected some errors into which Aristotle had fallen in the modal syllogism, by basing it on a new judgment about the concept of the possible.[28] Finally, he introduced *hypothetical syllogisms*.[29]

Theophrastus did not radically change the foundations of the logic of Aristotle. He simply took positions which were more emphatically formal, and always less connected to the ontology of the *eidos* or the essence. And with the hypothetical syllogism he was on the way to encountering the Stoics. Without any awareness of it, he contributed actually to the opening of logic, as the most attentive scholar of this aspect of Theophrastus's thought says, to new horizons: "he is not a Stoic, although he did prepare for Stoicism."[30]

4. Ethics

The empirical orientation of Theophrastus is also quite visible in ethics. The novelty of the Eresian in ethics does not consist in the introduction of new moral principles, but rather in the diminution of his interest in the principles and foundation of ethics, and the consequent increase of his interest in the phenomenological description of particulars. In this area Theophrastus showed that he was truly a master: his work entitled *Characters*, which examines thirty human types, is characteristically full of acumen, subtlety, and psychological penetration.[31]

About the table of values, Theophrastus only fixed on things that Aristotle had previously said, stressing some aspects by reason of his anti-Stoic and anti-Epicurean polemics. Virtue for him is the highest good, the good which confers happiness, but it is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for happiness, because happiness requires that goods of the body and exterior goods be possessed. The Stoics and Epicureans are deluded when they say that the wise man can be happy even when being tortured: where there is suffering and pain there is no happiness. Cicero sharply criticized this view:

> Theophrastus... after deciding that blows, the rack, torture, ruin of country, exile, childlessness had great influence in rendering life evil and wretched, did not venture to speak in an exalted and dignified strain, as his thoughts were mean and low: how far he was right is not the question now; consistent at any rate he undoubtedly was. And so it is not my way to be content with criticizing conclusions where one has granted the premises: but this most subtle and learned of all philosophers is not seriously criticized when he says there are three kinds of good; he is however bitterly attacked by everyone, first for the book he wrote about the happy life in which he discusses at length the reason why the man who is racked, who is tortured, cannot be happy. In the course of it too he is thought to say that the happy life cannot mount the scaffold to wheel. It is true that he does not anywhere say so completely but what he does say amounts to the same thing.[32]

Now in this regard note what follows: if Cicero believed that

Theophrastus was not consistent with the Peripatos,[33] it is only because he did not know of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (right up to the time of the edition of the esoteric works by Andronicus, the Aristotle who was read was chiefly the Aristotle of the exoteric works of his youth). We have seen, in fact, that Aristotle expressly stated that happiness, in addition to virtue, "has need also of exterior goods"[34] and that "no one can be truly happy if he meets the end that Priam did."[35]

Again he writes more clearly:

> ...why the happy man needs the goods of the body and external goods and of these fortune in order that he may not be impeded in these ways. Those who say that the victim on the rack or the man who falls into great misfortunes is happy if he is good are, whether they mean to or not, talking nonsense.[36]

But the novelty and audacity of the new Hellenistic schools are to be found in the affirmation of the self-sufficiency of virtue in order to arrive at happiness, as we will fully document.

On the contrary, the individualism of the new Hellenistic schools makes itself felt in the position of Theophrastus on matrimony. Theophrastus advises against marriage for the philosopher who does not wish to be distracted by domestic preoccupations and must have power to be sufficient for himself.[37] The position of Theophrastus, in a positive sense, chiefly on the equality of all men makes itself felt as going beyond the decidedly ethnic prejudices of Aristotle. Theophrastus, in fact, correctly maintained that all men, both Greeks and barbarians, are ***relatives and kinsmen*** (οἰκείους καὶ συγγενεῖς) even if he went further in wishing to extend such a bond to all living beings and hence also to all sentient beings.[38]

5. Conclusions concerning Theophrastus

We have seen that, examined with appropriate care, the philosophical doctrines of Theophrastus, far from revealing the fidelity of the disciple to his master, demonstrated an irresistible constant, a mostly unconscious tendency toward the solution of problems which were solutions of an empirical, mechanical, and immanent nature. Theophrastus the scientist showed in an unequivocal manner that he did not understand adequately the philosophical message of his teacher, even if as a scientist, for example in botany, he stood on the same level as his teacher. Theophrastus had already lost the meaning of the speculative and metaphysical dimension of philosophy and it is not a surprise that even his follower Strato, who succeeded him as scholarch in the Peripatos, limited the area of inquiry solely to the physical and that the successors to Strato addressed themselves chiefly to the empirical sciences.

III. The Other Immediate Followers of Aristotle: Eudemus, Dicaearchus, Aristoxenus

1. Eudemus

Before speaking about Strato "the physicist," we want to remember at least three immediate followers of Aristotle, colleagues of Theophrastus, whose inclinations are particularly significant.

Eudemus of Rhodes took courses in the Peripatos, together with Theophrastus, while Aristotle was still alive.[1] It does not seem that Eudemus was very original; however, some of his changes are quite clearly in the same directions as those taken by Theophrastus.

First, he developed, together with Theophrastus, the hypothetical syllogism.[2]

But what is more interesting is that Eudemus, as well as Theophrastus, made statements with an immanentistic flavor about the immobile Movent. Seeking, in fact, to solve the question of how the immobile Movent moves the first heaven, Eudemus prescinded totally from the solution given by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*, according to which the Movent moves as object of love, being outside of the world, immaterial, without parts, impassible, not mixed with anything else. Eudemus, in fact, upheld the view that the Movent was present "inside the outermost sphere,"[3] a solution which reflects the immanentistic hypothesis of Theophrastus according to which it is sufficient to have a cosmic soul as explanation of the motion of the heavens.[4] And it is a solution which, in some way, presupposes the materialization of the Movent or, at the very least, the loss of his metaphysical nature to the total advantage of a physical-cosmological Movent.[5]

2. Dicaearchus

Dicaearchus[6] is no less interesting, insofar as he seems to return even to a conception of soul not only pre-Aristotelian, but certainly pre-Platonic.[7] He maintained, in fact, a conception of the soul as a kind of epiphenomenon like a "harmony of the four elements."[8]

This means, as was already acknowledged by the ancients, a denial that the soul was a substance.[9] And it means also, consequently, a denial that the soul was immortal (the soul ceases to be in the moment at which the harmony of the elements ceases) and it means, in general, that there is no metaphysical discourse about the soul.[10]

3. Aristoxenus of Tarantum

The position of Aristoxenus of Tarantum[11] was also analogous. Cicero writes:

> A theory diffused in antiquity, and more recently held by Aristoxenus, musician as well as philosopher, made of the soul a special tuning-up of the natural body analogous to that which is called harmony in vocal and instrumental music thus answering to the nature and conformation of the whole body; vibrations of different kinds are produced just as sounds are in vocal music: this thinker has not gone outside the limits of his own art but all the same he has made a contribution of value, the proper meaning of which had long before been plainly stated by Plato.[12]

Cicero has correctly understood: both Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus represent precisely that position taken from medical and Pythagorean sources which Plato presents in the *Phaedo* and which he effectively and vigorously rejected. But this is quite instructive: the refutation of the epiphenomenal theory of soul as a harmony of the corporeal elements was made on the basis of the discovery of the supersensible and it was derived from the "second voyage." It is precisely the total loss of this discovery that allows the return to life of the positions of the naturalists, that is, even the Presocratics.[13]

IV. Strato of Lampsacus, Second Successor to Aristotle

1. Physics

The person most well-known from the ancient Peripatos, after Theophrastus, was Strato of Lampsacus who was, also, the tutor of Ptolemy II at Alexandria, and then successor to Theophrastus in the headship of the Peripatos.[1]

With Strato the tendencies which we have seen operative in the Peripatos previously with Theophrastus reach the breaking point. The doctrine of Strato is now, without any doubt at all, a form of materialism and of immanentism both in its letter and spirit.

Cicero writes:

> You deny that without God there can be anything: but here you yourself seem to go contrary to Strato of Lampsacus, who concedes to God a pardon from a great task. If the priests of God were on vacation, it is much more just that the Gods would also be on vacation; in fact he denies the need to appreciate the work of the Gods in order to construct the world. All the things that exist he teaches have been produced by nature; not hence, as he says, according to that philosophy which claims these things are made of rough and smooth corpuscles, indented and hooked, the void interfering; these, he upholds, are dreams of Democritus which are not to be taught but dreamt. Strato, in fact, investigating the individual parts of the world, teaches that all that which is or is produced is or has been produced by ***weight*** and by ***motion***. Thus he liberates God from a big job and me from fear.[2]

The fragment is revelatory in many ways.

In the first place, the elimination of the immobile Movent which was already begun by Theophrastus is evident. Strato speaks, clearly contradicting Aristotle, who states that the heaven and nature depend on a divine principle, that nature is sufficient to itself and has no need of any ***transcendent principle.***

But also the total elimination of any ***immanent principle*** of a vitalistic kind is evident, such as, for example, a cosmic soul, who is a divine immanent maker of the kind hypothesized by the Stoics, as we shall see.[3]

Strato then decisively turns towards the Atomists and the Epicureans. Even if he criticizes Democritus, in fact, he is on the same track in the measure, at least, in which he supposes that "weights" and "movements" are the causes of all things, and places everything under the notion of mechanical necessity by excluding any finality.[4] Nothing changes the nature of this mechanism, not even the fact that in order to explain the things which occur, in addition to "weights" and "movements," he has recourse to the two qualitatively different principles of the ***hot*** and

the *cold*, from whose dynamism he derives the succeeding qualities.[5] In fact, these two qualitative principles do not work because of a goal, but rather they work in an automatic and necessary way, neither more nor less than "weights" and "movements."

The transcendent principle destroyed as final-moving cause destroys the final cause and destroys the form; of Aristotelian ***physis*** only matter remains, that is to say, almost nothing of Aristotle, insofar as there remains nothing beyond the Presocratic notion of ***physis***. The achievement of Plato and Aristotle is lost, so that the withdrawal to the Presocratic position becomes fatal.

There is no surprise in the fact that Strato, in addition to metaphysical concepts, rejects many of the properly physical views of Aristotle as well.

He rejects the doctrine of the "fifth element," maintaining that the heavens are made of fire,[6] instead of aither. He also rejects the theory of natural places and the connected natural motions of the elements.[7] He changes the doctrine of time and reinterprets the doctrine of movement.[8]

2. Psychology

Naturally, by eliminating the notions of form and immaterial substance, Strato falls into a decidedly materialistic conception of the human soul. Previously Theophrastus, as we saw, tended to interpret thought as a movement of the soul,[9] and within movement, in a more decisive way, Strato also interprets it. Sensations and thought, in his view, are movements of the same kind.

Here is an eloquent fragment in this regard:

> And Strato of Lampsacus, who was a follower of Theophrastus, and is numbered among the better Peripatetics, not only was better in saying that the irrational soul is moved, but also the rational, since he affirms that the activities of the soul are movement also. He says therefore in the book *On Movement*, among other things, also what follows: "always in fact there are those who think it is a movement, as for those who see, hear, and smell; intellection in fact is an act of the intellect, just as sight is an action of vision." And primarily he writes in this context: "The greater part of the movements are hence the same, those, that is, with which the soul is moved by itself in the act of intending, and those for which it is moved antecedently by sensations." And it is clear that anything which has not at first been perceived cannot be intelligibly conceived whether it is a question of places, windows, pictures, statues, men, or anything else of this kind.[10]

Hence, thought is not qualitatively different from sensation, it is a

"psychic motion," just as sensation is, and it depends, in fact, on sensation itself.

The conclusion concerning the material nature of the soul is therefore inevitable, granted the premises of the Stratonian argument. The soul is reduced, more precisely, to a ***pneumatic substance***, diffused throughout the body, but which has its center and its ***commanding part*** localized in the part of the brain which is between the two eyebrows. All sensations, affections, as well as passions, are related to this leading part, which alone has the capacity to sense.[11] It is not improbable that this pneumatic substance of the soul was, for Strato, connected with the principle of heat.

We are not surprised, consequently, to hear Strato say that "all sentient beings participate in the intellect itself."[12] In fact, the intellect of which he speaks here is the pneumatic substance which, as it has been said, is responsible for all sensations just as it is for all thought, which is nothing more than a prolongation of sensation. In effect, Wehrli is correct in saying that "sensism does not recognize any essential distinction between man and animal."[13]

It is hardly necessary to note that, in this context, it does not make sense to speak of the immortality of the soul. In fact, it has come down to us that Strato expressly rejected the Platonic proof given in the *Phaedo* in support of the immortality of the soul.[14]

Thus Strato was totally a physicist: not only because he was occupied with questions of physics but also because those problems, just as the problems of man, he resolved wholly in a naturalistic vein, that is, materialistically. Strato has thus brought back into the Peripatos, the sanctuary of Aristotelianism, Presocratic physicalism.

V. Conclusions Concerning the First Peripatos

The fate which befell Aristotle in his school, and (as we shall see in the fourth volume) that of the whole Hellenistic Age up to the threshold of the Common Era, was rather unfortunate.

His greatest follower, collaborator, and immediate successor, Theophrastus, if he was secure in his eminence because of the vastness of his knowledge and because of the originality of his scientific inquiries, as we have seen in detail, was not capable of the loftiness required to understand and hence to make understood to others *the most properly philosophical* and speculative *aspect* of Aristotle. Even less capacity to understand Aristotle is shown by his other followers, who quickly returned to materialistic conceptions of a Presocratic type, while the successor to Theophrastus, Strato of Lampsacus, signaled a more decisive breaking point with Aristotelianism.

But beyond this oblivion or this lack of understanding of the teacher which is evident in his followers, and which, as we have seen, has a strict parallel in the history of the Platonic Academy, there is another fact which explains the bad luck of Aristotle.

Theophrastus, when he died, left the garden and the buildings of the Peripatos to the school, but reserved the library which contained all the unpublished works of Aristotle for Neleus of Scepsis.[1] Now we know from Strabo[2] that Neleus took the library to Asia Minor and, when he died, he left it to his heirs. These people, as we have previously mentioned in the treatment of Aristotle, hid the precious manuscripts in a cellar, and so avoided having them fall into the hands of the Attilide kings, who worked to establish a library at Pergamum. These writings would remain hidden up to the time when a bibliophile named Apellicon acquired them and took them to Athens. A little after the death of Apellicon, they were confiscated by Sulla (86 BCE) and taken to Rome, where they were entrusted to the grammarian Tyrannion for copying. A systematic edition was hence made by Andronicus of Rhodes (the tenth successor to Aristotle) in the second half of the first century before the Common Era.

Hence from the death of Theophrastus onward the Peripatos was deprived of what can be considered the most important instruments of a philosophical school. In particular, it was to be deprived of its Aristotelian products, consisting of the notes and lesson materials (the so-called esoteric writings), which contained the most profound and original teachings of the Stagirite. And it is quite true, as some scholars have noted, that some reproductions of these writings were certainly made and that hence some copies remained in the Peripatos and that the story of Strabo has some elements of fiction. And it is also true that an attentive study of the ancient catalogues of the works of Aristotle which have been pre-

served leads to the conclusion that there remained in circulation copies of the esoteric Aristotelian works besides those taken to Asia Minor. However, whatever the truth of the matter, there remain two incontestable facts, and these are that the Peripatos would reveal for a long period an ignorance of a major part of the esoteric writings and that only after the edition of Andronicus would these writings return to the foreground. If, therefore, the Peripatos, after Theophrastus, remained in possession of some esoteric works of Aristotle, no one was in a position, for another two centuries and a half, to understand and interpret them. The Hellenistic Age read, therefore, for the most part, indeed almost exclusively, the exoteric works, the ones that Aristotle had published which, as we have seen, lacked that *speculative vigor*, and *theoretical profundity* which is characteristic of the esoteric works.

Thus the Peripatos was not in a condition to exercise a philosophical influence of significance and its debates were scarcely heard beyond the walls of the school.

The spiritual food of the new age by this time was being provided by other schools: by the Garden of Epicurus, by the Stoa of Zeno, and by the sceptical movement of Pyrrho.

Second Part

EPICUREANISM FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE END OF THE PAGAN ERA

«Μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν, μήτε γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν. οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδείς ἐστιν οὔτε πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον. ὁ δὲ λέγων ἢ μήπω τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ὥραν ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὥραν, ὅμοιός ἐστι τῷ λέγοντι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μήπω παρεῖναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι.»

Let no one while young delay the study of philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of its study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul. And the man who says that the age for philosophy has either not yet come or has gone by is like the man who says that the age for happiness is not yet come to him or has passed away.

Epicurus *Letter to Menoeceus* 122

First Section

EPICURUS AND THE FOUNDING OF THE GARDEN

«κενὸς ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου λόγος, ὑφ' οὗ μηδὲν πάθος ἀνθρώπου θεραπεύεται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς οὐδὲν ὄφελος μὴ τὰς νόσους τῶν σωμάτων ἐκβαλλούσης, οὕτως οὐδὲ φιλοσοφίας, εἰ μὴ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκβάλλει πάθος.»

Vain is the word of a philosopher which does not heal any suffering of man. For just as there is no profit in medicine if it does not expel the diseases of the body, so there is no profit in philosophy either if it does not expel the suffering of the mind.

Epicurus *Fragment* 221 Usener

I. The Development and Characteristics of the Garden

1. The polemic of Epicurus against Plato and Aristotle

The first, in chronological order, of the greatest Hellenistic schools was founded in Athens toward the end of the fourth century BCE (307/306 BCE) by Epicurus.[1] For accuracy's sake, we must say that the school was already established, at least in embryo, some years previously, since Epicurus had taught at Colophon, Mitylene, and Lampsacus; and at Mitylene, and especially at Lampsacus, Epicurus gathered his first students around him. In any case, he removed the school to Athens (which still was the cultural capital of Hellas), which signaled its entrance into the cultural life of the Greeks.

This transfer of the school of Epicurus to Athens brought on a confrontation with the great schools of Plato and Aristotle, a real act of defiance, a provocation, and even the beginning of an intellectual revolution, as we will see. But Epicurus had understood that he had something new to say, something that necessarily had a future, while the schools of Plato and Aristotle necessarily had, by this time, almost only a past; a past that, however much it was chronologically near, because of new events had become unexpectedly and spiritually remote.

Moreover, as we have said,[2] the Academy and the Peripatos were laying bare the foundations on which they themselves were established and were rapidly obliterating the teachings of their founders, both in spirit, and frequently also, in the letter. And owing to this crisis of the traditional schools there occurred, as a matter of fact, a spiritual void, in which a new alternative position could easily insert itself which corresponded to the new needs of the changing times.

The aversion held by our philosopher for both Plato and Aristotle was radical and did not stop at half measures.

The aversion for Platonism, probably, was born in Epicurus already by the time of his first arrival in Athens, on the occasion of the ceremony of manhood,[3] and perhaps even before when, in his native Samos, he had heard the lectures of the Platonist Pamphilus.[4] Epicurus could not agree with Plato in any of the dimensions according to which his teaching had proceeded: not in the epistemological or metaphysical one, which was connected to the immaterial; not in the mystical, religious, and teleological one, which was totally centered on the supersensible and on the transcendent; not in the political one, which had idealized the ancient polis and its values and which history was inexorably destroying.

The same marked aversion Epicurus conceived also in relation to Aristotle, who he considered a follower of Plato and essentially a Platonist. Ettore Bignone[5] has in fact shown, in a way that is not easily contestable, that Epicurus had read and meditated on the exoteric

Aristotle, that is the works (mostly composed in dialogue form, as imitations of the Platonic dialogues) which the Stagirite wrote and published chiefly when he was a student in the Academy, and which were expressions of concepts and in general of a way of thinking and feeling which was strongly Platonic. The works of the school of Aristotle, the esoteric works, if not entirely unknown to Epicurus, basically did not, however, have an impact on our philosopher, whatever some scholars have tried to show to the contrary. It is with the Platonic Aristotle, in any case, that Epicurus engaged in his most vigorous and radical arguments.

2. The rejection of the "second voyage"

The stages of the anti-Platonic and anti-Aristotelian polemic are specified and reconstructed from very recent studies: with the result, as a matter of fact, that all the essential theses of Epicureanism acquire their correct historical and properly theoretical significance within the context of these polemics.[6] But what is of major interest to us is to point out that Epicurus tried to reject in a drastic way the foundation itself on which the imposing speculative edifice of Plato and the early Aristotle was based, that is to say, the "second voyage" and with all of the results connected to it.

In the celebrated passage of the *Phaedo* in which the reasons are clarified that made the "second voyage" necessary (of which we have spoken fully in the preceding volume [II]), Plato clearly says that his speculative journey consists in the passage from things to the Ideas by means of the *logoi*, the *reasonings*. Things are not cognizible through the senses: in fact they "blind the soul," and hence, far from revealing the Ideas, they hide them. Things are intelligible only by postulating *through logoi and arguments* the existence of the meta-empirical Ideas. The reason for the coming into existence, the passing away, and the being of sensible things is not to be found *in* the sensible things themselves, but in a meta-sensible cause (the "true cause").[7] In the *Republic*, Plato explains in detail what the necessary stages of this "long way" are which leads from the sensible to the intelligible. The soul is detached gradually from sensible things at first *by means of the mathematical sciences* (mathematics, geometry, astronomy, and harmony), which reveal through the sensibles (the geometric figures, the vision of the stars and their motions and sounds) the existence of entities, intelligible laws and proportions and, then, *by means of dialectic*, which lead to the vision of the Ideas in themselves and in their mutual relations and, finally, to the vision of the supreme Idea, the Idea of the Good.[8]

Well, Epicurus tried to shatter this imposing construction by contesting in a detailed way all the principles from which it arose.

Above all, he not only denied that sensation veils things and confuses

the soul, but he maintained that it constitutes ***the most solid criterion of truth***, what is always and only truthful, and which hence "grasps being" (we will see this amply in the next chapter). Arguments and demonstrations move into emptiness because they proceed to infinity and therefore are always further removed from sensible things, which are as a result veiled instead of being revealed. The Platonic meta-empirical reasoning and dialectic which produce this inference are hence deceptive: man needs to be anchored to things and to their "voices" (the sensations). Diogenes Laertius writes:

> [The Epicureans] rejected dialectic as superfluous: they say that for the physicist it should be sufficient to pay attention to the ***natural meanings*** [in Greek, φθόγγους, which means to the letters of the alphabet, ***sounds, voices***] of things.[9]

Moreover, against the specific process of division of Platonic dialectic we read in the *Letter to Herodotus*:

> First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, ***so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning.*** For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word ***should be immediately clear, and that there should be no need of explanation***, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference.[10]

According to Epicurus, not only dialectic, but also the sciences that Plato prescribed as obligatory stages in the "long way" to being, are deceptive. Geometry is "wholly contrary to the truth" because its "principles are ungrounded."[11] Astronomy is "vain."[12] Music is "useless" and even "to be condemned."[13]

By rejecting the "second voyage" and by eliminating the supersensible, there is left nothing to Epicurus except the Presocratic ***physis***, which therefore takes on a new meaning. The Presocratics did not have to determine the nature of ***physis*** on the basis of the categories of the sensible-supersensible, material-immaterial, corporeal-incorporeal, because these categories arose only within the context of the "second voyage." But after Plato and Aristotle the specification of the nature of reality in function of these categories became necessary, both by those who shared or did not share the Platonic or Aristotelian solutions.[14] So the vision of ***physis***, of the nature of reality, proposed by Epicurus became an authentic "materialism," ***thanks to the clear and explicit denial of the supersensible, of the incorporeal, and of the immaterial.*** Epicurus is, in a certain sense, the first materialist who formulated in a consciously theoretical

manner his own materialism. In fact the Presocratics, who as we have said did not conceive the immaterial dimension of being, could not deny what they did not conceive (materialism is such *only if it expressly denies the existence of other realities beyond the material*). The minor Socratics stopped half way since they denied the existence of the Platonic Ideas and made generic affirmations with a materialistic tendency, but without drawing out all the necessary consequences and without articulating the implications, because they were almost totally interested only in ethical discourse, emphasizing it in an almost exaggeratedly one-sided manner.

3. The renewal of atomism and the Eleatic categories fundamentally connected to it

Epicurus, actually, was not able to create a new ontology. In order to express his own materialistic vision of reality in a positive manner (that is, not simply denying the Platonic-Aristotelian conception), he went back to the concepts and the theoretical constructions already elaborated within the scope of Presocratic philosophy. And among all the Presocratic constructions it was almost inevitable that Epicurus should choose those of the Atomists, because they, *after* the Platonic "second voyage," could be seen without doubt as the most materialistic of all.

Our sources inform us that Epicurus came to the Atomist's doctrine through Nausiphanes,[15] whom he heard at Theo, near Colophon, where he stayed for perhaps four years (from Nausiphanes he became acquainted with the new term "sceptic," which Pyrrho spread, since Nausiphanes was an auditor of Pyrrho).[16] However, invincibly convinced as he was of the ethical novelty which he was elaborating and teaching to the Greeks, Epicurus denied any debt of knowledge to Nausiphanes, just as he denied any debt to any other philosophers with whom he had direct or indirect contacts.[17] Evidently in this he was mistaken: the meaning of those novel constructions of which he felt himself to be the dispenser hid the truth from him. In fact, if the vision of life which he proposed was authentically his construction, we cannot consider his creations either the theoretical reasonings with which he tried to support it or the *physical* vision of the universe in which he framed his vision of life. Those reasonings, in fact, repeated the models of Atomism, with few variations or novelty, as we will see, among which the most outstanding one consists in a lucid and materialistic consciousness with which he re-used these models, to which we have already alluded.

But Atomism, as we have seen in the first volume,[18] is a precise response to the aporias arising from Eleaticism, an attempt to mediate the opposed requirements of both the Eleatic logos and experience. Into the logic of Atomism passed a great deal of the Eleatic logic (Leucippus,

the first Atomist, was a follower of Melissus,[19] and in general Atomism was the most rigorously Eleatic among the pluralistic options). Consequently, it was inevitable that this logic would also pass into Epicurus, as has been clearly demonstrated in a recent work.[20] And thus, as we will see, frequently more than the canons of logic expressly elaborated by Epicurus (of which we will speak in the next chapter), the canons of Eleatic logic, and especially the logic of the *excluded middle*, which is based on this paradigm, are often decisive: being is, not-being is not, and a third position is not possible (*tertium non datur*). Not only, therefore, will we hear again, in the ontology of Epicurus, the typical Eleatic affirmations such as "nothing is derived from nothing," and "nothing is resolved into nothing," "that being is wholly homogenous," "wholly equal to itself," but we will see this typical mode of reasoning which does not allow for "an intermediate," not only between contradictories, but even between contraries extended likewise into the sphere of the canonic and of the ethics.

4. The relations between Epicurus, Socrates, and the minor Socratics

We have said above that one of the characteristics of the philosophy of the Hellenistic Age is the return to Socrates and to Socratic views.[21] Already this is quite evident in Epicurus, not only in the decided pre-eminence given to ethical problems in general, but more precisely in the specific conception of philosophy as something which ought to provide for the "health of the soul," as is clearly inferred from the *Letter to Menoeceus*,[22] or better yet, from the following testimony:

> Vain is the word of a philosopher which does not *heal any suffering of human beings*: for just as we do not have any need of medicine if it does not expel disease from our bodies, so also we do not have any use for a philosophy if it does not dispel the sufferings of the mind.[23]

We will see, moreover, that the same "Socratic intellectualism" returns to play a very important role and that even the "paradoxes" of this intellectual attitude will be revived.

Naturally, the message of Socrates acts through the filter of materialism. In fact, Epicurus could no longer give to the term *psyche* its meaning or that pre-eminence which Socrates gave it, since his materialism imposed a conception of the soul and the body as *homogenous in nature* (they are both made of material atoms).[24]

In the first place, the Cyrenaics, with their doctrine of pleasure, were among the minor Socratics acting on the formation of the Epicurean philosophy which, we will see, with Eleatic logic will be reinterpreted fully and reformed radically. In the second place, the Cynics exercised a

precise influence: the elimination of superfluous needs induced by society and the reduction of elementary needs to those the satisfaction of which is indispensible to living well. The rejection of participation in political life and *autarcheia* are, in fact, precisely Cynic themes which are given a new coloration and play an essential role in the Epicurean system.

Epicurus differed clearly from Socrates (and from the Socratics) in his conception of philosophy as a *system*, as the expression of *doctrines* systematically deduced and justified and not of simple attitudes and problems:

> The wise man...will teach doctrines dogmatically and will not speak through aporias.[25]

It is for this very reason that Epicurus elaborates a "Canonic" and especially a "physics," just in order to give ethics a foundation which is not only anthropological but ontological, *because a vision of human nature cannot be correctly justified except in function of a conception of the cosmos and of being, of which human nature is a part.*

5. The predominant role of ethics

Finally, for an accurate historical and theoretical arrangement of the thought of Epicurus there still remains an essential point to notice. The Presocratics only recognized philosophy as cosmology and as ontology, ignoring ethics. Socrates and the Socratics, instead, reject cosmology and ontology and reduced philosophy solely to ethics, to the doctrine concerning wisdom. With Plato and Aristotle, ontology (which became metaphysics) returned to be the essential stage of philosophy and ethics was founded on it: the superiority of ontology (of the doctrine which explains the causes of the whole of reality) over ethics is very clear in Plato and is even affirmed on a theoretical level in Aristotle. Well, Epicurus, while reaffirming the necessity of ontology as a foundation for ethics, *overturned the Platonic and Aristotelian hierarchy and maintained the superiority of ethics over physics* (to ontology). *Phronesis*, practical wisdom, was superordinated to science and to *sophia*. Let us read in the *Letter to Menoeceus*:

> Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy [= science], for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly (nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice) without living pleasantly.[26]

The problem of life becomes, for Epicurus, the problem of utmost importance: all the rest is aimed at the solution of this problem. Moreover, Epicurus is not only interested in the theoretical solution of the problem, but also the practical actualization of ethics. In certain texts,

in fact, Epicurus would seem to be especially concerned with this *practical actualization*, especially when he applies it to his followers. Domenico Pesce clarifies this particular position of Epicurus in an accurate way as follows: "...the exclusively [perhaps it would be better to say prevalently] practical function of the entire philosophy leads to these consequences: in what concerns ethics it is a question of living it in practice, insofar as the validity of the doctrine will be immediately confirmed by the experience of a life lived while, in what concerns physics, because this, contrary to ethics, has a negative function of liberation rather than of a positive advancement, there will be no need to possess the doctrine, that is, to know the actual explanation of the various phenomena, ***but it will be sufficient to know that this explanation is available.*** This explains the unusual character of the περὶ φύσεως of Epicurus and the completely unique relation which is established between the master and his followers. ***The whole of knowledge must exist,*** because only in it is given the proof that the principles of the doctrine and the general schema of the interpretation of phenomena (the ontology and epistemology) function perfectly and do not allow for any exceptions. But it is not at all necessary for the follower to regain it in full, it is sufficient for him to study some *epitome* or a compendium for him who knows less to have faith in those who know more."[27]

The strong tendency of Epicurean philosophy to become and to propose itself as a faith and even as a secular religion is quite evident already from the above, and the further analysis which we will now provide will make clear the inner dynamics of this tendency.

6. The purpose of the Garden and its originality

Even though there are numerous differences which mark the moral philosophies of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, they had as a common basis the polis and the *ethos* which characterized it. All the voices of dissent which were raised against the *ethos* of the polis, from those of the Sophists to those of the minor Socratics, however radical and audacious they could be or appear to be, presupposed, in any case, an ideological and social order still firmly supported by the vitality of the Greek city-state. The affirmations of cosmopolitanism of the minor Socratics, then, had special meaning, insofar as, as we know, they were human beings, not Greeks or semi-Greeks, who were hence wholly or in part strangers to that *ethos*. Epicurus lived and thought in an epoch in which the polis, its *ethos*, its values were in a state of crisis owing to the revolution of Alexander. Moreover, being of Greek blood and of Athenian origin, he understood perfectly well the tragic sense of that spiritual void which had formed and he intended to fill up that gap by proposing a new

ethos which broke with the already dead past and was no longer revivable in a new life.

The new *ethos*, contrary to the traditional one rooted in the *polis*, was based on the *individual man*, on the *private man*: it was the *ethos of the individual*. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle taught "political excellence," that is to say, a human excellence which perfected *human beings as citizens*, presupposing that *human beings as such were identical with the citizen* (man = citizen). The new virtue which Epicurus taught was *the virtue of the private man*, the virtue which perfected *man as an individual*, that is, man considered in himself, outside of his living in a political group. Epicurus challenged definitively the identification of man and citizen; in fact, he even condemned politics as "a useless affair" and proclaimed the validity and excellence of the "hidden life," remote and far from political turmoil.[28]

In this context can be grasped, in our judgment, the rejection by Epicurus of the whole of the traditional culture. The Epicurean rejection of the sciences, as we have seen, is meant as anti-Platonic (anti-metaphysical), while the rejection of poetry[29] and rhetoric[30] is motivated by the fact that both are bound up with *civic values*, which were in crisis because of the destruction of the city-state. The authentic anti-culturalists were the Cynics, while the attitude of the Epicureans expresses, in reality, more than an aversion to culture as such, chiefly a challenge to the values of which the traditional culture was the bearer. Only in this way can it be explained how Epicurus could combat this culture and, at the same time, could write three hundred works and, especially, a monumental treatise *On Nature* composed of thirty-seven books.

Also the choice of the place in which the school arose is an expression of this revolutionary novelty. Socrates taught both in market-places and in gymnasia, where free men met; in gymnasia Plato and Aristotle had founded their schools. Epicurus chose instead a completely unusual place: a building with a garden, or more exactly with an enclosed garden, on the outskirts of Athens. The Garden was far from the daily tumult of *political* life and close to the solitude of the countryside. From the Garden one could feel the peace of nature, admire the landscape of fields and trees, which to Socrates and Plato said nothing,[31] but which for the new Hellenistic sensibility was on the contrary of considerable importance. From this fact the name "Garden" became current to refer to the school and the expression "those of the Garden" was used to designate the Epicureans.

The teachings which came out of the Garden can be summarized in a few general propositions: 1) reality is perfectly penetrable and knowable by the intelligence of man; 2) in the dimensions of reality there is space for the happiness of human beings; 3) happiness is the absence of pain and suffering, it is the peace of the spirit; 4) in order to achieve this

happiness and this peace man needs only himself; 5) therefore he does not need the city-state, institutions, the nobility, wealth, and things in general, not even the Gods: man is completely *autarchic*.

It is clear that, in the face of this teaching, all human beings are equals, because all aspire to peace of the spirit, all have a right to it, and all can achieve it, if they wish. Consequently, the Garden was open to all: to the well-born and to common people, to those who were free and those who were not, to men as well as women, and even to prostitutes in search of rehabilitation.

The new message that came from the Garden was hence an original one in the sense of the spirit which informed it, in the spiritual character emblazoned on it. It did not constitute a fashionable movement with a purely or prevalently intellectual attraction, but it involved a call to a truly unusual life-style.[32] There is in Epicurus more than a trace that calls to mind the figure of a prophet or of a saint.[33] Inspired in great part by Bignone, Farrington correctly writes: "The Garden was a training-base for missionaries and the house was the center for intense propaganda. The fragments which have survived inform us about the spread of the movement even during the lifetime of the founder. We know of letters 'to friends at Lampsacus,' 'to the friends in Egypt,' 'to the friends in Asia,' 'to the lovers of wisdom at Mytilene.' In his literary letter-writing addressed to his communities scattered throughout the East, Epicurus seems to be a precursor of Saint Paul."[34]

Epicurus was very far-sighted; if his contemporaries received his ideas with suspicion, time on the contrary proved him to be right and his philosophy survived even longer than any of the others created during his era. Bignone writes: "And for a longer time than any of the others [the Epicurean philosophy] resisted the ruin of the ancient world, because more than any of the others it held firm two beliefs which in the ancient world were the profound reasons for life: a belief in reality and in a knowledge of it, as well as a belief in the achievement of happiness. When anxiety about the supernatural overcomes, and earthly reality seems to be full of illusion and error, and true knowledge no longer inquires through the way of experience, but through mystical and religious apocalyptics (hence it will seem useless to worry about what can never be understood about the world and which will one day be revealed to us), when earthly existence itself is irredeemably condemned, and man aspires to nothing other than to leave it as soon as possible, only then will the philosophy of Epicurus vanish, as well as all the sunny realities of the ancient world. But until then, as long as there remains in classical man the hope of conquering, of finding in himself with his own forces alone the health of the soul and a reason for living, Epicurus, this healer of spirits, will again appear...as a 'savior,' and the school will be the last to fight for these beliefs."[35]

Let us now see in a detailed way what the new doctrines of the Garden are in their division into the *Canonic*, *Physics*, and *Ethics*.

II. The Epicurean Canonic

1. The "Canonic" as determining the criteria of truth

We have seen, in the preceding volume, the significance of the Aristotelian logic: it signalled, essentially, the moment of complete maturity of the philosophical *logos*, that is, the moment in which *logos*, after having critically examined everything which is an object of thought, turned to itself, its procedures, the general rules and conditions which govern it. Therefore, the logic of Aristotle is the first wide-ranging attempt, in the spiritual history of the West, to determine the forms which necessarily specify human thought processes, the first attempt to explain in general the reasoning powers of the human mind. Thus the Stagirite was able to establish the nature of the primary elements of reasoning and thinking (the categories), the nature of the elementary connections of these elements (the judgment, the proposition), the form of reasoning itself (the syllogism), the kinds of reasoning possible, its valid and invalid forms, the dialectical syllogism and sophistic paralogisms, the nature of deductive and inductive reasoning, and their value, limits, and conditions.[1]

As a result then, the Garden of Epicurus not only almost lost in its entirety the results and the acquisitions of this wide-ranging design, but it even lost the meaning itself of the problematic of Aristotelian logic.[2] Cicero notes correctly:

> Again in another part of philosophy, that which concerns the art of discussion and which is called *logic*, this person, your Epicurus is, it seems to me, absolutely rash and defenseless. Abolishing definitions teaches nothing about divisions and articulations. He does not teach in what way an argument is constructed and concluded, in what sophisms are solved and the ambiguities of discourse. . . .[3]

Actually, Epicurus was concerned with logic solely from the viewpoint of establishing the nature of the criteria or basic canons which permit us to achieve truth and certitude, as was well known to the ancients:

> The Epicureans move logic far from the area which is proper to it, because they seek first the canons of judgment, by making the art of teaching by precepts apply both to evidence and to what does not fall under the senses, and to what follows from them.[4]

In conclusion, the Epicureans restrict their logic to a kind of critique of knowledge and reduce this to some very elementary principles which, after Aristotle, sound rather simplistic and, in part, even somewhat crude. Moreover, the term "canonic" with which Epicurus designates his logic rather effectively expresses the significance that he attaches to

it.[5] Therefore, it is possible to explain how Epicurus and the Epicureans did not grant to logic any autonomous value but attached it to physics, by even considering logic almost as an introduction to physics. Actually the Epicurean canonic is developed only as a propaedeutic to physics and ethics, and can be correctly said to be their methodological stage. (In addition, as we have already emphasized and as we will see better further on, even the physics of Epicurus does not have autonomous value, but essentially finds its completion in ethics: the physics is developed only insofar as and in the measure in which it serves to determine the ontological foundation of ethics.)

2. Sensation and its absolute validity

Epicurus, in his canonic, affirms that there are three criteria of truth: *sensations*, *prolepses*, and *feelings*.

He places sensation (αἴσθησις) as the first and fundamental criterion. Against all the tendencies (from those of the Sophists to those of incipient scepticism) which have affirmed or are affirming the subjective and relative nature of sensation, and hence its aleatory nature from the viewpoint of certitude and validity, Epicurus claimed with the most vigorous emphasis the objective certitude and validity of sensation which he forcefully declared to be even absolute. Here are some important affirmations:

> If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standards to which to refer and therefore not even a way of judging those things which you say are wrong.[6]
>
> If you reject a sensation without distinguishing correctly among what must belong to opinion, what waits confirming, and what is present with evidence on the basis of sensation or feeling or to each act of intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will end by confounding also the other sensations with vain opinion, and you will fail to use any criterion of judgment. ...[7]

Keep in mind that for Epicurus sensations are *always, every one of them,* true *without any exceptions.* In fact, he says, if *only one* of the senses, even for *only one time*, were mistaken, then there could not be any faith *in any* of the senses and the validity of sensation as such would collapse. Cicero writes:

> To such a point does Epicurus reach that, he says, if one sensation for one time in a lifetime were to induce an error, there would be no possibility of giving credence to any sensation.[8]
>
> Epicurus held that if only one sensation were revealed to be deceptive no one could speak the truth. And he called the senses the "ambassadors of truth."[9]

The arguments on which Epicurus based these assertions are transmitted to us by Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius and we must explain them, since they reveal in an effective way the peculiarities of his *dogmatism*.

In the first place, sensation, insofar as it is an *affection* and hence passive, is not produced by itself, but must be produced by something out of which it comes as the effect; and, if it is produced by this something, it must in some way correspond to it. As the affections of pleasure and of pain are produced by something and they correspond to it (it is impossible that whatever produces pain, if and in the measure in which it produces it, is not painful; and whatever produces pleasure, if and in the measure in which it produces it, is not pleasurable), so it is for every other sensation. It is necessary not only that the object exists that produces sensations, but that it likewise corresponds to the sensation that it produces.

In the second place (and this undoubtedly is the chief argument), sensation is objective and true because, in the ultimate analysis, it is produced and hence guaranteed by the *atomic structure itself of reality*. In fact, as we will see further on, the emanations from the masses of atoms are the *images* and *simulacra* (εἴδωλα) of the things themselves and the sensations are produced by the penetration of such images into us. For this very reason the objectivity of sensation is unconditioned because it can be produced only if, when, and how the images enter into us. Those things that can be judged illusions of the senses (such as the diverse shapes in which an object appears at a distance or the weakening or deformation of a sound which is becoming distant) are, on the contrary, objectively registering and reproducing the simulacra which actually are present. In departing from things the images are changed, and sensations reveal them always and only in such a way as the images arrive at the senses. The simulacrum of the near object is actually different from the simulacrum of a distant object, so that what, according to some, is a deception of the senses, for Epicurus is a proof of their objectivity. (Error can only pertain to *opinion*, which can intervene *and judge incorrectly about sensation*.)

Here is the justly famous passage of Sextus Empiricus in which these arguments are contained:

> Epicurus asserts that there are two things which are correlative—namely, apprehension and opinion—of which *the apprehension, which he also terms "evidence" is constantly true*. For just as the primary affections—that is to say pleasure and pain—come about owing to certain agents and in accord with those agents (pleasure, for instance, from things pleasant and pain from things painful), and it is impossible for the agent productive of pleasure even to be not pleasant, or that which is creative of pain to be not painful, but of neces-

sity that which gives pleasure must in its real nature be pleasant and that which gives pain painful—*so also in the case of the apprehensions, which are affections of ours, the agent which is productive of each of them is always entirely apprehended and as being apprehended it is incapable of being productive of the apprehension without being in very truth such as it appears.* In the case also of the particular sensations one must argue in the same way. Thus the visible object not only appears visible but actually is such as it appears; and the audible object not only appears audible but also really is so in truth; and so on with the rest. The apprehensions, then, which occur are all true. And reasonably so, for, say the Epicureans, if an apprehension is termed "true" wherever it arises from a real object and in accord with that object, then every apprehension is necessarily true. But some are deceived by the difference in the apprehensions which seem to be derived from the same object of sense—for instance a visible object—because of which the object appears of another color or of another shape, or altered in some other way. For they have supposed that, of the apprehensions thus differing and conflicting, one kind must be true and the kind derived from an opposite source false. But this is silly, and the notion of men who do not consider the real nature of things. Thus—to base our argument on objects of sight—it is not the whole of the solid body that is seen, but the color of the solid body. And of the color, one part is on the solid (as in the case of objects seen close at hand or at a moderate distance), and another part outside the solid and existent in the spaces adjacent (as in the case of things viewed at a great distance). And this being altered in the intervening space and receiving a special shape of its own *gives rise to an apprehension which is similar to its own real nature.* For just as neither the sound in the brass instrument that is struck nor the sound in the mouth of the man who shouts is heard but the sound which strikes on our own sense; and just as no one says that he who hears a faint sound from a distance hears falsely because the same man, on coming close, perceives it as loud—just so I should decline to say that the eyesight is false because at a long distance it sees the tower as small and round but from close at hand as large and square, but I should say *rather that it reports truly because when the object of sense appears to it small and of a certain shape it really is small and of a certain shape, as the limits belonging to the images are rubbed away by their passage through the air*; and again when it appears large and of a different shape it is correspondingly large and of a different shape, since it is no longer the same object that is both at once. For it is left to the distorted opinion to imagine that the apprehended object seen from close at hand is the same as that seen from a distance. *But it is the special function of sense to perceive only that which is present and affects it*—color, for instance—but not to discern that the object here is one thing and the object there another. *Hence, for these reasons, apprehensions are all true.*[10]

A third argument is reported by Diogenes Laertius. Sensation, said Epicurus, is *a-rational* as well as *deprived of memory, not self-produced but produced by something else*; in this way it is not in the condition of taking away from itself, nor of adding anything to itself, but just because it is such, sensation is objective (*not in any way manipulated by the activity of the subject*). Sensation is hence irrefutable, because nothing can be opposed to it: *a*) not another homogeneous sensation, because it has the same value; *b*) not a heterogeneous one, because it refers to a different object; *c*) not reason, because reason depends on sensation and not vice-versa:

> Every sensation, he says, is a-rational and does not participate in memory; it is not produced from itself, nor is it produced from some other thing, nor is it capable of adding to or subtracting anything from. Nor is there anything which can refute a sensation: an homogeneous sensation can not be refuted by another, because both have the same validity; nor can a heterogeneous one, because the objects judged are not the same; nor again can reason refute them, because all reasoning depends on sensations; nor finally can one sensation refute another, because we attend to all equally. It is only the fact that sensations are something existent which guarantees the veracity of the senses. It is a real fact that we see and hear, just as is the reality of feeling pain.[11]

It has been accurately stated that, in these affirmations, Epicurus precisely overturns the position of Plato.[12] He, in fact, devalued sensations just because they are *a-rational*, that is, incapable of giving an account of themselves and, hence, they are brought down to the level of blind belief (πίστις).[13] Epicurus, on the contrary, maintains that the character of a-rationality and passivity of sensations establishes the greater guarantee of their being simply a reproduction of unmodified data, and just because of this they can be declared absolutely true. Therefore, this scholar rightly concludes: "Immediacy, passivity, limitation to the present [and we can add a-rationality], in a word a character which is a pure registering of sensations, cause *all* the sensations necessarily to possess the value itself of truthfulness. That is why doubting one sensation is equivalent to doubting all of them, to declare that one is false is to affirm that all of them are false. In this way we come across ... an Eleatic schema which we will then find again continuously in every single part of the system: either dogmatism or scepticism, *tertium non datur*."[14]

3. *Prolepses* or *anticipations* and language

As a second criterion of truth, Epicurus posited the so-called *prolepses* (προλήψεις) or *anticipations* or *prenotions*, which are nothing other than

mental apprehensions of things, and, we could say, it is the sensistic correlative of the concept, or better yet, that to which Epicurean sensism reduces the conceptual universal. The Epicureans, Diogenes says, described the prolepsis as follows:

> They say that the anticipation [prolepsis] is an apprehension or a universal idea present in us which is not then other than the memory of what has frequently been presented to us by an external object.[15]

The final words are the most meaningful: the prolepses are nothing other than the images of things that flow from perceptions and are formed through the repetition of the perceptions themselves and their preservation in the memory. They are called prolepses, that is pre-conceptions or pre-notions, for the following reasons. Once the images of things are formed in us through sensations in the manner described above, they can be recalled to the mind at will, because they remain in the mind as "imprints" (τύπος) of past sensations,[16] and in this way they allow us to recognize beforehand both those forms and those qualities which belong to things, without any need to have them in front of us and to actually perceive them. To speak in other terms, they anticipate in us those qualities and those forms that things will manifest when, through sensation, we again find ourselves in direct contact with them. In addition, they precede and condition all forms of reflection, of reasoning, and in general every type of rational activity. In fact we cannot set and develop any reasoning or discourse except by basing it on the elements which are known to us through pre-notion. The Epicurean prolepsis anticipates experience and rational activity ***only insofar as and in the measure in which it is derived and produced by experience.*** And because of this strict connection with experience and with sensation, the truth value of the prolepses is guaranteed which, just as sensations, is produced from the actions of things on our soul, and, because of this, is truthful, as we have already noted.

Moreover, for Epicurus, "names" which constitute our language refer to nothing other than to these prolepses and they refer to them in a fundamentally ***natural*** way. In fact, names and in general language, according to our philosopher, are nothing other than the expression of our perceptions and affections through phonic means and, hence, they constitute a natural manifestation of the original action of things on our soul. Epicurus expressly writes:

> Moreover, we must suppose that human nature too was taught and constrained to do many things of every kind merely by circumstances; and that later on reasoning elaborated what had been suggested by nature and made further inventions, in some matters quickly, in others slowly, at some epochs and times making great

> advances, and lesser again at others. And so names too were not at first deliberately given to things, but men's natures according to their different rationalities had their own peculiar feelings and received their peculiar impressions, and so each in their own way emitted air formed into shape by each of these feelings and impressions, according to the differences made in the different notions by the places of their abode as well. And then later on by common consent in each nationality special names were deliberately given in order to make their meanings less ambiguous to one another and more briefly demonstrated. And sometimes those who were acquainted with them brought in things hitherto unknown and introduced sounds for them, on some occasions being naturally constrained to utter them, and on others choosing them by reasoning in accordance with the prevailing mode of formation, and thus making their meaning clear.[17]

In conclusion, in the measure in which language expresses the prolepses, it is, like them, revelatory of the nature of things and the bearers of truth.

4. The feelings of pleasure and pain

As the third criterion of truth, Epicurus considered *affections* or feelings (πάθη) of pleasure and pain (which can be called in a certain way also the "internal senses"). Diogenes Laertius writes:

> They affirm that there are two states of feelings, pleasure and pain, which arise in every animate being, and that the one conforms to nature, the other hostile to that being, and by their means choice and avoidance are determined.[18]

Aristocles confirms it:

> Epicurus and his followers hold...that pleasure and pain are principles and the criterion for all that which is chosen or rejected....[19]

Epicurus himself in the *Letter to Menoeceus* writes explicitly:

> We say that pleasure is a principle and goal of living happily. We consider it in fact as a primary good which is connatural to us, and from it we move in the taking of any position of choice or of its rejection, and to it we return again in judging every good on the basis of the criterion of this affection.[20]

Just as we read in the passage from Sextus Empiricus quoted above,[21] the feelings of pleasure and pain are objective for the same reasons for which sensations are such. Yet they have a particular importance, because, in addition to being the criteria for distinguishing the true and

the false, being and non-being, as we have read in the testimonies and fragments quoted above, they are the axiological criteria which enable us to distinguish *value* and *disvalue*, *good* and *evil*, and hence they constitute the criteria of choice and rejection, that is, the rule for our actions.

But we will speak about this fully when we discuss the Epicurean ethics.

5. Opinion

Sensations, prolepses, and feelings have a common nature that guarantees their truth value, and this consists in their *immediate evidence* (ἐνάργεια). Therefore, as long as we stick to the evidence and accept as true whatever is evident, we cannot possibly err, because the evidence is given in the ultimate analysis by the direct action of the things acting on our soul. In the strict sense, then, what is evident is only what is immediate like sensations, anticipations, and feelings. But because in reasoning we cannot stay with the immediate, since reasoning fundamentally involves an operation of mediation, opinion (δόξα, ὑπόληψις) arises in this way, and with it arises the possibility of error.

Therefore, while sensations, prolepses, and feelings are always true, opinions can be at one moment true and at another false. So Epicurus tried to determine the criteria on the basis of which true opinion may be distinguished from false opinion.

Those opinions are *true* about which: *a*) we *receive probative testimony*, that is, *confirmation* by experience and by evidence and *b*) *do not receive contrary testimony*, namely, *denial* by experience or by evidence; on the contrary, *false* opinions are those about which *a*) we *receive contrary testimony*, that is, which are *denied* by experience and by evidence and *b*) *do not receive probative testimony*, that is, do not receive *confirmation* from experience and from evidence. Sextus Empiricus lays out with great clarity this point of Epicurean teaching in a passage worthy of being read in its entirety:

> Because we have the capacity of making judgments about our apprehensions, it happens that some of them are true, others false, since they are judgments of ours concerning the apprehensions or because of subtracting something from them, and, in either case, falsifying the irrational sensation. Of opinions, then, according to Epicurus, some are true, others false: the true being those which testify for, and not against, the evidence of sense, and the false those which testify against, and not for, that evidence. And confirmatory testimony is apprehension by means of evidence that the thing opined is of such a sort as it was opined to be—as when, for example, on the approach of Plato from afar I guess and opine, because of the distance, that is Plato, and when he has drawn near the fact that he is Plato is further testified—the distance being reduced—and is con-

> firmed by actual evidence of sense. And the lack of contrary testimony is the congruity of the supposed and opined non-evident object with the apparent—as when Epicurus says that void exists, which is a thing non-evident, that is supported by an obvious fact, namely motions; for void does not exist neither ought motion to exist, the moving body having no place into which to pass over, owing to the fact that all things are full and close-packed; so that, since motion exists, the apparent not give testimony that contradicts the opined non-evident fact. But contrary testimony is something which conflicts with lack of contrary testimony; for it is the supposed non-evident fact—as when, for instance, the Stoic says that void does not exist, asserting something non-evident, and jointly with this supposed fact the apparent fact, by which I mean motion, is necessarily refuted; for if void does not exist, of necessity motion does not exist either, according to the argument we have already set out, so likewise lack of confirmatory testimony is opposed to confirmatory testimony; for it is the impression due to sense-evidence that the thing opined is not such as it was opined to be; as, for instance, when something is approaching from afar and we guess, because of the distance, that it is Plato, but when the distance is reduced we learn by evidence that it is not Plato. Such an occurrence is lack of confirmatory testimony; for the thing opined was not confirmed by the apparent fact. Hence confirmatory testimony and lack of contrary testimony form a criterion of the truth of a thing, but lack of confirmatory testimony and contradictory testimony of its falsehood. And the base and foundation of all is the evidence of sense.[22]

It is to be noted that, as Sextus Empiricus correctly points out in the last sentence, *evidence* remains the measure on the basis of which truth is measured and recognized: but it is, in any case, solely empirical evidence: it is evidence of phenomena, that is, evidence which appears to the senses and not evidence which appears to reason. More than ever here is revealed the overwhelming presence of the sense criteria at the base of the Epicurean canonic, which, as we will immediately see, renders them inadequate and insufficient as the requirements for the construction of Epicurean physics itself.

6. Aporias and limits of the Epicurean canonic

The histories of philosophy for some time now have correctly specified the final aporias of the Epicurean canonic as essentially reducible to the following two.

In the first place, the unconditioned validity which Epicurus attributes to sensation ends in destroying any possibility of objective knowledge. In fact, from the simple affirmation that all sensations are true, it is possible to deduce Protagorean relativism and subjectivism no less than Epicurean objectivism.[23] As we have previously seen in part and

we will see even more so further on, Epicurus has cleverly tried to explain every one of our perceptions by reference to the action that things exercise on us. In fact, for our philosopher, every apprehension is generated by the "simulacra," that is, by the emanation of the atoms which flow from things. And because there are many of these simulacra that come from the same thing and are identical but also different (because subject to being modified in various ways owing to diverse causes), it is not true to say that the same object appears in various ways to various persons. Different persons who have had different sensations have been affected not by the same simulacra coming from the same object, but by *different* simulacra coming from that same object. Therefore, Epicurus believed that he could validly conclude that all the different sensations of these persons are equally true, in the sense that they have all corresponding simulacra, and that deception arises only with judgment, which unduly infers from sensation what it must not about the thing. But Zeller has correctly said, with this explanation, that Epicurus did not solve, but merely shifted the difficulty. The following aporia in fact still remains: "The perceptions must always faithfully give back the image or simulacrum by which the sensorial organs are impressed; however the images or simulacra give back the object in a manner not always uniform and faithful. Now, how is it possible to distinguish the faithful images or simulacra from those which are not faithful, namely, those which indicate a determined and real object from those which do not correspond to any object or which correspond to an object determined differently? To this question the Epicurean system does not have any response. In fact, if it says that the wise man knows how to distinguish the simulacra from one another, this strategy removes the objectivity of the criterion, and thus we transfer entirely to the subject the decision concerning truth and error."[24] It is evident, therefore, that sensism is not a condition for moving away from subjectivism and relativism.

In the second place, the logic of Epicurus is very weak in the sphere of giving explanations, both generally and particularly, of the processes of inference on which the very possibility of constructing a physics is based (as well as establishing and justifying an ethics). All the propositions of physics that we now set about to explain (as well as many ethical propositions) go beyond immediate empirical control. They are not truths which fall under the senses, but they suppose inferences of reason which, as a guarantee of the truth, have only the absence of contrary testimony, namely, the lack of denial by experience, well explained in the passage read above from Sextus Empiricus. They have, so to say, therefore a very fragile support.

The atoms, the void, the swerve of the atoms are not things which are immediately evident, for the reason that they are not in any way ascertainable to the senses; however, Epicurus says there are things which

are not evident but supposed and opined by giving reasons for phenomena and in accord with phenomena. But that the atoms themselves, the void, and the swerve, etc. are the *sole* and ***unique*** causes which we can assume in order to explain the phenomena, evidently Epicurus is a long way from being about to demonstrate, because other principles wholly diverse from these could equally claim the "absence of contrary testimony" on the part of experience.[25]

Now, why does Epicurus turn to an involvement with Atomism? In our view, Epicurus began from a new moral vision of life emotionally and intuitively arrived at and he *then* chose Atomism, because he judged this doctrine as the best "foundation" for his ethics. The true center of Epicureanism is ethics. The ontology which is developed is so developed only in the measure and in the way in which it serves ethics.

Moreover, it is Epicurus himself who said this almost verbatim in one of his maxims:

> If we were not troubled by our suspicions of the phenomena of the sky and about death, fearing that it concerns us, and also by our failure to grasp the limits of pains and desires, *we should have no need of natural science.*[26]

In this way it becomes clear what we have already pointed out and are going to demonstrate later on: the physics of Epicurus juts out beyond his logic, and in its turn the ethics of Epicurus juts out, in a yet more accentuated measure, beyond his physics. Indeed by reason of the instrumental function and value which our philosopher attributed to physics and to the canonic and their subordination to an ethics that arose in reality from other sources, they end by changing their role as foundation and criteria which they must have and force, in this way, the developments and the results according to the requirements of ethics, and thus overthrow their natural roles. This phenomenon we will repeatedly see, even if in different ways, in the other great schools of the Hellenistic Age.

III. Epicurean Physics

1. The ontological foundations: the characteristics of reality as such, bodies, the void, and the infinite

Let us now examine the physics of Epicurus in a detailed way. The great *Letter to Herodotus*, though it is an epitome and synthesis, permits us to understand in a precise manner both the foundations and the essential corollaries of this part of the Epicurean philosophy, while the fragments of the great treatise *On Nature* so far discovered offer precious analyses of some important concepts.[1] The bases can be summarized and formulated as follows: "Nothing comes from nothing"[2] because otherwise anything would be absurdly generated from anything else without the need of any generator's seed; and nothing "can be dissolved into nothing,"[3] otherwise at this moment all would have already perished and nothing would exist. And because nothing arises and nothing perishes, in this way everything, namely reality in its totality, was always what it is now and will be such always; in fact, beyond the whole there is nothing into which it can change, nor anything into which it can be changed. Here are the precise words of Epicurus:

> When this is clearly understood, it is time to consider generally things which are obscure. To begin with, nothing comes into being out of what is non-existent. For in that case anything would have arisen out of anything, standing as it would in no need of its proper seeds. And if that which disappears had been destroyed and become non-existent, everything would have perished, that into which the things were dissolved being non-existent. Moreover, the sum total of things was always such as it is now, and such it will ever remain. For there is nothing into which it can change. For outside the sum of things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about change.[4]

It is here that the great ancient Eleatic principle is revived which was assumed as a point of departure by the Pluralists and in particular by the Atomists. Epicurus formulated it according to the version belonging to Melissus, whom we know to have been the teacher of the Atomists,[5] though he diluted the richness of the ontology with a more physical and cosmological orientation in his vocabulary.

The "whole" (πᾶν), namely the totality of reality, is determined by two essential constituents: *bodies* and *void*. The existence of bodies is proven by the senses themselves, while the existence of space and the void is inferred from the fact that movement exists. Actually, because movement exists, it is necessary that there be empty space in which bodies can change place. The void is not absolute not-being but rather "space,"

or as Epicurus also says, "an intangible nature." In addition to bodies and the void *tertium non datur* because no other thing is conceivable which is existent in itself and not as an affection of bodies:

> For the existence of *bodies* is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known. And if there were no space which we can also call the *void* and *place*, and *intangible nature*, bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to do. *Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental conception* or on its analogies we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space both are regarded as wholes or separate things (φύσεις), not as the properties or accidents of separate things.[6]

The inference of the void with the related reasons goes back to Leucippus and it rises from the Eleatic problematic and in particular from the anti-Melissean polemic from which it emerges.[7] The resolute denial, then, that in addition to bodies and the void there exists something else rests on the simple Eleatic dogma of *the absolute homogeneity and equality of being*,[8] namely, a categorical exclusion of the possibility of distinguishing levels and diverse meanings of being, in other words, the clear rejection of the reforms of Plato and Aristotle.[9]

Reality as conceived by Epicurus is *infinite*. Firstly, it is an infinity as a *totality*. Our philosopher writes:

> In addition the whole is infinite because whatever is finite has an extreme limit, and such an extreme limit is determined at that point by something else; (but it is not possible to recognize the whole in relation to any other thing); it must therefore be admitted that insofar as the whole does not have an extreme limit it does not have an absolute limit and not having limits it is infinite and unlimited.[10]

Cicero writes:

> Do you not see Epicurus...in what way he deduced the infinity of the universe by referring us to the nature of things we say to be the whole? He says: "whatever is finite has a limit...whatever has a limit is limited by some other thing external to it...but whatever is a whole cannot be limited by anything external.... It does not there have any limit and it follows necessarily that it is infinite.[11]

It is evident, moreover, that because the whole can be infinite, each of its constitutive principles must be infinite. The plurality of bodies must be infinite and extension of the void must be infinite (if the plurality of bodies were finite, they would be spread out in an infinite void, and if the void were finite, it could not receive the infinite bodies). The concept of the infinite in this way returned and imposed itself contrary

to the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions which, in the wake of the Pythagoreans, had been rejected. When viewed speculatively and compared to the ancient Presocratic notion of infinity, the infinity of Epicurus did not offer anything new. It was nothing other than the infinite admitted by Leucippus and Democritus who, in their turn, restated the old Ionic intuition and especially the precise Melissean demonstration of the infinitude of being, of which there was still a clear echo in the very words of Epicurus.[12] However, this presentation of the concept of infinity was not without importance, chiefly in what concerned its influences over the vision of man and of life, as will be noted further on.

2. The atoms

Some "bodies" are composed, others on the contrary are simply and unconditionally indivisible. Only the absolutely indivisible bodies are primary and are something compact and indivisible (the atoms).

The admission of the existence of these *indivisible bodies or atoms* is rendered necessary because, in the contrary case, we would have to admit a divisibility to infinity of bodies which would be, in that case, to admit the dissolution of things into not-being which, as we know, is absurd.[13] The foundation for the admission of the existence of atoms is therefore the Eleatic principle (and more precisely Zeno's) of the impossibility of a division to infinity, which would dissolve being into nothingness.

> Of bodies some are composed, others are the elements which are the sources of the composed bodies. These are indivisible and immutable bodies, *since the whole cannot be dissolved into nothingness*; they possess the capacity to remain unchanged in the course of the dissolution of the composed bodies, having a compact nature and not in any way susceptible of dissolution. The principles constitutive of bodies are therefore of their nature necessarily indivisible.[14]

It is evident from what we said that the principle according to which nothing is generated or destroyed is valid for simple bodies, namely, for the atoms (as well as for the totality as a totality) and not for the composed bodies, which are generated and corrupted. However, *generation* and *corruption* of composed bodies once again are being understood in an Eleatic spirit and in the same way in which the Atomists had understood them (so in general all the Pluralists), as they were preoccupied with the preservation of the phenomena without contradicting the guiding principle of Parmenides,[15] as a *union* of things which are and as a *disaggregation* or *separation* into things that are.

Plutarch writes:

> [The Epicureans] maintain that there is no generation of what was

> not present previously or destruction of what exists, but that generation occurs through the reciprocal joining of each entity and death through their disaggregation.[16]

3. The structural characteristics of the atom

Among the characteristics of bodies it is necessary to distinguish those that belong to *bodies insofar as they are composed* (those which therefore depend on the composition) from those which belong to *simple bodies*, which are primary and essential and hence have the greatest importance, because without them the bodies themselves could not exist and also because from them the further characteristics of composed bodies are derived.

The structural features of the atom are *form* or *figure*, *weight* and *magnitude*, and whatever is naturally connected to figure.[17]

On this point Epicurus differs from the ancient Atomists. They pointed out as structural characteristics of the atoms *figure*, *order* (or spatial disposition which the atoms have in relation to each other both as aggregates and as individuals), and *position* (which an atom has both in the aggregate and in a compound reality).[18] The ancient Atomists—note—do not posit *magnitude* among the primary qualities. They, however, included magnitude in the form; in fact, they indicated the form with the word *rhusmos* (ῥυσμός), which meant *geometrical form* and hence *dimension*, *mass*, *magnitude*. And just as modern scholars have emphasized, the Atomists probably did not even make weight one of the primary qualities: they did use it in their explanation of movement, but in a different way from Epicurus (as we will soon see) and with a particular nuance that in a certain way, once again, the term *rhusmos* can suggest, given that *rhusmos* (which is derived from ῥεῖν = to run) expresses the idea of *dynamic form* (mass, quantity, and magnitude), "namely the form insofar as it tends to join itself to other forms and so gives a direction to the atom."[19] Epicurus expressed, on the contrary, the concept of form with the term *schema* (σχῆμα), which was the term that Aristotle used to render the archaic *rhusmos* of the ancient Atomists. But *schema* means the static ontological form without the inclusion of the idea of physical mass and the dynamic direction of the atom. And thus it is possible to explain why Epicurus felt the need to explicate and add to it the characteristics of *magnitude* and *weight*, leaving aside *order* and *position*, which are characteristics concerning the relations between atoms more than the atoms themselves. The diverse *forms* of the atoms (which are not only regular geometrical forms, but are forms of every manner and type and are, in every case, always and only *quantitatively different* forms and not qualitatively diverse, like Platonic or Aristotelian forms, since the atoms are all of an identical nature) are necessary in

order to explain the diverse phenomenal qualities of things as they seem to us and also in this way the *magnitude* of the atoms (weight, instead, is a necessary condition for the explanation of the movement of the atoms).

Clearly Epicurus says, taking up an Eleatic argument typical of the Pluralists:

> It is necessary also to be convinced that the atoms do not present other properties of the phenomena except *shape*, *weight*, and *magnitude*, and all that which necessarily is connected to shape. For every property tends to change, *while the atoms do not change at all, because it is necessary that something solid and indestructible perdure in the dissolution of composed entities which can cause changes, not changes into not-being or from not-being but changes which happen through the shifting of position of some bodies, and by the addition or subtraction of the atoms*. For this reason it is necessary that the transposed realities be indestructible and they do not have and should not possess the nature of a being subject to change, *but they must possess a mass and a shape of their own and they must of their nature be permanent*. For even in things perceptible to us which change their shape by the withdrawal of matter it is seen that shape remains to them, whereas the qualities do not perdure in the changing subject in the way in which shape is left behind, but are lost from the entire body. Now the atoms left behind are sufficient to cause the differences in composed bodies *since it is necessary that some things should be left behind and [not] be dispersed into nothingness*."[20]

The atoms, in order to generate all the differences which we uncovered in phenomenal realities, must have numerous and diverse shapes but not unlimited ones (for to be infinite would allow for an infinite variety of magnitude; but then it would be visible, which is contrary to what is the case), while the number of the atoms is infinite for each of the existing forms:

> Besides this the indivisible and solid bodies, out of which too the composed bodies are created and into which they are dissolved, have an inconceivable number of varieties in shape: for it is impossible that such great varieties of things should arise from the same atomic shapes, if they are limited in number. And so in each shape the atoms are quite infinite, but only inconceivable in number; ... since there is nothing to prevent the atoms going on to infinity from the viewpoint of their magnitude.[21]
>
> Moreover, we must not either suppose that every magnitude exists among the atoms, in order that the evidence of phenomena may not contradict us, but we must suppose that there are some variations of magnitude. For if this be the case, we can give a better account of what occurs in our feelings and sensations. But the existence of atoms of every magnitude is not required to explain the differences of

> qualities in things, and at the same time some atoms would be bound to come within our ken and be visible; but this is never to be the case, nor is it possible to imagine how an atom could become visible.[22]

This is another point on which Epicurus differed greatly from the ancient Atomists, who maintained instead the infinity of the forms or shapes of the atoms.[23]

4. The doctrine of the "minima"

We have seen that the magnitude of the atoms has a limit: in fact, if they can have any kind of magnitude it would (once having reached a certain magnitude) make them *visible*; but this is denied by experience. Moreover even the smallness of the atoms has a limit: in fact, if the atoms were able to diminish in magnitude indefinitely, they would vanish into nothingness, which is absurd and is contrary to the same Eleatic logic which brought about the admission of the existence of the atoms (as we have already seen).

Moreover, all of the atoms from the smallest to the largest are necessarily, that is, physically and ontologically indivisible. However, the very fact of being *bodies* having a shape and hence extension and with diverse *magnitudes* (though within the two limits indicated above) implies that the atoms have *parts*. (If this were not so, it would make no sense to speak of *small* atoms and of *large* atoms and in general of atoms of *various magnitudes*.) Obviously, it is not a matter of ontologically non-separable *parts*, but of only logically and ideally distinguishable ones, indeed because the atom is necessarily indivisible. And even the magnitude of these atomic *parts*, for the same Eleatic reason which makes it impossible for the atoms to diminish in magnitude to infinity, will halt at a limit which Epicurus calls a "minimum" (τὸ ἐλάχιστον) and which is, as such, *the unit of measurement*.

Epicurus—note—speaks of *minima* not only in reference to atoms, but likewise with respect to space (the void), to time, to movement, and to the *swerve* of the atoms (of which we will speak soon), and in all of these cases, the *minima* are the units of measurement analogically.[24]

This is a notable addition to the physics of the ancient Atomists developed by the founder of the Garden.

5. The structural characteristics of the void

The void has characteristics antithetical to those of bodies. It is space which receives bodies and permits them to move and unite and separate. In fact, it is said to be *void* in contrast to bodies which are *full* (full of being). Moreover, it is possible to explain how the void is also said to have an *intangible nature* insofar as the most typical characteristic of

bodies for Epicurus is their *tangibility* (his sensism leads him to bestow in large measure the characteristics of touch on the other senses). It is also understandable that the void does not possess a capacity for *acting and being acted upon* insofar as these qualities are prerogatives of corporeity: that the void allows bodies to pass through itself without being affected by them results from the fact that it has no qualities. Finally, it is possible to also understand the character of *incorporeity* attributed to the void: if the void were corporeal, bodies, as we said, could not penetrate and move in it:

> Furthermore we must clearly comprehend as well that the incorporeal in the general acceptation of the term is applied to that which could be thought of as such as an independent existent. *Now it is impossible to conceive the incorporeal as a separate existence, except the void*: and the void can neither act nor be acted upon, but only provides opportunity for motion through itself to bodies.[25]

Consequently, to speak of the existence of *incorporeal beings* (which are, for example, Platonic Ideas, divine Intelligence, or the souls) for Epicurus is purely and simply absurd. Being is *wholly homogeneous*, and as we saw above, it is corporeal. No entity can be incorporeal except the void. The conscious rejection of the "second voyage" is once more very apparent.

6. Movement

In addition to the qualities examined which are so to speak *static*, the atoms have a further essential quality of a *dynamic* character. In fact the atoms are *always in continuous movement*. Epicurus understood this original motion of the atoms not as a random going in all directions, the way the ancient Atomists described it, but rather as a falling *motion toward "the bottom"* in infinite space, due to the weight of the atoms, as a very rapid motion equal to the speed of thought and equal for all the atoms, whether they are heavy or light.[26] Such corrections of the conception of the ancient Atomists results in a thoroughly unsound hybrid notion because it shows in a clear fashion that the conception of infinity is irremediably compromised by Epicurus's sensism, which cannot eliminate the empirical apprehension of high and low. But what exactly are the sources of this hybrid conception? V. E. Alfieri has a fine grasp of the issue which he expresses in a page which is appropriate to read here:

> In the first place [a primary source was] the geocentric conception of Aristotle, in which one can only speak of an absolute up and an absolute down; and Epicurus is an unconscious slave to that vision of the world, which is much more in accord with the common way of seeing than with the daring conceptions of the Presocratic philosophers and the Atomists especially, and he cannot free himself from

> that slavishness though affirming the multiplicity of worlds and rejecting the theory of "light" bodies which tend toward the upper areas. Besides facing the possible objection that it is absurd to speak about an absolute high or low, Epicurus has recourse to an argument which is quite valid for anyone always invoking sensation as the most certain evidence and that the direction upward is the ideal line extending above our heads to infinity and the direction downward is the line which extends beneath our feet infinitely: this conception cannot be said to be in any way geocentric but rather it is anthropocentric. Epicurus could not declare on the basis of sensations not only the existence itself of the atoms but also their velocity: in fact here he was constrained to rely on thought and indeed... rapid movement as much as thought defined the free movement of the atoms in the infinite void.[27]

Recently it has been said that "the universe of Epicurus is perpendicular";[28] but even in this cleverly qualified way the Epicurean conception does not lose its aporetic nature: in the very determination as "perpendicular" given to the cosmos are hidden all the contradictions about which we have spoken.

It remains now to see how, by falling in a "perpendicular universe," the atoms can collide with each other and combine in order to establish composite bodies. Why do not the atoms always fall in parallel lines to infinity without ever touching each other?

7. The "clinamen" or "swerve" of the atoms

In order to resolve the difficulty, Epicurus introduces the notion of the "swerve" (παρέγκλισις, *clinamen*) of the atoms according to which the atoms can swerve at any moment of time and at any point in space for a minimum interval from a straight line and thus collide with other atoms. Cicero says:

> [Epicurus] since he understood that if all the bodies were to move from the highest perpendicular region, as we have said, it would be impossible for any atoms to meet with any other, ... he thought up an artful expedient: he said that the atoms can swerve ever so slightly, with a ***minimum change***; and in this way it makes it possible for them to weave in and out, coming together and sticking together, each with the other atoms, from such motions the universe and all of the parts contained in it had their origin. ...[29]

In virtue of the principle of the ***swerve***, the atoms reciprocally collide and tumble and consequently upward motion originates just owing to the collision and tumbling following on the swerve. This ***swerve undoubtedly is the most notable novelty that Epicurus introduced into atomistic physics.*** But it is an innovation which he could only introduce at the price of very

grave aporias, which nevertheless, as such, are extremely eloquent and revealing about the new character of the philosophy of the Garden. The first reason for the introduction of the concept of the "swerve" we have already noted, and it is of a purely physical nature (the simple motion of falling would not allow for the collision of the atoms and the formation of things) and however great its importance is, it must not have been certainly the decisive one, simply because it is a physical cause. On the contrary, a further reason of a moral kind must have been decisive. In the ancient system of Atomism everything occurs *by necessity*: fate and destiny are the absolute sovereigns. But in a world in which destiny predominates there is no place for human liberty, and hence there is no place for a moral life of the kind conceived by Epicurus and hence there is no place for the life of the sage.

Here is how Epicurus writes in opposition to the ruling *necessity* in the system of the ancient Atomists:

> For indeed it were better to believe the myths about the Gods than to become a slave to the destiny of the Physicists. For the myths offer a hope of the possibility of placating the Gods by honoring them, while in fate there is an implacable necessity.[30]

So there is no doubt that the *swerve* has been introduced in order to make a place in the atomistically conceived universe for liberty, for the moral life, and for the possibility of the actualization of the ideal of the sage. To such a degree was Epicurus interested in opening an ontological space for these moral values that he was not concerned with the gravity of the consequences which the introduction of the concept produced in the physical sphere. Perhaps he did not even perceive that it, like a solid wedge violently inserted, provoked such a split in the atomistic system that it indeed shattered it into pieces.

About this contradiction the ancients were, to a large extent, quite aware. Cicero writes:

> Epicurus introduces this theory because he was afraid that, by admitting that the atom is always moved by the natural and necessary cause of its weight, we would not have any liberty, since our soul is moved in this manner just as the motions of the atoms are constrained to move. Democritus, the first to introduce the notion of the atom, preferred instead to accept this consequence, which is that everything occurs through necessity, rather than remove from the indivisible bodies their natural motion.[31]

Again:

> [Epicurus] states: "the atoms have swerve." In the first place, why? Democritus had conceived the atoms as having another energizing

> force which he called "force of collision"; for you, Epicurus, motion depends exclusively on gravity and weight. What is therefore the extraordinary reason in nature which provoked the swerve of the atom? Is it perhaps they themselves draw lots among themselves which deviate and which do not? And why swerve for only a minimal interval and not two or three intervals? All this is the expression of a mere wish and not a worked-out position. You did not in fact say that the atom moves from its place and swerves because it is forced from the outside; not that in the empty void in which the atom moves there exists such a cause which impedes the perpendicular motion from high to low; nor that in the atom itself there is verified a change such that makes it abandon the natural movement following on its weight. Therefore, simply not having endowed any cause with the capacity to give a place to this swerving Epicurus had formulated an important theory, while in reality he makes a statement which reason rejects and universally disdains.[32]

Previously the Stoics, as Plutarch writes, objected, and with good reason, that the *swerve* supposes in the ultimate analysis a coming-into-being from not-being, since it was without cause:

> The Stoics did not concede to Epicurus that the atom had even a minimum of swerve because they say that in this way he ***introduces a movement without a cause, generating it from not-being.***[33]

Moreover, we can also add that this is even more grave because of the fact that Epicurus repeatedly and energetically appealed to the principle that "nothing can come from nothing." In this way Epicurus, in order to introduce the *swerve*, contradicts the Eleatic principle which, as we have seen, stands at the base of his physics, and in order to find shelter from Necessity, from Fate, and Destiny, he puts the cosmos at the mercy of *chance*; in fact the *swerve*, which is not bound by law nor rules of any kind, is certainly not liberty, because it is estranged from any finality and any intelligence and hence it is only a mere *causality*: liberty cannot be sought nor found in the sphere of the physical and material, but only in the superior sphere of the spiritual. Nevertheless, as we said, these same aporias are among the things which, better than any others, help us to understand the complexity and true stature of the thought of Epicurus.

8. The universe and infinite worlds

In the totality of the infinite (as previously for the ancient Atomists and contrary to Plato and Aristotle),[34] Epicurus maintained the existence of an infinite number of worlds, some equal or analogous to our own, others dissimilar. Epicurus expressly writes:

> Furthermore there are infinite worlds both like and unlike this world of ours. For the atoms being infinite in number, as was proved already, are born on far out into space. For these atoms, which are of such a nature that a world could be created out them or made by them, have not been used up either on one world or on a limited number of worlds, nor again on all the worlds alike, or on those which are different from these. So that there nowhere exists an obstacle to the infinite number of the worlds.[35]

Next it is necessary to point out that all these infinite worlds arise and are disassembled, some more rapidly and others more slowly, in the duration of time. The worlds are thus infinite not only in the infinitude of space in a given moment of time, but they are likewise infinite in the infinity of temporal succession. And, notwithstanding in every instance there are worlds which are born and worlds which die, Epicurus can correctly affirm, as we have previously stated, that the totality does not change. In fact, not only do the constitutive elements of the universe remain permanently as they are, but even all their possible combinations are always actuated just because of the infinitude of the universe which always originates the actuation of all possibilities.

And here is how Epicurus conceived each of these worlds:

> A world is a circumscribed portion of sky, containing heavenly bodies and an earth and all the heavenly phenomena, whose dissolution will cause all within it to fall into confusion: it is a piece cut off from the infinite and ends in a boundary either rare or dense, either revolving or stationary: its outline may be spherical or triangular, or any kind of shape. For all such conditions are possible seeing that no phenomenon is evidence against this in our world, in which it is not possible to perceive an ending.[36]

The birth of new worlds can take place either in the space that separates world from world and which Epicurus called an interworld, or even within any world, when this is on its way to being disassembled. It is determined by the increase of atoms being formed appropriately, coming from other interworlds or from other worlds. These at first are produced in virtue of their motions, as we know; next, this accretion of atoms increases because of groups of atoms of the right type which then continue to increase, finally bringing them to completion. Then, after having reached a point beyond which they cannot increase, and thus an equilibrium, they begin to lose atoms and hence to decrease and finally disassemble, and the atoms out of which they were composed pass on to generate new worlds.[37]

Here is an ancient testimony which describes how our world developed according to Epicurus:

> The world hence developed by being formed in a curved shape wholly internal in the following way: because the indivisible bodies have unforeseeable and casual movements, and move continually and with the greatest speed, because of this many of them are in a great variety of magnitude and [weight] and shape, and gather in the same place. Gathering hence all together in the same place some, those bigger and heavier, are deposited at a point further below; those on the contrary which were small and round and smooth and slippery are pushed away by the pouring in of the other atoms and are shot up high. Since the repelling force ceases which raised them and the thrust no longer propels them on high but also they found obstacles to being pushed below, they become compressed toward a suitable place and collect those toward the periphery: and on these are placed about the multitude of such bodies that they interweave one with the others according to a curved line, thus the origin of the heaven. The atoms then were of various kinds, as is now said, having the same nature, forced toward the space on high they form the nature of the stars. Besides the multitude of the atoms which ascend as by evaporation, struck and compress the air; the air in its turn, becomes wind by the received motion and wraps up all the stars together, dragging them around with itself and in its turn imparting to them in the high space a rotary movement, which even now perdures. Consequently, from the atoms positioned below, the earth originated; from those rising in the high space, the heavens came, fire, and air. But because on the earth there is yet a great accumulating material which is condensed through the thrust of the winds and the vapor of the stars, all that in it was made up of minute parts was later compressed and produced the liquid nature. This, being a fluid, sent toward hollow places appropriate to their assemblage and containment, either water, deposited by itself, or excavated from being below. The more important parts of the world, hence, were formed in the aforesaid manner.[38]

This universe of Epicurus is one in which the negation not only of every finality but also of every teleology is forced to its extreme limit, beyond even the limits to which the Atomists themselves were forced. Actually, the teleological explanations of the cosmos were developed after the school of Abdera, chiefly due to Plato and Aristotle. Epicurus wished to deny just these explanations and in a special way the Platonic construct of the Demiurge, the artificer of the world. It is clear, therefore, how from this same polemical counter-position to the new strongly teleological positions the renewal of the mechanistic view of the Abderites was to take on a new meaning. But, as we have previously noted and as a result of what we have said in this paragraph, Epicurean mechanistic views, having abandoned the notion of necessity by means of the theory of the "swerve" which was dominant in the systems of the Abderites,

remained deprived also of that type of rationality which is bound to necessity. In fact it is undeniable that necessity had its rule, its logic, and in this sense, its reason (the logic of not-being-able-to-be-otherwise). But by destroying the Demiurge, who is transcendent Reason, and destroying Necessity with its immanent reason, all that remains is the casual and the fortuitous, which are irrational. And the Epicurean cosmos remains wholly consigned to them. Epicurus, and not Democritus, is the philosopher who truly "posits the world as coming into being by chance." In this way the cosmos ceases to be the realization of an intelligible model in the sensible due to the goodness of a Demiurge, or that wonderful order established by the movements caused by the perfection of a God. The antithesis between Epicurean cosmology and that of Plato in the *Timaeus* or that of the Aristotelian *Treatise on the Cosmos* (for the most part taken from the exoteric works of Aristotle) could not be more radical.[39]

9. Celestial phenomena and their multiple explanations

In the explanation of reality and of the causes of the cosmos and of the worlds in general, Epicurus is guided constantly by his concern to demonstrate that the whole does not depend on a God or Gods or even on Necessity, but only on the principles we have analyzed above, which are the only ones which liberate human beings from all fears and allow them to act in an absolute area of freedom. The same preoccupation guided Epicurus in the explanation of *particular celestial phenomena*. But in relation to such phenomena our philosopher unexpectedly changes methodology, maintaining the curious *principle of the multiplicity of possible explanations*. Now, this principle states that *particular physical phenomena* can have individually different and multiple causes. Excluding those phenomena which can be caused by the Gods or by fatal Necessity, numerous explanations can be maintained and accepted as plausible and satisfactory.

Epicurus expressly writes in the *Letter to Pythocles*, which is concerned, indeed, with this issue:

> In the first place, remember that, like everything else, knowledge of celestial phenomena, whether taken along with other things or in isolation, has no other end in view than peace of mind and firm conviction. We do not seek to wrest by force what is impossible, nor to understand all matters equally well, nor make our treatment always as clear as when we discuss human life or explain the principles of physics in general—for instance, that the whole of being consists of bodies and intangible nature, or that the ultimate elements of things are indivisible, or any other proposition which admits only one explanation of the phenomena to be possible. *But this is not the case*

> *with celestial phenomena: these at any rate admit of manifold causes for their occurrence and manifold accounts, none of them contradictory of sensation, of their nature.* For in the study of nature we must not conform to empty assumptions and arbitrary laws, but follow the promptings of the facts; for our life has no need now of unreason and false opinion; our one need is untroubled existence. All things go on uninterruptedly, if all be explained by the method of plurality of causes in conformity with the facts, so soon as we duly understand what may be plausibly alleged respecting them. But when we pick and choose among them, rejecting one equally consistent with the phenomena, we clearly fall away from the study of nature altogether and tumble into myth.[40]

Consequently, Epicurus presents a whole array of possible explanations of various phenomena relative to the sun and moon, comets, falling stars, clouds, winds, lightning, thunder, earthquakes, and to other phenomena of this type, explanations, in his words, that are all equally possible and conform to the phenomena and thus are methodologically plausible.

The opposite attitude that Epicurus assumes in the explanation of the *principal phenomena* of nature and in the explanation of *particular phenomena* has been the object of a great deal of criticism and perplexity, but the reasons given have not always been accurate.

First it is necessary to emphasize that the explanation of physical phenomena (and in particular of the phenomena listed above), by means of a multiplicity of causes, had been previously and systematically followed by Theophrastus, as we have said above.[41] The Arabic-Syriac extracts of the *Meteorologia* of Theophrastus confirm this fact in a lucid manner.[42] It is hence undoubtedly true that Epicurus, on this point, is indebted to Theophrastus. Moreover, it is necessary to emphasize that in the position of the scholarch of the Peripatos the pluralistic explanation of physical phenomena agrees, in great part, with his metaphysics because, as we have seen, he proceeds with an analogous method and does not even hesitate to discuss (even if then he does not have the courage to accept it) the hypothesis of a cosmic soul as a possible alternative to the thesis of the immobile movent, which would equally well explain eternal movement. In short, Theophrastus, in the sphere of ontology, generates aporias more than certitudes and, in general, his concerns are outside of this sphere, and are almost entirely concerned with the sciences (we can say that he is a metaphysician or an ontologist only *per accidens*).[43]

Now in the case of Epicurus, his discourse is decidedly different. His ontology is tenaciously dogmatic. The ultimate explanations of reality are unique and are such as not to allow the admission of alternative explanations. The unicity of the supreme causes does not seem to leave

room for a multiplicity of causes of physical phenomena. Actually, our philosopher, in order to justify the different behavior of physical phenomena, cannot make an appeal to plausible reasons: not to the *swerve*, which can always vary the causation of phenomena, nor to *the infinitude of the cosmos*, which in its innumerable combinations can cause the same phenomena in different ways, because it would not be clear how these reasons have value *only for some, and not for all such, phenomena*. The truth is that for Epicurus the explanation of particular phenomena, that is, physics in the strict sense, is of absolutely no interest. He is interested only in gaining through its study the negative thesis that phenomena are *not* caused by an intelligent agent, by Divine beings, just as they are not produced by Necessity, while he was wholly indifferent to the positive, detailed, objective, and disinterested scientific explanation of them. Scientific interest in the modern sense was totally foreign to Epicurus. But this is more than just a critical negative remark, it must be considered as a statement of the essential structure: Epicurus has completely understood that the problem of living—which he thought was the only authentic problem—could not be resolved by scientific explanations of particular phenomena, by what we today call "Science"; happiness and peace of mind can be derived only from an ultimate explanation of things, from the uncovering of the truth concerning the primary and supreme principles of reality in their totality, thus a science of the primary and supreme causes, by ontology. But let us listen to the exact words of our philosopher in this matter, stated in the *Letter to Herodotus*, which is quite important:

> Nay more: we are bound to believe that in the sky revolutions, solstices, eclipses, risings and settings, and the like take place without the ministration or command, either now or in the future, of any being who at the same time enjoys perfect bliss along with immortality. For troubles and anxieties and feelings of anger and partiality do not accord with bliss, but always imply weakness and fear and dependence upon one's neighbors. Nor, again, must we hold that things which are no more than globular masses of fire, being at the same time endowed with bliss, assume these motions at will. Nay, in every term we use we must hold fast to all the majesty which attaches to such notions as bliss and immortality, lest the terms should generate opinions inconsistent with this majesty. Otherwise such inconsistency will of itself suffice to produce the worst disturbance in our minds. Hence, where we find phenomena invariably recurring, the invariableness of the recurrence must be ascribed to the original interception and conglomeration of atoms whereby the world was formed.
>
> Further, we must hold that to arrive at accurate knowledge of the cause of things of most moment is the business of natural science,

and that happiness depends on this (viz., on the knowledge of celestial and atmospheric phenomena), and upon knowing what the heavenly bodies really are, and any kindred facts contributing to exact knowledge in this respect.

Further, we must recognize on such points as this no plurality of causes or contingency, but must hold that nothing suggestive of conflict or disquiet is compatible with an immortal and blessed nature. And the mind can grasp the absolute truth of this. But when we come to subjects for special inquiry, there is nothing in the knowledge of risings and settings and solstices and eclipses and all kindred subjects that contributes to our happiness; but those who are well-informed about such matters and yet are ignorant of what the heavenly bodies really are, and what are the most important causes of phenomena, feel quite as much fear as those who have no such special information—nay, perhaps even greater fear, when the curiosity excited by this additional knowledge cannot find a solution or understand the subordination of these phenomena to the highest causes.

Hence, if we discover more than one cause that may account for solstices, settings and risings, eclipses and the like, as we did also in particular matters of detail, we must not suppose that our treatment of these matters fails of accuracy, so far as it is needful to ensure our tranquillity and happiness. When, therefore, we investigate the causes of celestial and atmospheric phenomena, as of all that is unknown, we must take into account the variety of ways in which analogous occurrences happen within our experience; while as for those who do not recognize the difference between what is or comes about from a single cause and that which may be the effect of any one of several causes, overlooking the fact that the objects are only seen at a distance, and are moreover ignorant of the conditions that render, or do not render, peace of mind impossible—If then we think that an event could happen in one or other particular way out of several, we recognize that it actually comes about in more ways than one as if we knew that it happens in this particular way.

There is yet one more point to seize, namely, that the greatest anxiety of the human mind arises through the belief that the heavenly bodies are blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and causality inconsistent with this belief; and through expecting or apprehending some everlasting evil, either because of the myths, or because we are in dread of the mere insensibility of death, as if it had to do with us; and through being reduced to this state not by conviction but by a certain irrational perversity, so that, if men do not set bounds to their terror, they endure as much or even more intense anxiety than the man whose views on these matters are quite vague. But mental tranquillity means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths.[44]

The meaning of such statements, when they are really seen, has a much deeper significance than is generally acknowledged. The distinction between a science which explains the totality of the real, searching for and finding its supreme causes, and which allows for only a single and incontrovertible explanation, and a science of particular phenomena and their individual causes which allows for equivocal and even opposed explanations, would be to really see that it corresponds, it would seem, to the distinction between the science of *first philosophy* and the science of *second philosophy*, between metaphysics, or better, *ontology*, and a true and proper *physics*. This is a distinction that Epicurus, after the explicit rejection of the results of the Platonic "second voyage," no longer has a way to ground, from a theoretical point of view, but which *de facto* the force of things constrains him to re-introduce. It is a so much more interesting distinction because it is a method, worked out without any ambiguity, for grasping the knowledge of particular phenomena, which is the type and kind of object of knowledge which today is dealt with by the sciences. Epicurus has understood quite well that in the decisions regarding the moral choices of human beings there is involved *a knowledge of the totality in which man alone is placed ontologically and that determinant can be therefore solely the knowledge of the causes of this totality and nothing else.* This intuition can still be significant for modern man, who after decades of indiscriminate exaltation of the omnipotence of science has begun to perceive that science does not resolve his basic problems, quite the reverse, in many respects it has exacerbated them.

10. Soul, its materiality and mortality

The soul, as everything else, is an aggregate of atoms, an aggregation formed in part of *fiery*, *gaseous*, and *windy* atoms, which are the irrational and alogical parts of the soul, and in part of atoms which are *diverse* from the others and which do not have a specific name, which constitute the rational part.[45] Therefore the soul, like the other aggregates, *is not eternal, but mortal.* This consequence is a necessary inference from the materialistic premises of the system. We have in fact fully seen, in the preceding volume, how the concept of immortality can be uniquely gauged in terms of the concept of the supersensible, the spiritual, the immaterial and incorporeal. But after the loss of the results of the *second voyage*, Epicurus cannot even understand the meaning of the *incorporeal* in the Platonic or Aristotelian sense of the term. Here are his own words:

> Hence those who maintain that the soul is incorporeal speak foolishly: if it were so, it could neither act nor be acted upon, while we can clearly see both these properties in the soul.[46]

But remember that the truth, forcefully suppressed, gets decisively

re-evaluated. Epicurus, in the wake of Plato and Aristotle, corrects the psychology of the ancient Atomists by distinguishing a rational and an irrational part of the soul. But it is precisely through this distinction that the truth which was denied is affirmed. Epicurus, in fact, knew exactly how to characterize the atoms which constitute the irrational part of the soul as *windy* and *fiery* (since they are the more subtle and mobile atoms of those that exist); ***but he did not know how to characterize the atoms which constitute the rational part of the soul.*** He writes, in fact:

> Next, keeping in view our perceptions and feelings, we must recognize generally that the soul is a corporeal thing, composed of fine particles, dispersed all over the frame, most nearly resembling wind with an admixture of heat, in some respects like wind, in others like heat. ***But, again, there is the third part which exceeds the other two in the fineness of its particles and thereby keeps closer touch with the rest of the frame.*** And this is shown by the mental faculties and feelings, by the ease with which the mind moves, and by thoughts, and by all those things the loss of which causes death.[47]

It is clearly evident, here, that a ***qualitative difference*** has been surreptitiously introduced, more or less covertly, which the atomic theory cannot justify. Plutarch noted:

> The part with which the soul judges, remembers, loves, hates, in general the thinking part or reason, [the Epicureans] say in fact is composed of a substance without a name. And we know this nameless substance is nothing other except a confession of shameless ignorance, based on the fact that it does not know how to name what it does not succeed in comprehending.[48]

But the aporetic nature of the Epicurean psychology is yet more striking in the light of these further considerations. The admission of the existence of atoms which differ greatly in subtlety from atoms even so subtle as those which are airy and fiery, in order to explain the true and proper nature of the soul would seem to logically imply the admission of the ***originating source*** of the nature of the soul as a prerogative of these special atoms. On the contrary, Epicurus insists on saying that the soul is a soul and has its typical psychic functions, and in particular its ability to sense only if and when it is a body. When the body dies, the atoms which constituted the soul are dispersed and all sense capacity disappears as well as emotions, thought, and consciousness. But the unity of the soul, which is the unity of consciousness and hence of the person, is not a unity which is caused by aggregation and the sum of the parts, since it is original and uncombined: but it is just this that Epicurus is at a loss to explain. To understand Epicurus, what V. E. Alfieri notes in

detail in relation to the ancient Atomists is helpful: "...the Atomists did not succeed in explaining either that which is unitary and synthetic in the fact of consciousness or the unity of the individual as a person. Their pluralism begins, it is true, from the one and proceeds, as we have said, from the logical multiplication of unity; but that unity which is the atom is the lower limit of being, however, not the concrete, rich, and individual kind of being. Abstract qualitative individuality of a mathematical type, although projected into the physical world, does not come to an explanation of individual realities, however these ought to be conceived; with physicalism and mechanistic thinking there is no explanation of the spiritual, because in whatever way we may conceive what in a completely generic sense we designated as spirituality, the immateriality of its being and of its acting does not allow itself to be led back to simple mechanical manifestations of matter. It is true that the Atomists, with the admission as primary (at least in the already formed cosmos) of the fiery character of the atoms of the soul [and for Epicurus, still worse, with the admission also of very special atoms which constitute the rational part of the soul],...could believe that they had sufficiently explained the specific nature of the soul in comparison to other bodies. But their substance-soul remained always a multiplicity of juxtaposed atoms and in addition a flowing multiplicity: it did not constitute a true unity and so it remained inexplicable that human beings or animate beings in general can be centers of consciousness. In such an excess of individuals which were elementary individuals, the higher individuality remained without explanation, and especially that individual center which we designate by the term 'I'."[49] But after Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle the lack of explanation, in a way different from the Atomists, in Epicurus means the disappearance of the meaning of some results of inestimable value.

11. The likenesses and knowledge

Sensation and, in general, cognitive processes are explained by Epicurus according to a model taken again from the Atomists (which, as we have seen was in part common also to Empedocles). *Images* or *simulacra* (εἴδωλα) which reproduce their features emanate from all things and by penetrating into us produce not only sensations but thoughts as well. Here is how Epicurus characterizes these *eidola*:

> Again, there are outlines or films, which are of the same shape as solid bodies, but of a thinness far exceeding that of any object that we see. For it is not impossible that there should be found in the surrounding air combinations of this kind, materials adapted for expressing the hollowness and thinness of surfaces, and effluxes preserving the same relative position and motion which they had in

> the solid objects from which they come. To these films we give the name of "images" or "idols."[50]

These effluxes, because of their fineness, expand in all directions with the speed of thought[51] and by penetrating into us they allow us to feel as well as think. Sensible perceptions, as we already know, are veracious in fact in the measure in which they are direct apprehensions of the simulacra which come from things and give us anew their reality.[52]

In an analogous manner Epicurus explains the fantastic apprehensions of dreams and deleriums. In fact, he says that the simulacra can be maintained for a long time, preserving the disposition and order that the atoms had in the things from which they come, but they can also disassemble, deform, or reassemble combining themselves also with simulacra of other things. It is these isolated simulacra, deformed, disassembled or uncombined, which provoke the apprehension of dreams, deleriums, and fantasies. In any case, therefore, our apprehensions are generated by the simulacra; they are not something derived from inside us, but they are always the objective image of something from the outside of us. Even thought is explained on the basis of the action of the simulacra, but in a less clear way. In particular Epicurus cannot give a reason for the activity of thinking and its autonomy with respect to sensation. Yet Epicurus admits that, together with the psychic motion produced in the soul by perceptions, there is also produced another special psychic motion conjoined *to perception, but which can in a certain way be distinguished from it.* This special motion gives rise to opinion and consequently, as we already know, also the possibility of error.[53] But it is an admission which is not examined, just as the problem of consciousness and self-knowledge is not probed. The doctrine of the simulacra actually does not allow Epicurus to give a plausible response to the problem.

And in this way, for analogous reasons, Epicurus is not able from the theoretical perspective to explain the nature of liberty and free will which nevertheless is the central presupposition of his ethics. As we have already had occasion to note, without the concept of the spiritual it is impossible to determine the concepts of liberty and free will. He can do nothing but invoke the principle of the *swerve* of the atoms but when this is carried over into the soul and understood in the way seen above, it loses any possibility of being an explanation.

12. The conception of the Gods and the Divine

In this universe exclusively constituted by atoms, the void, falling motion, and the *swerve*, in this physicalistic vision which resolves everything into elementary material components and which categorically rejects the spiritual, there is no place for the activity of Divinity or

Divine beings. Moreover, Epicurus proposes as one of his essential aims to liberate mankind from the fear of the Gods. As a consequence we would expect either to hear Epicurus reject the notion of the Divine or to speak of Divinity at most as an attribute of the indestructible and eternal atoms; in other words, we would expect at most affirmations of the same tenor as those found in the ancient Physicist who made the Divine coincide with the natural principle or principles of all things.

Instead it is not so, and the position that our philosopher takes is a total surprise.

Epicurus did not resolutely deny the existence of the Divine and the Gods, but he rejected the existence of the Divine and the Gods as they were commonly understood, and contrary to such representations he was the foremost exponent of a new and revolutionary conception, contrary not only to the way of imagining them by the people and the poets, but likewise to the way of thinking about them by the philosophers. Actually, as we will immediately see, Epicurean theology is somewhat eccentric in comparison to all Greek theology, although maintaining some traits proper to Hellenic thought.

a) Let us begin with the polemic against the Gods of popular religion. Here is a very explicit text of Epicurus:

> First believe that God is a living being immortal and blessed, according to the notion of a God indicated by the common sense of mankind; and so believing, thou shalt not affirm of him aught that is foreign to his immortality or that agrees not with blessedness, but shalt believe about him whatever may uphold both his blessedness and his immortality. For verily there are Gods, and the knowledge of them is manifest; but they are not such as the multitude believe, seeing that men do not steadfastly maintain the notions they form respecting them. Not the man who denies the Gods worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the Gods what the multitude believes about them is truly impious. For the utterances of the multitude about the Gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions; hence it is that the greatest evils happen to the wicked and the greatest blessings happen to the good from the hand of the Gods, seeing that they are always favorable to their own good qualities and take pleasure in men like unto themselves, but reject as alien whatever is not of their kind.[54]

Let us leave aside for now the explanation of particular statements which we will give below; we first wish to explicate the presuppositions that this solid stand against the Gods of popular faith implies.

Since the time of Homer, and even before, it was a firm conviction among the Greeks that good and bad fortune, good results and bad results among humans, depended fundamentally on the Gods, on their

good will or their ill-will. For the whole period in which the polis had enjoyed great favor, the Greeks believed in the Gods who protected the polis and who effectively ruled its destiny: there were Gods to pray to, supplicate, placate, implore according to the circumstances, because they were thought perpetually to benefit or harm, and were considered as the primary causes and authors of great misfortunes, as well as of great public fortune. After the crisis of the polis and the consequent crises of the Gods of the polis, if the Greeks had ceased to believe in an intervention of the Gods in the destiny of the city-state, nevertheless they continued to believe in the intervention of the Gods in the destiny of the individual.

The Hellenistic Age, in fact, if it presented manifestations of scepticism and unbelief, also presented a "return to ancient pieties"[55] and the accentuation of the superstitious traits of believers. Now, it is clear that those who are convinced of the capricious nature of Divine intervention would be compelled to interpret all misfortunes as Divine punishments for their faults and their failures; they will be made anxious and grieve profoundly as a result and, thus will be unhappy. In addition, if they also believed in the immortality of the soul, they would not cease to fear the punishment of the Gods even after death.

Now, according to Epicurus, this error is exactly the one into which the vulgar understanding of the Gods fell: ***the belief that the Gods are concerned and preoccupied with human beings and their lives whether public or private.*** For Epicurus it was exactly true to say the contrary; he affirmed in fact:

> ...that every being who belongs to the Divine species is such as not to provoke in us any disturbance, and that it is free from all that which arouses fear....[56]

Cicero also writes:

> Divinity in fact does not act, nor is it implicated in the concerns of destiny, nor does it lavish attention on any work; it enjoys its wisdom and virtue and knows with absolute certainty that it will always be immersed in both the most excellent and eternal pleasures.[57]

b) What is the nature of the error in the philosophical representations of divinity? We will understand the thought of Epicurus better if we remember that the philosophical representations that he has targeted for criticism are those of the final period of Plato and those derived from the exoteric works of Aristotle. It is the conception of God as a demiurgic craftsman of the cosmos, the conception which saw in the celestial entities many Divine beings endowed with life and intelligence, that conception which had produced the birth of a philosophic religion in which the learned took refuge: the so-called religion of the cosmic God. Well then,

the error into which this representation of divinity fell is the same error as in popular religion and, in addition, for Epicurus the error is further compounded. In fact, both attribute to the Gods the care and concerns derived from the construction and government of the world. Moreover, not being capricious Gods as those of popular belief but Gods who rule the world with constant laws and rules, they are consequently supporters of the much abhorred necessity. Therefore, the Gods are not the cause of the cosmos, nor of celestial bodies, nor are they identifiable with these celestial bodies, as we read in a passage from the *Letter to Herodotus* quoted above.[58]

But what were the reasons, then, for Epicurus to accept the Gods; on what bases if he did not rely either on popular belief or on the arguments of the Physicists or on those bound up with the second voyage of Plato?

Here are his arguments:

[1] We have evident (ἐναργὴς γνῶσις) knowledge of the Gods and evidence, as we know from logic, is always unassailable.[59]

[2] This evident knowledge is possessed not only by some but by all human beings of all times and places, even the uncivilized.[60]

[3] This knowledge is precisely a *prolepsis or precognition* and as such is produced by objective *eidola* or simulacra which, in their turn, can only come from their respective realities even if these are outside of the range of our senses. Cicero writes:

> Only Epicurus first of all understood that the Gods must belong to us because nature itself has impressed the notion of them on the souls of all men. For what nation or what tribe of human beings is there but possesses it untaught and does not at least have the precognition of the Divine, that precognition which Epicurus called πρόληψις? ...[61]

[4] Reality in its infinitude is governed by the law of equilibrium or of compensation (ἰσονομία) which requires the existence of Divine beings. Cicero writes:

> The greatest is then the essence of the infinite and highly worthy of the greatest diligence and attention; it is necessary to understand the good as such for it is to its nature that all things correspond exactly to each other, equal things to equal things. Epicurus called this (ἰσονομία), that is, uniform distribution. From this principle it follows that if the multitude of human beings be so many, and not less, so must be the number of immortal Gods; and if the forces of destruction are innumerable, infinite, so must the forces be which are preserving things.[62]

[5] Finally, Epicurus must have appealed to a kind of argument *ex*

gradibus [from degrees]. Cicero writes, in fact, that Epicurus affirmed the existence of the Gods, because he maintained as necessary the existence of a highest nature, *to which nothing is superior*:

> *For he [Epicurus] affirms that there are Gods because it is necessary that there be present some nature with respect to which nothing is better.*[63]

But if these reasons at first glance seem clear, they immediately become obscure when we wonder what nature these Gods of Epicurus can possess. On this point, our philosopher does not cease to astonish us. The Gods have shapes analogous to those of human beings, because the human shape is the most beautiful one presented by nature. But here is what Cicero says that Epicurus added:

> And yet this their shape [*scil.* of the Gods] is not a body but *almost a body*, it is not blood but *almost blood*....[64]

It is scarcely necessary to point out that here the "almost" ruined all the philosophical reasoning and laid irreparably bare the insufficiency of atomistic materialism. Like every other thing the Gods must be constituted of atoms; but each atomically composed thing was susceptible of dissolution, while the Gods were immortal. Well then, to affirm that the atomistically composed entities which constituted the Gods contrarily to all other things did not dissolve because their losses (which they undergo with the continuous flow of the atoms which form the simulacra) are continually made up, did nothing more than shift the problem. In fact there was no way of explaining the reason for the privileged status of these composites. Then, to Epicurus, nothing remained except that aporetic notion "quasi-body," which in reality revealed the inexorable structural incapacity of atomism to explain the Gods. But there is more. In a fragment we read:

> In the work *On the Gods* he [Epicurus] says do not leave access for doubt that the being which possesses a perfected nature ought to be perceptible with the intellect and not be conceived completely as sensible.[65]

From this, therefore, it is clearly ascertainable that, with respect to the atoms which we have seen constituted the rational soul, so also in this case Epicurus surreptitiously introduced the intelligible. Actually the assertion read has significance only if we conceive intellect and sense as having a diverse nature, in a non-materialistic and non-sensistic sense, since for sensism the intellect cannot be something superior but only feeble and attenuated and what it grasps can never be anything meta-sensible or meta-empirical.

What we have tried to demonstrate in the course of this work is now, more than ever, evident. From this Epicurean position, we cannot go back to the second Platonic voyage even if a rational discourse on God is desired, which means that without the category of the spiritual, God cannot be apprehended except by falling into the most obvious contradictions.

Everything which Epicurus said about the Gods confirmed loudly what we are asserting. The Gods were quite numerous: there were at least as many as human beings, they were divided into masculine and feminine beings, they lived in the interworld conversing and speaking a language like Greek (which is the language of sages), and they passed eternity in the enjoyment of their wisdom and their companionship, without disturbances and worries of any kind, in a sphere totally closed off from the vicissitudes of the worlds, human beings, and all those things which live and die.[66]

As we said, the conception of the Gods of Epicurus is eccentric in comparison to all the notions that previous Greek thought had developed. Popular belief had admitted the Gods in order to explain life and human happenings, while the philosophers admitted the Divinity in order to explain the cosmos and reality. Epicurus rejected these two reasons which constituted the axes upon which the belief in the Gods and Divinity turned. But, at the same time, he maintained some precisely Hellenic characteristics taken from ancient theological thought, although these qualities were more aporetic. From popular belief he drew his anthropomorphism, going beyond Xenophanes; from the philosophical conception of Aristotle he drew the conviction about the impassibility of the Gods, which we have discussed at length in its appropriate place,[67] which is a source of insuperable difficulties.

Tell me what God you have and I will tell you what you are, said Goethe. But the principle is also reversible: tell me what you are and I will tell you what God you have. Epicurus was not a metaphysician, nor was he a physicist in the ancient sense; as a result of this he did not link his notion of God to his ontology and his physics, which in his system played the role of supporting his ethics. As his profound concern was fundamentally ethical, so also his conception of God had an ethical quality: his God, in the ultimate analysis, was the ideal of his ethics objectivized and hypostatized. His Gods, who lived an eternal life free of worry and disturbance, enjoyed profound conversations in the company of friends, were in fact the projection of the ideal of the Garden, and were the pattern writ-large which perfectly reproduced the qualities and the ways the Epicurean school taught human beings the happy life, which we will examine in the next chapter.

And when Epicurus proclaimed that the Gods are to be honored, even if they have not generated us nor in any way cared for us, simply for

their majesty, superiority, and excellence,[68] he was a long way from the moral fault of hypocrisy or conformism which some of the ancients charged. He said things about which he was thoroughly convinced. The honor to the Gods meant in the ultimate analysis honor to the ideal of life that was proclaimed to human beings from the Garden and which constituted the key to its very existence.[69]

IV. Epicurean Ethics

1. Pleasure as the foundation of ethics

We have seen that the physics of Epicurus jutted decisively out beyond the limits established by his logic. In an analogous manner, and perhaps still more—and even this we have previously noted—his ethics jutted beyond the parameters fixed by his physics. Naturally, we do not wish to deny that there are many points in which the ethics of our philosopher is in agreement with his logic and his physics; however, some of the most characteristic aspects of his ethics are destroyed, especially the spiritual climate that entirely characterizes it, which goes quite beyond the sphere of sensism and atomism. This explains rather neatly the reason why his ethics was subject to opposite interpretations. Chiefly in antiquity, it was claimed that Epicurean ethics was nothing but a popular and even repugnant hedonism; in recent times, on the contrary, some denied that it is even accurate to speak of Epicurean hedonism.

Let us try to reconstruct in a methodical way the thought of our philosopher.

Moral philosophy, beginning from Socrates, as we have seen, had completely determined the parameters of ethics. It had to establish what the nature of man is, what his proper *arete* is, his specific goodness, and hence his way of living in order to achieve this goodness which makes him happy. Now from Socrates to Aristotle moral speculation unanimously established that the *moral good* of man is nothing other than the actuation of his essence, the realization of what he is, and that happiness is achieved always and only through this way of the complete realization of his essence.

Epicurus also shared this formal understanding of ethics, now impossible to revoke, but he clearly departed from the Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian lineage in the determination of the essence of man, that is, in the specification of the very foundation of ethics. On this point, he is wholly consistent with the principles of his logic and physics. As nature in general is constituted by material atoms and atomic aggregations, so also is the nature of man constituted by nothing more than the aggregation of atoms, that is, by the coming together of the atoms of the soul and the aggregation of the atoms of the body, both of which are material things. If the essence of man is material, his specific goodness will necessarily be material goodness, the good that when actuated and realized constitutes his happiness. What this goodness is, nature, considered in its immediacy, tells us without any ambiguity, through the basic feelings of *pleasure* and *pain* (just as without ambiguity it tells us what exists by means of sensations). Living beings, when they are born, instinctively seek pleasures and instinctively flee from pains.

Cicero writes:

> This he [*scil.*, Epicurus] sets out to prove as follows: Every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the chief good, while it recoils from pain as the chief evil and so far as possible avoids it. This it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of nature's own unbiased and honest verdict. Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to *prove* that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, he thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them.... Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature. What does nature perceive or what does she judge of, besides pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?[1]

Hence the principle and goal of human action must be pleasure, because it is the true natural good the possession of which constitutes happiness.

Here are some explicit statements of our philosopher. In the *Epistle to Menoeceus* we read:

> Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of the blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing.[2]

From a work entitled *De finibus*, fragments are quoted which are highly eloquent:

> How much for me will I know about imagining the good if the delights of taste, of love, of listening are suppressed and about the motions of the agreeable which are derived from the vision of beautiful forms.[3]
>
> For my part I find no meaning which I can attach to what is termed good, if I take away the pleasures which come from listening to music, if I take away too the charm derived by the eyes from the sight of figures in movement, or other pleasures produced by any of the senses in the whole man. Nor indeed is it possible to make such a statement as this—that it is a joy of the mind which is alone to be reckoned as a good; for I understand by a mind in a state of joy, that it is so, when it has the hope of all the pleasures I have named—that is to say, the hope that nature will be free to enjoy them without any blending of pain.[4]

Again:

> I have often asked men who were called wise what content could be

> left in a good, if they took away the advantages named, unless it were to be supposed that it was their wish to utter sentences destitute of meaning; I have been able to learn nothing from these men; if they choose to go on babbling about "virtues" or "wisdoms," they will mean nothing but the way in which pleasures I have named are brought about.[5]

And the doxagraphical literature by and large echoes these words.[6]

Note that the Epicurean perspective is clarified completely through the relation with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. These philosophers had located the nature of man in the soul, because they had identified the human good with the goods of the soul and spirit, and consequently they had consciously rejected the notion that the pleasures of the body could be the good.[7] Aristotle himself, who had evaluated pleasures at considerable length, had not made them values but considered them as something which accompanies the actualization of values as the crown and perfection of human activity. Hence he did not consider them as goods but rather as an epiphenomena of goods.[8] On the contrary, for Epicurus, *pleasure*, insofar as it is pleasure, is the *value*, the *good*, the *goal* and so his position is unequivocally hedonistic. In this way the final position of the Cyrenaics is energetically returned to a position of prominence, even if essentially reinterpreted.

2. Reform of Cyrenaic hedonism

We have mentioned the Cyrenaics just now and we wish to make a more detailed reference to them, because they constitute a precise reference point to understand Epicurus and the Epicureans, who felt the need to differentiate their hedonism from that of the Cyrenaics on two points of notable importance.

In the first place, the Cyrenaics identified pleasure with movement, with gentle movement, and identified pain with violent movement, while resolutely denying that the intermediate state of quietude, that is, the absence of pain, can be pleasure, likening it rather in their view to the state of sleep, that is, a state of insensibility. Epicurus, on the contrary, not only admitted even this type of pleasure but, as we will see, gave it the greatest importance. Here is how Diogenes Laertius, with great clarity, explains this difference:

> He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both; also pleasures of mind as well as of body.[9]

However, not only did he admit both, but he maintained that catas-

tematic pleasure is the highest and most authentic pleasure because it corresponds to the state of the absence of pain and the presence of tranquillity, whereas the pleasure-in-motion (kinetic) always brings on disturbances together with motion. The distinction was hence fundamental because it implied, as we will see, a clear subordination of kinetic pleasure to catastematic pleasure in the search for happiness. Cicero explains with great clarity this conception:

> At present I shall proceed to expound the essence and qualities of pleasure itself... . The pleasure we pursue is not that kind alone which directly affects our physical being with a delightful feeling, a positively agreeable perception of the senses; on the contrary, the greatest pleasure according to us is that which is experienced as a result of the complete removal of pain. When we are released from pain, the mere sensation of complete emancipation and relief from uneasiness is in itself a source of gratification. But everything that causes gratification is a pleasure (just as everything that causes annoyance is a pain). Therefore the complete removal of pain has correctly been termed a pleasure. For example, when hunger and thirst are banished by food and drink, the mere fact of getting rid of uneasiness brings a resultant pleasure in its train. So generally, the removal of pain causes pleasure to take its place. Epicurus consequently maintained that there is no such thing as a neutral state of feeling intermediate between pleasure and pain; for the state supposed by some thinkers to be neutral, being characterized as it is by the entire absence of pain, is itself, he held, a pleasure, and, what is more, a pleasure of the highest order. A man who is conscious of his condition at all must necessarily feel either pleasure or pain. But complete absence of pain Epicurus considers to be the limit and highest point of pleasure; beyond this point pleasure may vary in kind, but it cannot vary in intensity or degree.[10]

The absence of pain, that is catastematic pleasure, was therefore the supreme limit which pleasure could achieve, beyond which it cannot be extended because in the absence of pain pleasure has achieved its complete fulfillment.[11]

But Epicurus was different from the Cyrenaics in a second rather important respect. The Cyrenaics, in fact, maintained that physical pleasures were superior to the pleasures of the soul and bodily pains were worse than psychic pain, so much so—they argued—that the guilty are punished with bodily torments. To which Epicurus wisely objected:

> The body suffers only for present evils while the soul suffers for the present, past, and future evils.[12]

Actually it is undeniable that the flesh enjoys only what is present, while the soul with memory enjoys past pleasures and can also antici-

pate, with longing, future ones. That is why, for Epicurus, psychic pleasures were superior to those of the body. This fundamental point of Epicurean hedonism also is explained rather well by a Ciceronian statement, which deserves to be read in its entirety:

> Again, we aver that mental pleasures and pains arise out of bodily ones...but although men do experience mental pleasure that is agreeable and mental pain that is annoying, yet both of these we assert arise out of and are based upon bodily sensations. Yet we maintain that this does not preclude mental pleasures and pains from being much more intense than those of the body, since the body can feel only what is present to it at the moment, whereas the mind is also cognizant of the past and of the future. For granting that pain of body is equally painful, yet our sensation of pain can be enormously increased by the belief that some evil of unlimited magnitude and duration threatens to befall us hereafter. And the same consideration may be transferred to pleasure: a pleasure is greater if not accompanied by any apprehension of evil. This therefore clearly appears, that intense mental pleasure or distress contributes more to our happiness or misery than a bodily pleasure or pain of equal duration. But we do not agree that when pleasure is withdrawn uneasiness at once ensues, unless the pleasure happens to have been replaced by a pain: while on the other hand, one is glad to lose a pain even though no active sensation of pleasure comes in its place, a fact that serves to show how great a pleasure is the mere absence of pain.[13]

It is also to be noted that this second correction of Cyrenaicism is essential in understanding the novelty of the position of Epicurus. If in fact carefully considered, it turns out to be the positive justification of the first distinction: *catastematic pleasure can be a positive pleasure only if it refers to the psychic dimension of human beings*, otherwise it would be true, as the Cyrenaics said, that it is a state analogous to that of sleep, that is, insensibility, and hence not pleasure. Because the nature of this distinction has been, from time to time, undervalued or overvalued, it is necessary to spell out the presuppositions on which it rested and the consequences that it implied.

Let us ask ourselves in the first place: can Epicurus consistently distinguish *bodily* pleasure from pleasures *of the soul*? Does his atomistic materialism and his sensism allow such a distinction? We have seen in the exposition of the physics that a human being was not a simple aggregation of atoms but a complex one, in the sense that he is constituted by the atomic aggregation of the soul which is included in the atomic aggregation of the body. Since the characteristics of the soul-aggregation were different from those of the body-aggregation, it would hence be correct to say that there was a distinction among pleasures relative to the first and those relative to the second. In addition, Epicurus was too attentive

an investigator of the concrete realities of men not to be aware that, rather than the titillation of the senses and their momentary enjoyment, for human happiness *the interior resonances and the psychic motions which accompanied them were much more relevant.* However, he gave to the distinction such an emphasis, and it supported such important consequences, as to threaten the ontological foundations that were at its base. In fact, on the one side, hedonism (and hence atomistic materialism which was at its foundation) seems to be reaffirmed and guaranteed by the affirmations that psychic pleasures and pains *originate in the body and they refer to the body;*[14] *whereas psychic pleasures and pains are much greater than those of the body.*[15] A consistent materialist and sensist would have argued that psychic pleasures are weakened and attenuated sensible pleasures and in no way amplified pleasures. On the contrary, the consistency is broken entirely by Epicurus not only with the superior ordering of psychic pleasures to those of the body in the sense of their *quantitative* but even in the sense of their *qualitative* superiority. In fact from the testimonies read it is clear that it is *conscience, awareness,* and *rationality* which make psychic pleasures superior. In this way the aporia which we have noted in the Epicurean psychology comes up again in all its tension. Just as the atoms which constituted the rational part of the soul are considered privileged to the point of not being able to be specified with a precise name different from all the others and a *qualitative* difference was surreptitiously introduced contrary to the nature of the atoms, which only allows for quantitative differences, so also the pleasure proper to this part of the soul is posited as privileged to the point of becoming, in the ultimate analysis, *qualitatively diverse from corporeal pleasures.*

Thus Epicurus reformed Cyrenaic hedonism on the two points mentioned above only by introducing contradictions into his atomistic materialism. *a*) If kinetic pleasure is not the highest good *but rather catastematic pleasure,* then Epicurus must renounce maintaining, on the contrary as he did maintain, that natural beings which are not yet corrupted, such as animals and babies, constitute the unfailing criterion which reveals what is good and what is bad, what is to be done and what is to be avoided: *in fact, these beings do not seek out catastematic pleasures but, on the contrary, just kinetic pleasures.* Cicero had previously noted:

> For proof of this, however, Epicurus cannot have gone to children nor yet to animals, which according to him hold a mirror up to nature; he could hardly say that natural instinct guides the young to desire the pleasure of freedom from pain. This cannot excite appetition; the "catastematic" condition of feeling no pain exerts no driving-power, supplies no impulse to the will. It is the positive sensation of pleasure and delight that furnishes a motive. Accordingly Epicurus's standing argument to prove that pleasure is naturally desired is that infants

> and animals are attracted by the "kinetic" sort of pleasure, not the "catastematic" kind which consists merely in freedom from pain.[16]

It is clear, then, that contrary to what he said, Epicurus did not *refer to the original nature of animals and babies in which animality precisely prevails, but to that particular nature of man which is different from all others. b)* If *psychic pleasures* were superior to those of the body, both in a qualitative as well as in a quantitative way, then it would be necessary to conclude that in that particular nature which is man there is a component which is different from a mere bodily and physical component, at least in the measure corresponding to the difference of the two types of pleasure about which we have been reasoning.

As is evident, it is impossible to reduce human beings to only one dimension; from whatever part Epicurus tried to correct the wholistic and simplistic conception proper to Cyrenaic hedonism, by paying heed to the most intimate and profound requirements of human nature, there he had to meet the implacable demand of the human spirit.

3. The hierarchy of pleasures and wisdom

The position which Epicurus assumed in relation to pleasures, of which we have spoken in the initial paragraph, implies that pleasure can under no conditions be an evil, since evil is solely pain. Actually, he states this point with great clarity:

> No pleasure is a bad thing in itself: but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them some disturbances many times greater than the pleasures.[17]
>
> If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky and death and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires and pains, we should never have cause to blame them, for they would be filling themselves full with pleasure from every source and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.[18]

Therefore, the pleasure of Epicurus was *not* the pleasure of the dissolute, and he expressly rejected, in the *Letter to Meneoceus*, the grossest misunderstanding of which, even at the time, his doctrine fell victim:

> When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the dissolute or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or willful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every

> choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul.[19]

Substantially, in these affirmations, the distinctions about which we have spoken in the preceding paragraph are restated: the absence of bodily pain (or *aponia*) is a *catastematic pleasure*, stable, quiet, while psychic imperturbability is the respective *psychic pleasure*. These pleasures, and only these, guarantee the happy life.

But, from the passages read above, another conclusion emerges: the ruling function in the moral life is not being exercised by pleasure as such, since *reason* and *reasoning* and *calculation are applied to pleasures* in order to establish which of the pleasures produce pure pleasure and which, on the contrary, involve pain and hence which are useful and which are harmful:

> It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these matters must be judged. Sometimes we treat the good as an evil, and the evil, on the contrary, as a good.[20]

Well then, what did the calculus of utility, the judgment which dissipated the errors and the correct evaluation of the pleasures, depend on? Epicurus has no doubt: it depends on *phronesis*, on practical *wisdom*:

> Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy, from it spring all the other virtues, for it teaches that we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honor, and justice, nor lead a life of prudence, honor, and justice which is not also a life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them.[21]

In this way *prudence* is proclaimed as the *supreme virtue*, and the hierarchy of Aristotle is overturned, which placed at the apex wisdom or *sophia* (and hence pure science), which is pure contemplation, and not prudence, which is on the contrary necessarily linked to the practical life of human beings. But it was a revolution which constituted, as we have said already, one of the most typical traits of the new currents of Hellenistic thought, which made the problem of life the philosophical problem par excellence.

But let us turn to prudence and see what are its concrete suggestions about the evaluation of desires and pleasures, and the judgment of choice among them.

First of all, three great classes of pleasures must be distinguished:

[1] *natural* and *necessary* pleasures
[2] *natural* but *non-necessary* pleasures

[3] ***non-natural*** and non-necessary ***pleasures***[22]

Just as the distinction between these pleasures is clear, so likewise is the criterion of choice among these pleasures clear and infallible:

> He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid, seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure.[23]

In other words, we can say: we must choose always and only catastematic pleasures or permanent ones (those that are reduced to the absence of pain) and psychic pleasures (those that are reduced to the absence of psychic turmoil).

4. Epicurean asceticism and *autarcheia*

Hence, if this is so, we must be content with always satisfying the first type of desires and pleasures; we must restrain from enjoying the second ones; we ought never yield to the third:

> We must not violate nature, but obey her; and we shall obey her if we fulfill the necessary desires and also the physical, if they bring no harm to us, but sternly reject the harmful.[24]

Here Epicurus clearly takes up an almost ascetical position regarding the diverse multiplicity of pleasures. In fact among the pleasures of the first group, that is, those that are natural and necessary, he posited only the pleasures which are strictly connected to the preservation of the life of the individual, only useful insofar as they removed bodily pains, as for example, eating when hungry, drinking when thirsty, resting when tired, and similar instances. He excluded from this group the desires and pleasures of love:

> No one was ever the better for sexual indulgence, and it is well if he be not the worse.[25]

Among the pleasures of the second group he placed, on the contrary, all of those desires and pleasures which constitute, so to speak, the superfluous variations of natural pleasures: to eat well like a gourmet, to drink like a connoisseur, to dress like a fashion plate, and so on.

Finally, Epicurus placed ***vain*** pleasures among the pleasures of the

third group, the non-natural and non-necessary ones, arising from the vain opinions of men, such as all the pleasures linked to the desire for wealth, power, honor, and similar instances.

Well then, the desires and the pleasures of the first group are the only ones which must be always and consistently satisfied, because they have from nature a *precise limit* which consists in the elimination of pain: the elimination of pain achieved, the pleasure does not increase further.[26] The desires and the pleasures of the second group do not have that limit at all, because they do not remove bodily pain, but they only change pleasure and they can provoke considerable harm. The pleasures of the third group do not take away bodily pain and, in addition, they are always a source of disturbance to the soul. So Epicurus can write:

> My body exalts in living delicately on bread and water and it rejects the pleasures of luxury, not in themselves, but because of the trouble that follows upon them.[27]

It is a joy then, which, more than from the action of things on us, is a result of the limitations which we place on the solicitations and on the effects of things on us. Consequently, it is a joy that can be placed at the disposal of everyone, provided that they wish to follow nature:

> He said that natural wealth is easily acquired because nature is satisfied with a little.[28]
>
> Nature...has made the necessary things easy to acquire and those that are difficult are not necessary to acquire.[29]
>
> Wealth according to nature is wholly embraced by bread, water, and any restoring of the body; superfluous wealth causes an animal an unlimited feeling of desires.[30]

Let us prune, hence, our desires; let us reduce them to that fundamental and essential nucleus; then we shall achieve wealth and a great deal of happiness, because in order to acquire these pleasures we must be self-sufficient, and in this *self-sufficiency* (*autarcheia*) the greatest wealth and happiness can be found. Here are some eloquent fragments:

> When a little is not enough for someone, then nothing is enough.[31]
>
> Nothing is sufficient for him to whom what is sufficient seems little.[32]
>
> While Euripedes wrote: "For the wise man the sufficient is enough," Epicurus, on the contrary, wrote: "self-sufficiency is the greatest wealth."[33]
>
> The philosophers affirm that nothing is thus necessary just as the wise man recognizes that nothing is necessary, and they maintain that the greatest wealth among them all is self-sufficiency and nothing is better than to have need of nothing.[34]

5. The absolute character of pleasure

Whoever places in pleasure the highest good and happiness is fatally tormented by the following three things: 1) the press of time which devours and carries away pleasure, 2) the threat of pain which can always turn up, 3) the ambush of death. Epicurus had therefore tried to erect barriers around pleasure which would protect it from such insidious enemies and, contrary to other hedonists, in a way he achieved this purpose, thanks to his conception of the complete superiority of "catastematic" pleasure over kinetic pleasure: in fact, the latter type of pleasure is necessarily implicated in the flow of time and is mired incessantly in evils and kept in check by death.

Let us see how Epicurus considered catastematic pleasure, which he proclaimed as the supreme good, a defense against all these adversities.

He tells us in one of the *Principal Doctrines*:

> Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.[35]

Both "times" [limited and unlimited] afford an equal amount of pleasure not only in regard to *quality* (and so far it is not difficult to think that, in comparison to the exquisite quality of a pleasure, an eternal God such as conceived by Epicurus and a mortal human being rejoice and enjoy in the same way, precisely because finite and infinite duration *do not change quality*), but even in regard *to quantity*. This is one of the most daring positions of Epicurus, which we must fully comprehend. Epicurus rejected, in substance, that *an infinite existence* can increase pleasure not only in quality but *also in quantity*: the duration of time does not in any way increase pleasure.[36] How is this possible? It is enough, says the maxim that we have read, to fully comprehend what is the *limit* of pleasure. The limit of pleasure, as we already know, *is the elimination of pain, that is, aponia*. In other words: *pleasure increases up until needs are spent and pain is taken away, and here pleasure reaches its extreme limit, beyond which it cannot increase any further.* It is the nature itself of catastematic pleasure which imposes these conclusions. If it consists in the absence of pain (*aponia*), it is clear that no addition or increase of the elimination of pain can be conceived. Hence, catastematic pleasure, when it exists and as long as it exists, is full and complete; it has absolute validity and is therefore infinite.[37]

In the maxim that immediately follows, Epicurus gives further details:

> The flesh does not admit limits in pleasure, and the time which serves to procure such pleasure is also without limits. But the mind which grasps the reason for the end and limit of what belongs to the flesh and which suppresses the fear of eternity makes possible a

> perfect life, for which we do not feel any further the need of an infinite time. It does not run from pleasure when circumstances carry it to the moment of departing this life. It can say that it did not neglect anything of what makes this the best life.[38]

The flesh perceives as unlimited the limits of pleasure because, when it is present, it is complete satisfaction which lacks nothing and cannot be further increased; it is absolute and therefore its fullness is unlimited in every instant of time. Reason, by intervening with judgment, realizes that the limit of pleasure, as we have seen, is *aponia*, or the absence of pain; that pleasure does not increase beyond this limit and consolidates pleasures by purging from the soul everything which could disturb it, such as the fear of death, the fear of the Gods, or the desire for eternity, and thus it makes happiness complete.[39]

In this sense, Epicurus can say that enjoyment *in time* is absolute no less than *in infinity*.

6. The relative character of pain

How can this absolute validity of pleasure, which Epicurus proclaims, not be irremediably compromised by pain, from which anyone who is mortal is never protected? Our philosopher says in one of his principal maxims:

> Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh. On the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last for many days altogether. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.[40]

The same concept is taken up also in another fragment:

> All bodily suffering is negligible: for that which causes intense pain has a brief duration, and that which endures long in the flesh causes mild pain.[41]

Analogously we read in the *Letter to Meneoceus*:

> [...he understands] how easily the limit of good things can be reached and attained and how either the duration or the intensity of evils is but slight.[42]

In conclusion: if physical evil is light, then it is always supportable and never such as to obscure the joy of life. If it is intense, it passes quickly. If it is extremely intense, it leads quickly to death which, in any case, as we will see, is a state of absolute insensibility.

But what of the evils of the soul? It is not necessary to deal at length

with this issue because they are nothing other than those produced by fallacious opinions and mental errors. Against them the whole philosophy of Epicurus stands as the most effective remedy and the most secure antidote.

7. Death is nothing for human beings

What of death? Death is an evil only for those who hold false opinions about it. Because a human being is a soul-aggregation within a body-aggregation, death is simply the dissolution of these aggregations. In this decomposition, the atoms must disperse in every direction, consciousness and sensibility cease totally, and thus human beings leave behind only ruins which disperse into nothingness. Hence death is not to be feared simply of itself, because when it happens we are no longer feeling anything, neither is it to be feared with respect to an *after*, precisely because nothing remains of us after we totally dissolve, both our souls as well as our bodies. Neither, finally, does it take away from the life we have enjoyed because, as we have seen, the absolute perfection of pleasure does not need the eternal. Here is a passage from a letter of Epicurus in which he expresses this way of thinking in a clear-cut way:

> [We should] accustom ourselves to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore, a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life as illimitable time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality. For life has no terrors for him who has thoroughly apprehended that there are no terrors for him in ceasing to live. Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatsoever causes no annoyance when it is present causes only a groundless pain in the expectation. ***Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not.*** It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer. But in the world, at one time men shun death as the greatest of all evils, and at another time choose it as a respite from the evils in life. The wise man does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life. The thought of life is no offense to him, nor is the cessation of life regarded as an evil. And even as men choose of food not merely and simply the larger portion, but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest. And he who admonishes the young to live well and the old to make a good end speaks foolishly, not merely because of the desirableness of life, but because the same exercise at once teaches to live well and to die well. Much worse is he who says that it were good not to be born, but when once one is born to pass with all speed through the gates of

> hades. For if he truly believes this, why does he not depart from life? It were easy for him to do so, if once he were firmly convinced. If he speaks only in mockery, his works are foolishness, for those who hear believe him not.[43]

Also in the construction of this argument, as has been correctly noted, there is at its base "the usual Eleatic schema which denies that any *intermediary* position can be given between living and dying, between being conscious and unconscious, and therefore it conceives death not in terms of duration, as a process, but as an instant in which living precisely ceases in order to give place to death."[44] But what terrifies human beings is exactly that *passage* (that intermediary state) which Epicurus denies exists.

8. Epicurean virtue and Socratic intellectualism

Bearing in mind what we have said, we shall not be surprised in any way if Epicurus identifies virtue with pleasure or, generally, if he considers virtue only in function of pleasure and as instrumental in attaining pleasure.

In the work *On Goals*, Epicurus writes:

> The decorous, virtue, and all the things of this kind are appreciated if they are such to procure pleasure; unless they are we abandon them.[45]

In a *Letter to Anaxarchus*:

> But I summon you to continuous pleasures and not in vain and empty virtues which have but disturbing hopes of results.[46]

In addition, Epicurus even says:

> Spit on beautiful mortality and on the idiot who admires anything which does not bring him pleasure.[47]

The ancients were terribly upset by such statements, but they are completely necessary in the thought of Epicurus and do not even constitute a radical break with the Greek conception of *arete*. In order to explain this, it is necessary to keep in mind the peculiarity of the Epicurean theory of pleasure, the declaration of the absolute superiority of catastematic pleasure, and the ascetic elimination worked out by Epicurus of a whole series of pleasures, some called non-necessary, others even vain and illusory. It is necessary also to keep in mind the unusual emphasis that our philosopher gave to *phronesis*, to practical wisdom, in the evaluation of pleasures for the purpose of accepting or rejecting them. *Phronesis* is the essential foundation of the happy life, as we have already read in a passage from his *Letter to Meneoceus*.[48]

There is a passage from the *Principal Doctrines* which should be mentioned:

> It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Wherever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.[49]

In short: the virtues have a meaning and a value because and in the measure in which they contribute to happiness:

> But we aim at these virtues in order to live without anxiety and fear and so far as possible to be free from pain of mind and body.[50]

Virtue is the technique of living pleasantly and happily.[51] If this is so, human excellence or *arete* still remains, even in the context of this new vision of human nature and of life as it had been for all the Greeks, that quality which distinguishes man from all other beings or, better, the full actuation and perfection of that quality, since only humans have the capacity to live a happy life. Moreover, at its base *arete* still remains, as was affirmed by Socrates and then all the Greeks, fundamentally linked with ***knowledge***, since knowledge and nothing but knowledge, even for Epicurus, is what teaches us the correct evaluation and methodic calculation of pleasures. This is a position which paradoxically the Socrates of the Platonic *Protagoras* had foreseen and formulated,[52] at least in a certain respect, for the purpose of demonstrating dialectically that even accepting the presuppositions of hedonism, it always remains true that virtue is knowledge, because hedonists cannot rely indiscriminately on pleasure, but must base themselves on a wise calculation of the convenience of pleasures, and this calculation is precisely science. Also the vein of Socratic intellectualism is present and operative in the ethics of Epicurus because the primacy, more than to pleasure as an irrational emotion, is given to logos, which rationalizes it. So virtue and the moral good is prudence, that is, practical science which is productive of pleasure. This prudence, once acquired, becomes ethically determining:

> There are three motives to injurious acts among men—hatred, envy, and contempt; and these the sage overcomes ***by reason***. Moreover, he who has once become wise ***never more assumes the opposite habit***, not even in semblance, if he can help it.[53]

As Socrates, consequently, so Epicurus must affirm that vice is fundamentally the absence of science, that is, ignorance:

> No one when he sees evil deliberately chooses it, but is enticed by it as being good in comparison with a greater evil and so pursues it.[54]

9. The devaluation of the State and political life and the elevation of the "hidden life"

Every form of hedonism and utilitarianism is always also a form of egoistic individualism and such is also the position of Epicurus. Moreover, in Epicurus, individualism is particularly accentuated, by the theoretical premises of his system and by two further factors of notable importance: first, the experience of the destruction of the city-state and its traditional political institutions, which he experienced in its most dramatic moment, and second, the consequent conviction of the fallaciousness of the theoretical interpretation which Plato had given of man as necessarily a citizen of the city-state, an interpretation vigorously maintained even by Aristotle, who saw in man a political animal (note: *political* and not simply social) in the confines of the city-state.

Well then, the historical failure of the city-state and the institutions connected to it involved *eo ipso* the loss of credibility of the theoretical reconstructions of Plato and Aristotle as they appeared as nothing other than the undeserved idealization of a contingent historical fact. Since the political forms succeeding the city-state, that is, the rule of Alexander and Hellenistic monarchies with their institutions were shown as extremely unstable and ephemeral, Epicurus believed that he found in all this the counter-evidence of the validity of those individualistic conclusions which the principles of his physics and his ethics logically imposed.

Lactantius writes:

> Epicurus says...there is no society among men in which anyone thinks only of himself.[55]

Another testimony places these words in the mouth of Epicurus:

> Be not deceived, men, nor led astray, nor mistaken: there is no natural fellowship with one another among rational beings; believe me. Those who say the contrary are deceiving you and leading you astray with false reasons.[56]

Therefore the political life is, for the reasons stated, essentially *not-natural*. It involves, consequently, continual pain and disturbance; it compromises *aponia* and *ataraxy* and, hence, compromises the most precious thing that a human being can have, that is to say, happiness. In fact these pleasures which are supposed to come from the political life are simply illusions: from the political life men expect power, fame, and wealth, which are, as we know, neither natural nor necessary desires and pleasures and hence are empty and deceptive mirages. Hence it is possible to understand the invitation of Epicurus:

> We must release ourselves in good time from the prison of our daily concerns and politics.[57]

The public life does not enrich humans but disperses and dissipates their life. So Epicurus stood aloof and lived separately from the crowd:

> If the protection in regard to one's fellow humans is derived up to a certain point by a well-founded position of power and riches, the further protection is achieved from a serene life and fleeing the crowd.[58]
>
> The time when you should most of all withdraw into yourself is when you are forced to be in a crowd.[59]

"Live hidden!" (λάθε βιώσας) is the celebrated cry of Epicurus's command.[60] Only in this withdrawal into oneself and remaining in oneself can there be found tranquillity, peace of mind, ataraxy. For Epicurus, ataraxy is the supreme good:

> The crown of ataraxy is incomparably superior to the crown of the greatest political power.[61]

On the bases of these premises, it is clear that Epicurus ought to give an interpretation about rights, law, and justice in direct opposition to the classical opinion of Greece and the philosophical positions of Plato and Aristotle. Rights, law, and justice have a unique meaning and value only when they are linked to *utility*: and utility alone is their fundamental objective.

Here are some particularly eloquent maxims:

> Natural justice is the expression of utility which consists in not mutually causing nor receiving any harm.[62]
>
> For all living things which do not have the capacity of making agreements mutually concerned with not being harmed or harming, there exists neither justice nor injustice; and it is also true for those peoples who cannot or do not wish to make pacts not to harm or be harmed.[63]
>
> In its general sense, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual utility in the dealings of men socially; but with reference to the particularities of place and circumstance it turns out that justice is not the same for all.[64]
>
> Among things which the law prescribes as just, that which is confirmed as useful in the necessities of mutual social relations must be considered as having the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not; but if a law is imposed which does not result in being consistent with utility in mutual relations, then it does not possess the nature of justice. If what was useful with respect to justice shifts but it has for a certain time a correspondance to the prenotion of justice, then who would not wish to say that it were not so during that time unless they try to confuse themselves by vain chatter instead of looking to the actual facts.[65]

It is clear, hence, that justice ceases to be an *absolute* value, as Plato claimed, but is reduced to the relation of utility:

> Justice does not exist in itself but only in mutual relations and where it is a compact not to harm nor to be harmed.[66]

Therefore, from such premises spring the following consequences:

> Injustice is not an evil in itself, but consists in the fear arising from the apprehension of not being able to avoid those who are appointed to punish such actions.[67]

In this way the State, from a moral reality endowed with absolute validity, becomes a relative institution, arising from a simple contract in view of its utility. Rather than being the source and crown of supreme moral values, the State becomes simply a means of guarding vital values; it is true for the moral life that it is a necessary condition, but it is anything but sufficient. Justice becomes a relative value, injustice becomes a prevalently extrinsic evil, derived from the possibility of punishment. The overturning of the Platonic ideal world could not be more radical and the break with classical Greek sentiment about life could not be more decisive. Man has ceased to be a citizen and has become simply an individual human being.

10. Friendship

The Academy of Plato was established in order to bring into being political men, public men, human beings who might reform themselves for the purposes of reforming the State, since it was considered to be a fundamental and impregnable principle that men could not be truly good unless the State was good, just as the State could not be good unless its citizens were good. The Garden of Epicurus was established, on the contrary, *to bring into existence human beings who, grasping fully an awareness of their individuality, would learn to understand that no salvation can come except from themselves*. Between these individuals the only bonds admitted as truly effective are those of *friendship*. Friendship is a free bond which brings together those with identical feelings, thought, and life-style. In a friendship nothing can be imposed from outside the relationship or which is not natural, and hence nothing violates the intimacy of the individual; Epicurus sees almost another self in the friend.[68]

The Platonic Academy, too, had cultivated friendship, but in a very different way. Friendship had to be a means which more easily assisted the reconstruction of the State, the ultimate goal. Epicurus transformed it, on the contrary, from a goal to a means; or if you wish, since friendship itself did not completely escape the laws of utility, he transformed

it into a means for the realization of the individual and nothing but the individual.

We have said that friendship does not escape the law of utility. In effect, nothing, in the context of Epicurean ethics, has sense except in function of pleasure and utility. Nevertheless, Epicurus wanted to recognize in friendship something special, so he writes:

> Every friendship is *desirable of itself* even if it has begun from utility.[69]
>
> He is no friend who is continually asking for help, nor he who never associates help with friendship. For the one barters kindly feelings for a practical return and the other destroys the hope of every good for the future.[70]

Hence friendship moves from *utility*, but once developed, it becomes a good in itself, because it gives pleasure. Diogenes explains it well:

> Friendship is born in view of utility, but one of them must in fact take the initiative just as we have to throw seed into the earth but it is maintained by a partnership of life between those who have achieved the fullness of pleasure.[71]

In conclusion, friendship is first sought in order to acquire specific advantages extraneous to it, then, once present, it itself becomes a source of pleasures and therefore a goal. So Epicurus can rightly say what follows:

> Of all the things produced by wisdom in view of a happy life, the greatest good is the acquisition of friendship.[72]
>
> The virtuous man cultivates above all wisdom and friendship; and of these the one is a mortal good, the other immortal.[73]

He can even write:

> Friendship can go around the earth, proclaiming to us all to wake up in order to give joy to each other.[74]

It is in fact the crown and seal of the happiness of the sage.[75]

In the Garden these statements of principle were accompanied by the practice of friendship for which it became justly famous. Not only will men come to the Garden, as they did to the Academy, from the nobility and the higher social classes, but men of diverse social backgrounds will also come, as well as women and some ***hetairas*** in search of peace of mind, as we have previously stated.

The message of Epicurus, in this way, breached the ancient barriers and traditional obstacles present in Greek society. Nevertheless, it did not yet destroy all barriers between man and man, there still remained

the barriers of natural differences. In fact, the Epicurean sage could not become a friend of everyone, but only of those who were similar to him.

Moreover, for Epicurus there existed men who not only are not wise but who cannot in any way become such owing to either natural endowment or ethnic background:

> The sage cannot arise from every physical constitution nor every people.[76]

Even the philosophy of Epicurus did not constitute a universal message for all human beings without distinction.

11. The fourfold remedy and the ideal of wisdom

Therefore, Epicurus has provided human beings with a four-fold remedy in the way seen: he has shown 1) that the fear of the gods and the world is vain, 2) that the fear of death, which is nothing, is absurd, 3) that pleasure, when it is understood correctly, is at the disposition of all, 4) that finally, evil is either of short duration or is easily supportable.

The man who knows how to apply to himself the four-fold remedy acquires peace of mind and happiness, which nothing and no one can erode away. The sage becomes, in this way, wholly the master of himself, and he can no longer fear anything, not even the most atrocious evils and tortures:

> The sage will be happy even among his torments.[77]

Seneca writes:

> Even Epicurus says that the sage if he is being burned inside the bull of Phalaris will cry out: "It is pleasant and does not concern me at all."[78]
>
> [Epicurus] says precisely that "It is pleasant to be roasted in this way."[79]

It is clear that this is a paradoxical way to say that the sage is absolutely imperturbable. Epicurus himself gave a demonstration of this amidst the spasms of pain of the illness which brought him to his death, while writing to a friend a final farewell, he proclaimed his life pleasant and happy.

In this way Epicurus maintained that he could say from his ataraxy that the sage can contend with the gods themselves in happiness: if eternity is taken away, Zeus does not possess more than the sage.[80]

To the men of this time, by now totally lacking what to the ancient Greeks had made life secure, tormented by fear and anxiety about life, Epicurus proposed a new way to recover happiness and offered a message which was like a challenge to fate and fatalism, because it showed that

happiness can arise from within, however things are outside us, because the authentic good, in the measure in which we live and as long as we live, is always and only within us. *The true good is life* and to sustain life very little is required, and that "very little" is available to all human beings; everything else is vanity.

Basically we can say that life is, for Epicurus, the true Absolute. The devotion and gratitude that he shows toward life always and without exception has without doubt something of the religious and the mystical about it. Recently this point was emphasized accurately by Domenico Pesce: "Here lies the very profound religious sense of the doctrine of Epicurus, which impresses us through the singularity of an asceticism which is neither the timid and egotistical fleeing before life of the Cynic nor the elevation to the pure theorizing of the Platonists, but the discovery so much more surprising as it is achieved outside all established religious tradition (although perhaps some inkling is to be found in ancient paganism) that the level of the elementary coincides with that of the essential, exactly where being can be attained after the vain and superfluous have been removed. The way of simplification was thus revealed for every mystic as well as for Epicurus, not as a loss but as a gain."[81]

Epicurus is thus one of the most authentic voices of his age, his thought and life became paradigms. The success which he achieved in the span of five centuries is the evidence for it. Bignone has made this point well enough in an exemplary passage with which we wish to conclude: "The Alexandrine world is the true homeland of Epicureanism. Never as then would men be as eager for that delicate spiritual balance which is *Greek eudaemonism*. Never as then would man place his proud superiority in proclaiming himself happy. Never as then would human life search eagerly for its own perfection which would obey the canons of such a perfect harmony as those which rule the statuary of Praxiteles and Lysippus. Every philosopher must offer his model of supreme human excellence, witness to it in his life, and achieve it in a serene and harmonious death. Facing the final agony, the final farewell, he must be able to say as Arria said, passing to her husband the weapon with which she had struck herself: *Paete, non dolet* [Take it, it does not hurt]. This daring challenge to destiny, this heroic negation of the law of nature, will be his glory. While the Greek Classical Age consecrated the ideal type of philosopher, who dies for the sake of justice, in Socrates conversing with his followers in his cell far from the cries of the women, in expectation of the marvelous mystery of the rebirth of the soul, the Alexandrine Age found it again in Epicurus, who, in his last words, affirms victoriously in the face of death his faith in happiness: 'On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life [writes Epicurus in a letter to a friend (Idomeneus) to whom he was saying goodbye to life], I write this to you.

My continual sufferings ... are so great that nothing could augment them; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations.' These two deaths so different but both so Grecian, mark the line between two ages, and they will represent for ancient men the seal of two human types and two spiritual forms, with their own faith and devotion: the *imitatio Socratis* and the *imitatio Epicuri*."[82]

Socrates and Epicurus are the models of two great faiths, or to put it in better terms, *secular religions*: the faith in and the religion of *justice*, the faith in and the religion of *life*.

V. The Followers of and Successors to Epicurus

Epicureanism did not have a *history* comparable to that of the other Schools of the Hellenistic Age, in the sense that it had no real *development of its thought*; it did not have either doctrinal or conceptual developments worth noting. Epicurus not only proposed his own doctrine, but in some sense imposed it with very firm discipline.[1]

So, in the Garden no discussions were admitted and no conflict of ideas broke out. The followers of Epicurus were limited to repeating and explaining his message, or, at best, to examining it and completing it in certain respects. They polemicized against other schools ranged against them, but as a general rule they did not go on to eclectic accomodations nor to the admission of principles or corollaries contrary to the fundamentals of their doctrine.

The thought of Epicurus became a dogma to be understood and defended almost like a religious truth. In this way it is possible to explain why there were various phases of the Stoa (an ancient, a middle, and a new), as well as various phases of Scepticism (Pyrrhonic, Academic, and Neo-), as we will see fully; whereas, there was only a single stage of thought and doctrinal unity in the history of the Garden. From the fragments of Epicurus to the poem of Lucretius to the wall inscriptions of Diogenes of Enoanda, that is, from the end of the fourth century BCE to the second century CE the vivifying spirit of the writings of the Epicureans remains fundamentally unchanged, the faith is unchanged, and its theoretical articulation is identical throughout.

The followers of Epicurus, even before the founding of the Garden at Athens, were Metrodorus and Polienus of Lampsacus.[2] Metrodorus is remembered chiefly as a polemicist, which fact is gleaned from the very titles of his works. Diogenes writes of him:

> [Metrodorus] who from his first acquaintance with [Epicurus] never left him except once for six months spent on a visit to his native place from which he returned to him again. His goodness was proved in all ways, as Epicurus testifies in the introductions to his works and in the third book of the *Timocrates*... . He showed dauntless courage in meeting troubles and death, as Epicurus declares in the first book of his memoir, *Metrodorus*.[3]

Metrodorus and Polienus died before Epicurus.[4] The successor in the direction of the Garden was Hermarchus of Mytilene, who wrote against Plato and Aristotle.[5] At that time also Leonteus of Lampsacus, Colotes, and Idomeneus were distinguished.[6]

The succeeding scholarchs of the Garden, of whom we know very little, were, in order: Polystratus, Hippoclydes, Dionysius, Basilides, Protarchus of Barghilia, Apollodorus, known as "the Tyrant of the

Garden" (who it is said wrote four hundred books), Zeno of Sidon, Phaedrus, and Patronus (Zeno and Patronus were heard by and known personally to Cicero).[7]

In the second half of the first century CE, the Garden of Athens was now defunct (after Patronus there are no notices of other scholarchs, and we know that the land on which the Garden was located had been sold),[8] but the message of the Epicureans was by now widespread, both in the East and West.

But it was in the West, more precisely at Rome, that Epicureanism was to find its second homeland, chiefly through the talents of the poet Lucretius, who sang of it with such exalted and touching verses.

Second Section

THE SPREAD OF EPICUREANISM AT ROME AND LUCRETIUS

"Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest non radii solis neque lucida tela diei discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque."

"This terror of the mind, therefore, and this gloom must be dispelled, not by the sun's rays nor the bright shafts of day, but by the aspect and law of reason."

Lucretius *De rerum natura* 2.59-61

I. The First Attempts to Introduce Epicureanism at Rome and the Circle of Philodemus

1. The attempt of Alceus and Philiscus and its failure

An abortive attempt to introduce the Epicurean message at Rome was made by two followers of the Garden (who are unknown except for this attempt), by the names of Alceus and Philiscus, who were quickly expelled from Rome.[1]

This occurred in the consulate of Lucius Postumius. Since there was a consulate of an L. Postumius in 173 BCE and another in 154 BCE, scholars are divided on the question of which of the two dates is correct. In 156/155 there came to Rome the noted embassy of three of the most famous Greek philosophers of the time: Carneades, Critolaus, and Diogenes (the first was scholarch of the Academy, the second of the Peripatos, and the third of the Stoa), who, availing themselves of the opportunity, held public lessons and tried to disseminate their teachings but were expelled for this action chiefly through the efforts of Cato. Now, it is quite possible—some think—that for this very reason, since the scholarch of the Garden had not been invited to Rome with the other three scholarchs, two Epicureans wished to try this experiment on their own. Other scholars propose, on the contrary, to use the prior dating maintaining the improbability that anyone would dare to make such a move immediately after the expulsion of the three famous scholarchs, trying again the experiment of reintroducing philosophy at Rome.[2] In any case, the date is only of relative importance.

The reason that was given for expelling Alceus and Philiscus from Rome was the licentiousness of the customs which they were proclaiming (insofar as they were inviting the young to lives of pleasure),[3] and hence it was for a moral or religious-moral reason.

2. The attempt of Amafinius

The attempt of Amafinius, who first composed a philosophical treatise in Latin supporting Epicurean notions, was more successful. Cicero writes:

> There are almost no Latin memorials or very few, whether the want is due to the absorption of the race in great practical undertakings, or whether again to the thought that such studies could not be commended to ignorant readers. To fill the gap their silence left came the voice of C. Amafinius, and by the publication of this work the crowd had its interest stirred, and flocked to the teaching he advocated in preference to any other, whether because it was so easy to grasp, or because of the seductive allurements of pleasure, or possibly also because, in the absence of any better teaching, they

> clung to what there was. After Amafinius again there came a number of imitators of the same system and by their writings took all Italy by storm: and whereas the chief proof that their arguments are stated without precision lies in the fact that their doctrine is so easily grasped and so much to the taste of the unlearned, they imagine this to be its main support.[4]

Cicero writes again in regard to Amafinius:

> For there is a class of men, who wish to be called philosophers and are said to be responsible for quite a number of books in Latin, which I do not for my part despise, for I have never read them; but as on their own testimony the writers claim to be indifferent to definition, arrangement, precision and style I forbear to read what affords no pleasure. What followers of this school say and what they think is not unknown to anyone of even moderate learning. Inasmuch therefore as by their own showing they do not trouble how they express themselves, I do not see why they should be read except in the circle of those who hold the same views and read their books to one another. For everyone, even those who do not accept their teaching or are not enthusiastic disciples, reads Plato and the rest of the Socratic school and after them their followers, whilst scarcely anyone beyond their own adherents takes up the works of Epicurus and Metrodorus; similarly these Latin writers are only read by those who approve their tenets. Our opinion on the other hand is that everything committed to writing should approve itself to the taste of all educated readers, and if we ourselves are unable quite to succeed in this, we do not for that reason think we should abate our efforts to do so.[5]

Hence, the books of Epicurean philosophy of Amafinius and his followers had a ***fundamentally popularizing*** character; they were, that is, meant for an illiterate public and probably were limited to ethics or at least they pointed out chiefly the practical aspects of Epicureanism. Certainly they would not present disquisitions on the complex questions of atomism, otherwise what Cicero says would be senseless. Therefore, the movement of Amafinius must have been ***essentially popular*** in character.

The chronological placement of this movement is unfortunately uncertain. It is thought by some to be at the end of the second century BCE, by others, instead, at the beginning of the first century BCE, finally, there are some who locate the movement in the years immediately prior to the epoch in which Cicero mentioned it (46/45 BCE).[6]

3. The circle of Philodemus

In Italy, in the first century BCE, there was another circle of Epicureans, of a decidedly aristocratic character, which was located in a villa at

Herculaneum on the property of Calpurnius Piso, a well-known and influential politician (he was the father-in-law of Caesar and was consul in 58 BCE) and a great patron of art and literature. The man who converted Calpurnius Piso to Epicureanism was born at Gadara in Syria and was called Philodemus. He came to Rome from Athens after the death of his master, Zeno of Sidon, became a friend of Calpurnius Piso, who placed at his disposal, as we have said, one of his villas at Herculaneum, which became the center for Epicurean gatherings frequented by the upper levels of Roman society.[7]

Excavations conducted at Herculaneum have identified the villa and the remains of a library of the writings of the Epicureans and especially of the writings of Philodemus himself.[8]

Contrary to the Epicureanism of Amafinius, that of Philodemus was presented in Greek and dealt with technical problems at a high level of discourse.

As a result of the rebirth of Epicurean studies in the last few decades, a more precise knowledge of Philodemus has developed. A contribution of Philodemus, at least in part original, may have consisted in the analysis of the logical operations which support human reasoning, initiated already by his master Zeno, and especially in an analysis of the inductive procedures based on analogy. Philodemus investigated the problem of the Gods, religion, and death. He was concerned deeply with problems of art and rhetoric, as well as economics.[9]

But the contribution which was by far the most perspicuous to Epicureanism came from the poem of the poet Titus Lucretius Caro, of Latin background, independently of both the popularizing movement originated by Amafinius and the learned circle of Philodemus and Calpurnius Piso. Concerning Lucretius, we must speak in detail because, although he did not put forward any outstanding philosophical novelties worthy of note if compared with Epicurus, he did establish for himself a ***unique place*** in the history of philosophy for all time.

II. Lucretius and Epicurean Doctrine Presented through Elevated Poetry

1. The inadequacy of some judgments concerning Lucretius

It is well to note the positions of the old interpreters of Lucretius,[1] who underlined the clear difference between the height and sublimity of his poetry and the poverty, the coldness, and even the impiety of the Epicurean doctrine about which he composed his poem. There have been noted attempts to show that Lucretius the poet ends by taking his poetic flight beyond Epicurus and even against Epicurus. Finally, there have been noted attempts to show an "anti-Lucretius" in Lucretius, in his pervasive melancholy and in that heavy sadness which fills the poem: the sadness and melancholy which were considered decidedly anti-Epicurean and hence contrary also to the Epicurean intentions of Lucretius.

Moreover, all these opinions arise basically from a real misunderstanding of Epicurus. Actually, the founder of the Garden has begun to be understood in depth only in our century. It is clear, therefore, that the lack of understanding of Epicurus fatally involves the incomprehensibility of Lucretian Epicureanism and hence of Lucretius.

Bignone read the thought of Epicurus in a new key. Thus Bignone is to be credited with overcoming the basic prejudice which projects into Lucretius a basic antithesis with Epicurus.[2]

2. The initial pessimism and the victory of reason in Lucretius and Epicurus

The well-known antithesis repeatedly pointed out by the scholars between Lucretius and Epicurus was seen in the famous verses of the fifth "canto," which seems to be soaked in profound pessimism, insofar as it illustrates the evil and pain which inexorably pervade the whole world: nature does not seem to be made for man and man does not seem to be made for nature.

Here are the famous verses:

> But even granting that I knew not what are the first beginnings of things, thus much at least I would dare to affirm from the very ways of heaven, and *to show from many other facts, that the world was never made for us by divine power: so great are the faults wherewith it stands endowed.* In the first place, of all that the sky covers in its mighty movement, a great part is possessed by Greedy mountains and forests full of wild beasts, part rocks and vast marshes hold, and the sea that keeps the shores of its lands far apart. Well nigh two parts of these lands are robbed from mortals by scorching heat, and

> constantly falling frost. Even the land that is left, nature would still cover with brambles by her own power, but that man's power resists, well accustomed to groan over the stout mattock for very life, and to cleave the soil with the pressure of the plough. If by turning over the fruitful clods with the ploughshare and turning under the surface of the soil we bring them not to birth, no growths could emerge into the lambent air of their own accord; and even so at times, these procured by great labor, when they are already covering the earth with leafage and all a-blowing, are either scorched up by the sun in heaven with too great heat, or penetrated and cut off by rains and chilly frost, and the blasts of wind batter them with violent storms. Besides, why does nature feed and increase the frightful tribes of wild beasts, enemies of the human race, by land and sea? Why do the seasons of the year bring disease? *Why does untimely death stalk abroad? Then further the child, like a sailor cast forth by the cruel waves, lies naked upon the ground, speechless, in need of every kind of vital support, as soon as nature has split him forth with throes from his mother's womb into the regions of light, and he fills all around with doleful wailings as is but just, seeing that so much trouble awaits him in life to pass through.* But the diverse kinds of beasts do grow, and the cattle and wild creatures; they need no baby's rattles, none of them wants to hear the coaxing and broken prattle of the foster-nurse, they seek no change of raiment according to the temperature of the season, lastly they need no weapons, no lofty walls to protect their own, since for them all the earth herself brings forth all they want in abundance, and nature the cunning fashioner of things.[3]

Well then, Bignone has shown that, far from falling into a form of heterodoxy, Lucretius in these verses repeats concepts precisely maintained by Epicurus in a polemical work attempting to refute the Aristotelian dialogue *On Philosophy*.[4] To the Aristotelian teleological optimism Epicurus countered with a vision which was decidedly not optimistic and strongly disteleological, in which he spoke of the "lack of skill" and "ineptitude" of nature and hence of the total absence of finality,[5] and adduced arguments analogous to those used by Lucretius. But here is, as a further confirmation, a pruning of an Epicurean fragment which is very significant for its basic pessimism, which seems to go even beyond that of the Lucretian passage read above:

> Epicurus saw that adversities always overtake good men: poverty, labor, exile, loss of one's earnings; he saw that evil men are always happy, they become always more powerful, receiving riches and honors; he saw that innocence is undefended, and crimes unpunished; he saw that death rages without keeping accounts of the conduct of men, without order nor distinctions of age, that some reach to old age, others are seized as infants, others die as adults, others in the first flower of youth are taken by an immature death;

> he saw that in war the better rather than the worst are vanquished and perish. But above all he was moved by the fact that men really upright are afflicted by grave evils while those that are wholly uncaring of the Gods or who do not offer them devout worship suffer minor evils or do not suffer at all....[6]

Therefore, as Lucretius, *Epicurus did not at all deny the evils existing in the world; quite the reverse, he emphasized and recognized them.* He wished, however, to cure them, he wished to ameliorate them and overcome them with his philosophy. Bignone correctly points out: "...the more painful is the fate of men left to themselves, the greater is the pride in the triumph of philosophy which, according to Epicurus, acquires happiness for them. The highest work of nature for Epicurus, therefore, is not the world as it was for the Aristotle of *De Philosophia* against whom he was arguing, but rather it is man, to whom nature, although among the evils which ensnare him, allowed him the possibility of triumphing through wisdom, 'It is true that one is worthy of Numi who can live life,'"[7] as Lucretius himself maintains.[8]

Therefore, the spiritual key which characterizes the thought of the founder of the Garden is identical with that of the Roman poet who sang about it. That same anxiety which pervades the whole Lucretian poem is at the base of the philosophy of Epicurus: those very obscure psychic evils of which Lucretius speaks are those which Epicurus wished to dispel with his words and wanted to recompose into a higher ataraxy. Epicurus must have felt within himself all the anxieties he wished to cure: the fear of the Gods (he who was so convinced of the existence of divine beings as to admit them without any further reasons whether physical, ethical, or eschatological), the fear of evil events (he who suffered so physically and was so sensitive in spirit), and the fear of death (he who understood so well how it is felt as the most horrifying evil for man). As we have seen, ataraxy, Epicurean happiness, is not inertia; it is not immobility nor indolence.[9] It is not even an immediate gift of nature. It is, on the contrary, a long-suffered conquest, through the *logos* which culminates in the supreme virtue of *phronesis*. The Epicurean ataraxy is, in its way, the triumph of man's reason over the irrational which surrounds him.

Lucretius also stating in detail the position of his teacher, writes:

> But if we see these things to be ridiculous and a mere mockery,[10] if in truth men's fears and haunting cares fear neither the clang of arms nor wild weapons, if they boldly mingle with kings and sovereigns of the world, if they respect not the sheen of gold nor the glowing light of crimson raiment, *why doubt you that this power wholly belongs to reason?* especially since life is one long struggle in the dark. For even as children tremble and fear all things in blind darkness, so we in

> the light fear, at times, things that are no whit more to be feared, than what children shiver at in the dark and imagine to be at hand. *This terror of the mind, therefore, and this gloom must be dispelled, not by the sun's rays nor the bright shafts of day, but by the aspect and law of reason.*[11]

The difference between Epicurus and Lucretius is in the fact that Epicurus, *even from the existential viewpoint*, succeeds in using reason to dominate his disquietude and anxiety, while Lucretius does not succeed; but we will speak further about this.

3. The truth which eases pain and produces peace

But there is another point to be emphasized in reference to the rational reconstruction of the real and the meaning of the "physics" which the *De rerum natura* proposed.

Again, in line with the old and badly posited questions on the originality of Lucretius, there was an attempt recently to reverse the traditional course followed by scholars, to point out the *science* and the *deductive rigorousness* of *De rerum natura* as the true originality of the Roman poet.[12]

Winspear writes:

> The originality of Lucretius might be analyzed on three [*sic*] levels. First, a gift for exposition which leads him to take a prosaic hint from one of his predecessors and makes it flower with imagery, imagination, and passion. Second, *an intellectual power which makes him see more clearly than any other ancient thinker the implications of the philosophical position which he held.* Lucretius holds to an *evolutionary and anti-teleological, anti-theological view of the universe and this outlook he grasps more firmly and expounds more eloquently than any other ancient thinker.* This world outlook he applies to the evolution of plant, animal, and man and *puts forward a theory of biological and social evolution that goes far beyond anything propounded in classical antiquity.* And this is what, perhaps, accounts for the extraordinary modernity of Lucretius's thought.[13]

Factors of a positivistic and even Marxist lineage, which are completely extraneous to the intentions of Lucretius, play a role in the interpretation of Winspear. They are, in the first place, the presupposition that "science" (understand the modern science of nature, mathematical physics, for the notion of "science") is the supreme criterion of truth, in the second place, the presupposition of Darwinian evolutionary theory as the most scientific reading of nature, and finally, that atomism is the most complete of the attempts made by the ancients to understand the world.

All these presuppositions are actually contributions which do not reveal but veil the sense of the Lucretian text. The *science* of Lucretius is an attempt to grasp the *totality, the supreme causes of the whole of reality*, the *ultimate foundations of being*, and hence it is by no means science in the modern sense of that term, rather it is metaphysics, or, in any case, ontology (remember the meaning of the Greek word *physis*, which we have fully and step by step clarified in the course of this work and of which the Latin word *natura* is an exact rendering). The evolutionary aspect of Lucretius's poem, on which the scholar strongly insists,[14] has—and consequently—another theoretical meaning with respect to Darwinian evolutionary theory, and hence the points of contact which Winspear emphasizes are accidental and do not touch the substance of the two doctrines. Finally, even the Lucretian atomism which Winspear praises is not the atomism of modern science. Ancient atomism (and that of Lucretius is not only the exception but rather the clearest confirmation thereof) is an ontology born in order to surpass the Eleatics and is based on Eleatic categories, especially Melissian. In fact, among ancient physics atomism is the one which is most strongly aporetic, especially in the Epicurean-Lucretian version, because of the assumption of the *swerve*, about which we spoke at some length previously. We cannot judge, then, that affirmations like those of Winspear are incorrect, if for no other reason than the fact that the greater organic unity and consistency of Lucretian atomism with respect to the other Atomists might be a purely illusory outlook since we do not possess all the texts of these Atomists but only their fragments.

We have mentioned this position of Winspear because it permits us, by pointing out its ambiguities, to deal with and clarify an essential point. It is true that in the poem of Lucretius he speaks much more of physics than ethics, but the scope within which the physical doctrines are discussed must not place a veil on their quality, that is, on their nature and aim. The physical doctrines are by no means an end in themselves, but they represent that "truth" which must help us avoid human horror and anxiety, whose "light" must dispel the darkness of the mind, that power which must disperse the phantoms haunting human beings.

In conclusion, Lucretian physics had only one aim, as did the physical doctrines of all the Hellenistic schools, namely that of showing that the ontological dimensions exist in which one can find a place for a happy life.

The truth of "science" about which Lucretius poetizes is only that truth which preserves man from the evils of this world, or at the very least ameliorates them.

4. The principles of true Epicureanism and the poem of Lucretius

The originality which Lucretius brings to the truth and the principles of authentic Epicureanism is therefore to be found precisely in his poetry. In this respect Boyancé writes: "In order to conquer man, if only to liberate him from his passions, one must above all touch him. In order to liberate man, Lucretius understood that it was not a question of obtaining, in a cool reflective moment, his adhesion to some truth of the intellectual order but that it was necessary to make these truths, as Pascal would say, understandable to his heart."[15]

Actually a reading of the *De rerum natura* in this key is most fruitful. If we grasp sympathetically the passages of Epicurus and the corresponding passages of Lucretius's poem, it will be noticeable that the differences are almost always of this kind: the philosopher speaks with the language of the *logos*, and the poet adds to this *logos* the persuasive sounds of heartfelt feelings, coloring the *logos* with the intuition of imagination, supporting the concept with the image. In short, the novelty is the magic of the poetic art which adds to philosophy and transforms it and makes it penetrate into the heart as well as into the mind.

In this *History of Ancient Philosophy* we cannot be concerned with the poetic art of Lucretius,[16] but only with his significance within the scope of the history of the Garden. So we will limit our treatment to some examples, choosing among the more significant ones those of chiefly philosophical interest.

It is sufficient to see that, after the prologue, the poem first casts light in a very suggestive way on the Eleatic principles used by the Atomists that *nothing can come from nothing* and that *nothing can be dissolved into nothing*, the principles of the *void* and of *bodies*. The principles *per se* are very dry, but in the verses of Lucretius's poem are enlivened by unusual resonances full of pathos.

But let us read how the Epicurean denial of the Platonic metaphysical "second voyage" is proposed, that is, the rejection of the existence of incorporeal, immaterial, and supersensible entities:

> Besides, there is nothing which you can call distinct from body and separate from void, to be discovered as a kind of third nature. For whatever is to be, that must be something in itself, and if it shall be sensible to touch however light and small, it will increase the quantity of body by some increment either great or small if you will, provided it do [*sic* does] exist, and will go to make up the sum. But if it shall be intangible, being unable to forbid anything to pass through it in motion at any point, undoubtedly this will be that which we call empty void. Besides, whatever shall exist of itself will either do something, or will necessarily be passive itself while other things act upon it, or it will be possible that things be and be done in it. But nothing can act or be acted upon without body, nothing can afford space but the void and the empty. Therefore besides void and bodies

> no third nature can be left self-existing in the sum of things; neither one that can ever at any time come within our senses, nor one that any man can grasp by the reasoning of the mind.[17]

Here is the notion of the infinite with Melissian accents: the infinite, which the Greeks never did succeed in comprehending fully and that, when accepted, was admitted only in a material and quantitative sense.

> The universe then is not limited along any of its paths; for if so it ought to have an extremity. Again, clearly nothing can have an extremity unless there be something beyond to bound it, so that something can be seen, beyond which this our sense can follow no further. Now since we must confess that there is nothing beyond the sum of things, it has no extremity, and therefore it is without end or limit. Nor does it matter in which of its quarters you stand; so true is it, that whatever place anyone occupies, he leaves the whole equally infinite in every direction. Besides, if all the existing space be granted for the moment to be finite, suppose someone proceed to the very extremest edge and cast a flying lance, do you prefer that the lance forcibly thrown go wither it shall be sent and fly afar, or do you think that anything can hinder and obstruct it? For you must confess and accept one of the two: but each of them shuts you off from all escape, and compels you to own that the universe stretches without end. For whether there is something to hinder and keep it from going whither it is sent and from fixing itself at its mark, or whether it passes out, that was no boundry whence it was sped. In this way I shall go after you, and wherever you place your extremest edge, I shall ask what at last happens to the lance. The effect will be, that no boundary can exist anywhere, and that room for the weapon's flight will always prolong its flying. Lastly, one thing is seen before our eyes to be the limit of another: air separates hills and mountains air, earth bounds sea and contrariwise the sea is the boundary of all lands; the universe, however, has nothing outside to be its limit.
>
> Besides, if all the space in the universe stood contained within fixed boundaries on all sides and were limited, by this time the store of matter would by its solid weight have run together from all sides to the bottom, nor could anything be done under the canopy of heaven, nor would heaven exist at all or the sun's light, because assuredly all matter would have been lying already in a heap from sinking down through infinite ages past. But as it is, sure enough no rest is given to the bodies of the first beginnings, because there is no bottom whatsoever, for them to run together as it were into it and fix their abode there. Always the business of the universe is going on with incessant motion in every part, and the elements of matter are being supplied from beneath rushing from infinite space. Therefore the nature of space and the extent of the deep are so great, that neither bright lightnings can traverse it in their course, though they glide

> onwards through endless tracts of time; nor can they by all their travelling make their journey any the less go: so widely spreads the great store of space in the universe all around without limit in every direction.
>
> Furthermore, nature withholds the sum of existing things from providing a limit for itself, because she compels body to be bounded by void and that again which is void to be bounded by body, so that by this alternation she renders the universe infinite, or else, either one of these two, if the other did not bound it, would yet by itself spread abroad without limit.[18]

Here is another passage, abounding with images which call to mind the romantic loss of self in the infinite:

> For since the sum of space is infinite abroad beyond the walls of the heavens, the mind seeks to understand what is there in the distance whither the intelligence continually desires to look forth, and whither the mind's projection flies free of itself.
>
> In the first place, all around us in every direction and on both sides and above and below through the universe there is no limit: even as I have shown, and truth of itself cries aloud, and the nature of the unfathomable deep gives forth light. Now since there is illimitable space empty in every direction, and since seeds innumerable in number and unfathomable in sum are flying about in many ways driven in everlasting movement, it cannot by any means be thought likely that this is the only round earth and sky that has been made, that all those bodies of matter without have nothing to do: especially since this world was made by nature, even as the seeds themselves of their own accord knocking together and collected in all sorts of ways, heedless, without aim, without intention, have allowed some to filter through which suddenly thrown together could become in each case the beginnings of mighty things, of earth and sea and sky and the generation of living creatures. Wherefore again and again I say you must confess that there are other assemblages of matter in other places, such as this is which the air holds in greedy embrace.
>
> Besides, when abundant matter is ready, when space is to hand, and no thing and no cause hinders, things must assuredly be done and completed. And if there is at this moment both so great store of seeds as all the time of living existence could not suffice to tell, and if the same power and the same nature abides, able to throw the seeds of things together in any place in the same way as they have been thrown together into this place, then you are bound to confess that there are other worlds in other regions and different races of men and generations of wild beasts.
>
> Moreover, there is no one thing in the whole sum which is produced unique, and grows up unique and alone, so as not to belong to some kind and to be one of many like it. To begin with, cast your mind to

> the animals: you will find that this is so with the mountain-ranging generation of wild beasts, this is so with the double breed of men, so also with the dumb scaly fish and all creatures that fly. Wherefore you must in like manner confess for sky and earth, for sun, moon, sea, and all else that exists, that they are not unique, but rather of number innumerable, and since there is a deepset limit of life equally awaiting them, and they are as much made of a perishable body as any kind here on earth which has so many specimens of its kind.[19]

Putting aside for the moment the illustration of the ways in which Lucretius proposed the theory of *atoms*, their *motion*, their *generation*, and their *life* on earth and *celestial phenomena*, as well as the theory of *knowledge* and the *simulacra*, which would take us beyond the limits which the nature of this work imposes, we wish to illustrate some more particularly significant points.

Lucretius too, like Epicurus, distinguished two parts of the soul, the irrational and the rational. He called the first *anima* and the second *animo* or *spirit*. And as Epicurus, so Lucretius proposed the aporetic affirmation that the *animo* or *spirit* consists of a privileged element which has no name. After having said that in the soul there is wind, air, and heat, he writes:

> Hence already the nature of the soul is found to be threefold; yet even all these three are not enough to produce sentient life; since the mind cannot admit that any of these can produce the motions of the sense much less the thoughts aroused in the mind. *A fourth nature must therefore be added to these; this is entirely without name*; nothing exists more easily moved and more thin than this, or made of elements smaller and smoother, and this first distributes the motions of the sense throughout the members....[20]

Even here, as in Epicurus, it is the *immaterial* which, although negated, avenges itself by reappearing as a substance "without a name." Nevertheless, as in Epicurus, it is declared to be mortal in even an obsessive way:

> Even as it is not easy to tear out the scent from lumps of frankincense, without its very nature being destroyed, so it is not easy to draw out mind and spirit from the whole body, without the dissolution of all. So interwoven are their elements from their first origin in the life which they live together....[21]
>
> ...and when for example I speak of spirit, showing it to be mortal, believe me to speak also of mind, inasmuch as it is one thing and a combined nature.[22]

Here is one of the most persuasive arguments:

> Besides, we feel that the mind is begotten along with the body, and grows up with it, and with it grows old. For as children running about have a body infirm and tender, so a weak intelligence goes with it. Next when their age has grown up into robust strength, the understanding and the power of the mind is enlarged. Afterwards when the body is now wrecked with the mighty strength of time, and the frame has succumbed with blunted strength, the intellect limps, the tongue babbles, the intelligence totters, all is a-wanting and fails at the same time. It follows therefore that the whole nature of the spirit is dissolved abroad like smoke into the high winds of the air, since we see it begotten along with the body, and growing up along with it, and as I have shown, falling to pieces at the same time forspent with age.[23]

Again:

> To be sure, just as the eye torn from its roots cannot by itself distinguish anything apart from the whole body, so it is seen that mind and spirit can do nothing alone....[24]

Finally:

> But since even in our body there is seen to be a fixed rule and ordinance in what place mind and spirit may exist and grow apart so much the more must we deny that they can endure and be produced wholly outside the body. Wherefore when the body has perished, you must confess that the spirit has passed away torn to pieces throughout the body. In fact to yoke mortal with immortal and to think that they can be partners in feeling and act upon each other, is folly; for what can be considered more discordant, more contradictory or inconsistent, than that what is mortal can be yoked together in combination with immortal and imperishable, to weather furious storms![25]

This is the clear antithesis of the Platonic and Aristotelian vision, represented with the precise meaning which it had for Epicurus.

Finally, listen as he restates the doctrine on death:

> Therefore death is nothing to us, it matters not one jot, since the nature of the mind is understood to be mortal: and as in time past we felt no distress, while from all quarters the Carthaginians were coming to the conflict, when the whole world shaken by the terrifying tumult of war shivered and quaked under the high heaven, and men were in doubt under which domination all men were destined to fall by land and sea; so when we shall no longer be, when the parting shall have come about between body and spirit from which we are compacted into one whole, then sure enough nothing at all will be able to happen to us who will then no longer be, or to make us feel, not if earth be commingled with sea and sea with sky.[26]

Even in the case that time might assemble (in the future, or had already assembled in the past in the infinite possibilities of combinations) that combination of atoms of which we now consist, it would not in any way change what we have said. In fact, this combination of atoms which we are now (and the others which could form, or which can already have been formed) would lack the essential link of the continuity of sensation and awareness. Hence the interruption of death makes the identical mechanical recombinations totally different from one another.[27] Therefore, Lucretius concludes:

> ...for in between has been cast a stoppage of life, and all the motions have wandered and scattered afar from those sensations. For if by chance anyone is to have misery and pain in the future, he must needs himself also exist then in that time to be miserable. Since death takes away this possibility, and forbids him to exist for whom these inconveniences may be gathered together, we may be sure that there is nothing to be feared after death, that he who is cannot be miserable, that it makes not one jot of difference whether he has ever been born at any time before, when death the immortal has taken away his mortal life.[28]

5. Pity through pain in the poem of Lucretius

A difference which belongs to the poetry of Lucretius is pity through evil and pain which befalls everything and the consequent amplification of that sense of melancholy which was already present in Epicurus but in him more contained, more neutralized, and in fact frequently completely conquered by reason.

It is pity through cosmic pain: benevolence which comes from a bitter reflection on the Fates themselves, "the barriers of the world," which, when conquered, will fall in a day into fragments,[29] or a reflection on the compassion for the lowly heifer which searches in vain for her calf which has been sacrificed, while its useless bellowing is lost among the trees.[30] But above all it is a benevolence toward human beings and, in particular, for men who are not wise who, deprived of the unveiled truths by Epicurus, live absurd and useless lives in toil and boredom and slip away into nothingness.

Here is a touching passage:

> Even as men evidently feel that there is a weight on their minds which wearies with its oppression, if so they could also recognize from what causes it comes, and what makes so great a mountain of misery to lie on their hearts, they would not so live their lives as now we generally see them do, each ignorant of what he wants, each seeking always to change his place as if he could drop his burden. There is one goes forth often from his palace who has been bored to

> death at home, and then suddenly returns because he feels himself no better abroad. Off he courses, driving the nags to his country house in headlong haste, as if he were bringing urgent help to a blazing pile, suddenly yawns on reaching the threshold of the mansion, or falls into heavy sleep and seeks oblivion, or even makes haste to get back and see the city again. Thus each man flees from himself (but of course, as you might expect, the self whom he cannot escape cleaves to him all the more against his will), and hates himself because he is a sick man that knows not the cause of his complaint; for could he see that well, at once each would throw his business aside and first study to learn the nature of things, since the matter in doubt is not his state for one hour, but for eternity, in what state mortals must expect all time to be passed which remains after death.
>
> Besides, what is this great and evil lust of life that drives us to be agitated amidst doubt and peril? There is an end fixed for the life of mortals, and death cannot be avoided, but die we must. Again we move and have our being always amidst the same things, and by living we cannot forge for ourselves any new pleasure; but while we have not what we crave, that seems to surpass all else; afterwards when we have attained that, we crave something else; one unchanging thirst of life fills us and our mouths are forever agape: and it is uncertain what fortune the next years may bring, what chance has in store, what end awaits us. And by protracting life we do not deduct one jot from the time when death shall last, nor are we strong enough to diminish that so as to leave a shorter time after our taking off. Nay, you may live to complete as many generations as you will; nevertheless that everlasting death will still be waiting, and no less long a time will he be no more who has made an end of life with today's sun, than he who fell many a month and year before.[31]

The true inferno and the true damnation, according to Lucretius, is here on earth; the truly damned are those who ignore the word of wisdom. Lucretius has immense compassion for them.

Tantalus suffers the torment of the rock suspended over his head here on earth, and it is so for those who fear the Gods. Titius suffers the lacerating claws of the birds here on earth with formenting passions and anguish which torment and devour him. Thus Sisyphus, laboring every day, is continually tired trying to obtain power and then returns deluded and defeated.[32] The whips of Tartarus and the Furies that punish the saddest deeds are all here on earth:

> But in this life there is fear of punishment for evil deeds, fear as notorious as the deeds are notorious, and atonement for crime, prison, and the horrible casting down from the Rock, stripes, torturers, condemned cell, pitch, red-hot plates, firebrands: and even if these are absent, yet the guilty conscience, terrified before aught can come to pass, applies the goad and scorches itself with whips, and

> meanwhile sees not where can be the end to its miseries or the final limit to its punishment, and fears at the same time that all this may become heavier after death. The conclusion of the whole matter is, that the fool's life becomes a hell on earth.[33]

Conversely, Lucretius is convinced that as the foolish has his inferno here, the wise man has his paradise here, and he writes his poem in order to demonstrate this. But the very sincerity of his poem and the sensitivity to the pain of others reveal the limits of that paradise even better than the balanced reflections of Epicurus.

It is a paradise which cannot annul pain nor death, and hence it is a paradise which does not satisfy.

Moreover, Lucretius, allowing himself to be overcome by feeling, writes:

> Or what evil had there been for us, had we not been made?[34]

This is a question that Epicureanism cannot answer. *Life could be said to be a good thing only if being were identified with the positive and with the good and if a* telos *would support things*, but not if beings are born from atoms, from void, from movements and from blind swervings totally extraneous to the good and to the goal.

6. The significance of life and death

Epicurus, on the day itself of his death, as we previously stated, even among the spasmodic pains of kidney stones proclaimed his happiness and retiring into the past said that life was beautiful, thus affirming his victory over death.[35]

Metrodorus, in his poem, writes:

> I have anticipated you, Fortune, and entrenched myself against all your secret attacks. And we will not give ourselves up as captives to you or to any other circumstances; but when it is time for us to go, spitting contempt on life and on those who here vainly cling to it, we will leave life crying aloud in a glorious triumph-song that we have lived well.[36]

Here to spit on life means to spit at the absurdity of living at any cost, of living eternally, and hence it means to spit at death.

The same notion expressed more completely is found in Lucretius:

> What ails you so, O mortal, to indulge overmuch in sickly lamentations? Why do you groan aloud and weep at death? For if your former life now past has been to your liking, if it is not true that all your blessings have been gathered as it were into a riddled jar, and have run through and been lost without gratification: *why not like a banqueter fed full of life withdraw with contentment and rest in peace,*

> you fool? But if all that you have enjoyed has been spilt out and lost, and if you have a grudge at life, why seek to add more, only to be miserably lost again and to perish wholly without gratification? Why not rather make an end of life and trouble? For there is nothing else I can devise and invent to please you; everything is always the same.[37]

In other words: he who knows how to live well when now the hour of death arrives does not lament it and he is like the guest that is satisfied at a banquet. He who does not know how to live well is useless when he tries to continue to live because by continuing to live he continues to live badly. In both cases death is no evil.

Bignone has said with respect to Epicurus that the negation that death is an evil was a challenge to destiny and an heroic lie: the same heroic lie which makes Epicurus great.[38]

In Lucretius, the heroic lie is felt with all its dramatic contradictoriness through his own poetry. Actually, the question is spontaneous: why must the guest inexorably leave the banquet without any appeal when he is ordered and call himself a satisfied guest, even if the banquet is only at the beginning or has not ended?

The metaphor aside, Lucretius explains that death is an ineluctable law.

But he cannot say, as Epicurus could not say, ***why such a law is not absurd.***

With the very force of his poetry, Lucretius said that the incurable desire which man has for eternity, contrary to the arguments which he adduced, pointed out that there is no way to give sense to a life which is only a brief season, destined for nothing.

It is the limits and aporias of the Epicurean message which the truth of the poem makes emerge from the logical system. This is why Lucretius does not betray Epicurus, but renders his message more touching and more authentic.

But it is also correct to acknowledge that no philosophy, not just Epicureanism, has ever known how to respond on the rational level to the problem of death and evil, because death and evil are irrational, and reason at its best can only hide from them, neither mentioning or denying them, but not penetrating and explaining them either.

In Epicurus, as well as in Lucretius, evil is indeed covered over and death denied, just as they are in the dilemma: as long as you are, there is no death, and when there is death, you are no more. It denies the tragic moment of death itself, which is not the negation of being any longer but is merely the moment when life ceases; it is the negative which destroys the positive, it is the moment of being which goes into not-being, and it is just when facing this nullification of being that reason remains tragically mute.

Third Part

Stoicism from its Origins to the End of the Pagan Era

"Nulli praeclusa virtus est, omnibus patet, omnes admittit, omnes invitat, ingenuos, libertinos, servos, reges, exules. Non eligit domum nec censum, nudo homine contenta est."

"Virtue closes the door to no man: it is open to all, admits all, invites all. The freeborn and the freedman, the slave and the king, and the exile, neither family nor fortune determines its choice—it is satisfied with the naked human being."

Seneca *De beneficiis* 3.18

First Section

ANCIENT STOICISM

«σοὶ δὴ πᾶς ὅδε κόσμος, ἑλισσόμενος
περὶ γαῖαν, πείθεται, ᾗ κεν ἄγῃς, καὶ
ἑκὼν ὑπὸ σεῖο κρατεῖται.»

"Lo, yonder Heaven, that round
the earth is wheeled, follows your
guidance, still to you does yield
glad homage."

Cleanthes *Hymn to Zeus* vv. 7 ff.
Frag. 537 von Arnim 1

«ἄγου δέ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἡ
πεπρωμένη, ὅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμὶ
διατεταγμένος, ὡς ἕψομαί γ' ἄοκνος· ἢν
δέ γε μὴ θέλω κακὸς γενόμενος, οὐδὲν
ἧττον ἕψομαι.»

"Lead me, O Zeus, and you my
destiny, whatever is ordained is by
your decree. I'll follow, doubting not,
or if with will recreant I falter, I shall
follow still."

Cleanthes *Frag.* 527 von Arnim 1

I. Zeno, the Foundation of the Stoa, and the Different Phases of Stoicism

1. The meeting of Zeno with Crates and with Socraticism

In 312/311 BCE a young man of Jewish origin came to Athens from the island of Cyprus. He came with the intention of becoming familiar with the sources of the great Hellenic culture and devoting himself completely to philosophy. He was Zeno, the man who would establish what was perhaps the greatest school of the Hellenistic Age.[1] His father, Mnaseas, who traveled from Cyprus to Athens as a merchant, brought him some writings of Socrates on his return from his journeys:

> Demetrius the Magnesian, in his work on *Men of the Same Name*, says of him: his father, Mnaseas, being a merchant, often went to Athens and brought away many books about Socrates for Zeno while still a boy. Hence he had been well-trained even before he left his native place.[2]

It was, with great probability, these "Socratic books" which developed the intention in the young man to go to Athens.

In the capital of Hellenic culture it was not the men of the great schools of the Academy and the Peripatos who determined the orientation of Zeno, but rather a representative of one of the minor Socratic schools: Crates, a follower of Diogenes the Cynic, who as we know was a follower of Antisthenes.[3] Crates the Cynic offered to Zeno chiefly a practical model of ***philosophic life***, corresponding only in part to those exigencies that the young man felt rising within himself. Crates lacked a theoretical justification adequate to his choice of life, therefore, Socrates was only somewhat present in his teaching. Socrates had fundamentally taught: *a*) that the real man is the interior man (man is his *psyche*); *b*) that therefore goods are not exterior things but only interior things; *c*) that happiness is produced solely by the achievement of these goods; *d*) that facts, circumstances, and in general all that which is external cannot impede the achievement of these goods and hence the attainment of happiness. Men can kill our body but they cannot *hurt* us because they cannot *touch our soul* if we do not wish it; *e*) that the achievement of this goal must be through *science*, that is, true *wisdom*. Plato had accepted all these premises and had developed and analyzed the structure of such a wisdom which in Socrates was only inchoate (the Academy and the Peripatos were then to follow out these aims). On the contrary, the schools of the minor Socratics (with the sole exception of the Megaric school) had agreed to all the Socratic premises except the last one; consequently they had given them a significance really contrary to that which Plato had given them. As we have said, Socraticism, chiefly with

Cynics, became a practice of living. Reflection was restricted to the elaboration of some principles and norms immediately applicable without being supported by any adequate theoretical reasoning.

Zeno became familiar also with another minor Socratic school which at that time was still having some success, namely the school of the Megarics: in fact, we are told that he was a "pupil of Stilpo," who, as we know, was very famous towards the end of the fourth century.[4] But the Megaric doctrine mutilated Socrates's views even more than the Cynics did. In fact the Megarics stressed the dialectical and logical phase, risking, for the reasons mentioned above, going back to a Presocratic position. The meeting with Stilpo was ripe with consequences for Zeno: the logic and the dialectic of the Stoa, as we will see, undoubtedly imply the influences of the Megaric school.

2. The rejection of the "second voyage"

Zeno wished to listen not only to the voices of the minor Socratics, but also to those of the Academics. Our sources, in fact, make reference to the fact that Zeno was also a follower of the Platonic philosophers Xenocrates and Polemon.[5] Though this contact with the Academy influenced and helped him to mature and resolve particular problems as well as to give a consistency and a speculative solidity to his philosophy which differentiates the Stoa from all the other systems of the Hellenistic Age, it did not forbid him to take a position on metaphysical problems in clear opposition to that of Plato. Moreover, we have seen that Xenocrates had already compromised the essential results of the master and that Polemon tended to go back to an almost pre-Platonic position.

Zeno rejected the results of the "second voyage" and, no less than Epicurus, ***he took a clear materialistic position.***

He denied not only the transcendent existence of the *Ideas*, but he refused to attribute to them even the ontological meaning which Aristotle, though he argued against their transcendence, had nevertheless maintained. For Zeno and for the Stoics the Ideas become simply ***thoughts of the human mind***:

> The Ideas are concepts of our mind (ἐννοήματα ἡμετέρα).[6]
>
> Concepts are neither substances nor qualities, but mental images similar to substances and qualities. ***They are what the ancients called*** "***Ideas***." In fact we can speak of the Ideas for each thing offered to us in the form of a concept, as for example, men, horses, and in general all animals and all beings of which it is said that there are Ideas. ***The Ideas do not have their existence in themselves***; we ourselves participate in the formation of concepts and find the terms of the language, the so-called "appellatives."[7]

Zeno denied not only the existence of the intelligible transcendent Ideas, but also the existence of a spiritual soul (as having a nature different from the body) as well as the existence of immaterial and transcendent Intelligences, the Platonic Demiurge, the Aristotelian immobile Movent, and the Aristotelian Intelligences, the movents of the celestial spheres.

The soul has a corporeal and material nature: if it were not corporeal, Cleanthes says, echoing an argument which goes back to Zeno, the multiple relations that it has with the body could not be explained:

> Alterations and affections are not communicated from corporeal things to incorporeal things and vice versa, but the soul suffers together with the body, participating in its pain if it is struck, wounded, tortured; the body participates with the soul in its sadness if it is afflicted by troubles, anxiety, love as it felt a force associated with it, failing of which it shows the shame and fear by its blush and its pallor. Hence the soul is a body.[8]

The soul is *pneuma* and fire; it survives for a certain period after the death of the body but then it dissolves into the whole of things:

> Zeno of Citium defines the soul as a warm breath (πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον), for by this we become animate and able to move.[9]
>
> The soul is a long lasting breath (πνεῦμα πολυχρόνιον) which survives the body but because of this we cannot say it is eternal because with time it dissolves into the whole.[10]

God also is corporeal. He is the active principle of the universe and is immanent to the universe itself; God is the eternal fire, as we will see further on.

In order to give a clear idea of the antithesis between the Platonic and Stoic positions, it is appropriate to quote a passage of the *Sophist* in which Plato, probably in opposition to Antisthenes and the first Cynics, in order to refute their identification of being (οὐσία) with the body and the corporeal (σῶμα), confirmed the results of the "second voyage" in the following way:

> Stranger: Let them tell us, then, whether they admit that there is such a thing as a mortal living creature.
>
> Theaetetus: Of course they do.
>
> Stranger: And they will agree that it is a body animated by a soul?
>
> Theaetetus: Certainly.
>
> Stranger: Taking a soul to be something real?
>
> Theaetetus: Yes.

Stranger: Again, they allow that one soul may be just, another unjust, or one wise, another foolish?

Theaetetus: Naturally.

Stranger: And that any soul comes to be just or the reverse by possessing justice or the reverse, which is present in it?

Theaetetus: Yes, they agree to that too.

Stranger: But surely they will admit that whatever can come to be present in a thing or absent from it is certainly a real thing.

Theaetetus: Yes.

Stranger: Granted, then, that justice or wisdom or any other sort of goodness or badness is real, and moreover that a soul in which they come to exist is real, do they maintain that any one of these things is visible and tangible, or are they all invisible?

Theaetetus: They can hardly say that any one of them is visible.

Stranger: And do they really assert that something that is not visible *has a body*?

Theaetetus: That question they do not answer as a whole without a distinction. *The soul itself, they think, does possess a sort of body, but when it comes to wisdom or any of the other things you asked about, they have not the face either to accept the inference that they have no place among real things or to persist in maintaining that they are all bodies.*

Stranger: It is clear, Theaetetus, that our men have grown better; for the aboriginal sons of the dragon's teeth among them would not shrink from any such utterance; they would maintain that nothing which they cannot squeeze with their hands has any existence at all.

Theaetetus: That is pretty nearly what they believe.

Stranger: Then let us question them further; for if they are willing to admit *that any existence, no matter how small, is incorporeal, that is enough.*[11]

The passage is really paradigmatic because it proves that the ancient Cynics, in order to be consistent with the presupposition that being is a body, admitted the corporeality of the soul, but did not dare maintain the "corporeal nature" of intelligence and virtue. On the contrary, Zeno and the Stoa not only believed that being (ὄν, οὐσία) is a body (σῶμα) but they carried their position to extremes as they said that *anything whatever*, without distinction, if it is being, is body, even *intelligence as well as science and virtue*. We will fully document this further on.[12]

Therefore, the attempt to overturn the Platonic position is radical.

3. The reinterpretation of Heraclitus and the concept of "physis" as fire-maker

Zeno did not listen only to the philosophers who were his contemporaries, but read and meditated also on the books of the ancient philosophers, as it is expressly said:

> It is stated by Hecato and Apollonius of Tyre in his first book, *On Zeno*, that he consulted the oracle to know what he should do to attain the best life, and that the God's response was that he should take on the complexion of the dead. Whereupon, perceiving what this meant, *he studied ancient authors*.[13]

Undoubtedly the reading of Heraclitus was of fundamental importance. In fact, the Heraclitean notion of *fire* which is *physis*, *logos*, and *God* was reinterpreted and appropriately elaborated, as we will see, and became the central idea of the ontology of Zeno and the Stoa.

Heraclitus said:

> All things are an exchange for fire and fire is an exchange for all things.[14]

Again:

> This order (κόσμος), which is identical for all things, did none of the Gods or men make but it always was and is and shall be: an everlasting fire, kindling in measures and going out in measures.[15]

This fire "governs all things"[16] and hence is "intelligence which governs all things through all things."[17] It is the "logos which governs the totality of things."[18]

Here are some important Stoic fragments:

> Nature is an artistically working fire going on its way to create which is equivalent to a fiery, creative, or fashioning breath.[19]
>
> Now Zeno gives this definition of nature: "nature is a craftsmanlike fire, proceeding methodically to the work of generation."... The nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno, not merely "craftsmanlike" but actually "a craftsman," whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail.... Such being the nature of the world-mind it can, therefore, correctly be designated as practical wisdom or providence.[20]

As far as this doctrine is concerned, we must make a necessary suggestion, which in part we have already made with respect to Epicurus: the Heraclitean *physis*, reinterpreted by Zeno, could no longer maintain its archaic Presocratic significance, which is a meaning prior to the dis-

tinction between organic/inorganic, matter/spirit, corporeal/incorporeal, immanent/transcendent, sensible/supersensible. After the Platonic and Aristotelian acquisitions, the conception of *physis* could be determined only in function of these distinctions. Thus we have seen that Zeno, as Epicurus, denied the spiritual, immaterial, supersensible, and determined *physis* in a materialistic, corporealistic, and sensistic way. But unlike Epicurus, who drew consistent mechanistic consequences with all their corollaries from Atomism, Zeno, on the contrary, in an equally coherent way, drew from the Heraclitean principle which had inspired him vitalistic, hylozoistic, organistic, and pantheistic consequences.

Everything lives, matter is intrinsically endowed with life and everything is a living organism, everything is God and God is identical with the cosmos, *physis* and *theion* are identical: these statements were *implicit* in the Presocratics but *only with the Stoics do they become explicit and thematic*, for the reasons explained above. Since Platonic-Aristotelian transcendence is denied, God (if admitted as existent), must necessarily be immanent and identified with the cosmos and nature. As we will see more clearly in our exposition of the physics, *the Stoics are the first pantheists* in the history of Western thought or, if you prefer, *the first true pantheists*, that is, the first philosophers who identified God and nature with full theoretical awareness of the presuppositions and corollaries involved in this identification.

But we will speak more fully of this further on.[21]

4. Relations with Epicurus

Undoubtedly, the foundation of the Garden of Epicurus, in 307/306 BCE, had a specifiable influence on Zeno. This event, as we have seen above, was something really new and revolutionary in the intellectual life of Athens.[22] Zeno must have rapidly had conflicting feelings about the new school, perhaps a mixture of repulsion and attraction, admiration and contempt, agreement and disagreement. Zeno must certainly have understood that Epicurus tried to satisfy the same needs which he felt, that Epicurus tried to give voice to the exigencies which Zeno also considered as necessary. In fact, Epicurus has interpreted and practiced philosophy as the "art of living," that is, in a new way unknown to the other schools, or only imperfectly achieved by them. But if Zeno shared the Epicurean concept of philosophy as well as the consequent way to state philosophical problems, he did not accept their solution and quickly became a fiery adversary of the dogmas of the Garden. He profoundly repudiated the two fundamental ideas of the Epicurean system, that is to say, the reduction of the world and man to a mere confusion of atoms and the identification of the moral good with pleasure.

The opening of the Garden, therefore, must have stimulated Zeno in

two directions: on the one hand, it moved Zeno to the idea of founding a new school; on the other hand, with its dogmas, it was a term of polemical reference for the solution of a whole range of philosophical problems.

Only five years after the foundation of the Garden, Zeno was ready to present to his contemporaries a vision of the world which did not appeal to the atoms but to *logos*, but without any reference to Platonic or Aristotelian metaphysics. He was ready to propose an alternative to the Epicurean solution of the problem of life. Without appealing to traditional values, which were no longer creditable, he could teach how to live as a man according to a more noble ideal than the one presented by the Garden, that is, without falling into unrestrained individualism and shallow egoism, but putting oneself at the service of others in a constant social obligation, since the *logos* unites and never divides. Finally, Zeno wanted to present an ideal which did not reduce happiness to pleasure, though it was purified as far as possible. It is the achievement of an ideal of spiritual peace that man can reach overcoming the weight, the adversity of things, exterior events, and the internal obstacles of the passions *precisely in the logos and by means of the logos.*

Therefore, it is impossible to understand the philosophy of the Stoa if one prescinds from this constant and fundamental opposition to Epicureanism, as we will amply demonstrate.

5. The origin of the Stoa and its development

Zeno was not an Athenian citizen and, as such, he did not have the right to purchase a building; for this reason he held his lessons in a Porch, which had been painted by the famous painter Polygnotus. The Greek term for Porch is "Stoa" and for this reason the new school was called the Stoa or Porch and its followers were said to be "those of the Stoa" or "those of the Porch" or even more simply "Stoics."

So Diogenes Laertius writes:

> [Zeno] used then to discourse, pacing up and down in the painted colonnade [ἐν τῇ ποικίλῃ στοᾷ], which is also called the colonnade of Pisianax, but which received its name [= painted = ποικίλη] from the painting of Polygnotus. ... Hither then, people came henceforth to hear Zeno and this is why they were known as men of the Stoa or Stoics and the same name was given to his followers who had formerly been known as Zenonians. So it is stated by Epicurus in his letters.[23]

In the Porch of Zeno, unlike in the Garden of Epicurus, it was permitted to discuss the teachings of the founder of the school, and, for this reason, his doctrine was subject to analyses, revisions, and reinterpretations. Consequently, while the philosophy of Epicurus was not subject to noticeable modifications, in practice it was only or chiefly repeated,

commented on, and it remained therefore substantially unchanged. On the contrary, the philosophy of Zeno was subject to innovations, even important ones, going through a rather considerable development.

Scholars have now shown that it is necessary to distinguish three periods in the history of Stoicism: 1) the period of the *Ancient Stoa*, which is from the end of the fourth century through the whole of the third century BCE, in which the philosophy of the Porch was gradually developed and systematized by the three great scholarchs: Zeno, Cleanthes,[24] and especially Chrysippus[25] (it was chiefly Chrysippus, also of Semitic origin, who, writing more than seven hundred books, definitively fixed the doctrine of the first stage of the school); 2) the so-called period of the *Middle Stoa*, which developed between the second and first centuries BCE, and which is characterized by eclectic infiltrations into the original doctrines; 3) the period of the Roman Stoa or of the *New Stoa*, which belongs to the Christian Era. The Stoic doctrine became essentially a moral meditation and takes on a strongly religious tone in conformity with the spirit and aspirations of the new epoch.[26]

Therefore, the distinction of these three periods necessarily requires a separate analysis, because each of them reveals particular characteristics explainable only through the new questions gradually posed during five hundred years.

However, it is very difficult to differentiate the thought of the individual representatives of the ancient Stoa, because their doctrines are handed down to us by commentators who drew from the innumerable works of Chrysippus. They were written with an exceptional and refined dialectical ability and, therefore, they obscured the whole output of the former Stoic thinkers almost to the point of making it disappear. Actually, if Chrysippus had not existed, as we have previously observed,[27] the Stoa would have disappeared after Cleanthes, since with Ariston[28] and Herillus[29] heterodox tendencies had already taken over and real schisms had occurred. Therefore, the exposition of the doctrine of the Ancient Stoa is chiefly an exposition of the doctrine in Chrysippus's formulation. The detailed testimonies, even in regard to the thinkers of the Middle Stoa, Paenetius and Posidonius, are scarce, but the two thinkers are clearly able to be distinguished. Instead, in regard to Roman Stoicism, the works which we possess are numerous, complete, and detailed.

Let us begin by a systematic explanation of the fundamental teachings of the ancient Stoa.[30]

II. The Tripartition of Philosophy and the Logos

Zeno and the Stoa accepted the tripartition of philosophy established by the Academy (it also was substantially accepted by Epicurus, as we have seen above); nevertheless, they emphasized it and tirelessly formed new images to effectively explain the relationships joining the three parts. All philosophy, for them, is exemplified in the image of an orchard in which *logic* corresponds to the boundary wall which limits the area of the orchard and which sometimes functions as a defensive position; the trees represent *physics* because they are like the necessary condition without which there would be no orchard; finally, the fruit which is the goal of the trees represents *ethics*. Another famous image is that of the egg: the protective shell is logic, the albumen physics, and the yolk ethics. Posidonius will propose, instead, the dynamic image of a living organism: logic is like the skeleton, physics like flesh and blood, and ethics is the soul.[1] These images express well both the importance and the privileged position of ethics as well as the indispensibility of the other two parts of philosophy.

But the Stoics, unlike the other schools who admitted the tripartition of philosophy (and unlike the Epicureans themselves, who in addition to the tripartition will still admit the same hierarchical subordination proposed by the Stoics), know how to show in an original manner the foundation which solidly linked the three parts in the principle of the *logos*. The *logos* is *the source of truth* in logic, it is the *constructive principle* of the cosmos in physics, and it is the *normative principle* in ethics.

It is very significant that the Stoics, in order to indicate this principle of immanent and rational spirituality which lies at the basis of their system, did not choose the term *Nous* (νοῦς), that is, *mind or intelligence*, which had an interesting history from Xenophanes to Parmenides to Anaxagoras to Plato to Aristotle (who—remember—had even called his primary principle the νόησις νοήσεως). But indeed they chose to use the Heraclitean term *logos* for the reasons indicated in the previous paragraph. They claimed to find expressed in it a polyvalent meaning which unites the subjective and objective, the anthropological and cosmological, the epistemological and ontological aspects. Hence, this *logos* can function indifferently to denominate either subject or object.

Pohlenz, who, as we have said above, has most fully and carefully studied, examined, and interpreted the Stoic philosophy in the whole course of its development and its problems, has explained the sense of the Stoic *logos* thusly: "...for the Greeks the essence of the *logos* is not exhausted in speech and knowledge. It cannot be said that a thing only exists, but that a thing also must be. The *logos* does not stop at knowledge, but contains also the drive to act. Only by beginning from this function can we understand why the *logos* became the fundamental

notion in the philosophy of Zeno and had a significance which *nous* could never have achieved. The *logos*, for Zeno, is not only the reason which thinks and knows, but also the spiritual principle which gives a rational form to the whole universe according to a strict plan. It impresses on every single being its own purpose. For Zeno as well as for Heraclitus, the *logos* rules both in the cosmos and the human sphere as well as giving us the possibility of grasping not only the meaning of the world but also the sense of our spiritual existence as well and thus of becoming aware of our actual destiny. In this way, it indicated also the way to achieve a comprehension of the cosmic becoming and so to satisfy both the rational thought and religious feeling of Zeno."[2]

In this way what we said above is clarified: how the *logos* is a unitary principle with three diverse meanings which generate the three parts of philosophy. First, the *logos* as principle of truth, with its laws of thinking, of knowing, and of speaking, is the specific object of logic. Second, the *logos* as ontological principle of the cosmos is the object of physics (understood in the original Presocratic sense as a doctrine of *physis*). Finally, the *logos* as a finalistic principle, that is, as the principle determining the meaning of each thing and hence also the goal and the axiological being of man, constitutes the object of ethics.

III. The Logic of the Ancient Stoa

1. The role and the articulations of Stoic logic

If the primary place in the hierarchy of knowledge from the axiological perspective belongs to ethics, from the ontological perspective it belongs to physics. Instead, from the methodological and didactic viewpoint, it belongs to logic. And even if, in this respect, the followers of Stoicism exhibited differences and fluctuations in their opinions, the conviction of the founders, that is, of Zeno and Chrysippus, was that logic must methodologically be treated first, physics second, and ethics third.[1]

Actually, as we have previously stated above, what the Stoics are concerned about (as are all the Hellenistic philosophers) is the resolution of the problems of life and the search for peace of mind. But in order to resolve the problems of human life it is necessary to define the cosmo-ontological dimension in which human beings are situated and therefore to elaborate a physics in order to be able to resolve such problems. It is likewise necessary to have adequate instruments which can only be attained through logic, which therefore must be acquired first.

On the other hand, the Stoics, as the Epicureans, and even more than some Epicureans, were firmly convinced that human beings have the possibility of achieving certitude and absolute truth and that peace of mind can only flow from this achievement and possession. Indeed logic, at its best, is the elaboration and definition of the criterion of truth and absolute certitude.

Not only does the Stoic feel that he has the truth in every part of his system, but he proudly proclaims that he is able to show it logically both to himself and others. It is possible to understand, hence, the reason why Sceptics chose the Stoics as their favorite target: they, in fact, are the most dogmatic philosophers of the Hellenistic Age. Dragged into the Sceptic polemic, they sharpened even further their dialectical instruments and began giving even more weight to logic. Thus they became more and more different from the Epicureans, who, as we have seen, had little interest in such a discipline and, therefore, achieved rather meager results in this sphere.

Actually, up to the end of the previous century, although scholars recognized the differences in the works of the Porch in comparison to the Garden in the field of logical research, nevertheless they evaluated them in a decisively negative way.[2] The Stoa simplified and impoverished the Platonic-Aristotelian position. It simply refurbished the logic of Aristotle with new terminology, inappropriately developed some parts of it to the detriment of others, and sometimes even distorted it. On the contrary, recent studies have correctly stressed that Stoic logic is different from Aristotelian logic. Stoic logic moves in different, sometimes

even opposite, directions since it develops pre-Aristotelian elements elaborated by the minor Socratic schools and especially by the Megarics.[3]

Actually Aristotelian logic, as we have seen, depends on Aristotelian metaphysics and, in particular, on the conception of being as determined according to the categories, on the conception of the primacy of the category of substance with respect to all the other categories, and on the relation of inherence binding these other categories to the primary one. Finally, Aristotelian logic depends on the conception of the metaphysical primacy of form or essence (understood as *separated or separable by thought* and as a metaphysically privileged cause). Therefore, many of the accusations of contradiction and ingenuousness lodged against Stoic logic comes from not having taken into account this dependence and not having emphasized that the new ontological area of interest of the Porch must necessarily require a change in the logical sphere. If the logic of the Porch is interpreted within the new ontological field of interest, unlike that of the Garden, it takes on its own shape, its own coherence and originality even if, as we will see, it falls into insoluble aporias.

The very distinction of the parts of logic proposed by the Stoics clearly indicates its non-Aristotelian origin. Zeno, in fact, with a completely pre-Aristotelian viewpoint distinguished logic into *dialectic* and *rhetoric*, since he admitted only two possible kinds of discourse: that which *proceeds by means of arguments* and that which develops in an oratorical manner.

> Discourse is of two kinds: reasoned and oratorical, and therefore, either dialectic or rhetoric. With the closed fist Zeno used to show the concise and sharp-edged nature of dialectic, and with the open hand and with stretched-out fingers the fullness and spread of rhetoric.[4]

Nevertheless, we are informed that some Stoics, as well as Epicureans, accord to the logical procedure the task of providing the canons or criteria of truth.[5] In fact, some sources speak of the doctrine of the criterion of truth as having the primacy in their teaching:

> The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation, and again, the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first, then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation.[6]

Actually, a philosophy can express dogmas, that is, absolute certainties, only if and in relation to the fact that it provides the criteria which permit the achievement of these certainties. Therefore, our exposition

must also move according to the same priority given to the doctrine on the *criterion of truth*.

2. The criteria of truth: sensation and cataleptic presentation

The soul is, originally, like a "tabula rasa," and through experience it gradually acquires awareness:

> The Stoics say when a man is born he has the ruling part of the soul, like a page of clean paper, fit for copying a script. On this part he notes every single concept. The first way of this transcription is by means of the senses.[7]

Sensation and sensorial presentation are the initial phase, that is, the coming of knowledge into the soul. Therefore, it is possible to understand why the Stoics studied them very carefully. They ended by indicating that the criterion of truth was not in sensation itself, as it was for the Epicureans, who were even more strongly sensists, but it was in the *presentation*, a result of the sensism and materialism of their criteriology.

Therefore, knowledge depends on sensation (*aisthesis*), which is an impression on our sensorial organs provoked by objects. This impression is transmitted through the senses to the soul where it is imprinted, and thus presentation (*phantasia*) is generated. Diogenes Laertius explains:

> A presentation (or mental impression) is an imprint on the soul: the name having been appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon the wax.[8]

However, the basic materialism of the Stoa involved not a few difficulties in the determination of *the nature of such an imprint on the soul*. Actually, Zeno and Cleanthes understood the impression as a real *material imprint on the soul*, while Chrysippus, more knowingly, defined it as a *qualitative alteration*. Sextus Empiricus writes:

> Presentation, then, according to the Stoics, is an *impression* on the soul. But about this they at once began to quarrel; for whereas Cleanthes [just like Zeno] understood impression as involving eminence and depression, just as does the impression made in wax by signet-rings, Chrysippus regarded such a thing as absurd. For in the first place, he says, when the mind imagines at one and the same moment a triangular object and a quadrangular object, the same body [that is, the mind or soul which, as everything else for the Stoics, is a body] must needs be circumscribed by different forms at the same time and become simultaneously both triangular and quadrangular, or even circular, which is absurd; and further, when many presentations occur in us simultaneously, the soul will also receive

> innumerable formations, which result is worse than the former. Chrysippus himself, therefore, suspected that the term ***impression*** was used by Zeno in the sense of ***alteration***, so that the definition runs like this—***presentation is an alteration of the soul***; for it is no longer absurd that, when many presentations co-exist in us at the same moment, the same body [that is, the soul] should admit of innumerable alterations; for just as the air, when many people are speaking simultaneously, receives in a single moment numberless and different impacts and at once undergoes many alterations also, so too when the regent part is the subject of a variety of images it will experience something analogous to this.[9]

It is clear that the correction of Chrysippus changes the difficulty but does not resolve it at all. In fact, if we substitute the example given by Chrysippus with examples of contraries, the change also falls into the same difficulties for which he reproved Cleanthes. When we have simultaneous presentations of contraries, or things which mutually exclude each other, our soul should have corresponding simultaneous contrary alterations which ought to mutually exclude each other. It is a difficulty which cannot be resolved if we remain within the scope of a materialistic psychology.

Let us proceed in the analysis of the Stoic doctrine. The criterion of truth is not the mere sensation but the ***presentation***, and yet not every or any presentation but only the ***cataleptic or comprehensive presentation***. Let us see precisely what its nature is, why it is fundamental in order to understand not only the philosophy of the Porch but also the positions taken by the various opponents of the Porch, in particular by Sceptics and Academics.

The veridical presentation, according to the Stoics, does not merely imply sensation but likewise postulates ***an assent, an approval, an agreement proceeding from the logos which is in our soul.*** The impression does not depend on us, since it depends on the action which objects cause on our senses and we are not free to accept or reject this action. Nevertheless we are, in a certain sense, free to take a position in relation to the impressions and the presentations which are formed in us, by giving the assent of our logos or by denying this ***assent*** (συγκατάθεσις, ***sunkatathesis***). Only when we give our assent do we have the ***apprehension*** (κατάληψις, ***katalepsis***). The presentation which has received our assent is the ***cataleptic or comprehensive presentation*** (καταληπτικὴ φαντασία), and this alone is the criterion and guarantor of truth.

Here is a clear testimony of Cicero in this regard:

> Not all presentations are trustworthy, but only those that have a "manifestation," peculiar to themselves, of the objects presented; and a trustworthy presentation being perceived as such by its own

> intrinsic nature he termed "graspable" (καταληπτόν)—but after it has been received and accepted as true, he termed it a "grasp" (κατάληψις) resembling objects grasped in the hand—and this Zeno used to demonstrate by gesture: for he would display his hand in front of one with the fingers stretched out and say "A visual *appearance* is like this"—next he closed his fingers a little and said, "an act of *assent* is like this"; then he pressed his fingers close together and made a fist and said that that was *comprehension*; but then he used to take his left hand, place it around his right fist, and squeeze it tightly and forcibly and then say that such was knowledge.[10]

The spontaneity of the *assent* proclaimed by the Stoics is the most critical and important point to understand. Let us read three testimonies in this regard. Cicero writes, again:

> Zeno added to the assent of the soul presentations and those things almost received from the senses, which he claims *were placed in us and are voluntary*.[11]

Sextus Empiricus writes:

> To the Stoics, presentation is "assent to the apprehensive presentation," and this seems to be a two-fold thing, and to be partly involuntary and *partly voluntary and dependent on our judgment*. For the experience of a presentation is involuntary, and it does not depend on the person affected, but on the cause of the presentation, that he is affected in this particular way—as, for instance, with a sense of whiteness when a white color presents itself, or with a sense of sweetness when something sweet is offered to his taste; *but the act of assenting to this affection lies in the power of the person who receives the presentation*.[12]

Finally, the neo-Stoic Epictetus says:

> I will prove it to you first in the sphere of assent. Can anyone prevent you from assenting to truth? No one at all. Can anyone force you to accept the false? No one at all. Do you see that in this sphere you have a moral purpose free from hindrance, constraint, obstruction?[13]

Actually, this liberty of assent is so ambiguous and attenuated that it almost disappears as soon as we test its consistency. The Stoics are far from thinking that the logos has, in relation to sensation, an autonomy or a regulative function of the type that we find in modern epistemologies. They are far from conceiving that the *cataleptic presentation* is a kind of synthesis or a sort of estimation of the spirit on the basis of the sensory data. The liberty of assent is, therefore, nothing else than recognizing and accepting *objective evidence* and rejecting *non-evidence*. In this respect, the following passage of Diogenes Laertius is extremely relevant:

> There are two species of presentations, the one [cataleptic] directly apprehending a real object (φαντασία καταληπτική), the other [non-cataleptic] not directly apprehending a real object (ἀκατάληπτος). The former, which they take to be the test of reality, *is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind*, the latter, or non-apprehending, is that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.[14]

This passage is in complete agreement with the statement of Sextus Empiricus:

> An apprehensive presentation is one caused *by an existing subject and imaged and stamped in the subject in accordance with that existing subject, of such a kind as could not be derived from a non-existent object.*[15]

As we can see, this is the presupposed conviction of the Stoics: *when we are actually in relation to an object* it produces in us an impression and a presentation endowed with such force and evidence[16] that we are brought naturally to assent and hence to cataleptic presentation. Conversely, when we have a cataleptic presentation, that is, when we give our assent to a presentation, we find ourselves securely in relation to a real object. Therefore, the presupposition of a complete correspondence between the real presence of the object and an evident presentation moving us to assent ends in being predominant in this conception of the criterion of truth. Thus it will not be difficult for the Sceptics to find out that this point of Stoic doctrine runs into great contradictions and to show that no presentation, insofar as it is such, has such characteristics that it deserves, or does not deserve, our assent without any possibility of equivocation.[17]

Actually, for the Stoics, the truth or truthfulness belonging to the cataleptic presentation is due to the fact that this is an action, a material and corporeal modification that things produce in our soul. It provokes an equally material and corporeal response from our soul. For the reasons which we will clarify further on, the truth, according to the Stoics, is something material, or "it is a body."[18]

3. Intellectual knowledge, *prolepses*, and universal concepts

Knowledge is not exhausted within the sphere of sensation nor even within experience in general, which is precisely the consolidation of the memory of sensible presentations of a similar kind. The Stoics recognize that human nature also has the capacity of thinking and reasoning, that is, of forming intellectual presentations or concepts (ἔννοιαι), of connecting these presentations and hence of proceeding to "inferences" in

various ways. Though the Epicureans, in their canonic, were chiefly concerned with linking "opinions" to experience in order to verify the validity of an opinion, they did not indicate any other criterion but the simple "confirmation" and "non-denial" on the part of sensations and experience. They had seriously limited or at the very least did not recognize the importance and fecundity of that "autonomy" which is proper to thinking and reasoning. Consequently, they did not elaborate a theory of the forms of thinking and reasoning, that is, an authentic and sound logic.[19] On the contrary, the Stoics recognized the autonomy of our thought and hence were able to develop an authentic and sound logic, which they called *dialectic*.

In order to understand this dialectic, it is necessary to comprehend the Stoic doctrine on coming-to-be, on nature, and on the significance of the universal (or better, that to which the Stoics reduced the universal).

How does the passage occur from sensation and sensible presentation to intellection (νόησις, ἔννοια), that is, to the concept? Sextus Empiricus writes:

> Every intellection is derived from sensation or not without sensation and by a contact (περίπτωσις) or not without a contact.[20]

Other texts specify further that in addition to this "contact" (περίπτωσις), which is the most immediate way by which we move from empirical to intellective presentations, there are other ways which are yet not so immediate and are more complex. Sextus Empiricus writes:

> In general, everything which is conceived by the intellect is conceived in two ways: *either through contact and through immediate evidence* [κατὰ περίπτωσιν ἐναργῆ] or through a *passage* [or inference] from evident things [κατὰ μετάβασιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν], and this last happens in three ways: either by way of *resemblance* or by way of *composition* or by way of *analogy*. White and black, sweet and bitter, are conceived by the intellect by contact and immediate evidence. By a passage [or an inference] from evident things notions are conceived by way of similarity, as for example from the image of Socrates, Socrates himself, by way of composition as for example from horse and man the hippocentaur: by mixing parts of a horse with parts of a human we have forged the presentation of the centaur, which is neither man nor horse but a composite of both. By way of analogy, we ultimately conceive notions in two ways: through addition or by diminution as for example by starting from ordinary men through which then, by accretion, we conceive the notion of Cyclops...or through diminution the pygmy, whom we did not perceive through immediate evidence.[21]

If we do not have sensations first, we cannot have intellectual presen-

tations and concepts. In the first place, we move from sensation to intellections through an immediate activity: for example, from *this* white which I see to the (general) notion of white; from *this* color to the notion of color (this is the passage κατὰ περίπτωσιν). In the second place, we move through a *mediated* passage, that is by association, combination, and division on the notions obtained by immediate evidence. Thus we are able to transform them in various ways. Furthermore, it is to be noted that (probably by accepting Epicurean terminology) even the Stoics admitted the existence of "prolepses," conceiving them as "a natural conception of the universals,"[22] that is, as a process that occurs in a quite natural way in babies and which achieves completion around the seventh year:

> Among conceptions, some are established naturally according to the way mentioned above and without any art; others, on the contrary, are established by means of our doctrines and activity. The former, therefore, are simply called concepts; the latter instead [which are established naturally], are also said to be *anticipations*. They say that reason, because of which we are defined reasonable, reaches its completion from anticipations during the first seven years. The concept then is an intellective vision in a reasoning animal. In fact when vision begins to fall into a rational soul, then concept is said taking this name from the intellect.[23]

Those *prolepses* and notions, which are found in all men, are "universal notions or concepts" (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, *communes notitiae*).[24] The Stoics have even spoken about "notions and *prolepses* inborn in human nature" (ἔμφυτοι προλήψεις) in regard to some moral concepts.[25]

This language, which can make us think that innatism is present at least "virtually," is inconsistent with the statement that the soul is a "tabula rasa." Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that, as we will see, the logos of man is nothing else than a part or a moment of the universal logos and as such must not only be able to achieve truth but must likewise have in itself, in a certain way, some germs of the truth.

4. The "expressibles" (λεκτά) and their "incorporeity"

What is the nature of the "universals," of which the mind thinks, puts together, or separates in various ways? The reply to this question involves noteworthy difficulties for the Stoics, because of the materialistic and sensistic premises of their system.

Epicurus, as we have seen, had a simple solution: he only admitted things which are corporeal and individual and words which are equally corporeal and individual. He held that words refer immediately to things

(like sensations and *prolepses*, which are material imprints). Epicurus therefore suppressed the problem of the universal.[26] On the contrary, the Stoics realized that this was a simplistic solution and admitted, in addition to existing things and significant words, a *tertium quid*, that is, the *contents of thought*, "the signified" things (σημαινόμενα). They called them mere λεκτά, that is, using a common expression, mere "expressibles" (it would be better to translate the term with "things expressed" or "enunciated" or "said"). They affirmed that such things are "incorporeal" (ἀσώματα). Sextus Empiricus writes:

> The Stoics maintained that "three things are linked together, the thing signified and the thing signifying and the thing existing," and of these the thing signifying is the sound (Dion, for instance), and the thing signified is the actual thing indicated thereby, and which we apprehend as existing in dependence on our intellect, whereas the barbarians, although hearing the sound, do not understand it; and the thing existing is the external real object, such as Dion himself. And of these things *two are bodies*, that is, the sound and the existing thing, and *one is incorporeal*, namely the thing signified and *expressible* [λεκτόν = expressed, said, signified] and this too is true or false. But this is not all alike true or false, it being partly incomplete and partly self-complete. And of the self-complete that part is true or false which is termed "judgment" and which they describe by saying "a judgment is that which is true or false."[27]

The passage becomes clearer if we read further from Sextus:

> And they [the Stoics] say that "the expressible" [λεκτόν = expressed, spoken, signified] is *that which subsists in conformity with a rational presentation* and that a rational presentation is one in which the object represented is established by reason.[28]

We can easily explain that the contents of thought, which are the result of our rational activity and which we express and communicate by words (which are the universals), are for the Stoics pure *expressibles* (*lekta*) and incorporeals. In fact *being is always and solely corporeal* and, as such, *individual*. The contents of thought are predicated of many individuals and therefore they are not individual and cannot be *bodies* and hence *realities*. Consequently they are not bodies, but not yet in the spiritual or positive sense, but in the negative sense of the *absence of that quality which is typical of reality and being, which, for the Stoics, is only corporeity*. In addition, they are *lekta* insofar as they exist only conjoined to human *leghein* and to human *dia-leghein*, that is, in dependence on our speech, thinking, and reasoning. The position of the Stoics is hence conceptualistic and nominalistic insofar as it recognizes the universal as something dependent on our thought and speech, but they reject the notion that it has a real existence or foundation in reality.

The conception of the ***immaterial lekton*** as a concept (as "semainomenon") is intertwined with a second one, attested to by other sources and by Sextus Empiricus himself. This conception is much more complex, but no less important for the correct understanding of the philosophy of the Porch in general and dialectic in particular and about which, hence, it is necessary to write.

In the context of Stoic materialism and corporealism, which, as we have previously emphasized, is of a hylozoistic and vitalistic kind, the relation of cause-effect that was without any precise precedent in previous thought is unique. Only the cause is reality, is being, is "body" and the effect is instead merely accidental, devoid of corporeal reality and hence "incorporeal." The effects are therefore considered as mere "predicates" (κατηγορήματα) and hence "incorporeal" and hence also "expressibles" (λεκτά).[29]

Here are the most significant texts:

> Zeno says that cause is "that through which," while that of which it is a cause is *an accident.* And a cause is a *body*, that of which it is a cause is a *predicate* (κατηγόρημα).[30]
>
> Chrysippus says that the cause is the "that for which." And the cause is *being and body* and that of which it is cause *is neither being nor body.*[31]
>
> The Stoics declare that every cause is *a body* which is the cause to a body *of something incorporeal* (ἀσωμάτου τινός): for example the scalpel is a body, and "the flesh" is a body, and the *expression "being cut" is incorporeal* (ἀσωμάτου κατηγορήματος); and again fire is a body, and "the wood" is a body and the cause of the *expression "being burnt" is incorporeal.*[32]
>
> Cleanthes and Archedemus define the *predicates* (κατηγορήματα) as *expressibles* (λεκτά).[33]

There were many attempts to explain this baffling Stoic doctrine, but scholars have not always achieved the same results.

Actually, the reasons that explain this kind of doctrine are multiple.

First, the reason why the effect produced by a cause is considered an *accident* or a mere *event*, as we have already emphasized, is due to the monistic-pantheistic materialism of the Porch and to the new categorical system which follows from it. As we will see further, in dealing with physics it recognizes being and reality only in ***substance-substrate*** and ***quality,*** which are "bodies," whereas all the other categories are ***modes*** and ***relative modes,*** which are on a completely different level. Though the effect can never obviously be a substance-substrate, not even a ***quality*** can be, since substance-substrate and quality are monistically conceived as "entirely penetrated among themselves":[34] quality is a

body which penetrates and pervades another body. If this is so, whatever the intrinsic force a body produces externally, or whatever a body produces on another, without compenetrating, intrinsically it is nothing else than an exterior "event," an accidental modality. Hence it is also devoid of true reality and being which means, according to Stoic vocabulary, it is "incorporeal."

But why is the effect-accident-incorporeal said to be a "predicate" (κατηγόρημα)? It is evident that the Stoics defined it in this way since they moved from another order of considerations, which the significance of the term "predicate" will reveal to us. The "predicate" is defined as "whatever is conjoined to one or more things";[35] now if it is conjoined to *more things*, it is not individual, and hence it is universal. For this reason—it seems to us—it is one of the expressibles (λεκτά) which are universal.[36]

In conclusion, among the "expressibles" (λεκτά) we can find both the "signified" and the "predicates," for the reasons given. These complex explanations are indispensable for understanding the nature of Stoic dialectic, its novelty, and also its value, since it is concerned entirely with the expressibles (λεκτά).

5. Dialectic

The Stoics defined dialectic, as we have seen, in a Socratic manner:

> Dialectic is the science of correctly discussing (διαλέγεσθαι) subjects by question and answer.[37]

Although the discussion, the *dia-leghein*, has to do with both words and notions or, using Stoic vocabulary, with things *signifying* (σημαίνοντα) and with things *signified* (σημαινόμενα), dialectic also deals with these two things. Consequently, Chrysippus defined dialectic as follows:

> Dialectic refers to signs and things signified.[38]

Stoic dialectic is divided, therefore, into two great sections: one concerns *language* and its *structure*, the other the *forms of reasoning*.

In the study of language the Stoics laid down the premises for the scientific study of grammar. The theory of declension with the determination of the "case endings" was probably their most significant discovery in this field.[39] It is to be noted that, in the section of dialectic dealing with language, the Stoics, as Diogenes Laertius tells us,[40] not only studied the parts of speech (that is, the proper noun, the common noun, the verb, the conjunction, and the article), its structure, and the connected question of style, but they also included questions concerning *definition*, *genus*, and *species*. These are questions which should be part

of the section concerning the *semainomena*. But, on further reflection, what at first causes surprise can be given a precise explanation within the system. The rejection of the eidetic structure of reality, that is, the metaphysical structure which stresses the form and the species (and hence gives special prominence to the essence and the definition) and the consequent *conceptualism* which even has touches of *nominalism*, undoubtedly moved the Stoics to consider these problems chiefly as problems concerning words and language.

In the other section of dialectic, the Stoics were concerned instead with the forms of reason, as again Diogenes Laertius says:

> To the section dealing with things and things signified is assigned the theory of the "expressions" (τῶν λεκτῶν), of the complete expressions, as well as judgments and syllogisms and also the theory of defective expressions comprising both active and passive predicates.[41]

The second section of dialectic, hence, in addition to judgments and syllogisms, is concerned with "predicates," which according to the Stoics are *verbs*. They are precisely the "defective expressions" or the "incomplete expressions," as for example "writes," "talks," and "runs."[42]

The reasons why the Stoics displaced all their interest from the subject to the predicate and stress the latter in a clear way are to be sought in their ontology and precisely in the doctrines which we have tried to clarify in the preceding paragraphs. Their sensism and their materialism must flow from the understanding that the subject of a judgment is chiefly the *individual* (and not a concept) and the predicate as an action and an effect produced by the subject (and not another concept). The preferred judgment of the Stoics is the *singular* judgment, such as "Socrates writes," "Socrates speaks," "Socrates runs," or "this man writes," "this man speaks," and similars.

Therefore, in their logic the Stoics try to establish not only the links which unify their concepts, but also the links which unify the events. And we know already that the words expressing precisely "the events" are, for the reasons previously mentioned, "incorporeals."

The proposition, or judgment,[43] is a "complete expression," that is, an expression which has a determined and completed sense insofar as it connects the predicate to the subject. As for Aristotle, so also for the Stoics the true and the false are linked structurally to the judgment:

> The judgment is that which expressed in words becomes an assertion which is either true or false.[44]

But also on this point the Stoics do not cease to astonish: they, in fact, consider the ontological value of "truth" and of the "true" as different. The truth is *corporeal*; the true, on the contrary, *incorporeal* in the sense

that we understand, as Sextus Empiricus writes with accuracy:

> The "true" differs from the "truth" in substance, in composition, and in potency. In essence, the truth is *a body* whereas the true is *incorporeal.* This distinction is explained thus: the true is a judgment, the judgment is an expression and hence incorporeal. On the other hand, truth is a body insofar as it is held to be "knowledge declaratory of all true things" and all knowledge is "a particular state of the principal part," just as the fist is conceived as a particular state of the hand and, according to these thinkers, the ruling part is body, so that truth also will belong to the genus body.[45]

It is to be noted that the Stoics are interested chiefly in the hypothetical and disjunctive judgment neglected by Aristotle but to which the first Peripatos had already directed its attention.[46]

Even in the study of reasoning, the Stoics stressed the ***hypothetical*** and ***disjunctive syllogisms*** because they are the most useful way to bring together events but not concepts.

Chrysippus tried to individualize the figures or the fundamental schemas of deduction to which all reasoning is reduced and specified them as five, called the "anapodictics," because they are evident per se, that is, they do not have any need of further demonstrations.[47]

Here is the schema with the related exemplifications of the five anapodictics:

[1] If A is, also B is;
but A is;
hence also B is.
Example: If it is day (A), it is clear (B);
but it is day (A);
hence it is clear (B).

[2] If A is, also B is;
but B is not;
hence A is not.
Example: If it is day (A), it is clear (B);
but it is not clear (B);
hence it is not day (A).

[3] A and B cannot be at the same time;
but A is;
hence B is not.
Example: It cannot be at the same time day (A) and night (B);
but it is day (A);
hence it is not night (B).

[4] Either A is or B is;
but A is;
hence B is not.
Example: Either it is day (A) or it is night (B);
but it is day (A);
hence it is not night (B).

[5] Either A is or B is;
but B is not;
hence A is.
Example: Either it is day (A) or it is night (B);
but it is not night (B);
hence it is day (A).

These types of hypothetical syllogisms have been maintained by some scholars as more "modern" than those of the Aristotelians and more fruitful. Actually, they are not in harmony with the Stoic system. In fact, once the essence is excluded as principle of the syllogism, the mere events ("incorporeals") in the scope of the Stoic system appear incoherent or, if connected, their connection, when it is not reduced to a mere identity, ends by being surreptitiously introduced, as Bréhier demonstrated:

> ...from the viewpoint of [Stoic] dialectic that concentrates on isolated events, there is no link possible, or rather there is no other link except that of identity. Dialectic remains on the surface of being. Certainly the Stoics tried to surmount the tautological reasoning: "*Si lucet, lucet; lucet autem; ergo lucet*" ["If it is light, then it is light. But it is light therefore it is light"]. But they could not do this without being arbitrary and trivial... No stable doctrine has ever been able to impose itself in their view. Their dialectic, though it may appear paradoxical, is too much bound to the facts to be fruitful. It is not able to depart from the brute fact and the datum, either by means of the idea [i.e., the essence] which it denies or by means of the law [*scil.*, the law which links the phenomena discovered by modern sciences], which is not yet known, so it must be satisfied with an indefinite repetition of the objective data.[48]

6. Rhetoric

As we have emphasized above, rhetoric according to the Stoics is a fundamental way of speaking, ***leghein***, that is, the ***logos***, and as such it is in principle part of logic.

On the other hand, it is true as well that the Stoics attributed to rhetoric an importance decisively subordinated to dialectic. In fact, rhetoric is the science which permits the clear and unambiguous laying out of the true, but this is discovered only by means of dialectic.

Here are two significant testimonies:

> Further, by rhetoric they understand the science of speaking well on matters set forth by plain narrative and by dialectic that of correctly discussing subjects by question and answer; hence their alternative definition of it as the science of statements true, false, and neither true nor false.[49]
>
> Only with the study of dialectic can the wise man reason without falling into error: in fact by means of dialectic the true is distinguished from the false and the persuasive can be discerned from what is ambiguously expressed. In addition, without dialectic it is not possible to question and to answer methodically.[50]

As we see, from the all-powerful political instrument for persuading and for moving souls—which Gorgias had exalted and Plato[51] had branded—rhetoric becomes simply the art of speaking elegantly, that is, the art of saying the truth in a proper way: dialectic expresses the truth in a sharp and concise way, rhetoric expresses it in an appropriate and embellished way. Moreover, with the death of the *poleis* and free democracies and the advent of the Hellenistic monarchies, it is possible to understand why rhetoric, in the classical sense, no longer had any political arena and why it could no longer be anything but of modest literary importance.

Here is what the elements and the parts of rhetoric are for the Stoics:

> Rhetoric according to them may be divided into the following: the invention of arguments, their expression in words, their arrangement and delivery. Rhetorical discourse has the following aspects: introduction, narrative, replies to opponent, and epilogue.[52]

The epilogue note is understood here as a summary and not as a form of conclusion used to produce a moving and emotional effect: rhetoric, in fact, must rely only on the *logos*.

In conclusion, for the Stoics, rhetoric is the *beautiful form of the true*. It is a purified conception of rhetoric which Plato himself would not have disdained.

7. Conclusions: the relations between logic and reality

The canonic of the Epicureans was limited to the elaboration of a doctrine of the "criterion of truth" and by reducing this criterion to sensation, they did not leave room for a sound and authentic logic. The Stoa, because of the importance given to the *logos*, did not limit the cognitive capacities of human beings to sensible presentations. They admitted intellectual knowledge, they allowed for the validity of the operations of reason, and hence elaborated a sound and authentic logic, as we have seen. But how does the logic of the Stoics affect reality, or, at least reality as they conceived it, and in general, the structure of their

system? And especially, what role does it play in the elaboration of their ethics?

We can immediately say that such an effect is very negligible if not even non-existent; the understanding of the reason for this fact is very important for the purpose of comprehending the development of Stoicism which, as we will see, tends more and more to be disinterested in logic to the point of complete disregard. However, it allows us to understand a characteristic of the systems of the Hellenistic Age, that is, their fundamental ***intuitionism***.

Stoic dialectic does *not* grasp the being and the essence of things but only "incorporeals" in the negative sense, which we have previously explained (the incorporeals are ***"unreals"***). Hence it glides over the surface of things and grasps only the "accidents" of things. The hypothetical syllogism itself, which shifts from essences and concepts to "events" and "facts" in order to be fruitful, in reality, as we have noted, supposing that it can rise from the dryness of tautology, does not leave the sphere of the incorporeal and accidental.

The cataleptic presentation which is sensible knowledge remains, therefore, ***the only form of knowledge which grasps reality*** because, as we have seen, it is an intimate and immediate contact with corporeal things and it is itself corporeal. Thought and reason, hence, in Stoic doctrine, do not get a real grip on being but only skim over it.

Thus, the only system of the Hellenistic Age which elaborated a logic emptied this logic of any authentic validity by giving it, as object, an ontologically enervated "incorporeal" being.

The consequences, which are of the greatest importance, are stated clearly and distinctly by Bréhier: "The complete separation between this way of knowing [cataleptic presentation] and rational and logical thought, a separation which is derived from the theory of the incorporeals, must have had an enormous influence in the development of Stoicism.... The successors of the first Stoicism, by completely leaving aside sterile dialectic and hypothetical reasoning which turned indefinitely upon itself, applied themselves to developing the consequences of ***intuitive cognition***, the only one which was active and real."[53] In the ultimate analysis, as Bréhier has noted again, "it was 'the disdain for the incorporeals' pointed out by Proclus as a characteristic of the Stoics which produced in their school the abandonment of discursive logic to the advantage of the enthusiasm for the religious and moral life."[54]

We want to also add that within the ancient Stoa the incomprehension of the ontological stature of the incorporeal (the loss of the "second voyage") and the massive reduction of the effect of logic on the real had already provoked the following consequences. Physics, as previously in Epicureanism, so also in Stoicism, ends by jutting out considerably beyond logic, while ethics itself ends by jutting out beyond both logic and

physics. In the elaboration of physics, to a certain extent, the cataleptic presentation is of help, but beyond this, it is a religious intuition (that, as we will see, is of a pantheistic kind) which gives coherence to the whole, while in the elaboration of ethics the authentic source is a new sentiment toward life, a new ***emotional intuition*** of its value. Logic, hence, in the Old Stoa, although elaborated and studied accurately (and by Chrysippus even doggedly), still remains necessarily marginal and situated on the surface of the system.

IV. The Physics of the Ancient Stoa

1. The characteristics of Stoic physics and its relation to Epicurean physics

Physics was by no means a doctrine concerning only a part of reality but rather a doctrine of *physis* in the Presocratic sense, that is, a doctrine which claims to know the totality of reality by showing the principles and laws which are its ground, both for the Epicureans as well as for the Stoics. It is, hence, a sound and authentic ontology, a metaphysics of immanence, as we will see.[1] Physics according to the Stoics, as well as for the Epicureans, in addition has the task of determining what are the ontological spaces into which we can place ethics and it is constructed for its ethical function. We can find analogies between the physics of the Garden and the Porch even in the formulation and statement of individual questions.

Under these similarities, however, there are radical contrasts which appear much more striking and evident for the very reason that they are derived from opposed solutions *of the same questions, in order to achieve the same end.* It can be said, in general, that in physics the solutions adopted by the Stoics in the great majority of cases were exactly opposed to those adopted by the Epicureans.

Someone has even suggested that it is a question "not so much of differences as much as reactions, as it were, hand-to-hand combat between the two philosophies."[2]

Epicurus had proposed atomistic pluralism; the Stoics proposed, on the contrary, monism. Epicurus had maintained the absolute absence of finality; the Stoics defended with all their might teleology. Epicurus had upheld mechanism; the Stoics proposed hylozoism and vitalism. Epicurus had maintained an infinite number of worlds; the Stoics upheld the existence of only one world and, further, that it is finite. Epicurus had maintained the existence of the atom and hence the impossibility of a division to infinity of matter; the Stoics upheld, on the contrary, the doctrine of dynamic continuity and the possibility of a division to infinity. Epicurus had made the void a principle; the Stoics categorically denied a void exists in the world and they banished it to outside the world. Epicurus had denied the penetrability of bodies; the Stoics maintained the penetrability of bodies. Epicurus had placed the Gods totally outside the world and without any relation with the world; the Stoics identified God with the constitutive principle of the world and with the world itself. Epicurus had categorically denied any Providence; the Stoics had made Providence a fundamental dogma. Epicurus had denied Fate with his *clinamen*; the Stoics made Destiny, the other face of Providence, as essential as Providence. And the list of oppositions could

be extended further.

Actually, such oppositions spring out coherently from two opposed visions of the world, the most opposed that can be imagined *in the space left by the common negation of transcendence.* The Epicurean physics and the Stoic physics represent the two most distant forms of ancient materialism. Nevertheless, they are both materialistic and therefore they reject *in toto* the results of the "second voyage" of Plato.

Only by considering the similarities indicated above together with the last one we stressed do we fully comprehend the meaning of each opposition as well as the exact meaning of the uninterrupted confrontation of the two schools.

2. The materialism and the corporealism of the Stoa

The first characteristic which differentiates the physics of the Stoa, not only from that of the Garden but in a certain sense also from that of all Greek thinkers, is the following: its *materialism* clearly appears to be a *pantheistic monism.* In fact, if some of the Presocratic systems in some respects can appear monistic and pantheistic, it is only because we interpret them by making use of later clarifications and discoveries. We judge them according to categories that we in fact are not able to do without but that the Presocratics certainly did not possess. In the case of the Stoics, instead, the situation is totally different. The concepts of corporeal and incorporeal, matter and spirit, immanence and transcendence, monism and pluralism had already been clearly elaborated and acquired by philosophical thought. The Stoa properly constructs its vision of reality on the basis of a conscious exploitation of such acquisitions, as we will see.

However, it is better to clarify immediately the meaning that has to be given to the term *materialism* in the Stoic context: without this preliminary clarification the peculiar meaning of the pantheistic monism of the Porch would escape us.

The Stoics, as the Epicureans, denied the existence of any purely spiritual reality. As the Epicureans, they turned against Plato those same weapons which he had used in the *Sophist* in order to refute those materialistic thinkers who maintained that there is nothing but the corporeal.[3] Plato, in fact, had said in the *Sophist* that only that which has the *capacity to act and to be acted upon* can be considered real, and such is ideal being.[4] Both the Epicureans,[5] and the Stoics take possession of this definition and affirm that the *capacity to act and be acted upon* belongs *only* to what is corporeal and material:

> Everything which acts or is acted upon is corporeal.[6]
> Being is said only of what is a body.[7]
> Being and body are identical.[8]

Being, as such, hence *is materiality and corporeality*. On the basis of this presupposition, it is understandable how the Stoics must have considered everything which is real, without any exception, as corporeal. God is a body, the soul is a body, the good is a body, wisdom is a body, passions are bodies, vices are bodies, virtues are bodies. We will consider these statements later; now let us read a passage clarifying the reduction to bodies of the virtues and vices themselves. Seneca writes about the thought of the ancient Stoa:

> Is the good is corporeal? Now the good is active: for it is beneficial; and what is active is corporeal. The good stimulates the mind and, in a way, molds and embraces that which is essential to the body. The goods of the body are bodily; so therefore must be the goods of the soul. For the soul, too, is corporeal. *Ergo*, man's good must be corporeal, since man himself is corporeal. I am sadly astray if the elements which support man and preserve or restore his health are not bodily; therefore, his good is a body. You will have no doubt, I am sure, that emotions are bodily things ..., like wrath, love, sternness unless you doubt whether they change our features, knot our foreheads, relax the countenance, spread blushes, or drive away the blood? What then? Do you think that such evident marks of the body are stamped upon us by anything else than body? And if emotions are corporeal, so are the diseases of the spirit such as greed, cruelty, and all the faults which harden in our souls, to such an extent that they get into an incurable state. Therefore evil is also, and all its branches spite, hatred, pride; and so also are goods, first because they are opposite poles of the bad, and second because they will manifest to you the same symptoms. Do you not see how a spirit of bravery makes the eye flash? How prudence tends towards concentration? How reverence produces moderation and tranquillity? How joy produces calm? How sternness begets stiffness? How gentleness produces relaxation? These qualities are therefore bodily for they change the tones and the shapes of substances, exercising their own power in their own kingdoms. Now all the virtues which I have mentioned are goods, and so are their results. Have you any doubt that whatever can touch is corporeal? Nothing but body can touch or be touched, as Lucretius says. Moreover, such changes as I have mentioned could not affect the body without touching it. Therefore, they are bodily. Furthermore, any object that has power to move, force, restrain, or control, is corporeal. Come now! Does not fear hold us back? Does not boldness drive us ahead? Bravery spur us on, and give us momentum? Restraint rein us in and call us back? Joy raise our spirits? Sadness cast us down? In short, any act on our part is performed at the bidding of wickedness or virtue. Only a body can control or forcefully affect another body. The good of the body is corporeal; a man's good is related to his bodily good; therefore, it is bodily.[9]

3. Pantheistic monism

The "body" is, however, a complex concept for the Stoics. In fact, in the determination of this concept they followed a way exactly opposed to the pluralistic-mechanistic-atomistic one followed by the Epicureans. A body is, for the Stoics, *matter* and *quality* (or *form*) united between them in such a manner as to be structurally inseparable from each other. The quality-form is the cause or active principle, while the matter is the passive principle; the first is always and only immanent to the second and in no case can be separated and exist in itself. Seneca writes:

> Our Stoic philosophers, as you know, declare that there are two things in the universe which are the source of everything—namely, cause and matter. Matter lies sluggish, a substance ready for any use, but sure to remain unemployed if no one sets it in motion. Cause, however, by which we mean reason, molds matter and turns it in whatever direction it will, producing thereby various concrete results. Accordingly, there must be, in the case of each thing, that from which it is made, and, next, an agent by which it is made. The former is its material, the latter its cause.[10]

A large number of testimonies insist on the "inseparability" of the active principle from the passive principle.[11] The following passage of Chalcidius seems to us to express the concept of the co-eternal and structural union of the two principles in a very effective way:

> This essence [the matter] is finite, one, and common substance of everything which exists; it is divisible, subject to every sort of change. In fact, its parts move but do not perish. Because it lends itself to making up every kind of figure, like wax which can be shaped in a thousand ways, it does not possess its own quality; but nevertheless it *never appears except as conjoined and inseparably connected with some quality*. It has neither principle nor end because it does not come from nothing and it cannot be reduced to nothing. Therefore *it is not devoid of an eternal spirit and vigor, moving it according to reason*, sometimes as a whole, sometimes in part, and it is cause of the frequent and impetuous change of the universe. Now, this spirit which moves is not nature but the soul and the rational one, of course, giving life to the sensible world and impressing it with the beauty with which it shines....[12]

This principle which pervades matter, informs and molds it, moves and shakes it violently, is beyond the various names which it assumes (mind, soul, nature, and the like) and God himself. Diogenes writes:

> According to the Stoics there are two principles in the universe, the active principle and the passive. The passive principle is a substance

> without quality, matter; the active principle *is the reason in matter, that is, God.* And God which is eternal is the creative craftsman of all things in the extent of matter.[13]

Themistius writes:

> The followers of Zeno maintain concordantly that God penetrates throughout reality and that he is now intelligence, now soul, now nature....[14]

The penetration of God (who is corporeal) throughout matter and the whole reality (which is quite corporeal) for Stoicism is possible in virtue of the tenet of the "total mingling of bodies" (κράσις δι' ὅλων). By rejecting the atomic theory of the Epicureans, the Stoics admit the divisibility of bodies to infinity, and hence the possibility that the parts of bodies can be intimately united so that two bodies can be blended completely into one. It is clear that this thesis implies the statement of the *penetrability of bodies* and is even identical with it. However aporetic this thesis is (the problems which it raises are so evident that we will not linger over them), it is in any case demanded by the pantheistic materialism adopted by the Stoa.[15]

The following summary can be taken from the passages read and the remarks made.

a) The Stoic physics is basically a form of corporealism and materialism because it reduces being to corporeity and materiality.

b) This materialism, rather than taking the form of mechanism and atomistic pluralism as with the Epicureans, appears as hylomorphism, hylozoism, and monism. Body is always matter united to quality and they are inseparable from each other. Each body is always an inseparable moment of the whole of which it is a part. There is only one matter which contains in itself that principle of life and rationality which makes all things germinate from it. Passive principle and active principle, matter and God, *are not*, hence, *two separate entities*; they are logically and conceptually distinct but they are ontologically inseparable: they constitute therefore a single reality. Consequently, all the multiple individual things are related to the two principles which are ontologically co-existent, thus like multiple members within a single organism. As matter is one and the active principle is one, the cosmos also is one and it embraces everything in itself. The monism of this conception is very clear.

c) Because the active principle, which is God, is inseparable from matter and because there is no matter without form, God is in all and God is all. God and the cosmos are one. Diogenes writes:

> The substance of God, Zeno says, is the entire cosmos and the heaven.[16]

Again:

> Cosmos has for the Stoics a threefold meaning: first, *God himself*, the individual whose quality is identical to that of the whole substance of the universe; he is hence indestructible and ungenerated, being the artificer of the universal order which at determined periods of time absorbs into himself the whole substance of the universe and again generates it from himself.[17]

It is confirmed by further evidence:

> They call God the whole cosmos and its parts.[18]

Hence, the pantheism of the Stoic conception is very clear.

4. The ontological emptying of the incorporeal

On the basis of what we have already clarified, it is possible to grasp fully the curious position that the Stoics took in relation to the "incorporeal." We have said[19] that the reduction of being to corporeity implies, as a necessary consequence, the reduction of the in-corporeal (of that which lacks a body) to something *deprived of being*. The incorporeal, lacking corporeity, lacks those characteristics which are distinctive of being, that is, *it can neither act nor be acted upon*:

> Nothing can be produced from what is incorporeal.[20]
>
> The incorporeal in its nature is not in a condition to act nor to be acted upon.[21]

The incorporeals are not, however, nothing and they are not even exhausted within the sphere of dialectic, that is, in the area of the *lekta*, of the "expressibles" of which we have spoken above.[22] In fact, we are told that beyond the *lekta* the Stoics declared that *place*, *time*, and *the infinite* are likewise "incorporeals."[23]

We have previously explained, in dealing with Stoic logic, the reasons why the *expressibles* are "incorporeals".[24]

Place, which is understood as "what is occupied entirely by a body,"[25] is incapable of acting and being acted on and it is, so to say, *an effect of the being of bodies*. For these reasons, it is in-corporeal (remember that for the Stoics the effects produced by bodies are not bodies).[26]

Time is the "interval [or the dimension] of movement,"[27] or, as Chrysippus defines it, "the interval of the movement of the cosmos."[28] As such, time cannot have any capacity to act or to be acted on; it is an effect of being, of the living and the movement of bodies and in general of the cosmos, and as such is "incorporeal." In addition, it is incorporeal for a further reason: it is *infinite* (in the dimensions of past and future)

and no body, for the Stoics, can be infinite.[29]

The *void*, which is conceived as the "absence of a body"[30] and is placed outside of the cosmos is conceived as infinite (the absolute absence of a body implies the absence of limits), and therefore it is "incorporeal" for the same reasons.[31]

This conception of the "incorporeal" is such as to cause a great number of aporias of which the Stoics were at least partially aware. In fact, a spontaneous question arises: if the "incorporeal" does not have being because it is not a body, then it is a non-being, it is nothing. In order to avoid this difficulty the Stoics were forced to deny that *being* is, so to speak, the supreme genus and that it is predicable of everything, and to affirm that the widest genus of all is " τί," "something."

Alexander writes:

> [The Stoics declare] that being is predicated only of bodies.... For this reason they say that "something" is a wider genus since it is predicated not only of bodies but likewise of the incorporeals.[32]

This doctrine must have produced a fair number of perplexities.[33] Seneca, who personally did not agree, says expressly that it was maintained not by all but only *by some Stoics*:

> But the genus "that which exists" (τὸ ὄν) is universal and has no term superior to it. It is the first term in the classification of things, and all things are included under it.... The Stoics would put ahead of this still another genus, even more primary.... To *some Stoics* [*Stoicis quibusdam*] it appears that the primary genus is "something" (*quid*).[34]

It is clear that such a doctrine, by subverting the very tenet of classic ontology, must fatally fall into terrible contradictions, whence the perplexities of the Stoics themselves.

Plotinus correctly points it out:

> This "something" is such as to be incomprehensible and inconceivable even for them and it is not appropriate either to the incorporeal or to the corporeal; and they have not left any discriminating quality so that they can subdivide the "something;" in addition this "something" is either being or not-being; if, then, it is being, it is one of its species; if it is not-being, it is the being which is not—and so on with all these absurdities.[35]

Naturally, in this context the Aristotelian table of the categories, which are the highest "divisions" or the highest "genera" of being, loses all its meaning.

The Stoics reduced the categories to two fundamental ones. Then

they added two other categories which are, however, on a different level. The two fundamental categories are: substance understood as ***material substrate*** (ὑποκείμενον) and ***quality*** (ποιόν) understood as the quality which, together with the substrate, determines the essence of individual things. Both are material and corporeal and they are inseparable from each other (as we have seen in the preceding paragraph).[36] The other two categories are the ***modes*** (πῶς ἔχοντα) and ***the relative modes*** (πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα).[37] These two categories should be placed among the "incorporeals" since they express effects and occurrences of things.

Actually, some scholars maintained that it is undoubtedly possible to draw such conclusions[38] which, however, are contradicted expressly by the texts.

In any case, the speculative fragility of this point is evident, although essential, to the ontology of the Stoa. The vitalistic Stoic materialism thus, as well as the mechanistic materialism of the Epicureans, is not able to justify its basic assumptions.

5. The further determination of the Stoic conception of God and the Divine

Before proceeding, we must return to the concept of God which is the center around which the whole Stoic physics revolves and examine it further.

a) We have previously explained the meaning of the identification of God and ***physis***, both from the historical and from the speculative points of view.

It is, however, necessary to note again what follows. For the Presocratics ***physis*** was the material principle; for Plato ***physis***, in its highest sense, even indicated the Idea; for Aristotle ***physis*** indicated, in its most specific acceptation, the *eidos* or the immanent unmoved essence of things as well as the immanent principle from which the growth of things develops. For the Stoics ***physis*** implies matter but it implies the intrinsic agent principle which also is, gives, and becomes the form of all things, that is, the principle from which everything is born, increases, and exists. The Stoic ***physis*** subsumes in itself both the naturalistic and the spiritual meanings which were gradually developed in the preceding speculations. Therefore, it is possible to understand how it fundamentally cannot indicate anything else except an immanent and pantheistic conception of God.[39]

b) God who is ***Physis*** is likewise ***Logos***, that is, the principle of intelligence, rationality, and the spiritual. It is possible to understand that this principle of intelligence and rationality is necessarily immanent to matter, since the existence of any reality and substance but the material or corporeal is denied. Ontologically it cannot be anything else but

matter and corporiety. Let us read two further testimonies in this regard for the sake of completeness:

> Chrysippus and Zeno...posited as principle of all things God and conceived him as the *purest body*....[40]
>
> Plato and Zeno the Stoic dealt with the essence of God, but they did not conceive it in the same way. Plato conceived God as incorporeal, but Zeno conceived him *as a body*.[41]

This conclusion of the Stoics was necessary because what is not a body, for them, is not real and is a non-being; if God is, he is a body, as each being is a body.

c) Therefore, it is understandable why the Stoics identified their God-physis-logos with the artificer of *fire*, with Heraclitus's "fire which governs all things,"[42] as well as with *pneuma*, which is "heated breath," that is, air endowed with heat.[43] Fire, in fact, is the principle that transforms everything and penetrates everything. Heat is the principle *sine qua non* of every birth, growth, and in general of every form of life.

Cicero writes:

> All things capable of nurture and growth contain within them a supply of heat, without which their nurture and growth would not be possible; for everything of a hot, fiery nature supplies its own source of motion and activity; but that which is nourished and grows possesses a definite and uniform motion; and as long as this motion remains within us, so long sensation and life remain, whereas so soon as our heat is cooled and quenched we ourselves perish and are extinguished. This doctrine Cleanthes enforces by these further arguments, to show how great is the supply of heat in every living body: he states that there is no food so heavy that it is not digested in twenty-four hours; and even the residue of our food which nature rejects contains heat. Again, the veins and arteries never cease throbbing with a flame-like pulse, and frequent cases have been observed when the heart of an animal on being torn out of its body has continued to beat with a rapid motion resembling the flickering of fire. Every living thing therefore, whether animal or vegetable, owes its vitality to the heat contained within it. From this it must be inferred that this element of heat possesses in itself a vital force that pervades the whole world.[44]

After having demonstrated that all the natural elements constituting the world imply heat, Cicero concludes further:

> Hence from the fact that all the parts of the world are *sustained by heat* the inference follows that the world itself also *owes its continued preservation for so long a time to the same or a similar substance*, and all the more so because it must be understood that this *hot and fiery*

> *principle is interfused with the whole of nature in such a way as to constitute the male and female generative principles, and so to be the necessary cause of both the birth and the growth of all living creatures, whether animals or those whose roots are planted in the earth.*[45]

Alexander of Aphrodisias states:

> It is the opinion of Chrysippus... that the whole reality is unified by a *pneuma* which pervades it completely and by which everything is held together, is permanent and agrees with itself.[46]

Numerous other testimonies fully confirm this doctrine.[47]

d) This pantheistic and materialistic conception of God *does not exclude polytheism*. Even for the Stoics, in fact, as for all the Greeks, the conceptions of the one-God and the many-Gods do not exclude each other. Monotheism and polytheism do not appear to be antithetical. They, in fact, speak of one God and of many Gods at the same time. They even speak of "Daimons" and "Heroes" intermediate between Gods and men. God is the *logos-fire*, he is the highest active principle or, seen from another perspective, he is the totality of the cosmos. The many Gods are the stars, that is, privileged parts of the cosmos, and are conceived to be living and intelligent beings.[48]

Diogenes says:

> Also they hold that there are daimons who are in sympathy with mankind and *watch over human affairs*. They believe too in heroes, that is, *the souls of the righteous that have survived their bodies*.[49]

However, it is to be noted that only the *Logos* is truly the eternal God; the others are long-lived Gods, but they are born and die together with the cycle of the cosmos, which, as we will see, in the recurring great year is devoured by fire and then regenerated:

> All the Gods are born and die except the supreme God who is identical with the eternal fire and remains throughout the conflagrations and the successive renovations of the universe.[50]

e) Polytheistic mythology, if allegorically interpreted, that is, considered as the poetic expression of a physical truth, could thus be accepted by the Stoics and considered as reconcilable with their doctrine. Here is how Diogenes deals with this point in the doctrine of the Porch:

> The God, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting nothing evil [into him], taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he is not of human shape. He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the father of all, both in general and that in particular part of

him which is all-pervading, and which is called many names according to its various powers. They give the name Dia (Διά) because all things are due to (διά) him; Zeus (Ζῆνα) insofar as he is the cause of life (ζῆν) or pervades all life; the name Athena (Ἀθηνᾶν) is given, because the ruling part of the divinity extends to the aither (αἰθέρα); the name Hera (Ἥραν) marks its extension to the air (ἀέρα); he is called Hephaestus since it spreads to the creative fire; Poseidon, since it stretches to the sea; Demeter, since it reaches to the earth. Similarly, men have given God his other titles, fastening, as best they can, on some one or other of his peculiar attributes.[51]

f) The Stoic God, according the logic of the system, since he is identical with nature, ***cannot be personal.*** Consequently it makes no sense to pray to God, if he is impersonal logos and nature: beyond that, as we will see, man, in order to fulfill his life, has no need of the assistance of God. However, in the history of the Stoa, God will tend to assume more and more spiritual and personal traits, religiousness will tend to permeate more and more strongly the system, and prayer will begin to acquire a precise meaning. Moreover, it is a fatal destiny of pantheism that it cannot keep the identification of God and Nature in a correct equilibrium so that it tends to resolve in the end, either into atheism or theism. The Stoa will turn, especially in the last stage, towards theism, but without arriving at it fully. In any case in the first Stoa, with Cleanthes, a vivid religious sense had already appeared. It found full expression in the well-known *Hymn to Zeus* (the only full, direct fragment which we possess from the ancient Stoa), which we want to read in its entirety because it is the synthesis of what the ancient Stoics thought about God, although in religious tones which were due solely to Cleanthes.

God most glorious, called by many a name
Nature's great King, through endless years the same;
Omnipotence, who by your just decree
Controls all, hail, Zeus, for to you
It is well for creatures in all lands to call.
We are your children, we alone, of all
On earth's broad ways that wander to and fro,
Bearing your image wheresoe'er we go.
Wherefore with songs of praise your power I will forth show.
Lo! yonder Heaven, that round the earth is wheeled,
Follows your guidance, still to you does yield
Glad homage; your unconquerable hand
Such flaming minister, the levin brand,
Wields, a sword two-edged, whose deathless might
Pulsates through all that Nature brings to light;
Vehicle of the universal Word, that flows
Through all, and in the light celestial glows

Of stars both great and small.
A King of Kings
Through ceaseless ages, God, whose purpose brings
To birth, whate'er on land or in the seas wrought, or in high
heaven's immensity;
Save what the sinner works infatuate.
Nay, but you know to make crooked straight:
Chaos to you is order: in your eyes
The unloved is lovely, who did harmonize
Things evil with things good, that there should be
One Word through all things everlastingly.
One Word—whose voice alas! the wicked spurn;
Insatiate for the good their spirits yearn.
Yet seeing see not, neither hearing hear
God's universal law, which those revere,
By reason guided, happiness who win.
The rest, unreasoning, diverse shapes of sin
Self-prompted follow: for an idle name
Vainly they wrestle in the lists of fame:
Others inordinately riches woo,
Or dissolute, the joys of flesh pursue.
Now here, now there they wander, fruitless still,
For ever seeking good and finding ill.
Zeus the all-bountiful, whom darkness shrouds,
Whose lightning lightens in the thunder-clouds;
Your children save from error's deadly sway:
Turn you the darkness from their souls away:
Vouchsafe that to knowledge they attain;
For you by knowledge are made strong to reign
O'er all, and all things rule righteously.
So by you honored, we will honor you,
Praising your works continually with songs,
As mortals should; nor higher meed belongs
E'en to the Gods, than justly to adore
The universal law for evermore.[52]

6. Finality and Providence (*Pronoia*)

The Stoics defended with all their power, against the mechanistic thought of the Epicureans, a rigorous conception of finality. Previously Plato and Aristotle had formulated a clearly teleological conception of the cosmos, but the Stoics proceed beyond them. In fact, if all the things without exception are produced by the immanent divine principle which is logos, intelligence, and reason, then everything is rigorously and profoundly rational. Everything is as reason wishes for it to be and reason cannot wish it in any other way. Everything is as it ought to be and is as good as it can be and the whole of reality is complete: there is no ontolog-

ical obstacle to the work of the immanent artificer since matter itself is the vehicle of God. Thus everything which exists has its precise meaning and is made in the best possible way. The whole is complete in itself: the individual things, though imperfect if considered by themselves, nevertheless have their completion in the design of the whole. Cicero writes:

> In fact there is nothing else beside the world that has nothing wanting, but is fully equipped and complete and perfect in all its details and parts. For as Chrysippus cleverly put it, just as a shield-case is made for the sake of a shield and a sheath for the sake of a sword, so everything else except the world was created for the sake of some other thing; thus the corn and fruits produced by the earth were created for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man: for example the horse for riding, the ox for ploughing, the dog for hunting and keeping guard; man himself, however, came into existence for the purpose of contemplating and imitating the world; he is by no means complete, but he is "a small fragment of that which is complete."[53]

Seneca, in favor of the universal finality and perfection of the world, presents an argument which Leibniz made famous but that Stoicism, as we will immediately see, had already completely stated:

> And no two living things are equal. Consider the bodies of all beings: every one has its particular color, shape, and size. And among the other reasons for marveling at the genius of the Divine Creator is, I believe, this, that amid all this abundance there is no repetition; even seemingly similar things are, on comparison, unlike. God has created all the great number of leaves that we behold: each, however, is stamped with its special pattern. All the many animals: none resembles another in size—always some difference! The Creator has set himself the task of making unlike and unequal things that are different.[54]

Logically, as a consequence of the affirmation of finality, the question of Providence (*pronoia*) also appears to be prominent. The concept of Providence is absent within the ambit of Presocratic philosophies. Aristotle himself did not connect the conception of the end to the conception of Providence. Instead, the doctrine is found in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon,[55] and is conjoined to the conception of the Demiurge in the Platonic *Timaeus*.[56] But Providence emerges as fundamental only with the Stoics and occupies a very important place in the system. Stoic Providence—note—does not have any connection with the Providence of a personal God. It is, in the final analysis, nothing other than the ***universal finality*** that we previously examined: it expressed, that is, that every being (even the smallest) made as it is, is good, and as it is, it is better that it is part of the logos. ***It is an immanent, not a transcendent,***

Providence which is identical with the immanent artificer, with the world-soul, with the world itself understood pantheistically. Here in this regard are two fine testimonies from Cicero. The first we already treated in part, but we can enjoy rereading it in its entirety.

> Now Zeno gives this definition of nature: "nature is a craftsmanlike fire, proceeding methodically to the work of generation." For he holds that the special function of an art or craft is to create and generate, and that what in the processes of our arts is done by the hand is done with far more skillful craftsmanship by nature, that is, as I said, by that "craftsmanlike" fire which is the teacher of the other arts. And on this theory, while each department of nature is "craftsmanlike," in the sense of having a method or path marked out for it to follow, the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely "craftsmanlike" but actually "a craftsman," whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared, and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, (that the Greeks call ὁρμαί), and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as practical wisdom or "Providence" (for in Greek it is termed πρόνοια) and this Providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival, next, absolute completeness, but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind.[57]

Here is the second testimony:

> For you yourselves are fond of saying that there is nothing that a God cannot accomplish, and that without any toil; as man's limbs are effortlessly moved merely by his mind and will, so, as you say, the Gods' power can mold and move and alter all things. Nor do you say this as some superstitious fable or old wives' tale, but you give a scientific and systematic account of it: you allege that matter, which constitutes and contains all things, is in its entirety flexible and subject to change, so that there is nothing that cannot be molded and transmuted out of it however suddenly, but the molder and manipulator of this universal substance is divine Providence, and therefore Providence, whithersoever it moves, is able to perform whatever it will.[58]

Providence is physical and immanent, so in this way, it is no surprise that Providence provides more to the species than to the individual and that hence it is not concerned with ***individual human beings*** insofar as they are individuals. Only a conception of God and Providence as per-

sonal would allow an effect in this sense.[59]

7. Fate (*Heimarmene*)

But this immanent Providence of the Stoics, seen from another perspective *must appear as "Fate" and as "Destiny" (heimarmene)*, that is, as *an ineluctable necessity*. The Stoics understood this notion of *Fate* as the irreversible series of causes, as the natural and necessary order of all things, as the indissoluble intertwining that links all things, as the *logos* according to which things happen, and have happened, and according to which that which happens, happens and things which will come about, will come about. Since everything depends on the immanent *logos*, everything is necessary, even the most insignificant event. The Stoics are poles apart from the Epicurean vision, which with its "swerve of the atoms" had instead placed everything at the mercy of chance and the accidental.

Let us read some testimonies on the Stoic doctrine of *heimarmene*. Stobaeus writes:

> The Stoic Zeno in his book *Concerning Nature* writes that Fate is the power that moves matter according to the modes themselves and similarly and that it makes no difference to call it Providence or Nature. The Stoic Antipater declared that God is Fate.... Chrysippus explains the essence of Fate as the pneumatic power that governs the whole in an ordered way. He writes this, therefore, in the second book of the work *On the Cosmos*. In the second book of the *Definitions*, in the books *Concerning Fate*, and elsewhere, here and there, he explains it in various ways by saying that Fate is the *logos* of the cosmos, or the *logos* of things which in the cosmos are governed by Providence, or the *logos* according to which things that have happened, have happened, the things which happen, happen, the things which will happen, will happen. In place of the term "logos" he also uses terms like "truth," "cause," "nature," "necessity" by also adding other denominations that he refers to the same essence according to always new intuitions of the concepts.[60]

Diogenes Laertius writes:

> Fate is defined as an endless chain of causations as whereby things are, or as the reason or formula (λόγος) by which the world goes on.[61]

And Cicero writes, summarizing these concepts:

> Reason compels us to admit that all things happen by Fate. Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη, that is, an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect that is an immortal truth

> having its source in eternity. Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to happen and, likewise, nothing is going to happen which will not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening. Consequently, we know that Fate is that which is called, not ignorantly but scientifically, "the eternal cause of things, the wherefore of things past, of things present, and of things to come."[62]

On the basis of this it is clear why the Stoics would defend divination: if everything is determined and predetermined it is possible to gaze at the future and in some way to foresee it by using the proper technique.[63]

Pohlenz advanced the hypothesis that Zeno, who was of Semitic origin, had taken from the spiritual patrimony of his people and land the germs of some ideas which we are now examining. In particular the idea of Providence, a rather tenuous notion in the Greek philosophical tradition, could be an echo of the biblical notion of Providence, immanentistically interpreted, just as the idea of *Heimarmene* could be an echo of fatalism, profoundly developed among eastern peoples, in particular among the Arabs.

It is nevertheless to be pointed out that the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon wherein the doctrine of Providence (which as we know, is put into Socrates's mouth) has a consistent development was certainly read by Zeno. Instead, the preeminence that the notion of Fate had within the Stoic system seems to go beyond the convictions of the Greeks and hence it is not possible to trace its origin back to them. Therefore, the thesis of Pohlenz can be said to have some plausability by which he explains the particular Stoic conception of Fate but not their conception of Providence.[64]

8. Necessity and Liberty

The adversaries of Stoicism immediately realized that within this fatalistic conception it is not possible to ground human freedom. If every event is strictly determined and even a hair falling cannot be casual, moral obligation does not have any meaning precisely because the results of our actions are predetermined in every case. Responsibility is meaningless because our actions depend not on us, but on the necessary and unchangeable series of causes, as well as any other action does.

Chrysippus tried to solve this aporia, but with very little success. In fact, it is *structurally not solvable*. It is impossible to admit the Stoic *Heimarmene* and at the same time preserve human freedom: in fact, they irreparably destroy each other.

Let us see briefly what reasons are given by Chrysippus, which in themselves are quite interesting. He distinguishes two kinds of causes: *a*) the auxiliary and external causes, and *b*) the principal and complete causes, that is, the causes which are able to produce the effect. The

chain of causes of *Heimarmene*, by which we are enclosed, is the chain of auxiliary causes not dependent on us. On the other hand, the proximate causes which are able to produce the effect do depend on us. Let us illustrate. The rise of a certain presentation is inevitable, since it depends on external and auxiliary causes. But the *assent* that we do or do not give to such a presentation, and hence also what follows assent, does not depend on auxiliary causes, but rather depends on a cause internal to us, the only one which is capable of producing the effect. This is a cause which depends on our interior nature and hence is free.

We have seen previously the clear ambiguity which is peculiar to the notion of *Stoic assent*: it is, in short, the freedom to say yes to evidence and to say no to non-evidence. As we cannot say no to evidence, it is difficult to understand what the freedom of assenting to evidence means. Such an aporia becomes still clearer in the example in which Chrysippus recalls the distinction of the two kinds of causes and tries to explain human freedom. If one gives a push to a cylinder on an inclined plane, the cylinder rolls; but the push is only the external and auxiliary cause, while the true cause, which is proximate and produces the effect, is the *rounded nature* of the cylinder:

> Hence, as those who push the cylinder have given it the beginning of the movement but not the property of rotation, so also the image which is presented to us will impress itself and will mark us, that is to say, its form in our soul, but assent will be in our power, and as it is said once produced by an external impulse the cylinder will be moved for the remainder of the movement through *the effect of the force and its own nature*. If something is produced without an antecedent cause it would be false to say that everything happens through the workings of Fate. If instead it is like the situation in which what happens is preceded by a cause, what reasons can be given for not admitting that everything happens through the workings of Fate? *This is sufficient to comprehend the nature of the distinction and the difference between the causes.*[65]

It is evident that the difficulty is not resolved but simply shifted: we can object contrary to Chrysippus that a round cylinder rolls because of its nature after receiving a push; nevertheless, because of its nature, it cannot do other than roll *necessarily*, so that its nature becomes inexorably a part of the circle of the necessary causal series of Fate.[66] Analogously, as we have already mentioned, it is not possible to understand how our faculty *to assent* is free. In fact, when we have an evidential presentation our assent is necessitated, that is, it cannot not be given. In any case, owing to the materialistic psychology of the Stoics, how the assent can avoid the chain of causes of *Heimarmene* is inconceivable. Moreover, the rigid determinism which the Stoic doctrine necessarily implies is stated

paradigmatically in the theory of the eternal return (of which we will speak below). The world will appear again in a constant recycling and each man will return to earth and will do exactly all those things which he did in his preceding existences right down to the smallest particular with absolute necessity.[67]

In contrast to the above-mentioned ambiguity, the Stoics become much more clear when they explain that the real freedom of the sage is the conforming of his own wishes to those of Destiny. It is a willing together with Fate whatever Fate wills. This is "freedom" insofar as it is the rational acceptance of Fate, which is rationality itself: in fact, Destiny is the *Logos* and hence to will the wishes of Destiny is to will the wishes of the *Logos*. Freedom, hence, is to lead one's own life in complete harmony with the *Logos*.

Cleanthes expresses completely such a concept of "freedom" in the following lines:

> Lead me on, O Zeus, and to that goal long ago to me assigned I'll follow and not falter, if my will prove weak and craven, still I'll follow on.[68]

Here is a beautiful passage reported by Hyppolitus which exemplifies well enough this concept:

> Also they [the Stoics] declared with certainty that all things are due to Fate, and they gave the following example. When a dog is tied to a cart, if he wishes to follow it, it is dragged and he follows the cart, doing by necessity also what is his own will; if, on the contrary, he does not wish to follow the cart, he is forced in any case to do so. The same thing also occurs to men. Even if they do not wish to follow, they will be in any case forced to proceed where it has been established by Fate.[69]

Translating a line of Cleanthes, Seneca will say in a lapidary sentence:

> Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.[70] [Fate leads the willing, but the unwilling are dragged along.]

This is the main point of Stoic wisdom and it made a deep impression because it showed that, in a certain sense, it was possible to free oneself from Destiny by a way which was opposed to the Epicurean one. It is useless, as Epicurus claimed, to laugh at Destiny, because it will grasp us again inexorably. But there is a way of making ourselves free from Destiny by understanding its reasons, its inner laws, and consequently getting into harmony with them. Therefore, rather than as a force subduing and reprimanding us, Destiny becomes a force leading and guiding us with absolute certainty to the goal which we are allotted.

9. The cosmos and man's place in it

The world and the things of the world are born from the unique material substrate which is gradually determined by the immanent *logos*. It is also unique but yet capable of differentiation into an infinite number of things. The logos is like the *seed of all things*, it is like a seed containing many seeds (the *logoi spermatikoi*, which is translated into Latin by the phrase *rationes seminales*).

Aetius writes:

> The Stoics declare that God is intelligent, creative fire which proceeds methodically to the generation of the cosmos, and *includes in itself all the seminal reasons according to which things are produced according to Fate.*[71]

Diogenes points out:

> God is ... the seminal reason of the *cosmos.*[72]

The Ideas or Platonic Forms and the Aristotelian forms are thus subsumed into the unique logos manifesting itself in infinite creative seeds or forces or productive potencies. They work from within the material by being structurally immanent to it.

From the original fire-logos the four elements are formed: the fire element,[73] the air element, which when heated by fire, as we know, is said to be *pneuma* (spirit); hence the liquid element and the solid one are formed and then the whole cosmos and the things of the cosmos through the fire itself and the *pneuma* which circulates in all things. The Stoics particularly stressed the concept of *tonos* or the tension of the fire, or better, of the *pneuma*, which would be a kind of propulsive force going from the center to the extreme limits and then returning to the center and giving, therefore, unity to each single thing and to the whole.[74]

The pneuma extends throughout the universe with different intensity and purity and hence produces various things following an hierarchical gradation although remaining one. Inorganic things are produced in this way: the pneuma acts and manifests itself in them as *hexis* (ἕξις), that is, as a force guaranteeing cohesion and duration to things, then vegetable organisms are produced. The pneuma acts and manifests itself in them as a capacity of feeding, increasing, and reproducing and hence as *physis* (in the specific meaning of principle of growth). Finally, animals are produced. The pneuma manifests itself in them as *psyche*, that is to say, as the actual life principle. Then it manifests itself as sensation and instinct and as logos in human beings.[75]

The universe is spherical, according to the ancient Stoa. The stars are at its periphery. They are made of fire (not of aither, as Aristotle

claimed). As we know, they are animated, living, and divine beings. At the center is the earth, which is like the hearth (the sacred Hestia) of the divine house of the universe.[76]

Contrary to the statement of Epicurus, the universe is finite, but it is surrounded by the infinite void. Sextus writes:

> Now the philosophers of the Stoic school suppose that "*the whole*" differs from "*the All*"; for they say that the *whole* is the cosmos, whereas the *All* is the external void together with the cosmos, and on this account the whole is limited for the cosmos is limited, but the *All* is unlimited for the void outside the Cosmos is so.[77]

The plants and animals of the earth are for human purposes: all the things existing in the sublunar world were created for man, as we have previously seen.[78] Therefore, it is possible to understand the definition given by the Stoics: the universe is the system formed by Gods, men, and the things created for them.[79]

According to Pohlenz, such an *anthropocentric* conception claimed by the Stoics has no Greek origin, since anthropocentric statements are found only in passages of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and Aristotle's *Politics*.[80] The German scholar writes: "We notice a sentiment of life which is quite novel as the Stoic cosmology revolves around this very idea: ***man is the unique aim of the formation of the world and everything has been created for him***. This sentiment was as alien to ancient Greece as it was familiar to us through the Old Testament...." Therefore, Pohlenz conjectures that Zeno derived from his own country such an anthropocentric conception as well as the idea of Providence.[81] But even in this case the works of Xenophon and Aristotle mentioned above prevent us from drawing these conclusions. It is true instead that, in any case, it is only with the Stoics that this conception was posited.

10. The universal conflagration and the eternal return

There is still an essential notion concerning Stoic cosmology which we need to consider. Like the Presocratics, the Stoics also thought that the world was generated and hence corruptible (what is born must also perish). Moreover, it was experience itself which said that there is not only a fire which creates, but also a fire, or some aspect of fire, which burns, incinerates, and destroys. Actually it would be inconceivable that individual things of this world are subject to corruption and not the world which is constituted by them. The necessary conclusion was, hence, that fire is both producer and destroyer. Therefore, at the prophetic completion of time there will be a universal conflagration, that is, a general combustion of the universe *ekpyrosis*. It will be a kind of universal purification and there will be only fire.[82] After the destruction

of the world a new birth will follow (*palingenesis*) and everything will return exactly in the same way (*apokatastasis*). The cosmos, this same cosmos, will be regenerated. It will continue to be eternally destroyed and then reproduced not only in its general structure but also in its particular events (the eternal return): each human being will reappear on this earth and will be as he was in his preceding life, even in the smallest details. The fire-logos is the same, the seed is the same as well, the seminal reasons, the laws of their fulfillment, and the chain of the causes according to which the seminal reasons develop both in general and in particular. Nemesius writes:

> The Stoics say that when the planets return to the same sign [of the Zodiac] both in longitude and in latitude as each of them was at the beginning, at the time of the origin of the universe, in determined periods, a conflagration and a destruction of beings will occur. The same cosmos is re-constituted from the beginning; as the stars move in the same way, each event of the preceding period occurs again, invariably. Again there will be Socrates and Plato and each man with the same friends and citizens; the same things will be believed and the same things treated, and every city, village, and country will equally return. This return of all things will not be once but many times, over and over again, without end.... Nothing different will occur, nothing which did not happen in the preceding period but all will return in the same way, invariably, even in the smallest details.[83]

Tatian confirms it:

> Through the conflagration the world is renewed and begins again, repeating itself even in the smallest details, with the same persons in the same conditions and activities, that is, Anytus and Meletus to be informers, Busirides to kill his guests, and Heracles to sustain his labors.[84]

11. Man

Within the world, as we have seen, man occupies a preeminent position. This privilege derives ultimately from his sharing in the divine logos more than any other being. In fact, man is formed not only with a body, but also with a soul which is a part of the cosmic soul[85] and hence a part of God, since, as we know, the universal soul is God.

Naturally, within the Stoic ontology, with which we are already familiar, the soul is not an immaterial substance, but rather a body,[86] although a quite privileged body, that is, fire or pneuma:

> For Zeno the seed of life is fire, which is soul and intelligence.[87]
>
> Zeno of Citium defines the soul as a warm breath.[88]
>
> The soul feeds on blood, and its nature is pneuma.[89]

The soul permeates the whole physical organism, giving it life; its material nature is no problem since the Stoics admit the penetrability of bodies. As it permeates the whole human organism and rules over its essential functions, the Stoics distinguished eight parts: a central one called the ***hegemonic***, that is, the ruling part which is essentially reason, five parts corresponding to the five senses, the part presiding over speech, and finally the one presiding over reproduction.[90] In addition to the eight "parts," the Stoics distinguished different "functions" in each part: thus the hegemonic, or ruling part of the soul, is able to perceive, assent, desire, and reason.[91]

Death is the separation of the soul from the body.[92] It is not a metaphysical separation as Plato thought,[93] as well as the Epicureans, but a physical separation. But whereas the Epicureans declared that the soul disperses as soon as it is separated from the body, the Stoics admitted a survival, albeit only a temporary one.

12. The destiny of the soul

Therefore, the position which the Stoics took with respect to the survival of the soul is midway between Plato and Epicurus. Diogenes Laertius writes that:

> The soul...is a body and secondly that *it survives death*. Yet it is *perishable*.[94]

Cicero states:

> The Stoics said that the soul endured for a long time but not forever.[95]

How long does the soul survive after death? The *terminus ad quem* is given by the universal conflagration. But the philosophers of the Stoa did not completely agree about this doctrine: some of them, like Cleanthes, thought that all souls indiscriminately would endure until the universal conflagration:

> All souls continue to exist until the general conflagration.[96]

Instead, other Stoics, like Chrysippus, thought that only the souls of wise men would have the privilege of such a long duration.

Diogenes Laertius writes:

> Chrysippus maintained that only the souls of the wise survive until the world conflagration.[97]

Aetius also writes:

> The Stoics say that the soul does not die leaving the body but remains in itself and by itself for a certain time. But a soul which is

> weaker (that is, the uneducated one) remains for a short time. On the contrary, the souls of the wise men which are more worthwhile remain even until the conflagration.[98]

The place destined for the souls which take a spherical form[99] seems to be under the moon.[100] They retain their cognitive capacities and they play an important part in divination and dreams. The better ones give rise to the so-called "Heroes."[101]

But even when the cosmic year occurs and the souls are absorbed into the universal soul and the eternal fire, they disappear only in a relative way. In fact, because of palingenesis, each soul, as well as every other thing, returns to be recycled without end. Therefore, the existence of each soul, as well as each human being, will continue for an infinite number of times.

It is nevertheless to be emphasized that, for the Stoics, the survival of the soul (as well as the rebirth in successive palingeneses) does not have any importance for the moral conduct of our life on earth. The privileged destiny of the soul of the sage after death must not influence his choice of a virtuous life even if such a survival is, to a certain extent, a kind of reward, just as the destiny of the unwise man is a kind of punishment.

Actually, a testimony of Lactantius states:

> The Stoic Zeno taught that the infernal regions exist and that the place of good men is apart from that of impious men: the sages live in pleasant and peaceful places while the others suffer their punishments in a dreadful abyss of mud.[102]

But this testimony is somewhat suspect. It is certain, in any case, that for the Stoics reward and punishment are necessarily related to virtue and vice already in this life: virtue, as we will see, has already here its paradise and vice its hell.[103] The Stoics were essentially concerned with the here and now, and though they admitted a beyond, they did not give to it such an importance as to reduce, in some way, the here and now to a simple place of passage: to the philosophers of the Porch terrestrial life seemed to be the true life just as the happiness which man can find on earth seemed to be the true happiness, as we will see.

V. The Ethics of the Ancient Stoa

1. The logos as the foundation of ethics

The most significant and lively part of the Stoic philosophy is not its daring and original physics, however, but its ethics: in fact, by means of their ethical doctrine the Stoics were able to teach something really worthwhile for more than five centuries. Their doctrine was felt to be particularly illuminating about the meaning of life, as well as profoundly consoling in the face of human troubles, helping to free man from illusions.

For the Stoics, as well as for the Epicureans, *to achieve happiness is the aim of human life*. Ethics must determine the very nature of happiness and the proper means of achieving it. In fact for the Epicureans, as we already know, the solution of this problem is not, contrary to the classical systems, the aim of *a part* of philosophy, but *the main and the only aim* of all the parts of philosophy.

For the Stoics, as well as again for the Epicureans, the statement and solution of ethical questions is pursued outside the traditional Hellenic schemata, following new criteria arising from a new interpretation of *physis*. Even the Stoic motto is "to live according to nature," or "to live according to the dictates of nature."[1] For "nature" we have to understand both a universal *physis* and the specific human *physis* which is a moment, or part of the universal *physis*.[2]

But the disagreement with the Epicureans becomes obvious and marked as soon as we try to define this nature. For the Stoics it is impossible to admit that the fundamental instinct of human beings is the feeling of pleasure, as well as its contrary, pain: if it were so, man and animal would be on the same level and would not differ in any appreciable way. An objective consideration of human nature shows that reason is his peculiar and specific characteristic: but the importance of his reason greatly exceeds the mere calculus of pleasures. Such a different metaphysical vision of man gives to the rational soul and to the human *logos* an ontological prominence which is clearly superior to the Epicurean one (for whom the human logos is a fragment and a moment of the divine logos). It permits Zeno and his followers to give to the characteristic, differentiating human beings from all other beings, a more profound ontological depth. Let us read a quotation from Seneca, who on this point repeats the doctrine of the Ancient Stoa:

> What quality is best in man? It is reason; by virtue of reason he surpasses the animals, and is surpassed only by the Gods. Perfect reason is therefore the good peculiar to man; all other qualities he shares in some degree with animals and plants... . Hence, if everything is

> praiseworthy and has arrived at the end intended by its nature, when it has brought its peculiar good to perfection, and if man's peculiar good is reason, *then if a man has brought his reason to perfection, he is praiseworthy and has reached the end suited to his nature.*[3]

In an explicit quotation from Cicero, we read:

> And just as our limbs are so fashioned that it is clear that they were bestowed upon us with a view to a certain mode of life, so our faculty of appetition, in Greek ὁρμή, was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living: and the same is true of *Reason and of perfected Reason.* For just as an actor or dancer has assigned to him not any but a certain particular part or dance, so life has to be conducted in a certain fixed way, and not in any way we like. This fixed way we speak of as "conformable" and suitable. In fact we do not consider *Wisdom* to be like seamanship or medicine, but rather like the arts of acting and of dancing just mentioned; its End, being the actual exercise of the art, *is contained within the art itself, and is not something extraneous to it.*[4]

Hence the *physis* peculiar to man is his *logos*, his *reason*. The aim of every being is to bring its own *physis* to completion; the aim and the end of human beings is to *bring their reason to completion.* Consequently, all the rules of moral conduct need to be deduced according to perfected reason.

2. The primary instinct

Let us return to a passage previously mentioned and see better how the particular *physis* of man finds its place within the general *physis*.

If we observe any living being, we generally remark that it is characterized by a constant tendency *to preserve itself*, to *appropriate* its own being, and everything which can conserve it as well as to avoid whatever is harmful, and to feel an *attachment* for itself and the things which are appropriate for its own essence. This fundamental characteristic of beings is indicated by the Stoics with the term *oikeiosis* (οἰκείωσις = approval = attraction = *attachment*). Therefore the principle of ethics needs to be deduced from *oikeiosis*.

In plants and vegetables in general, this tendency is wholly unconscious; in animals it depends on a particular *instinct* or *primary impulse* while in human beings such an impulse is still more specified and supported by the intervention of *reason*. Here is how the meaning of the definition mentioned in the previous paragraph becomes actual. To live in conformity with nature means *to live by fully achieving this appropriation or attachment for one's being and whatever conserves and completes it.* In particular, since man is not only a living being but a rational one, to live according to nature means *to live feeling an attachment for his*

rational being, conserving, and bringing it to full completion.[5]

Therefore, the foundation of Epicurean ethics is overturned by the concepts of *oikeiosis* and the primary instinct: because of the new criteria, pleasure and pain are considered not as *prius* but as *posterius*, that is, something which is after, and consequently after nature has already searched and found what conserves and completes it.

Since we are dealing with a new and important doctrine, we want to read some testimonies which prove and exemplify it.

Diogenes Laertius writes:

> [The Stoics] say that an animal's *first impulse is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself*, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work *On Ends*: his words are, "The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof"; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that *nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself*; for so it comes *to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it.* As for the assertion made by some people [the Epicureans] that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they [the Stoics] declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means *suitable to the animal's existence or constitution*; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them *life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life.* For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically.[6]

Cicero writes:

> A living creature feels *an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction.* In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain [contrary to

> what the Epicureans instead claim]; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness (*sensus sui*), and consequently felt affection for themselves.[7]

Seneca declares:

> "You maintain, do you" says the objector, "that every living thing is at the start *adapted to its constitution*, but that man's constitution is a reasoning one, and hence man *is adapted to himself not merely as living, but as a reasoning being*? For man is dear to himself in respect of that wherein he is man."[8]

Finally let us conclude with a passage again from Cicero in which the deduction of the good and moral choice from the primary instinct is rather detailed:

> The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are things to be taken for their own sake, and their opposites similarly things to be rejected, *the first appropriate act is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature* and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by appropriate action, *then such choice becomes a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature*. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature.[9]

Let us summarize: because of the principle of *oikeiosis* everything tends to appropriate its own being and loves its own being, everything tends to conserve and increase it, it feels attachment for the useful things, and it avoids noxious ones. In particular man tends to appropriate, conserve, and increase his rationality much more than his animal nature. Therefore, he chooses what helps his rational nature and avoids what harms it. So man brings himself to full completion by increasing his rationality.

3. The principle of the evaluations: goods, evils, and indifferents

The Epicureans had made the good identical with pleasure and evil with pain and had thought that the principle of evaluation of good and bad things is nothing other than the discrimination and correct evaluation of pleasures and pains. The Stoics, according to the doctrine of *oikeiosis*, opposed to the Epicurean principle a more radical and solid one. In fact, if pleasure is not something primary but only a consequent

phenomenon, it is not possible to rely on it in order to evaluate what is good and what is evil. It is necessary to go back to something primary and original. Since the instinct of conservation and the tendency toward increasing being is primary and original, the principle of evaluation is to be found here: *"good" is whatever conserves and increases our being; "evil" is whatever damages and diminishes it.* The tendency to evaluate is hence necessarily connected to the primary instinct, since all things have to be considered good or evil only if they are useful or harmful *to the primary instinct.* The good is, hence, the *useful* or the *beneficial*, evil is the *harmful.*[10] But note: the Stoics dwell on differentiating man from all other things by showing that he is determined not only by his purely animal nature but chiefly by his rational nature, that is, the special manifestation in him of logos. Therefore, the principle of evaluation established above will assume two different aspects according to whether it refers simply to the *animal physis* or to the *rational physis.* In fact, what is helpful to the conservation and the increase of *animal life* is different from what is useful *to the conservation and increase of the life of logos and reason.*

It is necessary, consequently, to differentiate a hierarchy of goods according to whether they are useful and increase reason or simply increase the animal life. As a matter of fact, in this differentiation the Stoics arrive at such a rigorous and intransigent position as to consider as true and authentic goods *exclusively* the ones increasing logos, and as true and authentic evils *exclusively* the ones opposing the *rational physis.* These and only these are moral goods, that is, the goods concerning man as such. Consequently, they allow him to achieve what he is and ought to be. Hence they make him "good" in the ontological sense, as we already know, that is, "virtuous." Therefore, they make him happy. Consequently, only what is contrary to these goods is evil and is truly evil because it makes man as he ought not to be, that is, "bad" or "vice-ridden." All this is summarized in the famous Stoic principle: *only virtue is good and only vice is evil.*

How will we consider what is useful to our body and our biological nature? And what will we name its contrary? The fundamental tendency of Stoicism is *to deny all these things the notion of being "good" or "evil"* precisely because, as we have seen, good and evil are only what is useful or what harms *logos*, hence only the moral good or evil. Therefore, all the things concerning our body (no matter whether harmful or harmless) are considered to be "indifferent" (ἀδιάφορα) or, more precisely, *morally indifferent.* Consequently, both physically and biologically positive things such as *life, health, beauty, riches*, etc., are to be placed among things morally "indifferent" as well as the ones which are biologically and physically negative such as *death, sickness, ugliness, poverty*, etc. Diogenes Laertius writes:

> Of things that are, some, they say, are *good*, some are *evil*, and some *neither good nor evil* [*the indifferents*]. Goods comprise the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, temperance, and *all that which is virtue* or *participates in virtue, while the opposites of these are evils, namely, folly, injustice, and all that which is a vice* or *participates in vice. Indifferent* (neither good nor evil, that is) are all those things which *neither benefit nor harm* [understood: morally] a man, life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, good reputation, and noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ignominy, low birth, and the like.[11]

Stobaeus confirms it:

> Things are divided into *goods, evils, and indifferents*. Good things [or benefits] are intelligence, temperance, justice, fortitude, and *whatever is virtue or participates in virtue*. Bad things [or evils] are stupidity, dissoluteness, injustice, cowardice, and *whatever is vice or participates in vice*. Indifferent things are life and death, being well-known and being obscure, pain and pleasure, riches and poverty, infirmity and good health, and similars.[12]

This very clean separation between *good and bad* things on the one hand and *indifferent* things on the other is undoubtedly one of the most characteristic features of Stoic ethics. Already in ancient times it aroused widespread amazement, spirited agreements and disagreements, and caused many discussions among adversaries and even among the Stoics themselves. Actually, it was this radical break which permitted the Stoics to shelter man from the evils of that age: *all the evils caused by the destruction of the ancient polis and all the dangers, insecurities, and adversities arising from the political and social turmoils were simply denied as evils and placed among the indifferents*. It was a very daring way to give a new sense of security to man by teaching him that goods and evils always and only come from himself and never from the outside. Hence they were able to convince him that happiness can be completely achieved apart from external events.[13]

However, it is to be noted that such a distinction, if we consider it carefully, is without adequate ontological and metaphysical supports. This distinction had precedents in Socrates and Plato, who had already tried in various ways to convince men that only the things aiding our soul and spirit are true goods. But—and this is the key point to remember—Plato brought to full completion the Socratic intuition through the "second voyage," that is, *the discovery of the supersensible*. In support of his thesis he stated that man is formed by a *sensible* component and a *supersensible* component which are not only structurally different but are even conflicting with each other. Therefore, the human task is to make free and release the supersensible component from the sensible

one. Well then, in this context, and only in this sense, can it have meaning to disvalue everything concerning the corporeal, as well as denying that the physical benefits are goods. But in the monistic and materialistic context of the Stoic physics there is no ontological place for such a radical distinction and therefore it is metaphysically unjustified. It is supported only by the sense of life elaborated in the Stoa through a chiefly intuitionistic way which superimposes itself surreptitiously on a monistic and materialistic ontology.

This explains well the subtle Stoic distinctions within the "indifferents," as well as the numerous internal polemics on this subject about which we now ought to speak.

4. Relative values: "preferables" and "non-preferables"

According to the general law of *oikeiosis*, all beings have the instinct to conserve themselves and evaluations depend on this very instinct. Therefore, it is necessary to consider as *positive* whatever conserves and increases them, *even on the simple physical and biological level.* Thus not only for animals, but likewise for men, they ought to have acknowledged as *positive* whatever conforms to physical nature and guarantees, preserves, and increases life such as health, strength, the vigor of the body and the limbs and so on. This *positive* which is according to nature was called by the Stoics *value or esteem* (ἀξία) while its contrary was called *absence of value and esteem* (ἀπαξία).

Therefore the "intermediates" between good and evil cannot be wholly indifferent; or better, although they are *morally* indifferent, they are "values" and "disvalues" *from the physical point of view.* Cicero writes:

> All other things, he said, were neither good nor bad, but nevertheless some of them were *in accordance with nature* and others *contrary to nature*; also among these he counted another interposed or "intermediate" class of things. He taught that things in accordance with nature *were to be chosen and estimated as having a certain value*, and *their opposites the opposite*, while things that were neither he left in the "intermediate" class [he understood as intermediate those things which neither conformed nor did not conform to nature, not the intermediate between good and evil] which are the indifferents.[14]

Stobaeus confirms it:

> The things in accordance with nature have *value* or *esteem*, the things contrary to nature have *disvalue* or *disesteem.* The things helping us to live according to nature have an absolute value or esteem; the things which are indifferent as such have a relative value only if they are convenient for a life in accordance with nature.[15]

Hence among the things between moral good and evil some are *values*, others are *disvalues*; some are values in a greater or lesser degree, and conversely, others are disvalues in a greater or lesser degree. Consequently, the first ones are objects of "preference" for our animal nature, the others are objects of "aversion." Therefore, we have a second distinction which is strictly dependent on the first one between "preferable" indifferents (προηγμένα) and "not preferable" or "rejected" indifferents (ἀποπροηγμένα), as it is clearly stated by the following quotations:

> Among things having value, some have much value, others little. Similarly among things having disvalue, some have much, others little. Well then, the things having much value are called "preferred" (or promoted), the ones having much disvalue are called "rejected" (or demoted). When we say "preferred," we understand something indifferent in itself that we choose for reasons of preference. The same argument is used as far as the "rejected" and the examples in accord with the principle of analogy are the same. None of goods [the real goods, that is, moral and spiritual goods] are "preferred" (or promoted) since goods have already the greatest value and worth in themselves; whereas the "preferred" (or promoted) has the second place and therefore smaller value and worth. *In some way it approaches the nature of goods.* As in the courts the king is not among the "preferred ones" (or promoted), that is, the dignitaries, but such are *those who come after him.*[16]

Other sources are still more detailed, clarifying the issue with examples as follows:

> Thus things of the preferred class are those which have positive value:
> [1] among mental qualities: natural ability, skill, moral improvement, and the like;
> [2] among bodily qualities: life, health, strength, good condition, soundness of organs, beauty, and so forth;
> [3] in the sphere of external things: wealth, fame, noble birth, and the like.
>
> To the class of things "rejected" belong:
>
> [1] of mental qualities: lack of ability, want of skill, and the like;
> [2] among bodily qualities: death, disease, weakness, being out of condition, mutilation, ugliness, and the like;
> [3] in the sphere of external things: poverty, ignominy, low birth, and so forth.[17]

We could summarize the things said above in the following way: 1) *Only moral goods* are true and proper goods; they preserve and increase

rationality and logos. Conversely only moral evils are real evils; they impair reason and logos. 2) These goods are absolute values as well as moral evils are absolute disvalues. 3) Though the "indifferents" are all on the same level from the moral point of view, they are not on the same level from the physical and biological point of view, since they are able to increase or damage life or they do neither one nor the other. 4) Consequently, there are things morally indifferent which are values or disvalues or are entirely neutral from the physical and biological point of view. 5) The things which have physical value are "preferables," while the things having disvalue are "non-preferables." The neutral ones are entirely indifferent. 6) Since the moral goods are absolute values, we cannot define them as "preferables." Their absolute value places them beyond any relation with anything else.

These distinctions arose from the need to weaken the too clean dichotomy between good, evil, and indifferent things, which was paradoxical. Moreover, for the reasons explained above, these distinctions were much more in accordance with the principles of the Stoic system than the above-mentioned dichotomy. Therefore, we can understand why the attempt of Aristones[18] and Herillus[19] to maintain the absolute *adiaphoria* or the *indifference* of things being neither good nor bad has found clear opposition in Chrysippus, who defended the position of Zeno and established it in a definitive way.[20]

5. Virtue and happiness

Our readers have surely noted that even in the Stoics, no less than in Plato and Aristotle, the conception of *arete*, that is of virtue, which we know to be one of the most typical characteristics of Greek moral thought from its beginning acquires perfect expression. *Human excellence is the perfection of the most peculiar and typical character of human beings*. Since the characteristic of human beings is reason, *virtue is the perfection of reason*.[21]

Therefore, the "life according to nature," which we have seen to be the fundamental precept of Stoic ethics, exactly corresponds to the "life according to reason" and hence to the "life according to virtue." Since virtue is the perfect accomplishment and the completion of human nature, it is *by that very fact*, happiness. In fact the blessed life, or happiness, is nothing else than this full and perfect fulfillment of the human *physis*. Stobaeus writes:

> [The Stoics] say that the goal is to be happy. We do everything for this, where as this is done for nothing. It means to live according to virtue, to live in accordance with nature and again, according to nature, which is the same thing. Zeno defines happiness in this way: happiness is a successful course of life. Even Cleanthes in his writ-

> ings uses this definition as well as Chrysippus and all their followers. They state that happiness is not different from the happy life, though they say that happiness is the aim while the goal is to have happiness, which is the equivalent of being happy. Consequently it is clear that "living according to nature" has the same value as "living nobly," "living well" as well as "goodness and nobility," "virtue and what participates in virtue." It is quite clear that what is virtue is also good and everything vice-ridden is also evil. Therefore the Stoic goal is also the same as a life in accordance with virtue.[22]

On the bases of these premises, it is evident why the Stoics must combat both the Epicurean thesis subordinating virtue to pleasure as a means to an end and the eschatological conception linking virtue to an ultraterrestrial reward. As the perfection of ***human excellence***, virtue ***is to be valued for itself***, not that it does not give happiness as something else than itself (whether pleasure or an ultraterrestrial reward), ***it itself is happiness***. Hence it has to be desired, sought, loved, cultivated in and for itself. Diogenes says:

> And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, ***it is in virtue that happiness consists***; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious.[23]

Thus the Stoic sage is ***completely self-sufficient*** because of his virtue. He has no need of pleasures which do not improve his human nature, but are only a concomitant phenomena and in any case not entirely within his own control. He has no need even of a future life adding something to the perfection which he already possesses through virtue. He does not fear to lose it because of someone else since no one can take it from him. In fact, it is ontologically rooted in his nature. Through virtue man reaches the apex of absoluteness in which he feels like the Gods:

> In no way is the happiness of Zeus preferable or more beautiful or more worthwhile than the happiness of the sages.[24]

Therefore we can understand the fervent praise through which the Stoics exalted virtue, giving it all the epithets that the Greek man, and in particular the Greek philosopher, considered as expressions of absolute perfection:

> Virtue is said in many ways. It is said to be *good* because it leads us through the right way. It is *pleasant* because it is undoubtedly approved. It is *very worthwhile* because it has insuperable value. It is said to be *precious* because it is worth great care. It is *commendable*, in fact we can praise it justly. It is said to be *beautiful* because it is by nature such as to gather to itself those tending toward it. It is *appro-*

> *priate* since it contributes so much to living well. It is said to be *useful* because it is useful in times of need. It is *preferable* because it is the origin of whatever we can chose reasonably. Hence also *necessary* when it is present we are benefited, and when it is absent, we do not know where to find benefits. It is *advantageous* since the advantages which we receive from it are superior to those gained from the activity by which we achieve them. It is said to be *self-sufficient* because it sufficient for the man who possesses it. It *needs nothing*, insofar as it is without any lack. It is *sufficient* because it is enough in its use and is the goal of every utility in life.[25]

Although the modern reader may feel something rhetorical in these fervid epithets, actually it is not the case.[26] Through virtue the Stoic man felt armed against all the evils of his turmoiled age; in it and only in it he was able to find peace of mind. Hence this hymn to virtue is profoundly sincere.[27]

6. Virtue as science, its unity and multiplicity

The component of Greek ethics which, to a certain extent, can be considered as the most typically Greek, was brought to full completion in the Stoics. We are alluding to the intellectualism which began with Socrates, that is, with moral philosophy itself, and which is an authentic category of Greek moral thought.

Actually Stoic philosophy, since it placed the ontological principle of all things in the *logos* and considered human beings as privileged beings in whom the *logos* was present in a very unusual way, can agree with the Socratic conclusions.

If virtue is the accomplishment of what is peculiarly human and if reason and *logos* are also peculiar to human beings, then it is clear that human virtue must consist in the possession of knowledge and science because reason is brought to full completion through and with knowledge. Therefore, virtue is defined again as "the science of good and evil" and vice as "ignorance of good and evil."[28] "Will" as a mental power apart from knowledge, as well as its role in the moral life, was also unknown to the Stoics, at least to the ancient Stoics. When we find that Seneca stresses particularly the will we must not allow ourselves to be deceived: Seneca, by translating into *voluntas* what the Greeks called *interior disposition* deriving from the notion of perfected knowledge, added something new, as we will see. Nevertheless, even Seneca was not able to explain his use of *voluntas* from the speculative point of view, and ended by making ethics depend on knowledge. Here is a significant passage:

> Conduct will not be correct unless the *voluntas* to act is correct; for this is the source of conduct. Nor, again, can the will be correct without a correct *attitude of mind*, for this is the source of the will. Fur-

> thermore, such an attitude of mind will not be found even in the best of men ***unless he has learned the laws of life as a whole*** and has worked out a proper judgment about everything and ***unless he has reduced facts to a standard of truth.***[29]

"Et quid de quoque iudicandum exegerit," that is, the judgment of reason (and hence reason itself) is the unconditioned condition of moral action.

Such a reduction of virtue to the ***knowledge of good and evil*** states again the problem that Plato had already felt as quite difficult to solve, that is, the problem of unity or multiplicity of virtue. This problem was discussed in the Porch for a long time and divided those philosophers. For example, Ariston, follower of Zeno, maintained that virtue is a unity.[30] Chrysippus, instead, followed by most of the Stoics, maintained that virtues are many. Therefore, already the ancients reprimanded him by saying that he had aroused "a strange and unknown 'swarm of virtues.'"[31] This was a famous metaphor through which Plato had ridiculed the thesis of the followers of Gorgias admitting a multitude of virtues.[32] Actually, Chrysippus was trying to illustrate the phenomenology of the moral life which shows that in human beings there are many qualities and that each quality has its own perfection and hence its "virtue." But Chrysippus himself, as well as all the Stoics, defined each virtue *as a particular way for the accomplishment of the science of good and evil.*

The Stoics also, as Plato, fixed the number of cardinal virtues at four: ***wisdom, temperance, fortitude, justice.*** All the other virtues meticulously distinguished were subordinated to these aforementioned ones.

Two passages of Stobaeus give the precise catalog of virtues. Furthermore they confirm the reduction of all and each of the virtues to *science* explicitly and perfectly:

> Wisdom [***phronesis***] is the *science* of what we need to do, of what we do not need and of what is not either in one or in the other condition, or the *science* of good and evil and of things naturally indifferent for the man living in community... . Temperance [***sophrosyne***] is the *science* of what is desirable, of what is to be avoided and what is neither one nor the other; justice [***dikaiosyne***] is the *science* of giving to each person what is his due; fortitude [***andreia***] is the *science* of what is fearful and what is not as well as of what belongs to neither category; silliness [***aphrosyne***] is *ignorance* of good and evil and of indifferent things; intemperance [***akolasia***] is *ignorance* of things to choose or avoid and whatever is neither to be chosen nor avoided; injustice [***adikia***] is the *ignorance* which is not able to give to each person what is his due; cowardice [***deilia***] is *ignorance* of what to fear and not to fear, of what is neither fearful nor not fearful.[33]

And Stobaeus explains further:

> Of the virtues, some are primary, others are subordinate to these: the primary ones are four: [1] wisdom, [2] temperance, [3] fortitude, [4] justice.
>
> [1] Wisdom concerns the appropriate;
> [2] temperance the human instincts;
> [3] fortitude the power of endurance;
> [4] justice the distribution of goods.
>
> Among the subordinate virtues, some are subordinate to wisdom, others to temperance, others to fortitude, and others to justice.
>
> [1] Those subordinated to wisdom: *a*) counsel, *b*) reflection, *c*) perspicacity, *d*) prudence, *e*) dexterity, *f*) shrewdness;
> [2] to temperance: *a*) timeliness, *b*) decorum, *c*) reservedness, *d*) continence;
> [3] to fortitude: *a*) firmness, *b*) courage, *c*) magnanimity, *d*) boldness, *e*) industry;
> [4] to justice: *a*) pity, *b*) goodness, *c*) sociability, *d*) affability.
>
> [1] *a*) They say that counsel is the *science* of what we need to do and how we need to do it in order to act appropriately; *b*) reflection is the *science* which analyzes and considers things happened and previously done; *c*) perspicacity is the *science* which permits us to find immediately the appropriate; *d*) prudence is the *science* of the better and the worse; *e*) dexterity is the *science* which completes the goal of all things; *f*) shrewdness is the *science* which is able to solve everything;
> [2] *a*) timeliness is the *science* which makes us know when we need to do something, after what other thing and, in short, it is the *science* of the order of our actions; *b*) decorum is the *science* of appropriate or inappropriate movements; *c*) reservedness is the *science* which preserves us from correct reproaches; *d*) continence is the *science* which does not allow us to go beyond what is in accordance with reason;
> [3] *a*) firmness is the *science* which makes us persevere in correct judgments; *b*) courage is the *science* through which we know that we will not fall into terrible things; *c*) magnanimity is the *science* which makes us superior to anything occurring by nature, whether in good or bad people; *d*) boldness is the *science* of a soul which is invincible; *e*) industry is the *science* which makes us able to succeed in our purposes without being overcome by fatigue;
> [4] *a*) piety is the *science* of the worship to give to the Gods; *b*) goodness science of doing well; *c*) sociability is the *science* of equality

> in social intercourse; *d*) affability is the *science* of living blamelessly with our neighbors. ***The aim of all these virtues is to live according to nature. Each virtue through its own nature allows man to accomplish this.*** In fact man is furnished by nature with some impulses driving him to search for the appropriate, the balancing of his instincts, perseverance, and distributive justice. Each virtue, acting in accordance with the others and itself, makes man *live according to his nature.*[34]

As is clear, even when the Stoics distinguished the virtues they *reunified them in science*, that is, in practical science. Olympiodorus better than any other writer explained the connection joining all the virtues.

> Though virtues are reciprocally linked, nevertheless they differ in specific properties. In fact they are only one virtue but in fortitude every virtue is present in a strong way, elsewhere in a prudent way, just as all the other Gods have the character of Zeus in Zeus, and elsewhere the character of Hera. No God in fact is imperfect. As Anaxagoras said that all is in all, but only one thing rules, thus we say also of the Gods. Each virtue in fact is wisdom, insofar as it knows the thing to be done; each virtue is fortitude insofar as it involves struggle; each virtue is temperance insofar as it drives to the best things; each virtue is justice insofar as it assigns to things what is due to them.[35]

Therefore, we can understand this famous Stoic maxim: "***he who has one virtue, has all of them.***"[36] They, in fact, are not only linked with each other but all of them are also particular emanations of the supreme virtue, ***the science of good and evil, that is, phronesis or wisdom.***[37]

7. The identity of virtues in all rational beings

The reduction of virtue to the perfection of the *logos*, and hence to science, entailed a consequence that fundamentally neither Socrates nor Plato nor Aristotle would have the courage to draw, nor would draw only partially, because they were conditioned by the social conventions of their time and in particular by the dogmas of the polis. We allude to the statements expressly repeated by the Stoics about the identity of virtue in men, to whatever class, sex, and condition they might belong, even if they are slaves. Epicurus had already received in his Garden men of various social origins, women, and even *hetairas*. In the past the structures of the polis had almost been categories of political thought for the philosophers themselves and had frequently been placed above their metaphysical principles. The fall of such structures made possible that consistency in moral thinking which, for the reasons stated above, was lacking in the philosophies of the Classical Age. Here is an ancient testimony:

> If the human nature is capable of wisdom, it is necessary that workmen, country people, women, and all, in short, who have a human shape are taught to be wise and that a crowd of sages of any language, condition, sex, and age is molded.... The Stoics realized this and said that philosophy was to be studied even by slaves and women; Epicurus also, who invited those who are altogether unacquainted with letters to philosophy.[38]

Actually, Epicurus had some reservations and showed some reticence, as we have seen. The Stoics were more determined as far as their doctrine. Resuming in great part the thought of the ancient Stoics, in fact, Seneca writes:

> Virtue does not preclude anyone, it is permitted to all, welcomed by all, calls everyone to itself, freemen, libertines, slaves, kings, exiles. It does not choose house or people, it is content with plain man [*nudo homine*].[39]

This thought is among the noblest of ancient speculation, a correction, to a great extent, of the many reactionary attitudes of which both Plato himself and especially Aristotle were the victims: virtue has no need of additions of any kind to the simple nature of man!

There is a further consequence, strictly dependent on this one, which the Stoics deduced from the *reduction of virtue to science and wisdom*: not only is virtue equal in all men, *but the virtue of men is equal also to the virtue of the Gods*.[40] Such an affirmation made an enormous impression on the ancients and was judged as immoderate and impious:

> The Stoics declare that the virtue in God is identical to that in man, deviating both from the religious feeling of Plato and from the Socratic measure.[41]

Such an affirmation was consistent with their principles: human logos is only an aspect of the divine logos and, consequently, the perfection (that is, the virtue) of human logos is the same as the perfection of the divine logos.

Virtue, hence, is shared by men and women, freemen and slaves, Greeks and barbarians, mortals and immortals.

8. Correct action (*katorthoma*)

The Stoics did not only deal in general with the essence of virtue and vice, but, because of their remarkable ethical interest, dwelt carefully on moral conduct, its actions, and the different moral meanings which human actions can have and thus reached new and original concepts.

He who possesses virtue, that is, a perfectly harmonized logos, can

only perform "perfect actions," *that is, actions which are completely in accordance with the perfect logos.* The Stoics declare:

> For every action that the sage initiates must necessarily be complete forthwith in all its parts.[42]

This means that actions necessarily involve the perfection of the source from which they come. Zeno had already said:

> The moral character [*ethos*] is the fountain of life, from which individual actions spring.[43]

He was convinced that this moral character had influence even on our features and on our dreams:

> Moral character can be grasped from the appearance of a person: the sage is recognized intuitively from his features. Everyone can realize his improvement on the way of virtue also from his dreams: If in his dreams it does not occur that he is pleased by something dishonest, nor does he approve it or commit any unworthy or monstrous action, but, as in a great bright and transparent sea in perfect tranquillity, the imagination and the passions of his soul are illuminated and cleared by reason.[44]

When virtue is possessed it is reflected in every action and in moral attitudes and it is manifest even in our unconscious. If we consider this, it is easy to understand what is the nature of the *katorthoma* (κατόρθωμα), that is, "correct action" or "perfect action" or "virtuous action." *Katorthoma* is the action which is rooted in virtue, and hence it "contains all the factors of virtue":[45] it is called *katorthoma* precisely because it proceeds from an "orthos logos"; it is a *perfect action* because it arises from and is inspired by a *perfect logos.*

From this doctrine it is evident that the Stoics in some sense began to partially realize some truths that will be clarified and grasped only with the advent of Christian ethics.

a) We must not judge whether an action is correct or it is not (that is, whether it is or is not a *katorthoma*) from its results and our reaching the results which we had, *but we must judge from our point of departure.*

> Actions springing from virtue are to be judged correct from *their first inception*, and not in their successful completion.[46]
>
> Even if our troubles in order to reach good and beautiful things are useless, yet they are useful to us by themselves. On the contrary, what is alien to virtue is completely useless if it does not reach its goal.[47]
>
> That he who receives a benefit gladly already has returned it. For, since we Stoics refer every action to the mind, a man acts only as he

> wills; and, since devotion, good faith, justice, since, in short, every virtue is complete in itself *even if it has not been permitted to put out a hand*, a man can also have gratitude *by the mere act of will.*[48]

Therefore, what is important is our interior spiritual disposition. The last passage mentions the *will*, but we know that Seneca uses *voluntas* for *diathesis*, that is, a *mental disposition*, or in other words, correct knowledge. He adds something new to the original acquisitions of the ancient Stoa: nevertheless it is clear that, at least intuitively, the Stoics had a hazy notion of what Christianity will call a "good will." But they are not able to define it better because they make it depend on knowledge and they fundamentally reduce good will to it.

b) We cannot judge whether an action is correct or not (whether it is a *katorthoma* or not) from its extrinsic aspects: an action can easily *be extrinsically similar to a katorthoma, but not be at all* if it is lacking *in correct disposition* and if it is not upheld by an *orthos logos*. A sage and someone silly can do the same thing but their action will be equal only extrinsically. On the contrary, it will be very different intrinsically: the first one and only the first one will be a *katorthoma*, as it necessarily follows from what has been explained in the preceding paragraph. The action of the silly man can never be a *katorthoma*.

c) Because a "correct action" is caused by virtue, that is, by wisdom, it follows that *no silly man* can even perform correct actions. In order to perform a correct action, he would first have to become wise. This means that most men will never be able to perform "correct actions (*katorthomata*)," *because they are not wise*. In this respect Pohlenz writes: "...the Stoics are absolutely convinced that most men never achieve this ideal disposition of mind and hence are not able to perform any *katorthoma*. Such a harsh affirmation can disconcert us, but even Paul, in the *Epistle to the Romans* (14.23), says 'whatever is not of faith is sin,' and Clement of Alexandria intentionally uses the Stoic term in order to characterize the nature of his ideal type of Christian: 'Every action of the gnostic is a *katorthoma*' (*Stromateis* 7.111). In Paul faith prevails, in Zeno ethical knowledge, but both of them have the same goal: they want to call man as strongly as possible to the only thing which is necessary, *to the spirit which determines the whole life.*"[49] In addition to the remarks of the German scholar, note that Paul nevertheless speaks about transcendent faith which revolutionizes man and joins him to the supernatural. Zeno speaks about the knowledge of the immanent logos, which completes the natural man.

9. Duty (*kathekon*)

Human actions cannot be divided with a clean cut between "correct or virtuous actions" (*katorthomata*) and their contraries, that is, "vicious

actions or mistakes" (*amartemata*). In fact in the middle we find a group of *intermediate actions* that the Stoics have tried to determine with a great deal of precision. We already saw that between moral goods and evils the Stoics placed a group of "indifferents" (*adiaphora*). They had some value or disvalue which was not moral but at least *natural*, and hence they were "preferred" or "rejected." Analogously, between "virtuous actions" and "vicious actions," which are connected with the spiritual and moral sides of man, they place the actions which are endowed with a *relative value* or a *relative disvalue*. These actions are chiefly connected with the natural and physical components of man, which we cannot leave out of consideration.

Well then, when these actions are performed in accordance with nature, that is, in a rationally correct way, they have a full rational justification and therefore are called "*suitable* actions" or "*duties*" (*kathekonta*).

Diogenes Laertius explains:

> Furthermore, the term "duty" (καθῆκον) is applied to *that for which*, when done, *a reasonable defense can be adduced, e.g., harmony in the tenor of life's plan*, which indeed pervades the growth of plants and animals.[50]

Actually, it is to be stressed that our translation of the term *kathekon* (καθῆκον) as "duty" tends to give the Stoic thought a modern sense. Literally it should have been translated as "the suitable." In this way, we could have understood better why Zeno also attributed some "suitable actions" to animals and plants. These, in fact, in order to exist, must also reject some conditions and comply with the requirements of nature. But it is clear why we can and must speak of "suitable actions" or "duties" especially with regard to man. The comparison with animals and plants shows only how the *kathekon* is linked to the biological and physical nature of man, whereas virtue and virtuous actions are connected only with the properly moral and spiritual side of human beings.

It is clear that actions of the ordinary man can never be placed within the morally perfect actions (*katorthomata*), but they can rightly be defined as "suitable actions." The conduct of the ordinary man, therefore, has within itself the criteria by which it can be understood and with which it has something in common, even if only partially, with the conduct of the sage.

Naturally, as there are actions which have value as "suitables" or as "duties" (*kathekonta*), thus there are actions which have the opposite mark, of disvalue, that is, they are *unsuitable*, and finally there are some which are *absolutely indifferent*. Diogenes Laertius writes:

> Befitting acts are all those which reason prevails with us to do; and this is the case with honoring one's parents, brothers and country,

and intercourse with friends. Unbefitting, or contrary to duty, are all acts that reason deprecates, e.g., to neglect one's parents, to be indifferent to one's brothers, not to agree with friends, to disregard the interests of one's country, and so forth. Acts which fall under neither of the foregoing classes are those which reason neither urges us to do nor forbids, such as picking up a twig, holding a stylus or a scraper, and the like.[51]

In order to complete this subject, let us read a passage from Cicero which summarizes well the concepts which we have dealt with and offers us the elements to conclude:

> But although we pronounce moral worth to be the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform an appropriate act [*officium*], in spite of the fact that we count appropriate [obligatory] action neither a good nor an evil. *For in the sphere of these neutral things there is an element of reasonableness, in the sense that an account can be rendered of it, and therefore in the sense that an account can also be rendered of an act reasonably performed; now an appropriate act is an act so performed that a reasonable account can be rendered of its performance*; and this proves that an appropriate act is an *intermediate thing*, to be reckoned neither as a good nor as the opposite. And since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is worth preserving. Again, this neutral class also includes action of a certain kind, viz., such that reason calls upon us to do or to produce some one of these neutral things; but an action reasonably performed we call an appropriate act; appropriate action therefore is included in the class which is reckoned neither as good nor the opposite.
>
> *It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Sage in the sphere of these neutral things.* Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: we observe that something exists which we call *correct action*; but this is an appropriate act *perfectly performed*; therefore, there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a correct act, "to restore a trust" must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification "on principle" makes it a correct action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that the class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected, therefore, whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term "appropriate action." This demonstrates that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with

> nature and reject the contrary. *Thus there is a sphere of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise*, and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral.[52]

Hence: 1) between perfect or virtuous actions and their opposites there is the area of the *middle actions*. Among them, the *suitable* actions or *duties* (the *kathekonta*) stand out. Nevertheless, they have only a relative value, whereas virtuous actions have an absolute value. 2) In the sphere of middle actions we need to distinguished also the actions which are opposed to the suitable ones or duties, that is, the inappropriate actions. 3) We have to draw a further distinction as far as absolutely indifferent actions or wholly neutral actions. 4) Duties are perfect duties or perfect appropriate acts *if they include wisdom*. Therefore, perfectly suitable actions certainly coincide with correct actions or *katorthomata*. They cease to be authentic *kathekonta* because they are connected with that spirit or interior disposition which is the origin of morality. Hence they are emanations and objectifications of it. 5) Duties are placed within the *intermediate* sphere, as we have mentioned, and their value is *relative*. Nevertheless the great importance of appropriate actions in the common morality cannot be ignored.

For the Stoics, human laws, as we will see below, far from being mere conventions, are expressions of an eternal and indestructible law which comes from the eternal Logos. They suggest correct actions (*katorthomata*) to the sage because he feels their command as necessarily coincident with his interiorly felt needs. This is made possible by his perfect *interior disposition*, that is, by the *right logos* within him which is in perfect harmony with the right logos outside of him. Hence we could say that the sage in his perfection has no need of laws or commands. On the contrary, to the silly man laws cannot command correct actions, since the silly man is lacking in the right spirit which is the origin of right actions. But in the first place they forbid him many faults (to the sage they do not forbid anything because not committing faults is natural for him) and then they command appropriate actions or duties. Though these actions are equal to actions of the sage as far as their content, they still lack the *form* which makes the actions of the sage perfect, that is, the *intimate interior disposition* of which we have spoken above.[53]

Hence, for most men, the commands and precepts of the laws are *kathekonta*, or duties. Therefore we can say that *kathekonta* rule the whole life of the ordinary man.

This concept of *kathekon* is substantially a Stoic creation. The Romans, who translated it by the term *officium*, contributed, through their practical and legal sensibility, by defining more clearly this notion that now we call *duty*. Prior to the Stoics we can find, obviously, the

notion corresponding to the Stoic *kathekon*. It was expressed in various ways, but was never stated as a problem and never was set forth systematically. Pohlenz thought that Zeno had taken the concept of "commandment," which was so familiar to the Jewish people, from the spiritual patrimony of the land of his origin, and then he created the concept of *kathekon* by grafting the concept of commandment on the Greek concept of physis.[54] And this is plausible. Anyway, it is certain that Zeno and the Stoa through their setting forth the concept of *kathekon* made an extraordinarily important contribution to the spiritual history of the West: the concept of "duty," in fact, although stated in various ways, appears to be an authentic category of Western moral thought.

10. Eternal law and the law of nature

Epicurus had fundamentally denied to the law and right any ontological value: for him law and justice were only expressions of temporary agreements established among men in order to guarantee the security of life, that is, for strictly utilitarian aims. Therefore, he resumed the thought of the Socratic schools, which had been strongly checked by Plato and Aristotle. The Stoics were poles apart from the Epicureans, but without taking up the ideas of Plato and Aristotle again, and hence achieved a quite new vision. The destruction of the polis on the one hand, and on the other the ontology of the immanent logos, opened to the Stoics the possibility of considering the problem of right and law in a new way, that is, in a meta-political and universal perspective.

Human law is nothing else than the expression of *an eternal natural law* arising from the logos itself. It molds all things through its rationality which establishes what is good and evil, and hence imposes duties and prohibitions. The Stoics deduced moral goods and evils in such a way that we can say that they thought *physis* and *logos* as having not only an *ontological* value but also a *deontological* one. Cicero writes:

> Law is the *highest reason, implanted in Nature*, which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite. *This reason, when firmly fixed and fully developed in the human mind, is Law.*[55]

And in a further statement:

> *Law* is not a product of human thought, nor is it any enactment of peoples, *but something eternal which rules the whole universe by its wisdom in command and prohibition.* Thus [the Stoics] have been accustomed to say *that Law is the primal and ultimate mind of God, whose reason directs all things either by compulsion or restraint.* Wherefore that law which the Gods have given to the human race has been justly praised; for it is the reason and mind of a wise lawgiver applied to command and prohibition.... This and other

> commands and prohibitions of nations have the power to summon to correctness and away from wrong-doing; but this power is not merely older than the existence of nations and states, *it is coeval with that God who guards and rules heaven and earth.* For the divine mind cannot exist without reason, and divine reason cannot but have this power to establish right and wrong.... *Because the true law and first capacity of commanding and prohibiting is the correct reason of the highest God.*[56]

In a testimony of Plutarch we read:

> Actually it is impossible to find another source or any other development for justice *except that from Jupiter and from common nature*; in fact, it is sufficient that all that has its origin from here be connected to it in speaking of good and evil actions.[57]

Hence law arises from the *logos* itself which rules the universe; therefore, rights are "given by nature"[58] and positive human rights are nothing but expression of this fundamental natural right. With the Stoics law and nature are perfectly reconciled: *nomos* is no longer a mere convention or opinion in contrast with *physis*, but it is its translation and interpretation. So Chrysippus can sing the praises of law with expressions taken even from Pindar:

> Law is the queen of all the human and divine things: it needs to rule the beautiful and ugly things, to lead and guide everything. Because of this, there must be a norm of justice and injustice and of sociable beings. It must impose what is necessary to be done and to avoid what does not need to be done.[59]

11. Cosmopolitanism

Also the individualism and egoism in which Epicurus had imprisoned men are sharply contested by the Stoics on the basis of the notion of *physis*.

Man is driven by nature to preserve his own being and to love himself. But this primordial instinct finds its reason not only in the preservation of the individual: man extends immediately the *oikeiosis* to his sons and his relatives and, mediately, to all his fellows. In sum: it is nature which imposes love of self, as well as the love of those we have generated and those who generated us. It is nature which forces us to join ourselves to others and also to help them:

> We derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. *The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him.*

> We are brought by nature to unite and associate ourselves with other men and into natural societies. Then we are pushed by nature to benefit as many people as we can, and especially by imparting information and the principles of wisdom.[60]

Man is again a "communitarian animal" and no longer one who lives closed up in his individuality, as Epicurus claimed. The new definition shows that it is not a simple return to Aristotle, who conceives man as a "political animal": man is made to be associated not within a polis, but rather with *all* other human beings.[61] On these bases, the Stoics were able to be promoters of a strongly cosmo-political ideal.

The polis was completely destroyed without any hope of being restored. On the other hand, ***nothing new had arisen in its place***: the monarchies which had been formed during the dissolution of the Macedonian ***empire*** showed themselves to be rather weak and transitory. Therefore, the Stoics defined the state only in a juridical way:

> They say that the state is a multitude of men living in the same place under the administration of laws.[62]

Therefore, we cannot say that "the Stoics created the general concept of the State," as Pohlenz claimed.[63] In fact this definition, as Pohlenz himself recognizes, is a mere extension of the concept of the polis to the new reigns; but the modern concept of the state is something more than the mere enlargement of the concept of the polis.

Actually, the Stoics considered not only all the men of the whole wide world as citizens of the ideal State, but they even included the Gods,[64] because the Gods also are rational beings:

> We must consider only this reciprocal community of the Gods as a state or a city properly happy. We can comprise within it also men together with the Gods, if we wish to include any rational being....[65]
>
> Hence we must now conceive of this whole universe as one commonwealth of which both Gods and men are members.[66]

The Stoics, through their concept of *physis* and *logos*, were also able to extirpate, more than any other philosophy, the ancient myths of blood-based nobility and superiority of race, as well as the chains of slavery. Nobility is said cynically to be "the scum and scrapings of equality";[67] everyone is declared to be able to achieve virtue;[68] man is proclaimed to be free in his deepest roots; in fact, "no man is a slave *by nature*."[69] The new concepts of nobility, freedom, and slavery are linked to the notions of ***wisdom*** and ***ignorance***: the sage is the real free-man, the fool is the real slave.[70]

The grounds of Aristotelian politics are completely shattered: the logos recovers, at least on the level of thought, the fundamental equality of all human beings.

12. Passions and *apatheia*

Pain and false opinions about good and evil were able to upset men according to the Epicureans as well as the Stoics. *The passions, together with their causes and effects, are the source of any unhappiness.* Therefore it is quite understandable why, in the Porch, they were deeply discussed and a special study was devoted to them. They dealt with an important phenomenon of moral life and tried to explain why our reason is obscured, blinded, and even overwhelmed by the irrational motions which are inside us.

Socrates, because of his moral rationalism and intellectualism, had tried to explain our being overwhelmed by passions as a consequence of a *logical error*, as an effect of ignorance. But Plato had already understood that passions and the passional aspect of our acting imply an alogical power springing from the human soul itself. Consequently, he had spoken of three parts or functions of our soul: *concupiscible*, *irascible*, and *rational*. Aristotle also stressed the non-rational parts of the soul, as we have seen.

Well then, the Stoics, as a consequence of their ontology giving the absolute and total pre-eminence to *logos*, tend inexorably to take up again the Socratic position. Firstly, they unanimously reject the thesis according to which passions are the effect of pure non-rationality, that is, of a part of us which is animal or, in any case, not dependent on our logos. But such a statement (passions are caused by non-rationality and whatever of the a-logical is present in us) obviously means to recognize the non-voluntary character of passions. In fact, they are wholly alien to the sphere of logic. On the contrary, if this explanation is rejected, it means that passions are necessarily connected with logos and reason. In this case, there are two possible positions: *a*) it is possible to say that passions arise *because and in consequence of an erroneous judgment*; or *b*) it is even possible to *completely identify passions with the erroneous judgment itself*. Both these views were maintained in the Stoa: Zeno, and many of his followers, upheld the first view; Chrysippus held the second view with great insistence.

It is possible to understand the position taken by the Porch with regard to this question. In fact, if passions are the gravest danger menacing the peace of our mind and happiness, it is necessary to be able to entirely master them through our reason. But they can be completely mastered only if they do not come from an extrinsic source which is opposed to reason, and if they depend in some way on reason itself.

Zeno explained passions in the following way. A tendency arises in us as a consequence of a given presentation, for instance, of wealth. If it is not mastered by a right and strong logos *judging* that it is something "indifferent" (that is, something which is neither good nor bad and

which is useful only for the necessities of life), but if, on the contrary, the tendency is supported by a weak logos overvaluing wealth, then it becomes a *false opinion*. This false opinion causes an *irrational movement* of the soul (a movement contrary to the right logos) which goes beyond the measure, and so passions arise: the greed for wealth and avarice. Therefore a passion is the effect of an erroneous judgment, in the example given by us it is the effect of the following erroneous judgment: "wealth is good."

Here are two testimonies:

> Passion...according to Zeno is either a movement of the soul, *irrational* and *contrary to nature*, or an excessive impulse [of nature].
>
> Zeno defined passion thus: passion—what is called pathos (πάθος)—is an emotion *which is separate from reason* and *contrary to nature* which is produced in the soul.[71]

The consequences of this doctrine are evident: since Zeno reduced will, freedom, and responsibility to reason through his ethical intellectualism, he could only conclude that passions are voluntary. In fact we are responsible for their arousal in us and their perduring there.

Zeno, hence, did *not* identify passions with judgments but with "the contradictions, effusions, exaltations, and depressions following judgments."[72] Hence to a certain extent he admitted an a-logical power, but it is able to develop only if reason permits it. On the contrary, Chrysippus made this passional element depend entirely on reason by stating that passion is identical with the judgment itself, as we have said above. Galen, who often quotes from our philosopher, writes:

> Chrysippus...in the first book *On Passions* tries to show passions are judgments of reason, while Zeno thought that passions are not the judgments themselves, but the contractions, dilations, exaltations, and depressions of the soul and that they follow judgments.[73]

Here is Plutarch's exposition of Chrysippus's doctrine:

> Some affirm that passion is not essentially different from reason, nor is there quarreling between the two and factious strife, but only a conversion of one and the same reason to its two aspects; this escapes our notice by reason of the suddenness and swiftness of the change, for we do not perceive that it is the same part of the soul with which we naturally desire and change to aversion, are angry and afraid, are swept along by pleasure to shameful conduct, and then, when the soul itself is being swept away, recover ourselves again. In fact, they say, desire and anger and fear and all such things are but perverse *opinions and judgments*, which do not arise in one certain part of the soul, but are inclinations and yieldings, assents

> and impulses of the whole directive faculty and, in a word, certain activities which may in a moment be changed this way or that, just as the sudden assaults of children have a precarious and inconstant impetuosity and violence, because of children's weakness.[74]

As with regard to virtue, so also with regard to passions, the Stoics showed a very strong interest in the phenomenology of their empirical manifestations. They distinguished four kinds of fundamental passions: desire, fear, pain, and pleasure, and many subspecies of passions which can be subordinated to the four main ones.[75]

Desire depends on a *false opinion* and on a *false judgment* about future good; *fear* depends on a *false opinion* and on *false judgment* about future evil; *pain* depends on a *false opinion* and on *false judgment* about a supposed actual evil; and *pleasure* depends on a *false opinion* and on *false judgment* about a supposed present good. Some passions are linked with *desire*: for instance wrath and its various forms such as scorn, anger, resentment, rancor, fury, and similars; greed and cupidity, ambition, and similars. Other passions are linked with *pleasure*: exaltation, enjoyment, malevolence, and witchcraft; hesitation, anxiety, consternation, trepidation, terror, and similars are linked with *fear*; envy, jealousy, compassion, torment, and similars are linked with *pain*.[76]

Since passions derive directly from logos because they are logos *errors*, it is clear that it does not make any sense for the Stoics to restrain or limit passions, as Zeno said, they must be completely destroyed, extirpated, and uprooted.[77] The wise man, by taking care of his logos and making it as correct as possible, does not allow passions to arise in his heart or he destroys them as soon as they arise. This is the famous Stoic *apatheia*, that is, the destruction and the absence of all passions, which are always and only a turmoil of our soul. Hence happiness is *apatheia* and imperturbability.[78]

Epicurus, in order to preserve his ideal of interior peace provided by catastematic pleasure, that is, by the absence of pain and turmoil, was forced to misunderstand the dramatic presence of pain and the deranging tragedy of death. Analogously, in order to preserve their ideal of *interior peace* provided by an harmonious logos, perfectly complied with itself and consistent for a whole life, the Stoics were constrained to deny the irrational forces struggling within us at every moment. They denied their presence and ontological meaning and reduced them to errors of reason. Hence it is evident that both the Stoics and the Epicureans could ground their ideal of happiness *only through a radical amputation and to the detriment of the integrity of human life and its situation*. As pain and death are the defeat of the ethics of *aponia*, so the strong and inevitable presence of the irrational within us is the defeat of the ethics of *apatheia*.

13. The ideal of wisdom

Within a conception of philosophy considered as the problem of life such as it was stated during the Hellenistic Age, the characterization of the perfect man had a very great importance. It tried to define the man who lives in total harmony with the logos, that is, the sage who is the ideal model at which anyone ought to aim.

It would be sufficient to say that the sage is crowned by the presence of all the virtues. But the Stoics (as well as the Epicureans) continually added epithets in order to characterize the wise man, lavishing on him a whole series of adjectives denoting positive qualities. The sage never errs, because he has no opinion but science. The wise man does everything well because he does it through the right logos, through the right spirit. The wise man is great, massive, tall, and strong:

> Great insofar as he can achieve the things which he chooses and proposes; massive insofar as he is spiritually increased in all his aspects; tall insofar as he shares in the loftiness which touches an excellent and deserving man; strong insofar as he is endowed with the power that belongs to him, since he is undefeated and invincible.[79]

Moreover the wise man is rich, noble, and beautiful: rich even if poor, noble even if a servant, beautiful even if physically ugly, because he has his riches, nobility, and beauty in the logos. The wise man is free because he desires only what is necessary; he accepts and endures everything willed by fate. The wise man is sufficient to himself because he has everything he needs in the logos. Nothing can disturb him because the armor of the logos protects him from everything. As well as the Epicurean sage, the Stoic sage also can be happy, even in the midst of tortures, because through the logos he transcends pain and deprives it of its negativity. In his interior peace he is equal to Zeus.[80]

In such a description there is something which recalls both the Platonic description of the world of the Ideas and the Aristotelian description of the immobile Movent. Actually, the true Absolute of the Hellenistic Age is precisely a moral ideal of which the sage is the paradigmatic incarnation.

But however exalting this description is, nonetheless some negative aspects appear in many respects. For instance, the ideal of the sage does not admit any middle way. Either one is a sage or one is a fool: there is no middle position (*tertium non datur*).[81] And among the fools there is no hierarchical gradation. A person can drown in a few inches of water or in the ocean depths: the depth of the water is of no consequence because he drowns nonetheless. In this same way a great deal of foolishness or very little foolishness is all the same; a greater or lesser quantity is meaningless with respect to quality. Consequently, even faults are all

equally grave because the spirit from which they arise is equally negative. Therefore, between the sages and the fools there is absolute incommensurability.[82] But the *apatheia* surrounding the Stoic is especially chilling and even inhuman. Because pity, compassion, and mercy are passions, the Stoic extirpates them from himself:

> Mercy is a fault and a vice of the human soul: only the fool is merciful.
>
> The sage is not moved for anyone: he does not condone the faults of anyone. A strong man is not conquered by prayers or deterred from a right severity.[83]

Therefore, the help given by the Stoic to other men is necessarily asceptic, distant from any human sympathy, as the cold logos is distant from the warmth of a feeling. Among his similars the sage will strike an attitude of complete sympathetic detachment; both when he devotes himself to politics or when he is married, both when he is concerned with his children or when he makes friends, he will always end by being estranged from life itself. Actually the Stoic is not enthusiastic about life or is he a lover of life as, on the contrary, the Epicurean is. While Epicurus enjoyed also the last moments of his life, happy even amidst pains, Zeno, in a pragmatic attitude, after a fall in which he had perceived a sign from destiny, chose death, happy to end his life, by shouting:

> I am coming. Why do you call me?[84]

Suicide was permitted by the Stoics when the sage finds himself in exceptional conditions which prevent him from living virtuously.[85] But it is not consistent with the theoretical premises of their system, if it is true that the logos is insuperable and invincible, and if it is also true that the sage can be happy even amidst flames. The admission of suicide is perhaps more properly grounded on that leaden vision of life which we have described above. By eliminating and restraining every sentiment and passion, even the primary and instinctive joy for living is almost completely lost.

Second Section

MIDDLE STOICISM

"...Posidonius...cumque quasi faces ei doloris admoverentur, saepe dixisse: 'nihil agis, dolor! quamvis sis molestus, numquam te esse confitebor malum.'"

"...Posidonius...as often as a paroxym of pain attacked him, continually repeated: 'It is no use, pain! For all the distress you cause, I shall never admit that you are evil.'"

Cicero *Tusculan Disputations* 2.25.61

I. The Middle Stoicism of Panaetius

1. The new direction imposed on the Stoa by Panaetius

After Chrysippus, the Stoa had only preserved and defended its teaching, losing a lot of its power and effectiveness.[1] It was Panaetius who, in the last three decades of the second century BCE, brought it back to its ancient splendor by giving it that liveliness which appeared to be lost.[2] Nevertheless, he succeeded in this task only by bringing to the doctrinal patrimony of the Porch modifications of some importance. He partially ameliorated a certain sharpness of the ethics, he modified some points of psychology, and he reconsidered some aspects of the physics.

The reasons which drove him to make these changes are many and of various kinds.

a) In the first place, we have to consider the effects caused by the polemic of the sceptic Academy against the Stoa. The attacks launched by Arcesilaus against Zeno and Cleanthes and by Carneades against Chrysippus (about which we will speak fully when we take up the Sceptics) only aimed at dismantling Stoic doctrines without substituting any new alternatives. Nevertheless, they had successfully pointed out the real weak points in Stoicism. Hence it was necessary, in order not to succumb under the weight of their criticism, to renew the doctrine, and especially to revive its spirit, which was hardening into a sterile scholasticism.

b) In the second place, the contact of Panaetius with the Roman mentality was fundamental as far as the revision of Stoic ethics. In Rome he was received in the circle of the Scipionians and through an assiduous attendance on the most powerful, influential, and enlightened men of the time he understood the novelty and grandeur of the Roman spirit. He was charmed, and to a certain extent he was even positively conditioned by it. In Greece his predecessors had seen especially what was decaying and ending in the sphere of the State and politics; on the contrary, Panaetius, in Rome, saw what had been built and was continually developing. Consequently, he regained that strong political sense which had been the distinctive trait of the Greeks of the Classical Age. Furthermore, he absorbed the strong practical sense which is the distinctive feature of the Roman spirit. Both elements influenced the vision of life of this philosopher very strongly.

c) Moreover, the careful and passionate reading of Plato and the first Academics, as well as of Aristotle and some Peripatetics, made Panaetius realize the necessity of accepting some positions of the Academy and the Peripatos. In his opinion, these schools, as well as the Stoa, could be considered as deriving from the same source, that is, from Socrates.

d) Panaetius, therefore, begins an eclecticizing tendency in the Porch

which brings together sceptical criticism, the new Roman spirit, and the doctrines of Plato and the Peripatos. Yet such a tendency does not degenerate into an eclecticism without a sense of internal unity, because the Stoic spirit is always dominant and is able to impose its own form on the new doctrines, adapting them to the new circumstances. Therefore, Panaetius opens a new phase in the history of the Porch. In order to indicate it, the historians of philosophy have coined the expression "Middle Stoicism," that is, the Stoicism between the early phase of the Stoa and the last one, which will develop with new characteristics in Rome during the Christian Era.[3]

2. Innovations in the physical doctrines of the ancient Stoa

Considering the testimonies handed down to us, it does not seem that Panaetius was concerned with problems of logic, nor had he systematically set forth all the problems of physics. In this sphere, however, he did introduce some corrections to the doctrines of the school which are of some importance.

Panaetius abandoned the doctrine of the *universal conflagration*, probably in order to avoid sceptical criticism, and accepted the Peripatetic notion of the eternity of the world.[4] Naturally this involved, as a consequence, the reconsideration of the chief physical concepts. The world could no longer be understood as a great living being which is born, grows, and then dies. Hence the fundamental vitalistic conception of the ancient Stoa must change its meaning. The rejection of *ekpyrosis* also changed the function of God as a craftsman working with fire, since he ceased to resolve all things into himself and then to regenerate periodically everything from himself; hence deity ended by becoming the ruler rather than the maker of the cosmos.[5] But all the implications entailed by the rejection of *ekpyrosis* are a difficulty Panaetius realized. Actually, it seems a quite tempered position, at times rejecting *ekpyrosis* and at times only raising doubts about it.[6]

Panaetius adopted a critical position even as far as divination, which was so important for the ancient Stoa. The testimonies handed down to us at times say that he clearly rejected it[7] and at times that he cautiously doubted it.[8] Also taking this position must have entailed not inconsiderable effects on his Stoic principles. In particular, it involved, if not the outright rejection, then at least a notable attenuation of the conviction of the ancient Stoa according to which every event is necessarily bound with all the others in such a way that any one of them has effects on all the others and conversely.[9]

Finally, within this parameter of thought we find also the resolute rejection of astrology,[10] which analogously aimed at modifying the Stoic concept of destiny.

3. Psychological doctrines

Panaetius also brought sensible innovations to psychology under the influence of Aristotle as well as of Plato.[11]

In the first place, it seems that he stressed the distinctions between the purely physical component of man (*physis*) and his soul (*psyche*). He assigned to the physical component the purely biological functions of nutrition, growth, reproduction, and the impulses connected to them; he assigned to the soul the five senses and the *hegemonic* role. (Therefore, the "parts" of the soul are reduced from eight to six—the five senses plus the hegemonic part; the function of reproduction is removed from the soul and attributed to the physical component, whereas phonics is no longer conceived as a function of an independent part of the soul.)[12]

Moreover, he opposed the five senses to the hegemonic and, especially within the hegemonic, he admitted *two powers* opposed to each other, the *irrational* and *reason*. Cicero writes:

> Now we find that the essential activity of the spirit is two-fold: one force is appetite (that is, ὁρμή, in Greek), which impels a man this way and that; the other is reason, which teaches and explains what should be done and what should be left undone.[13]

Again:

> Our mental operations, moreover, are of two kinds: some have to do with thought, others with impulse. Thought is occupied chiefly with the discovery of truth; impulse prompts to action.[14]

This distinction is evidently introduced in order to explain moral conflicts which, through its strictly rationalistic psychology, the old Stoa did not succeed in explaining.

Such a distinction between irrational and rational forces within the human soul is grounded on a conception which emphasizes and stresses the composite nature of the soul. The soul has two elements, that is, air and fire.[15] The irrational forces depend on air, the rational ones on fire.

It is obvious hence that Panaetius could not follow Plato and Aristotle with respect to the immortality of the soul. In fact, he reasons as follows. The soul is born, and so it must also die. Indeed it is necessary that everything which is born dies. Moreover, it is subject to affections and sufferings, and it is corruptible like everything subject to suffering. Therefore its eternal survival is inconceivable.[16] But in order to understand immortality, Panaetius should have regained the concept of the spiritual and supersensible; that is, he should have realized that the soul is spiritual and supersensible. Instead he conceived it as enflamed air and explained death as a diminishing of fire and a cooling of the pneuma. Since the results of the "second voyage" were lost, as we well know, we

are continually stressing that the immortality of the soul has no meaning conceptually speaking. The so-called "dualism" of Panaetius's psychology does not go beyond the antithesis of hot and cold (air and fire). It is, therefore, wholly contained in a basic materialistic monism.

4. Ethics and politics

His wide experience of men, still more than the conviction according to which the soul and the body are very tightly bound, suggested to Panaetius a reevaluation of the "indifferents." Diogenes Laertius expressly says:

> Panaetius, however, and Posidonius deny that virtue is self-sufficing: on the contrary, health is necessary, and some means of living and strength.[17]

Actually, this idea had been previously maintained, as we have seen, by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[18] Panaetius did not intend to corrode the great Stoic principle according to which the authentic good of man is virtue, that is, the moral good. He rather wanted to remind men realistically that these things when they are present facilitate virtue, and when they are not, they impede it. Therefore, they cannot be considered as purely indifferent. But apart from the intentions of Panaetius, this was a compromise contaminating the purity of the original Stoic position and destroying the affirmation about the absoluteness of moral good.

On this ground we can correctly explain the critical attitude taken by Panaetius toward the sage, or better, the myth of the Stoic sage. Seneca writes that Panaetius, when questioned by a young man as to whether the sage could love, answered:

> As to the sage, we shall see later; but you and I, who are as yet far removed from wisdom, should not trust ourselves to fall into a state that is disordered, uncontrolled, enslaved to another, contemptible to itself.[19]

Moreover, the expression "as to the sage, we shall see later" means that the sage who is discussed so much does not exist. Therefore, we do not have to care for him. We have to care for ourselves as we are, we who aspire to wisdom, but who are not nor can ever be wise in an absolute sense.

Therefore it is possible to explain why our philosopher was not particularly interested in the study of *perfect actions* (*katorthomata*), but in the study of *duties* (*kathekonta*), that is, of the intermediate actions. In

fact, *About Duties* is his greatest work. We can reconstruct some fundamental doctrines of this work, unfortunately lost, through the *De Officiis* by Cicero, which was an imitation of Panaetius's work.[20]

Panaetius also partially deviated from the doctrine of the ancient Stoa in the determination of virtues. He seems to take up again the distinction between theoretic virtue and practical virtue, but without recovering the Aristotelian doctrine. Theoretic virtue is *wisdom*; the practical virtues are *justice*, *magnanimity*, and *temperance*.[21] These virtues are grounded on four fundamental human tendencies: the desire for pure wisdom, the desire to preserve oneself and the community, the desire not to depend on anything or anyone, and the desire for moderation. Virtues are the very completion of these desires in accord with reason.[22]

Panaetius did not systematically set forth the superiority of practical virtues over the theoretical ones as, on the contrary, Cicero will do in developing the same Panaetian outline.[23] Nevertheless, he greatly valued the practical life, bringing into the Stoa a vivid sense of sociableness and a strong sense of the State, which he had absorbed from the Romans. He also corrected, to a certain extent, the vague cosmopolitanism of his predecessors.

5. The rejection of *apatheia*

Another aspect of the thought of Panaetius that must be pointed out specifically is his rejection of *apatheia*. Such a rejection probably entailed a break with the spirit of Stoicism. How is it to be explained? Epicurus proclaimed *aponia* and *ataraxia*; the ancient Stoics and Pyrrho proclaimed *apatheia*. They were men who had seen the destruction of the ideals of the Classical Age and they saw or believed they had seen only destruction all around them. Therefore, they found that the only way to defend themselves lay in adopting such an ethical attitude, as a person could rely only on himself. On the contrary, Panaetius saw in Rome, as we have already said, the revival of the ancient civic ideals; he saw a strong and vital State; he saw men acting and bringing to completion their actions; he saw that success can favor even the righteous man. He himself had enjoyed his own success in Rome and Athens. For these reasons and perhaps also as a consequence of a naturally sunny disposition, he wanted to overturn Stoic "imperturbability," which makes life death-like. He wrote a first work in order to teach that pain is to be confronted and supported by strengthening our bodies and spirit and in order to show how to avoid that pain which inhibits the completion of our duty. But what is more indicative, he wrote a work about *euthumia*, that is, about contentment and the joy of living. The joy which springs from a life in complete harmony with duty is one in which we are at peace with ourselves and others.[24]

6. The humanism of Panaetius and the significance of his philosophy

Many times scholars have spoken about the "humanism" of Panaetius; and indeed it is certainly true that Panaetius's philosophy is the humanistic phase of Stoicism, however paradoxical it may seem. His humanism, more than any other part of his teaching, is present especially in his corrections of the definition of morality. The expression "to live according to nature" is changed as follows: "to live according to the *dispositions* given to us by nature."[25] The moral task is a personal one and hence becomes more human insofar as it permits anyone to complete himself in his own way according to different natural dispositions.[26]

The historical importance of Panaetius lies in this more human side of Stoicism and in the consequent importance given to "duties." The concept of "duties" was introduced at Rome through Panaetius, and from Panaetius it was recovered and handed down to the entire West through Cicero as a definitively acquired spiritual notion.[27]

II. The Middle Stoicism of Posidonius

1. The Posidonian problem

The chapter concerning Posidonius (both within the scope of the evolution of Stoic thought, and in the wider scope of the evolution of ancient thought) is today certainly one of the most difficult and problematic about which to write. There are two opposed reasons which, taken together, make the reconstruction of the thought of this philosopher from Apamea extremely difficult and complex.

In the first place, we no longer possess any works of Posidonius and the fragments or testimonies in which the name of our philosopher is expressly mentioned are not abundant and furthermore are not conclusive.

On the contrary, too many things have been said and written about Posidonius, especially by German scholars, unbelievably more than the conclusions which we can infer from the indisputable documents. At first it was claimed that the first book of Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, the *Dream of Scipio*, and Plutarch's *De facie lunae*, and even the sixth book of the *Aeneid*[1] are to be considered as directly inspired by the thought of Posidonius. And even when these theses appeared to be acritically presupposed, numerous passages of Hellenistic-Roman philosophers were still considered even by well-known scholars as directly inspired by the thought of Posidonius, since their content corresponded to the aprioristic reconstruction of his thought.[2]

The result is not encouraging at all: a methodologically correct edition of the genuine fragments[3] has not yet been published, therefore a reconstruction of the spiritual profile of our author capable of receiving unanimous agreement is still lacking.[4]

But in our century works of vast breadth and great erudition have been published about our philosopher. Nevertheless the theses which are maintained, although more brilliant and imaginative than historical and solidly grounded, have now fallen into disfavor. Thus the weaknesses of the Jaegerian thesis have been denounced. He claimed to see in Posidonius the precursor of Neoplatonism and the inventor of the concept of the "intermediary."[5] We are now able to realize the aprioristic character and the interpretative arbitrariness of the ponderous works of Reinhardt. He drew the suggestive image of a Posidonius as creator of a vitalistic philosophy dependent on the concept of *vis vitalis* and cosmic sympathy.[6] Analogously, the works of Heinemann[7] did not meet the favor of scholars. And it is to be regretted that Pohlenz, in his fine synthesis about the Stoa, has not only accepted Reinhardt, but has even tried to demonstrate his thesis with the resultant compromising of this chapter of his work.[8] The reader is surprised, when checking the sources to which Pohlenz refers, that he finds almost no mention of Posidonius or

the reason why Pohlenz refers a certain source to Posidonius.[9]

Fortunately the recent, ample, and well-documented work of Marie Laffranque[10] has removed many of these misunderstandings and strongly recalled scholars to the necessity of working only on those fragments in which Posidonius is expressly quoted. She has also tried to construct a new profile of our philosopher as a consequence of her work.[11] The work of Laffranque, from a critical point of view, is of decisive importance, whereas for the positive reconstruction of the intellectual outline of Posidonius, she is less convincing. But for this reconstruction it is necessary to await the results of a new systematic edition of his fragments.

The synthetic reconstruction which we will offer is hence to be considered as necessarily provisional.

2. The characteristics of Posidonian Stoicism

Posidonius[12] followed the new direction which his teacher Panaetius gave to the Stoa. Nevertheless, he did not succeed him as scholarch. He preferred to open a school in Rhodes, perhaps desiring a greater independence or for other motives which simply escape us.

Posidonius shared the fundamental idea of his teacher—that is, the idea which created a new atmosphere in the Stoa—according to which truth is not necessarily nor exclusively contained in the teachings of the Porch. Hence the teachings of other schools could appropriately integrate and correct Stoic doctrines. Therefore, Posidonius opened the Porch to Platonic and Aristotelian influences. He does not hesitate to correct Chrysippus through Plato, though he did not modify the fundamental Stoic vision of life.

Perhaps Posidonius also felt the effects of some eastern influences: his native city of Apamea in Syria was situated between two civilizations. In any case, it is clear that he was trained in western culture, especially in Athens.[13]

But our philosopher was not content in listening to the lessons of his teachers and reading books; he wanted to experience places, countries, men, different customs, and habits. He traveled so much, both in the East and West, that he is justly considered the greatest explorer of ancient times. He traveled through Asia Minor, Palestine, Egypt, Italy, Gaul, and Spain.[14]

He was likewise a tireless and formidable student of empirical sciences. He was concerned with geography, ethnology, mathematics, astronomy, meteorology, and history. We will speak about the significance of Posidonius's scientific work later. Now we will try to specify how our philosopher corrected the speculative tenets of the Porch.

3. Physics

Reading some testimonies concerning Posidonian physics and theology, we have at first sight the impression that he did not change the basic tenets of the school. Arius Didymus writes:

> Posidonius declared that the substance and matter of the universe is lacking in quality and shape insofar as it has not in itself either its own determined shape or quality but is always in a shape and in a quality. Substance, which really exists, differs from matter only logically.[15]

In this testimony the monism and ontological unity of the passive and active principles are rigorously affirmed. The testimony of Stobaeus is in complete agreement:

> Posidonius considers that God is an intelligent fiery pneuma. Though he is shapeless, he is able to transform himself into whatever he wishes and to make himself similar to all things.[16]

This testimony is concerned with the active principle and stresses what in the preceding testimony was pointed out as related to the passive principle. But our impression changes as soon as we consider other testimonies, only recently explained in an adequate way.

Aetius writes:

> Posidonius assigned to Fate the third place after Zeus. He said in fact that Zeus is at the first place, Nature at the second, Fate at the third.[17]

Well then, we know that, on the contrary, the doctrine presented by the Stoa identified Deity, Nature, and Fate.[18] How did Posidonius distinguish them?

Rist[19] has recently connected some passages of Diogenes Laertius to this fragment, thus clarifying it. Diogenes says:

> The world, in their view, is ordered by reason and providence: so says Chrysippus in the fifth book of his treatise *On Providence* and Posidonius in his work *On the Gods*, book three—inasmuch as reason pervades every part of it, just as does soul in us. Only there is a difference of degree; in some parts there is more of it, in others less. For through some parts it passes as a capacity or faculty (ἕξις), as is the case with our bones and sinews, while through others it passes as intelligence, as in the ruling part of the soul. Thus, then, the whole world is a living being endowed with soul and reason, and *having aither for its ruling principle*: so says Antipater of Tyre in the eighth book of his treatise *On the Cosmos*. Chrysippus, in the first book of

> his work *On Providence*, and Posidonius, in his book *On the Gods*, say that the heaven, but Cleanthes that the sun, is the ruling power of the world.[20]

Again Diogenes informs us:

> The cosmos is one and finite, ***having a spherical shape***, such a shape being the most suitable for motion, as Posidonius says in the fifth book of his *Physical Discourses*.[21]

Finally, Diogenes writes:

> Posidonius in the third book *On Celestial Phenomena* showed that surface exists not only in our thought ***but also in reality***.[22]

From these passages we could infer that Posidonius identified God with heaven and precisely with the spherical surface surrounding the cosmos. In fact, this is a physical reality not just conceptually distinct (as we can deduce from the last passage). Rist[23] finds a confirmation of such an exegesis in a passage of Plutarch from which it can be deduced that Posidonius identified the soul of the world with the form (Idea) of the world.[24]

If in this way God would be identified with heaven, that is, with the active principle which is the world-soul, nature would be identified with the passive principle, that is, with the material principle, or better with the body of the world. Fate would correspond to the errant cause or the necessity of the material principle, as it was called by Plato.[25] Consequently, in Posidonius there would be present a tendency to distinguish God from the world as far as possible within his basic materialism.

About the concepts of *vis vitalis* and *sympatheia*, we have already said that Reinhardt undoubtedly exaggerated their significance and value: in fact, they were already a patrimony of the ancient Stoa.

Posidonius, as well as the ancient Stoa, considered the whole cosmos as living. He used the concept of *sympatheia* in order to explain some phenomena like tides and divination. Nevertheless, he is far from reaching a vitalistic intuition in the modern sense and a radical exploitation of *sympatheia*. The remaining fragments, at least, do not seem to support Reinhardt's thesis.[26]

4. Anthropology and morality

Following Panaetius, Posidonius continued and deepened the polemic against the psychology of Chrysippus, which had rejected, as we well know, the existence of an irrational component in the soul and had reduced passion to a simple error of reason. But if it were so, the tumult of passions in the human soul would be inexplicable.

Therefore, Posidonius did not hesitate to return to the psychology of Plato. He affirmed the tripartition of the human soul by admitting, in addition to the rational soul, the appetitive soul and the irascible soul. Posidonius spoke of "forces" rather than of "parts." But the most striking correction of Plato is given by the conception of the soul as material: in fact Posidonius, according to Stoic doctrine, made these forces originate from the heart.[27]

In this way, Posidonius is prevented from understanding the essential metaphysical significance of the Platonic doctrine of soul. Nevertheless, he uses the Platonic tenet of the three forces of the soul to interpret human actions more correctly than Chrysippus. Urged by the senses, the appetitive and irascible power of the soul can twist our reason and induce it to give undue assents, hence causing it to deviate from a just *telos* and making it err. Consequently, the task of man is now defined in a better way: he must strengthen his reason, which is the good daimon, in order to constantly conquer and dominate the irrational forces which are the evil daimon living in him.

That is what Posidonius wrote about Chrysippus, as Galen reports it:

> The cause of passions, that is, of an incoherent and unhappy life, is not to follow in all things the interior daimon having the same nature as the one who rules the universe. On the contrary, we are carried away by the worse daimon, having an animal aspect. But these men [*scil.*, the followers of Chrysippus] neglect it and do not give a better reason than passions. They do not think rightly about what concerns happiness and what is in accordance with nature. In fact, they do not see that the first thing is not to be carried by the irrational, harmful, and atheist part of our soul. Thus Posidonius showed clearly how Chrysippus and his followers were wrong by reasoning not only about passions but also about our goal. In fact to live according to nature is not what they meant but what Plato taught.[28]

To live according to nature means to follow reason, which has the same nature as the principle ruling the universe. Therefore it is said to be divine and it is considered to be the good daimon within us. This phrase also means to dominate the irrational to which reason is opposed, and hence it is called the maleficent element, the evil daimon.

As in theology, so also in the Posidonian psychology a certain dualism is outlined. However, it is not ontologically grounded because of the materialistic conception of the soul, although it is true that Seneca refers the following affirmation to Posidonius:

> Man's primary art is virtue itself; there is joined to this the useless and fleeting flesh, fitted only for the reception of food, as Posidonius remarks.[29]

Nevertheless, we cannot give too much importance to such a statement. In fact what Laffranque notes is very important: "Either Posidonius paraphrases another author like Plato, or even Chrysippus; otherwise it is only a figure of style, an antithesis in order to stress the difference between the hegemonic and all the other parts of man, which in his thought is particularly remarkable."[30]

A confirmation can be inferred also from the fact that Posidonius placed some "indifferents" among goods. Diogenes writes:

> For as the property of hot is to warm, not to cool, so the property of good is to benefit, not to injure; but wealth and health do no more benefit than injury, and therefore neither wealth nor health is good. Further, they say that that is not good of which both good and bad use can be made; but of wealth and health both good and bad use can be made; therefore wealth and health are not goods. On the other hand, *Posidonius maintains that these things too are among goods.*[31]

And then he writes:

> Panaetius, however, and Posidonius deny that virtue is self-sufficing: on the contrary, health is necessary, and some means of living and strength.[32]

Here Posidonius evidently follows Aristotle accepting the same point of view as his teacher, Panaetius, with which we have dealt above: health, vigor, and similars are goods insofar as they are conditions favoring the exercise of virtue. This evaluation of the "intermediates," nevertheless, does not go so far as to harm the great Stoic principle according to which only the moral good is the true and highest good and physical evil is not true evil, as it is stated in this famous passage of Cicero:

> It was not so with our Posidonius, whom I have often seen with my own eyes, and I shall repeat the story Pompey liked to tell, that after reaching Rhodes on giving up Syria, he felt a wish to hear Posidonius; but on learning that he was seriously ill with an attack of gout in the joints, he wished at all events to go to see so famous a philosopher: when he had seen him and offered his respects, he paid him distinguished compliments and said that he regretted that he was not able to hear him, but Posidonius said, "You can hear me nor will I suffer bodily pain to be a reason for allowing a man of your eminence to visit me for nothing." And accordingly Pompey related that from his sick bed the philosopher had earnestly and fully discussed this very proposition, *that there is nothing good except what is honorable*, and as often as a paroxysm of pain attacked him, continually repeated: "It is no use, pain! For all the distress you cause, *I shall never admit that you are evil.*"[33]

5. The destiny of the soul

Posidonian eschatology has been the subject of much discussion: the soul comes from the sun and after the death of the body it returns first to the moon where it enjoys a kind of pure contemplative life, and then to the sun. Unfortunately, these reconstructions are grounded on some testimonies which are incorrectly attributed to Posidonius. In fact his name is not quoted and they have other origins.[34]

The only certain testimony is by Cicero:

> Proof of the power of dying men to prophesy is also given by Posidonius.... Now Posidonius holds the view that there are three ways in which men dream as the result of divine impulse: first, the soul is clairvoyant of itself because of its kinship with the Gods; second, *the air is full of immortal souls*, already clearly stamped, as it were, with the marks of truth; and third, the Gods in person converse with men when they are asleep.[35]

This conception of souls which are in the air agrees with the Stoic doctrine which we already know. To say that the soul is immortal can only mean that it has a *long life*. In fact Posidonius, in opposition to his teacher Panaetius, reintroduces the cosmic conflagration,[36] and the life of the "immortal souls" ended in any case with the *Great Year*, that is, with the cosmic year of the *ekpyrosis*.

Moreover, the presumed solar eschatology is absurdly inconsistent with his identification of deity and the ruling principle of the universe not with the sun, as we have seen, but with the *ouranos*, that is, with the sphere surrounding and enclosing the world.

6. Conclusion concerning Posidonius

In order to fully comprehend the stature of Posidonius, we also ought to see in detail his contributions to the other sciences, but this would take us outside the confines of this work which is limited to philosophical problems. In the work of Laffranque the reader can find the contributions of Posidonius to history, geography, meteorology, and mathematics reconstructed on the basis of the extant testimonies as carefully as possible.[37]

An essential observation is nevertheless to be made in this regard. These particular sciences were not cultivated by Posidonius, in opposition to the opinions of some German scholars, as particular aspects of a great theoretical construction or as the empirical completion of a great philosophical plan.[38] Probably the opposite position is more accurate, as it would appear from the work of Laffranque. The scientific questions often give a certain outlook to the Posidonian philosophy or prompt it to

particular problems; in any case, it is certain that some of these sciences were cultivated by Posidonius on a purely technical level.[39]

Perhaps the greatest philosophical originality of Posidonius is the very attempt to set the Stoic doctrines in step with the scientific progress which occurred after the founding of the Porch.[40]

This would explain the rapid decline of his fame since it was linked to a particular historical situation. Already at the end of the Middle Ages, Posidonius is no longer spoken about; the Arabs ignore him, and the modern age is not concerned with him. Only the philologists and historians of philosophy of the last two centuries have considered him as a prominent figure in the history of Hellenistic culture. It is certain that Posidonius, as all now admit, was the most universal Greek mind after Aristotle as far as variety and breadth of knowledge. The exceptional character of his personality was perceived also by his contemporaries, who came to Rhodes from all over Greece and even from Rome in order to hear his lectures: even personages like Cicero, as we have previously said, or Pompey the Great, who visited him twice.

Fourth Part

SCEPTICISM AND ECLECTICISM FROM THEIR ORIGINS TO THE END OF THE PAGAN ERA

« Ἐτεῇ δὲ οὐδὲν ἴδμεν· ἐν βυθῷ γὰρ
ἡ ἀλήθεια.»

"In reality we know nothing, because the truth is in the Abyss."

Democritus *Frag.* 117 Diels-Kranz

First Section

PYRRHONIAN SCEPTICISM AND THE SCEPTICISM OF THE ACADEMY

« μηδὲν ὁρίζειν, ἀλλ' ἀπροσθετεῖν.»

"To define nothing or rather not to adhere to any opinion."

Timon *Frag.* 80 Diels

«τέλος δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοί φασι τὴν ἐποχήν, ἣ σκιᾶς τρόπον ἐπακολουθεῖ ἡ ἀταραξία.»

"The goal of the Sceptics is the suspension of judgment which brings with it like its shadow, imperturbability."

Diogenes Laertius 9.107

I. The Moral Scepsis of Pyrrho and Pyrrhonism

1. The origin of the Sceptic movement

Even before Epicurus and Zeno had founded their schools, Pyrrho, from his native city of Elis, had been spreading his new sceptic message since about 323 BCE (or a little after). It was the beginning of a movement of thought destined to have remarkable results in the ancient world and even destined, as were the Garden and the Stoa, to create a new way of thinking and a new spiritual attitude which, in the history of the ideas of the Western world, will remain as constant reference points.[1] Pyrrho did not found a real school in the sense that he gathered disciples or even wished to have his words preserved in writing. On the contrary, he wanted to return to the example of Socrates, since he was convinced that he could and had to communicate the most authentic message of philosophical wisdom verbally, and not simply verbally, but chiefly through the testimony of his living. His followers bound themselves to him outside the traditional ways. They were not so much followers as appraisers, admirers, and imitators; they were men who sought in their master especially a new model of living, an existential paradigm to which they could make constant reference. He was their secure guarantee, notwithstanding the tragic events in which the times were embroiled, notwithstanding the destruction of the ancient list of ethical-political values, that happiness and peace of spirit were still attainable *even if they were regarded as impossible to propose and construct anew.*

This is the very novelty which clearly distinguishes the message of Pyrrho not only from the thought of the preceding philosophers (who in fact had sought the solution of other problems), but likewise from the thought of the philosophers of his own epoch, that is, from the founders of the Garden and the Porch, because they also sought the solution of the same basic problem, the problem of living. *It is the conviction that it is possible to live a happy life, "with art," even without truth and values*, at least as they had been conceived and venerated in the past. The Garden and the Porch produced a few illustrious men later, when the word of Pyrrho began to be diffused slowly. Although they agreed upon attributing to the sage a series of essential qualities already clearly specified by Pyrrho, they nevertheless adopted a position diametrically opposed to the thought of Pyrrho. In fact, they proclaimed, with extreme firmness, that dogmas and tenets are indispensable to the sage. Hence they preserved the profound Greek conviction that being and truth exist and are achievable by man. They maintained that the regulations of a happy life can only spring from this achievement and hence from the reconstruction of a precise list of moral values.

How could Pyrrho go so far as to overturn this conviction which is so

typical of Greek rationalism? How could he deduce a "rule for living" and construct a "wisdom" in spite of renouncing being and truth and declaring that everything is vain appearance?

A reply to these questions can be given only by taking into account three essential factors: *a*) the precise historical moment in which the thought of Pyrrho matured, especially his participation in the great expedition of Alexander; *b*) the knowledge of Eastern culture, which revealed to him a type of "wisdom" totally unknown to the Greeks; *c*) the teachers and the Greek philosophical currents from which he deduced the conceptual instruments for the elaboration and the formulation of his thought. Let us examine, therefore, each of these factors individually and try to discover the nature of their influence and importance.

2. Pyrrho and the revolution of Alexander

We have previously clarified the significance of the expedition of Alexander for the Greeks as well as his conquest of the East and, in general, the revolution in the political and ideological order of the ancient world produced by it. It meant - to briefly recall it - the destruction of the city-state, the destruction of freedom as understood by the Greeks, the break in the identification of individual and citizen, the equalization of Greeks and barbarians, the affirmation of cosmopolitanism, the discovery and the exaltation of the individual, the diffusion of Hellenic culture with the consequent assimilation of elements belonging to other cultures, especially Eastern culture.[2]

Well then, Pyrrho, among all the founders of new schools, was the one who lived in a more direct and immediate way this moment of radical break with the spiritual life of ancient times, since he participated together with the philosopher Anaxagoras of Abdera[3] in the great expedition of Alexander. He was personally involved in the unfolding of these great events at the very side of the exceptional personality of the protagonist who, with a limitless will and an audacity which seemed beyond the human, destroying what was held to be indestructible, broke up the most ancient and deeply rooted convictions of the Greeks, and thus opened extraordinary perspectives to history.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the thought of Pyrrho, more than that of any of the other philosophers, shows the traces of the violent impact with these new realities. The great expedition of Alexander in which Pyrrho participated was an event, so to speak, which marked a break; analogously, the thought of Pyrrho also represented, as has been noted, "a philosophy of transition," that is, a position of thought which shows an unexpected passage from one world to another. Pyrrho was placed at the precise moment in which the Greek awareness lost some truths and as yet did not succeed in finding any to take their place and

hence, as has been strikingly and accurately stated, he is situated "at the zero moment of truth."[4]

3. The meeting with the East and the influence of the Gymnosophists

Among the various experiences which Pyrrho acquired following Alexander and which influenced him in various ways, one was of exceptional importance and, in a certain respect, perhaps determinative: the meeting with the "Gymnosophists." They were a kind of Indian sage living a typical monastic life, totally devoted to the overcoming of human needs, to the renunciation of things, and to the achievement of imperturbability. These Gymnosophists made a great impression on all the followers of Alexander. We know, moreover, that Onesicritus believed that he had found in them, in a certain respect, the ideal of Cynic philosophy.[5]

Well then, the influence of the Gymnosophists on Pyrrho was already well-known to the ancients. Diogenes Laertius writes:

> [Pyrrho] even got together with the Indian Gymnosophists and with the Magi. This led him to adopt a most noble philosophy, to quote Ascanius of Abdera, by introducing *akatalepsia* [that is, the inconceivability and unrepresentability of things] and *epoche* [that is, the suspension of judgment].[6]

Again:

> He would withdraw from the world and live in *tranquil solitude*, rarely showing himself to his relatives; this he did because he had heard an Indian reproach Anaxarchus, telling him that he would never be able to teach others what is good while he himself danced attendance on kings in their courts.[7]

There is yet something more. The historians write of an episode concerning one of these Gymnosophists, Calanus by name, which created a great sensation. Calanus voluntarily committed suicide by throwing himself on a fire and accepting with imperturbability the writhings of his burning flesh. Calanus hence demonstrated that if it is possible to accept with imperturbability even those sufferings which are considered the worst of evils, then sufferings ought not to have, *by themselves*, that "reality" and that "nature" which we commonly attribute to them and to which, no matter what, *the sage's condition renders him inured.*

Here is the account of the facts furnished by Plutarch:

> Calanus, who had suffered for a little while from intestinal disorder, asked that a funeral pyre might be prepared for him. To this he came on horseback, and after prayers, sprinkling himself and casting some of his hair upon the pyre, he ascended it, greeting the Macedonians

> who were present and exhorting them to make that day one of pleasure and revelry with the King, whom, he declared, he should soon see in Babylon. After thus speaking, he lay down and covered his head, *nor did he move as the fire approached him, but continued to lay in the same posture as at first, and so sacrificed himself acceptably as the sages of his country had done from old.*[8]

Pyrrho saw in the testimony of Calanus the living demonstration of the idea that, as we have seen, was destined to triumph in the Hellenistic Age, that is, that *the sage can be happy even in the midst of torments.*

Certainly the meeting with both the Gymnosophists and with Calanus together with the destruction, which Alexander was causing, of the classical Greek values must have contributed to the conviction "of the unreality of all which seems to be 'real,'"[9] which is the fundamental idea of Pyrrhonian scepticism.

4. The influence of the Megarics and the Atomists

The events about which we have now spoken must have contributed considerably *at the emotional and intuitive level* to the birth of the new vision of living of our philosopher. On the other hand, the conceptual instruments for its formulation came to Pyrrho from the Greek philosophical schools, and especially from the atomistic as well as the Megaric schools.

The contacts of Pyrrho with Atomism were made through Anaxarchus of Abdera who, as we have already mentioned, accompanied him on the expedition of Alexander. Our sources permit us to link him, without any doubt, with the school of Democritus.[10]

Diogenes Laertius writes:

> Anaxarchus, a native of Abdera, studied under Diogenes of Smyrna, and the latter under Metrodorus of Chios, who used to declare that he knew nothing, not even the fact that he knew nothing; while Metrodorus was a pupil of Nessas of Chios, though some say that he was taught by Democritus.[11]

Moreover, we also know that:

> Pyrrho most frequently mentions Democritus.[12]

This testimony, which is confirmed by many others, says that the teacher of Anaxarchus had already made affirmations of a sceptical type. Sextus Empiricus associates the follower with his teacher and writes:

> There have been not a few who have asserted that Metrodorus and Anaxarchus...abolished the criterion—Metrodorus because he said "We know nothing, nor do we even know the very fact that we know nothing."[13]

The works of Democritus himself abound in criticism of the senses and sensible knowledge which could be exploited in a sceptical way and which actually became very dear to the Sceptics. Here are some eloquent fragments of Democritus quoted by Sextus Empiricus:

> And in his book *Concerning Forms* [Democritus] says, "Man must learn by this rule that he is divorced [cause of the sensible appearances] from truth."[14]
>
> This argument also makes plain that we know nothing verily about anything, but each man's opinion is due to [a kind of] influx [*scil.*, influx which is caused by the contact of the atoms of the soul with the ones of the things perceived].[15]
>
> It will, however, be plain that it is impracticable to learn the veritable nature of each thing.[16]
>
> And Democritus in some places abolishes the things that appear to the senses and asserts that none of them appears in truth but only in opinion, the true fact in things existent being the existence of atoms and void; for "By convention," he says, "is sweet, by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention color; but by verity atoms and void." This means: Sensible objects are conventionally assumed and opined to exist, but they do not truly exist, but only the atoms and the void. And in his *Confirmations*, although he had promised to ascribe the confirmatory evidence to the senses, yet nonetheless he is found condemning them. For he says: "But we in reality comprehend nothing invariable, but what shifts about according to the disposition of the body and of the things which enter into it and the things which oppose it."[17]
>
> Now verily that we do not comprehend what the nature of each thing is or is not, has been oft-times made plain.[18]

The Sceptics were especially fond of the Democritean affirmation:

> In reality we know nothing, because the truth is in the Abyss.[19]

Now, it is true that Democritus said this referring exclusively to sensory knowledge and (as we have seen)[20] he maintained that it is possible to achieve truth "in its depth" through intellectual knowledge. Nevertheless (we have seen this also), Democritus presupposed the existence of intellectual knowledge even if he was not able to give it a theoretical justification. Therefore, it was almost inevitable that (before Epicurus would reform in a purely sensistic way the Atomistic epistemology, as we have seen) the criticism of sensible knowledge would end by taking on so much importance as to greatly enhance the sceptical attitude.

Pyrrho must have also derived sceptical elements from Megaric dialectic. In fact, as we have said above, the original positive principle affirmed by Euclid, that is, the unity of Being and Good, which they intended to

defend with their refutation and destruction of the basic theses of pluralism, becomes less and less explicit sometimes to the point of not even being mentioned.[21]

Pyrrho, hence, extracted a series of concepts and deductions from Atomism and Megaricism which, combined with his new intuition of the meaning of living (which was emotionally grasped and matured during the expedition of Alexander), thus generated his scepticism.

5. The radical overturning of ontology

We have seen that Epicurus and Zeno had attempted a systematic overturning of the Platonic "second voyage" in order to be able to ground their systems on "physics." Pyrrho is still more radical insofar as, in addition to the results of the "second voyage," he also rejects those results which, developing the Platonic image, could be called the "first voyage," namely, the results of the "voyage" attempted by naturalistic philosophers, as we will immediately see. In conclusion, he rejects both "physics" and "metaphysics" and in general denies every form of ontology as such.

The rejection of ontology in the sense of "physics," that is, in the Presocratic sense, is clearly attested to in this fragment of Timon:

> O Pyrrho, O aged Pyrrho, whence and how did you find escape from servitude to sophists, their dreams and vanities; how did you loose the bonds of trickery and specious craft? Nor did you reckon to inquire such things as these, what breezes circle Hellas, *to what end, and from what quarter each may chance to blow.*[22]

The rejection of the Platonic ontology of the Idea and the Aristotelian form and substance is likewise clear. The Platonic idea and the Aristotelian form, although in different ways, as we have seen, are the causes of the nature of things, their intelligibility, and hence the possibility of their knowledge, as well as the stability and the eternity of their values.[23] All things, in short, in the Platonic-Aristotelian ontology have "stability because of their essence,"[24] and therefore, they possess a principle of differentiation, a measure, and an objective distinctiveness. On the contrary, according to Pyrrho:

> Things do not have any differences, nor measure, nor distinctiveness.[25]

It follows, as we will see,[26] that values do not exist and nothing is by nature beautiful or ugly, good or bad, just or unjust. Everything is indifferently equivalent (and also not equivalent), since for our philosopher:

> nothing is more this than that.[27]

We could say, hence, that Pyrrho rejects the need for any kind of ontology as such. In fact, while the path of ontology goes from appearances to being (both for the Physical philosophers,[28] and the Metaphysical ones[29]), on the contrary, Pyrrho withdraws from being to appearance, denying precisely that being exists. Therefore he also denies that it is possible to express any judgment on being and recognizes consequently only appearances. Hence, according to Pyrrho, being does not dominate, appearances do:

> The phenomenon is always omnipotent, wherever it appears.[30]

A final comparison with the position of Aristotle will clarify fully the novelty of the Pyrrhonian position.

Aristotle writes in the *Metaphysics*:

> And, in truth, *the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always and is always the subject of inquiry: what being is, is just the question, what is substance?*... and so we also must consider chiefly, primarily and almost exclusively, that which is in this sense.[31]

As supreme principle of being, in addition, Aristotle had placed the principle of non-contradiction which had, for the most part, already been specified by Parmenides in the affirmation of the impossibility that being is not.[32] Therefore, it is impossible that the same thing both *be* and *not be*.[33] Aristotle had strictly connected the principle of the "excluded middle," to the principle of non-contradiction, according to which it is impossible that there be a middle term between contradictories. A thing either is or it is not. A third term is impossible (*tertium non datur*).[34]

Though Pyrrho suppressed the question of being and substance at its root, along with being, he also entirely suppressed the validity of these principles. In fact, the affirmation of the absolute domination of the appearances signifies precisely the negation of being and substance, while the affirmation that everything "is not more this than that" means the rejection of the principle of being. Moreover, with unequivocal language, as we will see better further on, Pyrrho does not hesitate to affirm that "everything is no more than it is not," that "everything is and is not," that everything "neither is nor is not."[35]

6. Pyrrhonism as a practical system of wisdom and its three fundamental rules

What can be constructed on this nullification of being and its principles and how can it be accomplished?

The Sophists, who would deny Being and Truth, put their trust in man: Protagoras, as we have seen, declared man and his logos as criterion and measure;[36] Gorgias, who denied any value at all to the

logos, proclaimed the word as criterion and affirmed the omnipotence of the word.[37]

Yet Pyrrho does not trust even man (and hence not the logos or the word), because he realizes his nothingness. (Moreover, man, his logos, and his word are also eliminated, since being is entirely eliminated.) We are told that he was most fond of some verses of Homer in which the poet sings of the fragility, the smallness, the misery, the nothingness of man. Diogenes Laertius writes:

> Philo of Athens, a friend of his, used to say that he was most fond of Democritus, and then of Homer, admiring him and continually repeating the line "*as leaves on trees, such is the life of man.*" He also admired Homer because he likened men to wasps, flies, and birds, and would quote these verses as well: "*Yes, friend, you die; why thus your fate deplore? / Patroclus too, your better, is no more,*" and all passages which dwell on the unstable purpose, vain pursuits, and childish folly of man.[38]

Then, if the criterion is no longer being and if even man cannot be, where do we look for the criterion? The reply of Pyrrho is: cease looking. The criterion is *the renunciation of the criterion*, or better, the renunciation of both of these kinds of criteria. It is a renunciation on which a series of consequences depends and, ultimately, the achievement of a criterion completely different from the former, which we will immediately see.

The reply of Pyrrho is found in a precious testimony of the Peripatetic Aristocles, who took it directly from the work of Timon, an immediate follower of Pyrrho. Hence Aristocles says:

> [Pyrrho] did not leave behind any writings, but his disciple Timon says that *those who wish to be happy* ought to consider three things: in the first place, what is the nature of things; in the second place, in what way must we behave towards them; in the third place, what are the results to someone who acts this way. 1) Well, he says that Pyrrho shows that things are equally *indifferent*, *incommensurable*, and *indiscriminable*, and because of this neither our sensations nor our opinions can be true or false. 2) Consequently, *there is no need to reconcile or trust them* but we must be *without opinions*, *without inclinations*, *without agitation*, by affirming of each thing *that it is no more than it is not*, or *that it is and it is not*, or *that it neither is nor is not*. 3) Those who are placed in this disposition will reach, says Timon, first *aphasia* and then *ataraxia*.[39]

This passage contains three principles, so to speak, which lucidly establish the rules of Pyrrhonian scepticism, and hence the source out of which will spring forth all the forms of later scepticism. Before going

on to the analysis of the three principles, it is better to stress the significance and the importance of the premise in which it is said that the consideration of these three principles must be made by "those who wish *to be happy*." The eudaimonistic aspect prevails, therefore, quite clearly in the thought of Pyrrho. Methodological, dialectical, polemical developments seem to have nothing to do with the thought of our philosopher. The three cardinal principles of Pyrrhonian scepticism express, therefore, *a practical system of wisdom*, and they should be read and interpreted in this spirit.

7. The nature of things as undifferentiated appearance and the nature of the divine and the good

The most difficult to interpret of the three Pyrrhonian principles which are stated in the passage read above is the first one, which is also the most important one. This is the difficulty. Does Pyrrho wish to say that things in themselves are undifferentiated, unmeasurable, and indiscernible or that they are such *not in themselves but only for us*? In other words, is the *indifference* of things *objective* or *subjective*?

Most of the interpreters (for the most part under the influence of later scepticism) believe that Pyrrho intended to say simply that *we* humans do not have adequate means (senses and reason) to grasp the differences, the criteria, and the determinations of things.[40] Actually, the text seems to say the contrary. It does not say that because senses and opinions are inadequate things are for us undifferentiated, incommensurable, and indiscriminable. On the contrary, it states the opposite, namely that things themselves (τὰ πράγματα) are undifferentiated, incommensurable, and indiscriminable. *Precisely as a consequence of this* (διὰ ταῦτα), senses and opinions can state neither truth nor falsity. In conclusion, things which are as it is said make the senses and reason incapable of truth and falsity and not vice versa. This is *a necessary consequence arising from the negation of being, the eidos, and substance*; it is the position which arises from the rejection of Platonic-Aristotelian ontology.

We can find a clear confirmation in a passage of Diogenes Laertius, to which we have already alluded:

> He denied that anything was *honorable or dishonorable, just or unjust*. And so, universally, he held that there is *nothing really existent*, but *custom and convention govern human action*; for *no single thing is in itself any more this than that*.[41]

The ethical values, and in general all values, as all things, do not have their own ontological status precisely because *nothing really exists* (μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ). Hence instead of being (εἶναι), conventions (*nomos*) and customs (*ethos*) are prominent.

Aristotle had pointed to substance as being par excellence and had defined substance as τόδε τι, that is, as "a determined something," as we have seen.[42] Pyrrho, on the contrary, taking up the same expression, overturns the Aristotelian position: "no single thing is in itself any more this than that" (οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε εἶναι ἕκαστον).[43]

Two famous fragments of Timon do not contradict this interpretation, but rather confirm it. The first says:

> I do not lay down that honey *is* (ἐστί) sweet, but I admit that it *appears* (φαίνεται)to be so.[44]

This means that honey *in itself*, being indeterminate like everything else, is unqualifiable, while only the *appearance* is qualifiable. This does not mean—note—that honey exists as a thing in itself endowed with its own nature but not achievable by us; honey does not have its own nature, and its appearance, if it is qualifiable by us as sweet, can be qualified in another way by another person (who does not like honey). In conclusion, being is not proclaimed *because it is not*; only appearance is proclaimed. Being, consequently, as we have already said, is substituted precisely by the *appearance* (the φαίνεσθαι) or the appearance (the φαινόμενον) which becomes all powerful, as another significant fragment of Timon expressly states:

> The phenomenon always dominates, wherever it appears.[45]

This "phenomenon" or "appearance," as we will see, was transformed by later Sceptics into the *phenomenon understood as an appearance of something which is beyond the appearance, that is, of a "thing in itself."* From this transformation numerous implications have been drawn which really do not seem to be present in Pyrrho's statements.

A subtle interpreter of Pyrrho recently wrote:

> ...Pyrrhonism (whatever the later forms of Scepticism may be) ought not in any way to be interpreted with the help of the notion of the "phenomenon." In fact, we do not have to confuse the phenomenon and the pure appearance. The phenomenon *manifests* something else, it referred back to something beyond the phenomenon, to something non-manifested. It supposes, therefore, the opposition of that which appears and that which does not appear, of the immediate and the mediate, of the evident and the hidden (*adelon*). It is positioned in the break between the whole sphere of what is manifest and what is hidden. It is, on the one side, what is referred back to the other side. Such a break is generally found among the dogmatists (it does not matter if they have the attitude of Democritus or Plato), but it is found as well among the [later] Sceptics contaminated by dogmatism (in the struggle which they carried on against it). The break is presupposed whether the mediate, the thing which is in its being

> and in its truth, is at last revealable and definitively offered to our thought, or contrarily, in the case that being remains obstinately hidden and truth inaccessible. The classical interpretation has constantly attributed to Pyrrho the distinction between the phenomenon and being. It is the very distinction which Pyrrho had precisely intended to reject by means of the notion of the non-differences of things.... Pyrrhonism does not confuse phenomenon and appearance and the distinction between the apparent and the hidden is not Pyrrhonian. In fact, the non-difference of things means the abolition of their "being" and their resolution into appearance. Pyrrho wishes to conceive the unity of the whole sphere (what Parmenides did not succeed in) not by means of the idea of being, but by the idea of appearance as a pure and universal appearance.[46]

Actually the distinction between "what appears" and what is hidden between "phenomenon" and "thing" seems to be later than Pyrrho. However Pyrrho did not go as far as to resolve everything into the pure and universal appearance. In fact, the resolution of everything into the pure appearance, without any remainder, would have brought him not to absolute doubt but to absolute certitude, because if all is resolved into appearance, things are precisely as they appear and not different from their appearance.

In fact, there is a fragment of Timon which shows clearly that the position of Pyrrho is quite complex. Pyrrho is asked:

> This, Pyrrho, this my heart wants to know,
> whence peace of mind to you does freely flow,
> why among men you like a God do show?[47]

Pyrrho replies:

> Truly I will relate each fact as it appears to me by taking as a correct canon this word of truth: that a nature of the divine and of goodness lives eternally from which proceeds to man life that is equal and just (ἰσότατος βίος).[48]

Well then, if Timon is accepted (insofar as he was the only immediate follower of Pyrrho who spoke of him) as a privileged source, we cannot certainly clear up these affirmations, but must consider them as personal inferences of Timon; otherwise the same judgment should be valid also for the principal evidence from which we have begun.[49]

How can we understand this "nature of the divine and of the good" (τοῦ θείου φύσις τε καὶ τἀγαθοῦ) and the consequent "correct canon"?[50]

It has been noted by Bréhier in this regard: "This religious emphasis sounds quite enigmatic; the God venerated by Pyrrho is not the providence of the world nor of men, as is the God of the Stoics; he is only the absolutely permanent being before whom the diverse and fleeting as-

pects of the real vanish."[51] (On the other hand, that Pyrrho believed in God is confirmed also by the fact that we are told that his fellow citizens chose him as high priest.)[52]

How is it possible to reconcile these affirmations with all the others examined above?

We can put forth two hypotheses to answer the question. The first is that Pyrrho shows traces of the influence of the tenets of the Megarics, of whom he was a follower. Also the Megarics, with their dialectic, attempted to reduce the multiplicity of things, movement, and becoming to appearance. However, they had this attitude precisely in order to reach the reality of the One-Good, which was their God or their deity, as is clear especially from the fragments of Euclid. The second hypothesis is that Pyrrho shows traces of Eastern doctrines at present not subject to critical control. The position of Pyrrho can be explained, in any case, by holding only the first of these hypotheses.

Things, according to our philosopher, are mere appearances, not, certainly, because of the dualistic presupposition of the existence of "things in themselves" inaccessible as such to us, but because of the counterposition to that "nature of the divine and of the good" of which the fragment of Timon speaks.[53] Measured with the standard of this "nature of the divine and of the good," everything will appear to Pyrrho as unreal and is also practically lived as such, as we will see. The analogy between this radical position of Pyrrho and the Megarics also explains the analogies between the respective practical positions towards things: we have seen, in fact, that the Megarics proclaimed *apatheia*, understood as "*ne sentire quidem*" ("not to feel anything"), as Seneca remarks;[54] Pyrrho, as we will see, proclaims the same doctrine (making it much more radical) and also for him, as Cicero attests, the position of the sage is *apatheia* understood as *ne sentire quidem* ("not to feel anything").[55]

If this is so, it cannot be denied that a religious background inspires Pyrrhonian scepticism. The abyss which he places between the unique "nature of the divine and of the good" and all other things implies an almost mystical vision of things and an extremely rigorous evaluation of living. In fact, it does not attribute to the things of the world any autonomous significance while it attributes reality only to the divine and to the good.

This interpretation permits us to explain the reason why Cicero *never considered Pyrrho as a Sceptic, but only as a moralist professing an extremist doctrine* according to which virtue is the sole and unique good. In comparison with virtue, all other things are not worth pursuing (it is indicative enough that Cicero always mentions Pyrrho together with Ariston, who was the most rigorous of the Stoics and who is famous for having energetically denied the accomodating admission of the "inter-

mediates" between good and evil, that is, between virtue and vice).

Here are two remarkable passages from Cicero in which, moreover, it is not difficult to find a precise echo of some affirmations read in the passage from Aristocles:

> Ariston and Pyrrho thought all these things utterly worthless and said, for example, *that there was absolutely nothing to choose between the most perfect health and the most grievous sickness*; and consequently men have long ago quite rightly given up arguing against them. For in insisting upon the unique importance of virtue *in such a sense as to rob it of any power of choice among external things and to deny it any starting point or basis, they destroyed the very virtue they desired to cherish.*[56]

> In my view, therefore, while all who have defined the end of goods as the life of moral conduct are in error, some are more wrong than others. The most mistaken, no doubt, is Pyrrho, because his conception of virtue *leaves nothing as an object of desire whatever.* Next in error comes Ariston, who did not venture to leave a mere negation, but introduced as the Wise Man's motives of desire "whatever chanced to enter his mind" and "whatever struck him." Ariston is *better than Pyrrho insofar as he allowed natural inclination* of some sort, but worse than the rest because he departed so utterly from nature.[57]

Hence, for Cicero, Pyrrho professes an extremist doctrine which does not leave anything as an object of desire and considers that all things are without any distinctions. Consequently, it causes its self-destruction, insofar as it does not preserve, in the general destruction, the only thing (virtue) which is worthwhile. We can easily explain the reason why Cicero did not consider this position as "sceptic": the Sceptic Academy did not admit its dependence on Pyrrho. On the other hand, Aenesidemus, who proposed a Neoscepticism, considering Pyrrhonism according to a new perspective (of which we will speak in the fourth volume of this work), was unknown to Cicero even if, as some scholars maintain, he was his contemporary (we cannot even exclude the possibility that Aenesidemus was, as some think, later than Cicero). The precise and systematic connection between Pyrrho and Scepticism occurred, hence, only with Aenesidemus. Moreover, this explains not only the position of Cicero, but also a very significant fact that Numenius, a follower of Pyrrho, has directly affirmed that the master "had positive tenets."[58]

8. The attitude that man must assume towards things: indifference and abstention from judgment

If things are undifferentiated, incommensurable, and indiscernible

and if, consequently, sense and reason can determine neither the true nor the false, the only correct attitude which man can have is of not putting any trust in the senses or in reason. He has to be *adoxastos* (opinionless), that is to say, he has to remain without opinion or to abstain from judgment (opinion is always a judgment) and, consequently, to remain *without any inclination* (not to incline towards one thing rather than another). He has to remain *without agitation*, that is, not to be shaken by anything, that is, *to remain indifferent.*

This abstention from judgment was subsequently expressed with the term *"epoche,"* which is of Stoic derivation. As it has been recently stressed, Zeno affirmed the necessity for the sage not to give his assent, that is, "to suspend his judgment" (*epoche*) towards what is incomprehensible (and to give his assent only to what is evident). Arcesilaus and Carneades (as we will see) in a polemic against the Stoics, maintain that the sage must "suspend his judgment," in every case, because nothing is evident. Later on the term *"epoche"* was taken up also by the Neopyrrhonian Aenesidemus in order to express the conception of the abstention from judgment; it became a technical term and hence was also attributed to Pyrrho. It seems correct, therefore, to conclude that Pyrrho spoke of "absence of judgment," or "lack of judgment" (which, as we will see, causes *aphasia*), and that the term *"epoche"* is later.

This position of complete abstention from judgment is of adamantine consistency with respect to the principle which denies being and essence to things, and hence it denies the fundamental law of being, the law of non-contradiction.

Aristotle wrote in regard to those who deny the supreme law of being:

> Besides, it is obvious that discussion with him is pointless, because *he makes no real statement.* For he says neither "yes" nor "no," but "yes and no"; and again he denies both of these and says "neither yes nor no"; otherwise there would be already some definite statement.[59]

Well, the position which Pyrrho takes is exactly this:

> We need to be *without opinion*...by affirming that each thing *is no more than it is not*, or *that it is and it is not*, or *that it neither is nor is not.* Those who accept this disposition will reach, in the first place, *aphasia*....[60]

These words, even if *historically* they are not a response to Aristotle, represent nevertheless the ideal antithesis of his affirmations.[61]

It is clear that what is called abstention from judgment on the theoretical level becomes *indifference to things* on the practical level, precisely because nothing is more this than that. Here is how, in his life, Pyrrho could act with absolute indifference towards those things which for a Greek were servile and ignoble but which for him are really indifferent:

> He lived in fraternal piety with his sister, a midwife, so says Eratosthenes in his essay *On Wealth and Poverty*, now and then even taking things for sale to market, poultry, perchance, or pigs, and he would dust the things in the house, quite indifferent as to what he did.[62]

Naturally, spontaneous objections arise. Such an indifference cannot go beyond certain limits: for example, it cannot be maintained towards things held to be dangerous. Aristotle wrote:

> For why does a man walk to Megara and not stay at home when he thinks he ought to be walking there? Why does he not walk early some morning into a well or over a precipice, if one happens to be in his way? Why do we observe him guarding against this, evidently because he does not think that falling in is alike good and not good? Evidently, then, he judges one thing to be better and another worse.[63]

Pyrrho, trying to make his living consistent with his thought, did exactly this. Here is what Diogenes Laertius says:

> He led a life consistent with this doctrine, going out of his way for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what not, and generally leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses; but he was kept out of harm's way by his friends who, as Antigonus of Carystus tells us, used to follow close after him.[64]

Here is another no less significant testimony:

> He would maintain the same composure at all times, so that even if you left him when he was in the middle of a speech, he would finish what he had to say with no audience but himself, although in his youth he had been hasty.... And once, when Anaxarchus fell into a slough, he passed by without giving him any help, and while others blamed him, Anaxarchus himself praised his indifference and *sang-froid*.[65]

Here we are undoubtedly beyond the limits of Greek thought.

9. The attainment of *aphasia*, *ataraxia*, and *apatheia*

Many times in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle stresses the concept according to which the person who denies the highest principle of being in order to be consistent with this tenet ***ought to be silent and say absolutely nothing.***[66] Such is the conclusion which Pyrrho draws by proclaiming *"aphasia."*[67]

In fact aphasia does not mean not to speak at all, i.e., absolute silence, but not to speak (or to be silent) about the nature and the being of things. It is not to judge anything by saying that things *are or are not*. Aphasia, then, will be an attitude typical of all Scepticism. Sextus Empiricus defines it as follows:

> Concerning non-assertion, what we say is this. The term "assertion" has two senses, general and special; used in the general sense it indicates affirmation or negation, as for example "It is day," "It is not day";...Non-assertion, then, is avoidance of assertion in the general sense in which it is said to include both affirmation and negation, so that non-assertion is a mental condition of ours because of which we refuse either to affirm or to deny anything.[68]

The separation from things, which reaches its highest point in aphasia, involves *ataraxia,*[69] that is, the absence of turmoil, interior quiet, "the most equal life."[70]

Here is how Pyrrho realized it in his living. Posidonius narrates:

> When his fellow-passengers on board a ship were all unnerved by a storm, he kept calm and confident, pointing to a little pig in the ship that went on eating, and telling them that such was the unperturbed state (ἀταραξία) in which the sage should keep himself.[71]

Diogenes says:

> They say that, when septic salves and surgical and caustic remedies were applied to a wound he had sustained, he did not so much as frown.[72]

It is difficult not to recognize in these examples the influences of the Gymnosophists and Calanus.

Cicero writes:

> Ariston's chief good is in these things to be moved in neither direction—he himself called it *adiaphoria*; Pyrrho, on the other hand, held that the sage does not even perceive these things with his senses—the name for this unconsciousness is *apatheia*.[73]

Diogenes Laertius also confirms it:

> The goal of the Sceptics is *apatheia*.[74]

Pyrrhonian apatheia is therefore ***insensibility***. Here is how Conche clarified the Pyrrhonian notion of apatheia:

> How can man be im-passible (*apathes*), in-sensible? Does not the word say perhaps that a person not only is not disturbed but also that he does not even feel? And why not? Is it not clear that man ought to reform his complete sensibility? It is a question, as Cicero has correctly said, not only of being indifferent and without perturbations but of not even feeling (***ne sentire quidem***). And how is this possible? It is possible by means of a modification in the way impressions are received: instead of making things good or bad, without making any judgment, we simply have to leave the matter to itself. I

> suffer an insult. It has to be reduced to a series of sounds which get lost in the atmosphere. There is a look of displeasure on a face. We have to see only a play of muscles of the face of a being who will die. More radically, we do not have to see anything except a series of impressions which disappear in a short time without leaving a trace—on condition that my memory does not make something from nothing. Habitually we do not stop at impressions as simple appearances, we maintain them, add to them, and interpret them. Here is what we feel. Not only are the simple impressions the same, but also the effects which other beings and their properties produce on us. Pyrrhonian insensibility is undoubtedly obtained by means of a return to pure sensation. It is an insensibility to the world of the object, to the causes, to the entities and their impressions on us and about us because the universe of entities and beings constructed by us and erected in relation to us by our judgment itself is now dismembered and undone. Sensibility to all the attractions and offenses, conflicts and agitations of the world of objects, gives way to a sensibility to pure impressions, mute and as far as possible without expectation and without memory. Now pleasure and pain, affections of all kinds are felt less intensely: they lose that concentration which gives them their power; exactly contemporaneous with pure impression and appearance, they are weakened by a kind of temporal dispersal and dilution. Pyrrho, who underwent surgical operations without so much as a frown, must have possessed this mental art of reducing pain. A man who *feels differently* from other men, who brings insensibility to what was customarily felt, hence a new sensibility, could not be understood by starting from the current ideas of the man of those times. Pyrrho, Robin properly says, "places before us a man up to that time unknown in Greece" not only a doctrine, but a man, that is, a principle of action and inaction, a sensibility, a life.[75]

These explanations are penetrating and exact. Nevertheless, we would like to remember what we have already stressed: Pyrrhonian apatheia was preceded by that of the Megarics.

Certainly apatheia is a goal, and Pyrrho himself sometimes did not succeed in being insensible, as we see from the following testimony:

> Once he got enraged in his sister's cause (her name was Philista), and he told the man who blamed him that it was not over a weak woman that one should display indifference. When a cur rushed at him and terrified him, he answered his critic that it was not easy entirely to *strip oneself of human weakness* (ὁλοσχερῶς ἐκδῦναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον) but one should strive with all one's might against facts, by deeds if possible, and if not, in word.[76]

The key to Pyrrhonism is undoubtedly present in this reply. "To entirely strip oneself of human weakness" does not mean that the goal

is the complete annulment of man, that is, his absolute not-being but, on the contrary, it is the same realization of the "nature of the divine and the good from which man derives the most equal life," of which the fragment of Timon speaks. It is the achievement of a life which does not feel the weight of things, which in comparison with that nature is simply undifferentiatable, incommensurable, and an indiscriminable appearance. "To entirely strip oneself" means the achievement of *ne sentire quidem*; it is to live the "life of equitability," "the most equal life" (ἰσότατος βίος), rising from the "nature of the divine and the good which lives eternally." It involves the overcoming of the unstable appearances and the annulment of all their fleeting and contradictory effects on us.

The success that Pyrrho achieved is of itself significant. In fact, it shows that it is not a sporadic instance nor is it based on a feeling extraneous to that epoch, namely, only or prevalently due to Eastern influences. Rather it concerns a man who was immediately considered as a model and hence of someone who was an interpreter of the ideals of his own epoch. Many traits of the Stoic sage are repeated in the traits of the Sceptic sage; Epicurus himself admired the way of living of Pyrrho and frequently inquired about him from Nausiphanes. In his native city Pyrrho was so respected and honored that "they made him high priest,"[77] as we have already said, and Timon celebrated him by saying "among men you are like a God."[78]

10. The successors of Pyrrho, with special regard to Timon

Two of the disciples of Pyrrho are particularly noteworthy: Nausiphanes of Theo,[79] who came from the school of Democritus, and Timon of Phlis.[80]

Nausiphanes is important because according to some testimonies he was the teacher of Epicurus, as we already know. Pyrrho hence, through Nausiphanes, may have had an influence over the founder of the Garden.

Timon, instead, is important for having put the teaching of Pyrrho in writing.

Today to establish whether there were differences of thought between Timon and Pyrrho and what they are is almost impossible. Aristocles, as we already know, considered Timon a faithful interpreter of his teacher and we do not have any reason to doubt his fidelity. Moreover, from the surviving fragments we do not sense that Timon had the special speculative strength from which an original re-interpretation of his teacher's doctrine alone could arise. Not only that, but the admiration and indeed the veneration which Timon had towards the thought of Pyrrho shows clearly that he was fully satisfied with it.[81]

Naturally, this does not exclude the fact that Timon contributed on other levels, even important ones.

In the first place, the fact itself of putting in writing a thought which

in the master he had found only as verbal and existential expression involved the necessity of giving it a more precise and rigorous systematization. The summary of Sceptic thought which Aristocles extracted from the work of Timon shows a remarkable clearness and consistency.

In the second place, by putting in writing the thought of his teacher, Timon was also forced to compare it, so to speak, with the doctrine of other philosophers, and hence to accomplish a cultural activity which gave to Scepticism a new and more ample dimension. Naturally the position of Scepticism is so radical that it does not admit any possible mediation with other doctrines. Therefore, the comparison between Scepticism and other philosophies gave rise not to a meeting but rather to a clash.

The Sceptic can only have an attitude of radical rejection towards philosophers who propose positive visions of reality: every positive affirmation for the Sceptic is a deceptive dogma.

In the polemic against the "dogmatists," Timon used, rather than the abstract logical and dialectical instruments, the more concrete weapons of satire and derision, by developing a certain poetic vein with which he was endowed (perhaps also a certain ability that he had acquired by living with a company of acrobats whose profession was making people laugh). This is the origin of the *Silli* (which were the works most read and admired in ancient times). They were poetic compositions in which the satirizing of the dogmatic philosophers was pursued, in addition to ironic gibes and jokes, with amusing parodies of Homeric verses.[82]

Scholars have achieved the reconstruction of three amusing scenes of the *Silli*, although on largely conjectural grounds.[83]

The first scene deals with a great battle of philosophers, a parody of some Homeric verses of the *Iliad*: in the presence of a large public participating with loud shoutings, dogmatists and anti-dogmatists face one another. Eris, the goddess of discord, incites fighting. It is a furious logomachy the true winner of which is Pyrrho.

In the second scene he describes a fishing contest: Zeno, the Stoics, and perhaps also the Epicureans are fishermen, while the Academic philosophers (with Plato at the head), some philosophers of the Socratic schools, and in the rear Pyrrho himself are fishes. Zeno (called "the old Phoenician woman") in vain tries to trap the fishes; in fact, the net (symbol of his captious arguments) is carried away by the fishes and the current:

> And I saw an old Phoenician woman: she was greedy, engorged of smokey pride, desirous of everything. The fibers of her too subtle cloth were destroyed: her intelligence was inferior to that of a pipe.[84]

The third scene was a descent to the underworld and must have been

a parody of the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*. The evocation of the shades of the philosophers provided Timon the way to lash them with his penetrating jokes in a very amusing manner.

The philosophers of the past who in their works expressed doubts about the possibility of true knowledge, or who made affirmations in accordance with Scepticism, were kindly treated by Timon,[85] while the others, on the contrary, were the targets in various ways for vituperation and jeers. Moreover, Plato was accused of plagiarism for having taken the content of the *Timaeus* from a Pythagorean book which he had purchased.[86] The great Aristotelian body of speculation was said to be "a painful futility" by Timon.[87]

Nor did Timon show more sympathy with the philosophers who were his contemporaries. His attacks on the Stoics[88] and the Epicureans[89] were very violent. Arcesilaus himself was not spared, but for a different reason: Timon did not forgive him (as we will see in the next chapter) for having forgotten his great debt to Pyrrho; only after the death of Arcesilaus did Timon give up his anger towards him.[90]

In conclusion, the importance of Pyrrho is that he wrote down his master's teaching, systematizing it, comparing it with other philosophies, and hence giving it further circulation. If Timon had not existed, the history of Scepticism probably would not have been what it was, and the Pyrrhonian patrimony would perhaps have been in large part dispersed.

According to some sources,[91] the school ended and was silent with Timon until the first century after Christ. Other sources give instead a list of names which should attest the continuity of the school up to Sextus Empiricus and Saturninus.[92] However, even if it were true, the followers of the school after Timon until Aenesidemus would only be empty names devoid of any importance. We have the real beginning of a new phase of Scepticism with Aenesidemus, about which we will speak in the fourth volume.

II. Sceptic Tendencies in the Academy of Arcesilaus

1. The "second Academy"

Scepticism is not exhausted with the circle flourishing around Pyrrho: while Timon was fixing and developing the chief lines of Pyrrhonism in his writings, in the Platonic Academy Arcesilaus[1] began a new phase of the school, taking positions which in many respects were close to those of Pyrrho and Timon. We shall now deal with this phase of the Academy, since it is the ideal link joining the first and the second Pyrrhonian Scepticism and carries on sceptic thought even when Pyrrhonism is momentarily silent.

Unfortunately, our sources on Arcesilaus are scarce and likewise open to different interpretations. Therefore, the reconstruction of the reasons for the sudden turn that he impressed on the Academy and its progressive articulation is in large measure conjectural.[2]

In the first place, it is indubitable that Arcesilaus himself can be defined as a *Sceptic*. The inflamed anger of Timon toward Arcesilaus[3] is proof: Timon felt that the new position of the Academy was an invasion of his own ground. Moreover, at least in one work, though reluctantly, he was forced to approve of Arcesilaus.[4] Beyond all the polemics, Sextus expressly admits that he does not see any essential difference between Arcesilaus and Scepticism:

> Arcesilaus...certainly seems to me to have shared the doctrine of Pyrrho, *so that his way of thinking is almost identical with ours*. For we do not find him making assertions about the reality or unreality of anything, nor does he prefer any one thing to another with respect to probability or improbability, but suspends judgment about all.[5]

Moreover, it is clear that Arcesilaus came to Scepticism through the influence of Pyrrhonism. In Socrates and Plato there are clearly aporetic treatises, positions of doubt, unexpected suspensions of judgment: but they are almost always ironically and maieutically aimed at the rediscovery of the truth or, for the most part, at mediating the preparation for this rediscovery. Doubt is always a means, never an end, in Socrates and Plato. Certainly an Academic can draw from the Platonic dialogues a list of expressions and passages containing doubts: but they would not have any *sceptical* meaning, in the sense which we are now considering, unless we wholly pass over the *constructive and positive parts* which are quite significant in Socrates, and very weighty in Plato. The incitement to accomplish this neglect of the facts could come only from the outside, that is, from the rise of new problems according to a logic which is absolutely different from Socratic or Platonic logic. Arcesilaus, hence, drew inspiration from Pyrrhonian Scepticism and fused it with Socratic

and Platonic elements about which we have now spoken; as a result they entirely lost their original meaning. It is very indicative that Arcesilaus thought that he had to reject even the only certitude that Socrates had, that is, ***the knowledge that he did not know***: Arcesilaus denied even ***the knowledge that he did not know***.[6] Such an inversion, of course, was the price that the Academy paid for getting deeply involved in the philosophical discussions of the new age, but it was at the same time a rejection of their own past.[7]

2. The dialectical basis of the Scepticism of Arcesilaus

The ironic method and the ability to confute others, which Socrates and Plato used in order to search after the truth, was mostly used by Arcesilaus in a new sceptical sense and was directed by him in a massive and implacable way especially against the Stoics, particularly against Zeno.[8] It was a matter of refuting the Stoa with its own weapons and reducing it to silence. In a particular way, Arcesilaus exposed to fierce criticism the Stoic criterion of truth, which the philosophers of the Porch identified, as we know, with cataleptic presentation. This was the force of his criticism:

> And if presentation is in fact assent to an apprehensive presentation, it is non-existent—firstly, because assent is not relative to presentation but to reason (for assents are given to judgments), and secondly, because no true presentation is found to be of such a kind as to be incapable of proving false, as is shown by many and various instances.[9]

Therefore, when we assent we also risk assenting to something which can be false. Hence certainty and truth can never be what arises from assent but only opinion. We have, therefore, only two possibilities: either the Stoic sage must be content with opinion or, if this is unacceptable to him (in fact, only the person who has the truth is wise), he must then *suspend assent* and be "a cataleptic":

> Since all things are non-apprehensible owing to the non-existence of the Stoic criterion, if the sage shall assent the sage will opine; for when nothing is apprehensible, if he assents to anything he will be assenting to what is non-apprehensible, and assent to the non-apprehensible is opinion. So that if the sage is in the class of assenters, the sage will be in the class of those who opine. But the sage, to be sure, is not in the class of those who opine (for, according to them, opinion is a mark of folly and a cause of sins); therefore the sage is not in the class of assenters. And if this be so, he will necessarily refuse assent in all cases. But to refuse assent is nothing else than *to suspend judgment*; therefore the sage will in all cases suspend judgment.[10]

3. The *epoche* of Arcesilaus

The "suspension of judgment," which the Stoics recommended only in cases of the absence of evidence, is thus generalized by Arcesilaus. In fact, it is stated that we can never have unconditioned evidence. Arcesilaus must have insisted on the *epoche* in a very particular way:

> He [Arcesilaus] also says that the *end is suspension*.... He declares too, that suspension regarding particular objects is good, but assent regarding particulars is bad.[11]

We have previously stressed that the word *epoche* (and maybe the concept also) seems to be an invention not of Pyrrho, but of Arcesilaus, which he gained precisely in the context of this anti-Stoic polemic.[12] However, as we have seen, Pyrrho had already spoken of the "abstention from judgment" and of "adoxia." Arcesilaus has, therefore, analyzed and developed the Pyrrhonian concept and has cleverly used it in his anti-Stoic polemic.

4. The doctrine of the "*eulogon*" or the "reasonable"

Naturally, the Stoics must have sharply reacted and countered that the radical suspension of assent implied the impossibility of resolving the problem of living (the only problem with which, as we well know, the philosophy of this epoch is concerned), and the impossibility of any action. Arcesilaus must have replied with the argument of the *eulogon* or the "reasonable." Here is the argument:

> But inasmuch as it was necessary, in the next place, to investigate also the conduct of life which cannot naturally be directed without a criterion upon which happiness—that is, the end of life—depends for its assurance, Arcesilaus asserts that he who suspends judgment about everything will regulate his inclinations and aversions and his actions in general *by the rule of "the reasonable"* (τῷ εὐλόγῳ), and by proceeding in accordance with this criterion he will act correctly (κατορθώματα); for happiness is attained by means of wisdom, and wisdom (φρόνησις) consists in correct actions, and the correct action is that which, when performed, possesses a reasonable justification. He, therefore, who attends to "the reasonable" will act correctly and be happy.[13]

It is to be emphasized with regard to this passage that the strongly Stoic terminology reveals clearly that more than a positive argument is involved, but actually a dialectical argument is being used against the Stoics. Its meaning seems to be the following. It is not true that by suspending judgment moral action is impossible. In fact, the Stoics themselves, in order to explain ordinary moral actions, as we have seen,

introduced the *kathekonta*, considering them actions which have their plausible and reasonable justification. While only the sage was capable of *perfect moral actions*, everyone is capable of the *kathekonta*. But here is the demonstration that moral actions are possible *even without the discovery of truth and without unconditioned certainty*. Moreover, this is the meaning of the argument read above—the reasonable or the plausible is sufficient to perform "correct actions" (*katorthomata*). In fact, he who does reasonable actions is happy, but happiness implies wisdom (*phronesis*) and hence the actions done according to the criterion of the reasonable are wise and are therefore truly correct actions. It is thus shown, with the same weapons as the Stoics, that the *reasonable* is sufficient and that the claims of the sage and of his superior morals are absurd.[14]

5. The so-called "esoteric dogmatism" of Arcesilaus

Finally *esoteric dogmatism* is also attributed to Arcesilaus along with esoteric Scepticism. He, in other words, is supposed to have professed scepticism without, but Platonic dogmatism within the Platonic Academy to his most intimate followers. Here is the testimony of Sextus Empiricus which seemed to be decisive to some scholars:

> And if one ought to credit also what is said about him, he appeared at the first glance, they say, to be a Pyrrhonian, but in reality he was a dogmatist; and because he used to test his companions by means of dubitation to see if they were fitted by nature for the reception of the Platonic dogmas, he was thought to be a dubitative philosopher, but he actually passed on to such of his companions as were naturally gifted the dogmas of Plato. And this was why Ariston described him as "Plato his head, Pyrrho his tail, in the middle Diodorus" because he employed the dialectic of Diodorus, although he was actually a Platonist.[15]

Sextus himself evidently does not give credence to the rumor since he mentions it immediately after saying quite clearly that for him Arcesilaus is a Sceptic.[16]

On the other hand, it should be stressed that the testimony of Diogenes Laertius, where we find a similar statement of the Stoic Ariston, has to be interpreted in a very different way:

> According to some, one result of his suspending judgment on all matters was that he never so much as wrote a book.... Some represent him as emulous of Pyrrho as well. He was devoted to dialectic and adopted the methods of argument introduced by the Eretrian school. On account of this, Ariston said of him: "Plato the head of him, Pyrrho the tail, midway Diodorus."[17]

The biting statement of the Stoic Ariston, which is a parody of the verse of the *Iliad* where the chimera is described,[18] says this: the face which Arcesilaus offered was Platonic (insofar as he was continuator and head of the school of Plato); behind the face, that is in substance, he was a Pyrrhonian; in the middle, that is in the instruments which he used, he was a Megaric dialectician (the School of Eretria—let us remember—had taken its method from the Megarics).[19]

Such interpretations are confirmed by the testimony of the Sceptic Timon (a contemporary of Arcesilaus) who, with his pungent irony, stresses the links of Arcesilaus with Pyrrho and the Megarics:

> With Menedemus under his breast like lead, he will run towards Pyrrho—all flesh—or towards Diodorus.[20]

Again:

> I will swim to Pyrrho or to the tortuous Diodorus.[21]

How did the rumor arise about the "esoteric dogmatism" of Arcesilaus?

We have documents which permit us to establish that it arose, so to speak, from opposite sides. On the one hand, some adversaries accused Arcesilaus of being disloyal, that is, of being an opportunistic Sceptic and in reality a dogmatist. On the other hand, when the Academy turned once again to dogmatism, as we will see, they tried to reformulate the sceptical phase precisely by acknowledging the tenet of "esoteric dogmatism."

The accusation of his adversaries is reported by Numenius, who clearly does not give credence to the rumor:

> In reality, Arcesilaus was a Pyrrhonian, except in name; he was not an Academic except that he was said to be such. In fact I do not believe Diocles of Cnidus, who says in his books entitled *Diatribes* that Arcesilaus, because of his fear of the followers of Theodorus and Bion (who attacked those who philosophized and did not hesitate to refute them by using any means), in order to avoid difficulty, was very careful to avoid affirming any dogmas openly, throwing before himself the "suspension of judgment" like a squid spraying black ink.[22]

It is to be noted that both Sextus and Numenius, in relating the information about "esoteric dogmatism," do not believe it to be true. Instead Cicero, who speaks for the eclectic Academy, seems to confirm the information, but he is not able to tell us what these "occult tenets" are.[23] Now it is evident that if it had really been so nobody would have been in a better position to know and report these tenets. The truth is that it was convenient for certain Academics to believe in these "occult tenets" in order to uphold the unity of their tradition and to fill in the conspicuous

hiatus which was established by the sceptical phase. Therefore, Cicero only repeated a thesis which he had received from his teachers, not being thereby in a position to demonstrate it.

The impossibility of attributing to Arcesilaus "occult tenets," finally, emerges not only from the documents and from the above analyzed circumstances, but also from an objective consideration of the progressive loss of the metaphysical nucleus of Platonism which characterizes the ancient Academy beginning from Speusippus and which reaches its highest point with Crates, Polemon, and Crantor,[24] who were the teachers of Arcesilaus. In order to profess and teach the "occult tenets," Arcesilaus would have had to recover the meaning of the "second voyage" which his teachers had lost and which for a long time yet, as we will see, the Academy will be incapable of recovering.

6. The aporetic nature and the limits of the Scepticism of Arcesilaus

The Scepticism of Arcesilaus differs notably from Pyrrhonism because of the problematic from which it arose, because of its speculative consistency, and because of the spiritual climate which it created.

The Scepticism of Pyrrho, as we have seen, arose as a solution to the problem of life and of happiness: it developed from a feeling of life according to which the secret to happiness lies in renunciation, imperturbability, and impassivity. The formulation and development of the Pyrrhonian teaching, as we have seen, is nothing more than the formulation and justification of those presuppositions and corollaries flowing from its fundamental intuition about the meaning of life.

On the contrary, Academic Scepticism started by Arcesilaus is deprived of its vitality and impoverished in its "dialectical" meaning, insofar as it tends to become a pure *elenchos*, a mere refutation of Stoic adversaries. The scepticism of Arcesilaus ends by reducing itself to the attempt to overturn the dogmas of the Stoa without being able to propose any positive alternative. The scepticism of Arcesilaus is a brief moment and has a limited life-span: it lives only if it has an adversary to destroy,[25] and after its adversary's destruction, it falls lifeless with him on the deserted battleground.

III. Further Affirmations of Scepticism in the Academy with Carneades

1. The "third Academy"[1]

For about half a century the Academy moved slowly along the way opened by Arcesilaus.[2] It was given a new impulse by Carneades, a man endowed with considerable ingenuity and exceptional dialectical ability combined with remarkable rhetorical talent.[3] Carneades did not write anything and confined his teaching entirely to the spoken word; nevertheless, neither Socratic nor Pyrrhonian reasons caused this attitude, but rather the intrinsic nature of his thought, which was purely negative and destructive, as well as dialectic and eristic in the way in which he articulated it. Actually, putting in writing what Carneades said would have caused a loss of all the fascination to be derived from his clever and persuasive way of speaking.

The Carneadean method substantially followed two leading lines. On the one hand, according to the procedures of dialectic previously adopted by Arcesilaus, it tried to reduce adversaries to absurdity by using the elements implied in their own thought with skillful plays on their internal inconsistencies. On the other hand, it likewise utilized the typical sophistic procedure based on the positing of opposed theses and reasons taken from opposed systems. The well-known exhibition of dialectic which he gave in Rome[4] was precisely marked by this second principle and astonished seasoned listeners as well as eliciting the enthusiastic wonder of the less experienced. On the first day, Carneades upheld some specific theses on justice which were supported by certain reasons. On the second day, he maintained theses exactly opposite to the first which were supported by opposite reasons.

The Stoics were once again victims of this dialectic, especially Chrysippus, who had carried the Porch to new successes. In fact, it is even possible to say that if we leave out the anti-Stoic polemic the thought of Carneades appears to be almost non-existent. He himself has honestly confessed it, according to a quotation in Diogenes Laertius:

> He studied carefully the writings of the Stoics and particularly those of Chrysippus, and by combating these successfully he became so famous that he would often say: "Without Chrysippus where should I have been?"[5]

Carneades criticized all the parts of the system of Chrysippus and Stoicism from logic to physics to ethics. In logic, he criticized the doctrine of cataleptic presentation, the doctrine of demonstration and dialectic. In physics, he criticized chiefly the part concerned with the existence of God, his nature, polytheism, the doctrine of Providence, the belief in

divination, as well as the doctrine on destiny. In ethics, he criticized the doctrine of the highest good and its foundation, as well as justice, as we will see below.[6]

These criticisms, although subtle and ingenious, are fundamentally empty because they tear down without replacing. They do not open new ways for thought nor do they imply any message which is not a simple negation of the adversary. Therefore, such criticisms in a *History of Ancient Philosophy*, understood as a history of the great speculative problems of Greco-Roman thought, have only relative importance and sound mostly *academic* in the modern and negative senses of that term, that is, as *scholastic*, insofar as they are reduced to a great extent to conflicts between different currents. We will limit ourselves, therefore, to what is essential in them.

2. Criticism of the Stoic criterion of truth

In the first place, let us speak about *the criticism of the criterion of truth*. According to Carneades, there is no general criterion of truth:

> Carneades arrayed his arguments concerning the criterion not only against the Stoics but against all his predecessors. In fact his first argument, aimed at all alike, is that by which he establishes that there is absolutely no criterion of truth—neither reason, nor sense, nor presentation, nor anything else that exists; for these things, one and all, play us false.[7]

Granted that a criterion exists, it would have to be either sensation or presentation (and in particular cataleptic presentation) or reason. Well then, the senses cannot offer us any guarantee of the truth, because frequently they deceive us (the stick in the water which appears broken to us, the neck of the dove which appears multi-colored to us, while in reality it has only one color, and so on).[8]

Not even apprehension and comprehensive presentation are guarantees of truth. In fact, presentation as presentation cannot be a criterion, but only the *true* presentation, that is, a representation corresponding to the object of which it is a presentation. But no presentation is such as to guarantee its own truth (that is, its correct correspondence with its object); in fact presentations which are true or false do not differ among themselves *as presentations*, or to say it another way, along with true presentations there are always false ones which, although they are such, do not have a special mark which distinguishes them from the other kind.[9] Consequently, no presentation will appear to have such characteristics as to merit our assent.[10]

Finally not even reason as such offers any guarantee of truth, because it rises from presentations and depends on them.[11]

Hence the correct attitude will be to hold back any assent to presentations and to *suspend our judgment.* Therefore for Carneades, also, the *epoche* is the last word.

3. The doctrine of *pithanon* or "probability"

It is clear that, since there is no general criterion of truth, we do not have any possibility of finding any particular truth whatever. But the necessity of acting is not lost because we lack a general criterion of truth. It is precisely in order to resolve the problem of living that Carneades produced his famous doctrine of the *probable* (πιθανόν), which is clearly reported by Sextus in the following passage:

> These were the arguments which Carneades set forth in detail, in his controversy with the other philosophers, to prove the non-existence of the criterion; yet as he, too, himself requires a criterion for the conduct of life and for the attainment of happiness, he is practically compelled on his own account to frame a theory about it, and to adopt both 1) the *probable presentation* and 2) that which is at once *probable* and *irreversible* and 3) *tested.*[12]

1) The presentation with respect to an object *is* either true or false; instead, with respect to the subject, it *appears* true or false. Granting that the objective truth escapes man, we can only cling to what *appears true.* Therefore the presentation which appears true with sufficient evidence is the criterion of truth. Well then, presentation which *appears true* is *probable.*[13]

2) Because the presentations are always conjoined together, a more elevated degree of probability is offered the presentation connected with the other presentations in such a way that *it is not contradicted* by any of them (for example, if I see at a distance a man whom I think I recognize, I have a presentation which seems true to me; but if I note that all the complex of presentations connected to him, clothes, gestures, height, general traits, etc. do not deny the verbal presentation, then it is a persuasive and non-contradictory presentation which obviously possesses a high degree of probability).[14]

3) Finally, the persuasive presentation which is not contradicted and *which is tested in each of its parts*, in addition to the characteristics of the two preceding ones, has the guarantee of a methodic and *complete testing of all the connected presentations*:

> In the case of the concurrence which involves the "tested" presentation, *we scrutinize attentively each of the presentations in the concurrence*—just as the practice is at assembly-meetings, when the people make inquiry about each of those who desire to be magistrates or judges to see whether they are worthy to be entrusted with the magistracy or the judgeship.[15]

Here we have a still greater degree of probability:

> And it is because of this that, just as in ordinary life when we are investigating a small matter we question a single witness but in a greater matter several, and when the matter investigated is still more important we cross-question each of the witnesses on the testimony of the others—so likewise, says Carneades, in trivial matters we employ as criterion only the probable presentation, but in greater matters the irreversible, and in matters which contribute to happiness the tested presentation.[16]

When it is necessary to make a decision urgently, we must be satisfied with the first presentation, if we have more time we will try to achieve the second one, and if we have still more time to test it completely, we will look for the third.[17]

Some scholars, on this basis, have spoken of *Carneadean probabilism* and such a probabilism is conceived as midway between scepticism and dogmatism.[18] But it has recently been shown that the doctrine of the probable of Carneades rather than being a profession of mitigated dogmatism has to be considered as a dialectical argument against Stoic dogmatism, as well as the doctrine of the reasonable and the plausible of Arcesilaus.[19]

We can advance a very strong argument in favor of this new interpretation: as the *eulogon* (the reasonable) is a completely Stoic conception, so is the *pithanon* (probable). Here is the Stoic definition:

> A reasonable proposition (*eulogon*) is one which has to start with more chances of being true than not, e.g., "I shall be alive tomorrow."[20]
>
> A probable judgment is *one which induces assent*, e.g., "Whoever gave birth to anything, is that thing's mother." This, however, is not necessarily true; for the hen is not the mother of an egg.[21]

It is evident from these definitions that Arcesilaus has drawn on the notion of the *eulogon*; Carneades instead has drawn on the notion of the *pithanon*. The former uses the notion of the *eulogon* in order to show that there is no absolute criterion of truth; in reality, the Stoic sage, contrary to his pretensions, thus conforms to the *eulogon*. The latter uses the *pithanon* in order to show, likewise, that there is no absolute criterion of truth; so the Stoic sage, like any other man, thus conforms to the criterion of the *probable*.

If comprehensive presentation does not exist, then everything is *incomprehensible* (*akataleptic*) and the following position is the one which we have to take: *a)* either epoche, that is, suspension of assent and judgment, or *b)* assent to what is nevertheless incomprehensible. If the first position is theoretically correct, the second is instead that which practically, as men, we are constrained to assume in order to live. The

Stoics cannot be an exception: therefore their actions will be founded not on the chimerical absolute criterion of truth, but on the criterion of probability which is not an objective criterion but a subjective one, and in any case the only one which men can assume. This dialectical interpretation of the Carneadean argument is confirmed by the further fact that even the distinction and the formulation of the three degrees of probability are made according to a terminology of Stoic origin.[22]

4. The evaluation of the position of Carneades

Hence Carneades did not mitigate the scepticism of the Academy but, on the contrary, developed and articulated it more systematically not in a positive sense but only in a negative sense with the precise intention of destroying every aspect of Stoic teaching.

The thought of Carneades destroyed without constructing anything just as the previous scepticism of Arcesilaus did, and for this reason, had an ephemeral life. The almost exclusively dialectical character of this scepticism, whose aim is only to destroy Stoic dogmas, necessarily involved the consequence that it almost totally exhausts itself in this destructive work. After Carneades, the Academy not only had nothing left because it no longer had anything in which to believe but it did not even have any means for reconstructing a belief, because the destruction of Stoicism was pursued with the same logical weapons as Stoicism.[23]

We add again another important point concerning the moral position of Carneades (as well as the position of Arcesilaus) as scholarch of the Academy, that is, of a school which not only does not reject itself but claims to compete with all the others. Actually, Carneades and the sceptic Academy philosophized with the absurd pretension that the destruction of the doctrines of other Schools was sufficient reason for the existence of a School, whereas on a belief in nothing, nothing can be sustained. The great success of Carneades is fundamentally explained by his ability and by the taste which the Greeks always had and fostered for dialectic, even in its eristic aspects as well as when it was purely destructive. Therefore, while Pyrrhonism is a scepticism which is wholly lacking in sophistic elements, Academic scepticism assumed numerous sophistic and even rhetorical elements (remember the two opposed discourses on justice given by Carneades at Rome, which reflect the methods of Protagoras and Gorgias). These are formal elements which make Academic scepticism methodologically more cunning than Pyrrhonism, but nevertheless do not help to give it content. In conclusion, Academic scepticism is the exacerbation of the negative component of Pyrrhonian scepticism. The component which remains even after we remove the new feeling for life which is the authentic motivation of Pyrrhonian scepticism is instead very weak Academic scepticism.[24]

Second Section

THE ECLECTICISM OF THE ACADEMY AND CICERO

Non enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta esse dicamus tanta similitudine ut in iis nulla insit certa iudicandi et adsentiendi nota. Ex quo exsistit et illud, multa esse probabilia, quae quamquam non perciperentur, tamen, quia visum quendam haberent insignem et inlustrem his sapientis vita regeretur.

This matter it is true I have discussed elsewhere more thoroughly, but some people are so dull and slow of apprehension that they appear to require repeated explanations. Our position is not that we hold that nothing is true, but that we assert that all true sensations are associated with false ones so closely resembling them that they contain no infallible mark to guide our judgment and assent. From this followed the corollary, that many sensations are *probable*, that is, though not amounting to a full perception they are yet possessed of a certain distinctness and clearness, and so can serve to direct the conduct of the wise man.

Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.5.12

I. Reasons for and Characteristics of Eclecticism

All the spiritual currents of the Hellenistic Age which we have examined to this point have now been given a precise physiognomy and specific causes. They have an historic meaning of primary importance as well as a value which is not exhausted in the confines of the centuries in which they flourished. It still remains to give an account of a current, if we can call it such, about which we have already anticipated some characteristics, especially speaking about the Middle Stoa of Panaetius and Posidonius.

We allude, of course, to *eclecticism*, that is, about that tendency which began during the second century BCE, growing quite strongly until it became dominant in the first century BCE and even later. Eclecticism is a term derived from the Greek *ek-legein* (ἐκλέγειν), which means "to select" and "to reunite" by taking from various parts. It has been chosen, therefore, most appropriately because it indicates perfectly the characteristic trait of this tendency which at a certain moment influenced all the other Schools: superficially Epicureanism, more considerably Stoicism, quite heavily the Academy, and even to a certain degree the Peripatos.[1]

The causes which produced this phenomenon are numerous: the exhaustion of the life-forces of each school, the unilateral polarization of their problems, the erosion of many theoretical barriers caused by Scepticism, the probabilism spread by the Academy, the influence of the practical Roman spirit, and the reevaluation of common sense.

Let us examine each of these causes in a detailed way.

1) Besides Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Scepticism, the Hellenistic Age in the Common Era did not produce anything new in the field of philosophical thought. Epicurus established the Garden in 307/306 in Athens, Zeno established the Porch in 301/300 and around 323, even before the birth of the Garden or the Porch, Pyrrho proclaimed the Sceptic message. At the end of the fourth century BCE, therefore, the new philosophies which nourished the whole Hellenistic-Roman Age had already arisen. In the third century the intense parallel elaboration of these doctrines was pursued; it is sufficient to think of the importance of the work of Chrysippus in the reelaboration and consolidation of Stoic doctrine, the contributions of Timon to the systematization and diffusion of sceptical teachings, and the significance of the inversion in direction accomplished by Arcesilaus within the Academy. But from the second century and even more so during the course of the first century BCE in all the philosophical schools we can observe that *process of wear which gradually corroded and little by little emptied them of their original significance and especially of any creative energy*, which is the real support of every system. The sterile play of scholastic repetition is substituted for it. Well then, it is clear that in these precise conditions not only do

the systems slowly lose the capacity to maintain firm and indestructible ideal barriers against the infiltration of ideas coming from other systems, but they tend to search for supports, confirming reasons, theoretical amplifications, and innovations in other systems, in an eclectic sense.

2) To the rapid erosion of the ideal barriers originally dividing the new Hellenistic systems we must also add *the general ethical polarization of the philosophical problematic* and the reduction of logic and physics to mere supports of ethics. In conclusion, all the Hellenistic philosophical currents, as we have seen, did not look for anything else but ataraxy, or peace of mind. The resources to achieve this peace were found by all the Hellenistic schools, not in transcendent principles and values, not even in things or in the external world but only in the subject, that is, in a particular spiritual attitude. Therefore, that the sage can be happy even amidst the flames is said in the same way by Epicureans, Stoics, and Sceptics. This ethical polarization of the philosophical problematic was one of the elements which contributed to make theoretical oppositions less and less evident among the opposed parties and which favored eclectic accommodations.

3) *Scepticism, with its criticism dissolving all dogmas, acted as a real and proper deterrent against all ideal barriers.* Timon had already begun to criticize all systems. The Academics especially attacked the Stoics, because they were the most awe-inspiring adversaries of that time; nevertheless, they did not neglect to direct attacks also against the other Schools. Therefore Scepticism, whether Pyrrhonian or Academic, ended by reducing all systems to the same common denominator of invalidity and untruth. But as Zeller has perfectly pointed out, scepticism, showing that *neither this nor that is true* because it is impossible to prove the truth of either one or the other, could precisely be reversed and understood as a justification *either of this or that*: in fact, if all theoretical positions are equally untrue, they can all equally be rejected or accepted, because they lack absolute truth as a discriminating criterion.[2]

4) *Also the same criterion of the "reasonable" of Arcesilaus and the "probable" of Carneades offered a base on which eclecticism could be established.* Originally Carneades must have presented his probabilism in the ironic-dialectical sense, as we saw, that is, principally with the aim of reversing the position of his Stoic adversaries. But when the polemic object became weaker and the position of the adversary was softened, then probabilism was understood by the Academy in a *positive* sense, that is, as what is near to truth or takes its place, as we will see. It is on the very *category of the probable* that the Academy after Carneades constructed its eclecticism.

5) Finally, *the introduction and the diffusion of Greek philosophy in Rome* was of notable importance in the consolidation of the eclectic tendencies. In Rome philosophy was accepted only in proportion to its practical and

instructive applications, that is, as far as it was able to complete the cultural and the spiritual formation of man. For this reason, a philosophy which might unify (or at least which tried to unify) the requirements of the various schools was the *optimum*. Actually Panaetius who, as we have seen, introduced eclectic elements into the Stoa carried on a great part of his activity at Rome. In Rome, as we will see, Philo of Larissa changed the direction of the Academy with a work which shocked even his follower, Antiochus of Ascalon, who was already strongly inclined to eclectic dogmatism. In Rome the philosophy of Cicero, which may be considered as the most typical form of eclecticism, had its origin.

6) In order to justify the choice of the various doctrines it accepted, eclecticism found its principle (as Zeller has emphasized) in *the principle of conscience and of interior knowledge*. What happened is analogous to what will happen in the Scottish school in reaction to the scepticism of Hume: a reevaluation of common sense, the consensus. As Zeller notes, in this way we reach not the knowledge of truth but the belief in probability; well, after the crisis of scepticism this belief in probability was considered as satisfactory. It is possible to overcome doubt by making an appeal to the conscience of all and everyone; it wins by ascertaining what are the convictions on which there is most agreement, or as Cicero will say, what is the *consensus gentium*.[3]

7) As we have already said, since the causes producing the phenomenon of eclecticism were not simply accidental but necessary, all the schools would be influenced by it. Epicureanism was only slightly influenced because of its closed attitude with regard to any discussion and possibility of modifying what was given by the master. The Aristotelian Peripatos was moderately touched. The Stoa was involved more considerably but it was always able to preserve the original and authentic spirit from which it arose. On the contrary, the Academy was totally open to the eclectic requirements but once again inverted the direction by rejecting its radical scepticism. Moreover, it was logical that the Academy was to become the tribune of the eclectic message: with Arcesilaus it had already renounced fidelity to its own spiritual inheritance and its own past. Hence, the Academy had nothing to preserve as a reason for its own existence: so much so that the dialectical scepticism which it had accepted as it developed (as we have noted above), led necessarily into eclecticism.

Let us see, in detail, some of the fundamental ideas of Academic eclecticism.

II. Philo of Larissa and the Fourth Academy

1. The five Academies

Setting about to indicate the differences between sceptic and Academic philosophy, Sextus Empiricus writes:

> According to most people there have been three Academies—the first and most ancient that of Plato and his School, the second or middle Academy that of Arcesilaus, the pupil of Polemon, and his School, the third or New Academy that of the School of Carneades and Cleitomachus. Some, however, add *as a fourth that of the School of Philo* and Charmidas; and some even count *the School of Antiochus as a fifth*.[1]

It is clear, from these statements that the ancients had already perceived clearly that with Philo and with Antiochus the Academy had ceased to be the same as before and that the teachings of Philo and of Antiochus were different from the doctrines of Arcesilaus and Carneades. The distinction of later phases of the Academy after the sceptic phase has its precise justification: in fact it is objectively impossible to place on the same level dialectic scepticism and eclecticism, except that the latter derives from the former.[2]

2. The originality of Philo

What is new about Philo of Larissa and the "fourth Academy"?

In the first place it is convenient to note that Philo, the successor of Cleitomachus, began his study following the doctrine of Carneades. The change in course occurred through two books which he published in Rome (about 87 BCE), where he had gone after the outbreak of the first Mithridatic war and where he had successfully opened a school.[3] The change must have been considerable, if his disciple Antiochus of Ascalon, who read the works in Alexandria was shocked by them and reacted with indignation, surprised by the sudden change of the thought of his teacher, from whom he already had severed connection for reasons which we will see.[4]

The novelty introduced by Philo must have certainly been the one which Sextus Empiricus hints at in the following passage:

> Philo asserts that *objects are not apprehensible with regard to the Stoic criterion*, that is to say, the apprehensive impression [= "cataleptic presentation"], *but are apprehensible so far as concerns the real nature of the objects themselves*.[5]

The passage is susceptible of two different interpretations: *a)* the former is narrow; *b)* the latter wider. *a)* According to the first it says this:

the Stoic criterion of truth (the comprehensive presentation) is not correct. Because the Stoic criterion, which is the most refined one, is not correct *no criterion of truth is correct*; this *does not imply* however that things *are objectively incomprehensible*; they are simply *not comprehended by us. b)* According to the wider interpretation the passage can, instead, mean this: the Stoic criterion of truth is not correct, *but there can be another criterion which is correct* (for example the Platonic one) because *insofar as their nature, things are susceptible of comprehension and are intelligible.*[6]

If we accept the testimony of Cicero, who was very close[7] to Philo, the correct interpretation of the passage seems to be the first. But also, by accepting this narrow interpretation, Philo is placed outside scepticism. In fact, to say that things are *comprehensible* so far as their nature, means to make a statement which, according to the sceptic canons, is "dogmatic" because of its implied ontological meaning. It means, in fact, *to admit a true ontology, even if the possibility of its logical and epistemological correspondence is rejected.*[8] The Sceptic cannot say: *truth exists, I am ignorant of it*; but he can only say: *I do not know if truth exists. I know in any case that I do not know it.*

3. From dialectical probabilism to positive probabilism

Philo must have been induced to make this innovation, as the historians of philosophy have correctly noted for a time, because of an objection which had been made to the doctrine of Carneades by Antiochus and which had placed it in a position of checkmate. Carneades had said: *a)* there are false presentations (which hence do not allow for any certitudes), and *b)* there are no true presentations which are perfectly distinguished from false ones by a specific character (hence it is not possible to distinguish certain from non-certain presentations). But Antiochus countered as follows: the first statement contradicts the second one and conversely, so that if the first is accepted, the second falls and if the second is accepted, the first falls; in any case, the Carneadean position is struck at its foundation. Here is Cicero's testimony:

> Nor yet, Lucullus, did you pass over the criticism made by Antiochus—and no wonder, as it is one of the most famous—which Antiochus used to say Philo had found most upsetting: it was that when the assumption was made, first, that there were some false presentations, and secondly, that they differed in no respect from true ones, Philo failed to notice that whereas he had admitted the former proposition on the strength of the apparent existence of a certain difference among presentations, this fact was refuted by the latter proposition, his denial that true presentations differ from false ones; and that no procedure could be more inconsistent. This

> would hold good if we abolished truth altogether; but we do not, for we observe some things that are true just as we observe some that are false.[9]

The following passage of Cicero, if not reporting verbatim the words of Philo, is very probably inspired by them:

> For even though many difficulties hinder every branch of knowledge, and both the subjects themselves and our faculties of judgment involve such a lack of certainty that the most ancient and learned thinkers had good reason for distrusting their ability to discover what they desired, nevertheless they did not give up, nor yet will we abandon in exhaustion our zeal for research; and the sole object of our discussions is by arguing on both sides to draw out and give shape to some result that may be either true or the nearest possible approximation to the truth. Nor is there any difference between ourselves and those who think that they have positive knowledge except that they have no doubt that their tenets are true, whereas we hold many doctrines as probable, which we can easily act upon but can scarcely advance as certain.[10]

Here is, then, the reply of Philo which Cicero also accepts: we do not have *to suppress the truth totally* and we have to admit *the distinction between the true and the false*; yet we do not have a criterion which brings us to this truth and hence to *certitude*, but we only have appearances which give us *probability*. We do not arrive at a certain perception of the objective truth but we approach it with *the evidence of the probable.*

Thus a new conception of the "probable" arises. It is not the ironic, dialectical notion with which Carneades refuted the Stoics because it is charged by a quite positive connotation which is absent in the position of Carneades. In fact the admission *of the existence of truth* gives an ontological meaning to the probable, which consequently becomes what for us stands in the place of truth and is distinguished from the non-probable, since it approaches truth. In conclusion: Philo understood that *without the admission of truth even the probable has no meaning* or, if you wish, that the probable exists because *the truth* exists.

Carneades denied both of the Stoic propositions: *a) there is truth, b) there is a criterion for grasping truth*; Philo only the second. But the admission of the first changes the sense of the negation of the second and especially does it modify the nature of the "probable" which placed along with an objective truth, becomes in some way its positive reflection.

4. The origin of evidence

For a time the historians of philosophy have indicated some expressions that Cicero uses reporting (as it seems) conceptions of Philo which would seem to allude almost to an innate wisdom. Philo would have

therefore admitted, as far as it seems, a truth "*impressum in animo atque in mente*," which nevertheless we cannot perceive or comprehend at the level of absolute certitude.[11]

Philo was perhaps inspired by Plato; even if, evidently, he could not make use of Platonic *anamnesis*. Better to say: this truth *impressum in animo atque in mente* could be what Philo was able to accept from Plato without having previously recovered the "second voyage" with which *anamnesis* is structurally connected, as we have seen fully in its proper place.

Therefore we agree with Zeller, who writes that in relation to such a doctrine we cannot think of anything else than "of the *immediate knowledge* which plays such a great role in his disciple Cicero."[12]

Philo could not attribute a meaning of veridical certitude to this knowledge impressed on our soul and mind, because his position was between the negation of the Stoic criterion of truth and the impossibility, for the reasons stated, of recovering the Platonic criterion.

In such a position he could really believe that he was able to sustain the view that only one Academy existed:[13] the parameter analyzed above of objectively existing truth, which is not subjectively reachable at the level of absolute certitude, permitted him to believe that it was possible to put together Plato and Carneades. Actually, he had not yet recovered Plato but he had already passed Carneades, taking a position which is now *decisively eclectic*.

5. Ethics

On the basis of the clearly positive reevaluation of the probable, it is evident that Philo could propose an ethics quite different from the one of Arcesilaus and Carneades, and that he could even propose concrete moral precepts.

He divided ethics into six parts, and used to compare the moral philosopher with a medical doctor. In the first place, the medical doctor should convince the sick man to accept the remedy proposed; thus the philosopher must convince man to accept philosophy. Then the doctor must confute possible erroneous convictions generated in the sick man by bad advisors; so also the philosopher must refute false doctrines and fallacious opinions. Then the doctor shows the causes of illnesses, while the philosopher shows the causes of moral evils and, positively, shows what the highest good is. Again, the final aim of the doctor is the recovery and health of the patient, so the ultimate aim of the philosopher is happiness. Ultimately, the doctor tends to preserve health and, analogously, the philosopher prescribes general and particular rules in order to maintain happiness.[14]

A novelty is to be emphasized in the ethics of Philo. Since he knew that

most men have no access to philosophy and do not read books of philosophy, he was concerned to provide, in the last book of his moral work, some precepts and brief indications that are accessible to them, and useful to the good conduct of the common life.

Brochard, who, like others, is unable to grasp the novelty of Philo, perfectly placed in focus this special contribution of our philosopher, by emphasizing that, in his concern with the common man, Philo takes a step beyond Stoic ethics: "...the Stoics did not have for the average man, for the little man, that is, the humble and the simple ones these considerations and this benevolence which Philo lavished on them, for he concerned himself with them throughout an entire book. They were satisfied to specify them as foolish and therefore they despised them. It is perhaps the first time that, with Philo, philosophy remembers that in the world there are other men in addition to wise men and philosophers."[15]

III. Antiochus of Ascalon and the Fifth Academy

1. The position of Antiochus

Antiochus, who was for a long time a follower of Philo, had left Carneadean scepticism before his teacher went to Rome and, as we have seen, changed the sceptical positions of the Academy with the two books written in Rome. The criticism of Antiochus was in fact essential, as we have previously seen, to undermine the original scepticism of Philo. But while Philo affirmed only the existence of objective truth *without having the courage to say that it is knowable by man* and put positive probability in place of certitude, Antiochus took the great step by which the history of the sceptic Academy was definitively closed. *In fact he declared that truth not only exists, but is also knowable and he substituted veridical certitude for probability.*[1]

On the basis of such affirmations he could appear as the restorer of the true spirit of the Platonic Academy: this spirit was the antithesis of the tendency started by Arcesilaus and Carneades which, against the opinion of Philo, he maintained not to be reconcilable and not able to be integrated with it.

Nevertheless there are no actual results corresponding to the aspirations of Antiochus. In the Academy of Antiochus Plato did not reappear at all, but we find an eclectic mess of tenets which are really acephalous, without soul or autonomous life. Moreover he was convinced that Platonism and Aristotelianism were identical philosophies and expressing the same concepts with different terms and expressions.[2] But—what is most indicative—Antiochus *went so far as to proclaim that the very philosophy of the Stoics was substantially identical to the Platonic-Aristotelian and differed only in its form of expression.* Some undeniably novel views of the Stoics were judged by him to be nothing else than improvements, completions, and deepenings of Plato, to the point that Cicero could write:

> Antiochus, who was called an Academic, was in reality, if only he would have changed a very few things, an authentic Stoic.[3]

Sextus confirms:

> Antiochus actually transferred the Stoa to the Academy, so that it was even said of him that in the Academy he taught Stoic philosophy: for he showed, in fact, that the tenets of the Stoics are present in Plato.[4]

Antiochus claimed to accomplish the restoration of the ancient Academy, by recovering Chrysippus and not Plato. In fact he did not hesitate to reject the Platonic epistemology and hence also the doctrine of

the Ideas on which it is based, as we can see from this passage of Cicero:

> Plato, however, held that the entire criterion of truth and truth itself is detached from opinions and from the senses and belongs to the mere activity of thought and to the mind. Surely our friend Antiochus does not approve any doctrine of these teachers?... He never diverges a foot's length from Chrysippus.[5]

Now any claim to be recovering Plato without accepting his theory of Ideas is absurd, and the reader of this *History of Ancient Philosophy* can clearly grasp the reasons: the theory of the Ideas, which is the result of the "second voyage," is the base on which the whole of Platonism is supported, just as the foundation of Aristotelianism is supported by the theory of supersensible substance. Therefore, what Antiochus recovered of Plato and Aristotle was something extremely irrelevant and, precisely for this reason, easily reconcilable with Stoicism. The spirit of Plato, in order to have new life, had still to wait.

2. Criticism of Academic scepticism

Antiochus, who, for a certain time, at the school of Philo (before his going to Rome) had heard the sceptical ideas of the Academy, was in the best condition to criticize them, since he knew this doctrine also as far as its inner reasons.

He observed that the two fundamental polemic objects of Scepticism, that is, *the criterion of truth* and the doctrine of *the highest good, cannot actually be renounced by whoever intends to be a philosopher and claims to have something to say to men.*

The Sceptics, with their doubts about our apprehensions (that is, based on the criterion of truth), overturn the support of human existence. On the one hand, since the importance of presentation is denied, also the importance of memory and experience (which depend on presentations) is compromised. Hence the very possibility of the various arts (which arise from memory and experience) is compromised. On the other hand, since the importance of the criterion is denied, we do not have any possibility of determining what the good is, what virtue is. Therefore there is not any possibility of grounding an authentic moral life. Without a firm certitude and conviction about the goal of human life and the essential tasks to be performed, moral duty disappears.

According to Antiochus, we cannot even take refuge in the sphere of mere probability because without the distinctive criterion of truth it will be impossible to find out even what is probable. In fact, if it is not possible to make out a distinction between true and false presentations, (since specific differences are missing), it will not even be possible to establish what presentation is near or proximate to the truth or less far

from it. Therefore, in order to preserve the probable, we must reintroduce the truth because *in order to establish if anything is more or less close to the truth, it is necessary to know what the truth is.*

It will not even be possible to suspend assent in any case whatever. In fact, the evidence of some perceptions naturally brings along assent. In any case, without assent we could have neither memory nor experience and in general we could not do any action and consequently all life would be stopped.

Again, we could accuse our senses of deception. Since the sensory organs are not damaged and the external conditions are appropriate (as Aristotle had previously noted), senses cannot deceive us, and hence presentations cannot deceive us. It is of no avail to recall arguments to the contrary like dreams, hallucinations, and similars: these impressions, in fact, are not endowed with the same *evidence* as normal sensory presentations.

Also the validity of concepts, definitions, and demonstrations is undeniable: it is attested by the existence of the arts, which is inconceivable without them. Even the very arguments of the Sceptics demonstrate it. In fact they can make sense only as far as concepts and demonstrations make sense.[6]

Finally, we have previously seen the dilemma by which Antiochus made the position of Philo unsustainable, forcing him to abandon Carneades. It cannot be admitted at the same time: *a)* that some presentations are false and *b)* that between true and false presentations there is not any specific difference distinguishing one from another: if the first statement is admitted, the second statement cannot be so; if the second is accepted, the first is destroyed.[7]

In conclusion, according to Antiochus, when it is pressed scepticism must inexorably recognize the truth which it had denied.

3. Logic, physics, and ethics

Unfortunately, if Antiochus was sharp in his criticism of scepticism (what has been reported above is only a sample of the numerous arguments brought forward by him), he was instead very disappointing as far as the proposal of the positive alternative which should have refilled the void left by scepticism.

In logic he did not differ substantially from the Stoics, and in particular from Chrysippus.[8]

Also in physics Antiochus reproposed Stoic ideas. He spoke in fact of the two-fold principle of reality which is active and passive, of the cosmos in a monistic sense, of the divine immanent principle animating the world, and of Providence. But what is more astonishing is his amusing claim that these are essentially also the convictions of Plato and Aristotle.[9]

The situation is not better as far as his ethical doctrine. Man must live by following nature, that is, conforming to his nature, which is reason. That is what virtue is and virtue is the highest good.[10] But the Stoics made a mistake in undervaluing the body and whatever is connected to it: virtue is sufficient for happiness, but not for perfect happiness. Therefore the Peripatetics are partially right when they maintain that complete happiness involves material goods also.[11] Moreover Antiochus attenuated the paradoxes of Stoic ethics[12] and tempered the claim that the wise man is impassive.

This is a typical example of dogmatic eclecticism, which takes ideas of diverse origins, yet without being able to make a synthesis. We have juxtaposition and superposition but no unification. Therefore the restored Academy could neither last nor go further; actually Antiochus was not able to give new life to the ancient Academy and he did not produce anything but an imitation of the teachings of the Porch.[13]

IV. Cicero and the Eclecticism of the Academy in Rome

1. The philosophical position of Cicero

As Philo and Antiochus are the most typical representatives of Greek eclecticism, so Cicero is the most characteristic representative of Roman eclecticism. Antiochus could be undoubtedly placed to the right of Philo, we may say using a modern metaphor, while Cicero follows the thought of Philo. The former elaborated a clearly dogmatic eclecticism, and the latter a cautiously and moderately sceptical eclecticism. Yet there is no doubt that, from the speculative standpoint, Cicero is included in both categories, since he did not propose any novelty which we can compare with the formulations of the *positive probabilism* of Philo or with the shrewd *anti-sceptical criticism* of Antiochus.[1]

If we are concerned with Cicero within a history of ancient philosophy, it is more for cultural than for strictly speculative reasons. In the first place, Cicero offers, in a sense, the most exemplary paradigm of eclecticism, which is to say the most exemplary paradigm of the poorest philosophy and, in a sense, the most anti-speculative kind of speculation. In the second place, Cicero is by far the most effective, the most widely diffused, and the most well-known bridge across which Greek philosophy poured into the sphere of Roman culture and then into the Western world. This also is of a non-theoretical merit: in fact mediation, diffusion, and cultural dissemination are the greatest qualities of his work. We do not want to deny that Cicero had brilliant or even shrewd intuitions about particular issues, especially moral problems (his *De officiis* is probably his most vital work); sometimes his analyses are particularly subtle: but it is a question of intuitions and analyses taking place, so to speak, at the margins of philosophy; on the central problems he, as well as all the representatives of Roman philosophy, had little to say.

The teachers themselves chosen by Cicero indicate clearly the pattern of his thought: in his youth he heard the Epicurean Phaedrus and later also the Epicurean Zeno; he attended the lessons of the Stoic Diodotus, he was fully acquainted with the thought of Panaetius, and he made friends with Posidonius; he was influenced by Philo of Larissa in a decisive way and, in addition, he heard for some time also the lessons of Antiochus of Ascalon. He read Plato, Xenophon, the exoteric Aristotle, some philosophers of the old Academy and the Peripatos, but always within the parameters of the philosophy of his time. He took from all of them and in all he searched for confirmation on some particular problems, excepting perhaps the Epicureans, with whom he argued vigorously.[2] He defined himself expressly as an Academic and as an Academic holding the views of Philo: also for him, in fact, *positive probability is the basis of philosophy*. In the eclectic fusing of the various currents Cicero

did not make any essential contribution, because such a fusion had been previously achieved by the teachers to whom he had listened. Cicero only proposed it in Latin and amplified it, not qualitatively, since this was not possible, but only quantitatively.

2. The eclectic probabilism of Cicero

We said above that Cicero rejected the eclecticism of Antiochus and took instead a position similar to the one of Philo: the dogmatism of Antiochus seemed to him somewhat risky, while Philonian probabilism satisfied him completely.

As the neo-Academics had done, Cicero also adopted the method of discussion, stating the reasons for and against every question. This method offers great advantages: in the first place, it offers the possibility of making known the various positions of the philosophers, making an extensive display of his erudition; in the second place, it offers the possibility of evaluating the nature of the opposed positions; in the third place, the comparison offers the possibility of choosing the most probable solution; and, finally, as a good orator and lawyer, he found that this method is a perfect exercise for his eloquence. Therefore, the comparison must not bring him to the suspension of judgment, but to the discovery of the probable and likely, as well, to rhetorical exercise. Here are the exact words of our philosopher which focus this point quite well:

> Accordingly, these considerations always led me to prefer the rule of the Peripatetics and the Academy of discussing both sides of every question, not only for the reason that in no other way did I think it possible for the probable truth to be discovered in each particular problem, but also because I found it gave the best practice in oratory.[3]

This passage permits us to make another reflection. Cicero states and resolves philosophical problems always in a cultural way but never directly, that is, in a purely speculative manner. The questions which he considers are those which have been raised previously by others, and his solutions also, for the most part, have been already proposed wholly or partly by others. In this way we can easily explain why his moderate scepticism, as Cicero himself writes, does not arise so much from the difficulties of the problems of knowledge and the criterion of truth (for example, the errors of the senses and similars), as from the difficulties caused by the disagreements of the philosophers about the solutions of such problems. It is now also clear that to the degree the disagreement of the philosophers upsets Cicero, so much does their consensus, when it exists, comfort him. Therefore, he does not hesitate to make such consensus a criterion of probability.

The truth, hence, is unattainable as the disagreement of philosophers

shows; nevertheless, the probable and the likely, which are not the truth itself but what is nearest to it, are attainable. Cicero says in the *De natura deorum*:

> Our position is not that we hold that nothing is true, but that we assert that all true sensations are associated with false ones so closely resembling them that they contain no infallible mark to guide our judgment and assent. From this followed the corollary that many sensations are *probable*, that is, though not amounting to a full perception they are yet possessed of a certain distinctness and clearness, and so can serve to direct the conduct of the wise man.[4]

In the *De officiis* Cicero writes:

> But people raise other objections against me—and so, too, philosophers and scholars—asking whether I think I am quite consistent in my conduct: for although our school maintains that nothing can be known for certain, yet they urge I make a habit of presenting my opinions on all sorts of subjects and at this very moment am trying to formulate rules of duty. But I wish that they had a proper understanding of our position. For we Academicians are not men whose minds wander in uncertainty and never know what principles to adopt. For what sort of mental habit, or rather what sort of life would that be which should dispense with all rules for reasoning or even for living? *Not so with us; but, as other schools maintain that some things are certain, others uncertain, we, differing with them, say that some things are probable, others improbable.* What, then, is to hinder me from accepting what seems to me to be probable while rejecting what seems to be improbable, and from shunning the presumption of dogmatism while keeping clear of that recklessness of assertion which is as far as possible removed from true wisdom?[5]

We can reach the "probable" by not joining ourselves dogmatically to some school but remaining free to choose eclectically what seems more likely. In the *Tusculan Disputations* we read:

> But let everyone defend his view, for judgment is free: I shall cling to my rule and without being tied to the laws of any single school of thought which I feel bound to obey, shall always search for the most probable solution in every problem.[6]

Therefore, Cicero's probabilism is linked structurally to his eclecticism: the first being the ground of the other and conversely. Both can be explained in a cultural and historical way, rather than theoretically. What is especially well explained is that in relation to the problems which Cicero is dealing with the probable grows weaker to the point of becoming doubt or, on the contrary, it grows stronger to the point of becoming a *quasi* certitude.

3. Logic: the criterion of truth

Cicero, like all the philosophers of his time, maintained that philosophy must chiefly establish *the goal of man*, that is, the nature of the highest good. He thinks also that in order to do this it is necessary to establish the nature of *the criterion of truth*:

> For the two greatest things in philosophy were the criterion of truth and the goal of goods, and no man could be a sage who was ignorant of the existence of either a beginning of the process of knowledge or an end of appetition, and who consequently did not know from what he was starting or at what he ought to arrive.[7]

Let us begin from the analysis of the criterion of truth, which is the starting point for wisdom.

In the first place, Cicero accepted the *testimony of the senses*. He did not accept it as an unconditioned certainty, that is, as certitude such as to merit our complete assent, but as a probability (remember the position of Philo and Antiochus). The evidence of the senses and of experience is hence a first criterion: he who denies these evidences subverts the very possibility of life.[8]

Cicero found a second criterion in *common sense*, in the *universal consensus of men* (as well as in the consensus of learned men). He uses, in fact, expressions recalling a certain kind of innatism[9] which has a slight resemblance to Platonic innatism but more closely resembles the doctrine of "prolepsis" which, as we have seen, is common both to the Garden as well as to the Porch. Thus, Cicero—we will consider only the most interesting aspects—admits not only that human nature gave us the *semina innata* of virtues,[10] that is, natural dispositions to virtue, but also that it produced *sine doctrina notitias parvas rerum maximarum*,[11] (without instruction embryonic notions of the loftiest ideas) in order to achieve the same virtues. This generic innatism is the true reason he maintains that the common sense and the consensus of all human beings is probative.

Naturally Cicero was not able to say more in this regard: he proceeds from the common sense and the universal consensus to notions which are given to us naturally, that is, innately. He thinks that this is enough to achieve a criterion endowed with such evidence as to have no need of further warrants.

4. Physics, theology, and psychology

Cicero shows very little interest in the problems of "physics," that is, for the great ontological and cosmological problems which Hellenistic philosophies included in the doctrine of *physis*. This point is perfectly

consistent with the Roman spirit, which is concerned with speculative problems only if it finds in them a practical connection. Naturally, he makes an exception for the problems of God and soul which are closely linked to ethics, as they conditioned its ultimate meaning.

As far as the solution of metaphysical, ontological, and cosmological problems, he appears to be much more a sceptic than anything else: he is unable to resolve these problems, and what is more he is not existentially interested in them. Therefore, he finds it more convenient to affirm that, concerning the nature of things, it is easier to say what truth is not than what truth is and that everything is enveloped in an impenetrable darkness:

> All those things you talk about are hidden, Lucullus, closely concealed and enfolded in thick clouds of darkness, so that no human intellect has a sufficiently powerful sight to be able to penetrate the heaven and get inside the earth.[12]

Nevertheless, he prudently does not maintain that all the physical questions are to be put aside because the consideration of nature is, in any case, food and sustenance for the mind, a force that sustains and uplifts us. Therefore, it permits us to look at human things from a different perspective and hence to appraise them properly: by considering celestial and sublime things it is possible to realize how small and miserable terrestrial concerns are. Furthermore, we achieve a spiritual joy whenever we reach, if not the unattainable truth, something which is at least likely:

> And all the same, I do not think that these physical investigations of yours should be put out of bounds. For the study and observation of nature affords a sort of natural pasturage for the spirit and intellect; we are uplifted, we seem to become more exalted, we look down on what is human while reflecting upon things above and in the heavens, and we despise this world of our own as small and even tiny. There is delight in the mere investigation of matters at once of supreme magnitude and also of extreme obscurity; while if a notion comes to us that appears to bear a likeness to the truth, the mind is filled with the most humanizing kind of pleasure.[13]

As we can see, Cicero states problems always from an ethical and anthropological point of view.[14]

On the *existence* of God, Cicero does not seem instead to have any doubt. The consensus of all peoples is for him the surest proof:

> Furthermore, as this seems to be advanced as the surest basis for our belief in the existence of Gods that there is no race so uncivilized, no one in the world, we are told, so barbarous that his mind has no inkling of a belief in Gods: true it is that many men have wrong

> notions about the Gods, for this is usually the result of a corrupt nature; nevertheless all men think that a divine power and divine nature exist, and that is not the result of human conference or convention, not belief established by regulation or statute, but in every inquiry the unanimity of the races of the world must be regarded as a law of nature.[15]

Cicero has no doubt about Providence: whether external things demonstrate that it is concerned with human beings, or the form and the structure of human beings themselves and their organs confirm a purposeful organization. To speak about finalistic organization is to speak about Providence.[16] There is nothing more repugnant to Cicero than the mechanistic conception of Epicurean atomism. A casual and mechanistic muddle of the letters of the alphabet can never, Cicero judiciously says, produce the *Annals* of Ennius.[17]

He appears to be more uncertain when he must take a position on the nature of God. He believes in the unity of God. But how ought we to conceive this one-God from the ontological viewpoint? The reader who followed us until now can have no doubt. To this question Cicero can have only ambiguous responses fluctuating between the spiritual and materialistic positions. This is not due to contingent, but to necessary reasons. Either the results of the Platonic "second voyage," that is, the meaning of the transcendent, are recovered, or the affirmations on the spiritual nature of God cannot have any theoretical sense. In the *Tusculan Disputations* we read:

> And indeed God himself, who is comprehended by us, can be comprehended in no other way save as a mind unfettered and free, severed from all perishable matter, conscious of all and moving all and self-endowed with perpetual motion.[18]

The expression "mens soluta quaedam et libera" (a mind unfettered and free) ought not deceive us, because this *mens soluta et libera* cannot be conceived by Cicero according to the category of the supersensible. In fact he would end by accepting the Stoic hypothesis which considers God as air or fire or even as the Aristotelian aither.[19]

Analogously, Cicero does not have a doubt about the immortality of the soul, since nature itself has placed in us this conviction. In fact, everyone is concerned with life after death.[20] This is, for Cicero, the surest argument in favor of immortality, even if he does not hesitate to support it with the traditional Platonic proofs.[21] Our soul joins us to God and is, so to say, the tangential point between man and God:

> No beginning of souls can be discovered on earth; for there is no trace of blending or combination in souls or any particle that could seem born or fashioned from earth, nothing even that partakes either of

> moist or airy or fiery. For in these elements there is nothing to possess the power of memory, thought, reflection, nothing capable of retaining the past, or foreseeing the future and grasping the present, and these capacities are nothing but divine; and never will there be found any source from which they can come to men except from God. There is then a peculiar essential character belonging to the soul, distinct from these common and well-known elements. Accordingly, whatever it is that is conscious, that is wise, that lives, that is active must be heavenly and divine and for that reason eternal. And indeed God himself, who is comprehended by us, can be comprehended in no other way save as a mind unfettered and free, severed from all perishable matter, conscious of all and moving all and self-endowed with perpetual motion. Of such sort and of the same nature is the human mind.[22]

Naturally, even in regard to the problem of the nature of the soul we can observe the same uncertainty and the same fluctuations as in regard to the nature of God. The root of these uncertainties is the same: the nature of soul is philosophically determinable only in function of the category of the supersensible; otherwise we fall inexorably into materialism. In fact, a little before the passage we read above, Cicero writes:

> And in fact, if God is either air or fire, so also is the soul of man; for just as the heavenly nature is free from earth and moisture, so the human soul is without trace of either element. But if there is a kind of fifth nature, first introduced by Aristotle, this is the nature of both Gods and souls.[23]

But air, fire, and the fifth essence itself are precisely always and only material.

5. Ethics

The part of philosophy in which Cicero was especially interested, as we have often noted, is ethics (it is not without reason that his two liveliest works are the *De finibus bonorum et malorum* and especially *De officiis*): for Cicero, not the Aristotelian purely contemplative activity but practical and social activity is paramount. Here is a very eloquent passage:

> My view, therefore, is that those duties are closer to Nature which depend upon the social instinct than those which depend upon knowledge; and this view can be confirmed by the following argument: suppose that a wise man should be vouchsafed such a life that with an abundance of everything pouring in upon him he might in perfect peace study and ponder over everything that is worth knowing, still, if the solitude were so complete that he could never

> see a human being, he would die.... And service is better than mere theoretical knowledge, for the study and knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective, were no practical results to follow. Such results, moreover, are best seen in the safeguarding of human interests. It is essential, then, to human society; and it should, therefore, be ranked above speculative knowledge.[24]

But even in this specific sphere, we would search in vain for real novelties. Cicero discusses the ethics of the Epicureans, Stoics, Academics, and Peripatetics; he rejects as a whole the Epicurean ethics and suggests an eclectic accommodation between the others. On the one hand, he is inclined to admire chiefly the Stoic ethics, and on the other hand, he makes concessions to Academic and Peripatetic thought (which he considers to be fundamentally identical). Cicero cannot accept the Stoic principle, stating that only the sage is good and everyone else is vicious. In fact, he notes that the wisdom of the Stoic sage is such that "no mortal man has yet attained it." Therefore, he proposes to consider what is present in the customs and in the common life of men, instead of what is only in aspirations and desires.[25]

The fundamental principle of ethics for Cicero also is ***to follow our individual nature, to follow human nature in respecting universal nature***, or better, as Panaetius has already taught, to follow our individual nature in respecting general human nature:

> For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of human nature but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular nature; and even if other careers should be better and nobler, we may still regulate our own pursuits by the standard of our own nature. For it is of no avail to fight against one's nature or to aim at what is impossible of attainment.[26]

This allusion to human nature, which is soul and body at the same time, permits Cicero to temper Stoic morality and to vindicate the body's rights, since it is necessary to live biologically, that is, to satisfy the needs of the body, in order to satisfy afterwards the needs of reason. Thus in this respect he sides with the Peripatetics, as Panaetius and Posidonius had partially done.

Then he turns to the Stoics, since he appears to consider virtue as completely dependent on reason. He disagrees with the typical Aristotelian conception of ethical virtue as a middle way between opposite passions. As the Stoics, he maintains that virtue is self-sufficient and enough for a happy life. He seems to side with the Stoics also in conceiving the sage as without passion and imperturbable.

Finally, also the vindication of human freedom in the work *De fato* is little more than a simple affirmation of an intuitively grasped freedom: the voluntary motions of the soul do not have an external cause but

depend on us, since the cause is the nature itself of our soul.

When Cicero proceeds from principles to the analysis of intermediate duties (which the Stoics called *kathekonta*), he then shows all his practical wisdom; but this is not a real philosophical analysis, it is rather a moral phenomenology. On the other hand, it is inevitable that all the original observations and remarks that we find in Cicero as far as moral analyses do not go beyond the phenomenological level and are theoretically formless. The ambiguous responses to ontological and anthropological problems of eclecticism do not permit him, for structural reasons, to go further.

As Marchesi has correctly said,[27] "Cicero did not give new ideas to the world.... His interior world is poor *because he accepts all voices*." His major contribution is hence the diffusion and dissemination of ancient culture. In this sphere, he is truly an essential figure in the spiritual history of the West. "Also here," Marchesi writes, "the disseminating and enlivening power of the Latin genius is manifested: because no Greek would have been able to diffuse Greek thought throughout the world as Cicero did."[28]

Conclusions about the Philosophical Systems of the Hellenistic Age

Epicurus quoque ait sapientem, si in Phalaridis tauro peruratur, exclamaturum: "dulce est, ad me nihil pertinet... dulce esse torreri."

Epicurus also maintains that the wise man, though he is being roasted in the bull of Phalaris, will cry out: "It is pleasant, and concerns me not at all... it is sweet to burn among the flames."

Seneca *Epistle* 66.18

«(οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς) μηδὲν κωλύειν φασὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τὰ ἔξωθεν, ἀλλ' εἶναι τὸν σπουδαῖον μακάριον, κἂν ὁ Φαλάριδος ταῦρος ἔχῃ καιόμενον.»

"The Stoics say that external things are not an impedient to happiness but the wise man is happy even if he roasts within the bull of Phalaris."

Chyrsippus *Frag.* 586 von Arnim, 3

«Φασὶ δὲ καὶ σηπτικῶν φαρμάκων καὶ τομῶν καὶ καύσεων ἐπὶ τινος ἕλκους αὐτῷ, προσενεχθέντων, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τὰς ὀφρῦς συναγαγεῖν.»

"They say that when septic salves and surgical and caustic remedies were applied to a wound he [*viz.* Pyrrho] had sustained, he did not so much as frown."

Diogenes Laertius 9.67

I. The Prejudices which Impeded the Correct Understanding and Adequate Evaluation of the Hellenistic Systems

The burden of prejudices of various kinds lay for a long time on the philosophy of the Hellenistic schools which flourished in the period between the death of Aristotle and the birth of Neoplatonism. They have conditioned and often even compromised its correct understanding. These currents of thought have been frequently designated as a whole as "post-Aristotelian philosophies" in a negative sense, that is to say, the philosophies of imitators, philosophies which in comparison to the speculative heights of Aristotle appeared to be by far inferior. They had been interpreted therefore as products of a spirit and a culture which at the time was exhausted and hence as the expression of decadence. Moreover, the different origin of various components of these philosophies has been insisted on in such a way as to diminish their originality. Finally, their internal contradictions have been stressed, diminishing in this way their validity.

In our century we have observed the fall of all the prejudices distorting the exact understanding of the significance of these philosophical Schools, and we can now proceed to their radical reevaluation.

In the first place, let us see specifically the nature of these prejudices.

a) A primary reason of inestimable importance which compromised, for a long time, the comprehension and the correct evaluation of the thought of the Hellenistic Schools is due to the loss for the most part of their imposing productions. We do not possess any complete works from the founders of the Schools, but only fragments, and indirect fragments at that. We possess entire works only of the followers, who alone cannot make up for the absence of the works of the founders, for the reasons which we have already seen.

We possess three letters of Epicurus and two collections of maxims; however, they are epitomes which give a summary of the doctrine which must have been much more precisely stated in the scientific works. The fragments which are extant are instead quite brief. The only complete work of the Epicurean School which we possess is the *De rerum natura* of Lucretius, which is a poetic work full of special ferment and resonances. We have numerous indirect testimonies and very few direct fragments of the ancient Stoics. Equally we possess only indirect testimonies of the Stoics of the Middle Stoa, whereas we have complete works of the Roman Stoics but these are expressions of a spirit which is partially transformed and moreover, of a problematic reduced for the most part to ethics. The situation is analogous as far as the works of the Sceptics. Pyrrho wrote nothing. We possess only fragments of Timon. The imposing work of Sextus Empiricus which we have is the final expression of Sceptic thought which, in comparison to the initial Sceptic thought, has shifted

its interest more towards methodological than towards ethical problems. We have only indirect testimonies of Academic Scepticism as well as of Academic Eclecticism, with the exception of Cicero.

But there is more.

The fragments and the testimonies of the Hellenistic philosophers which have come down to us have been collected and arranged only in recent times.

The *Epicurea* of Usener, where the fragments and the testimonies of the founder of the Garden are collected, date from 1887 and his *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* was published at the beginning of the nineteen hundreds (1903-1905). Systematic collections of the testimonies of the ancient Sceptics, of the sceptic and eclectic Academics, are still missing.

Consequently also, the detailed and original historical reconstructions of the thought of these Schools have been completed only at the end of the last century and chiefly in our century.

We are slowly becoming free from the acritical conviction that, if we have complete works only of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, but not of the ancient Epicureans, the ancient Stoics, and the ancient Sceptics, it is because of their intrinsic philosophical value and not the vagaries of chance.

b) Another prejudice is closely connected to the circumstances clarified above. We may define it as "theoreticistic," since in the comprehension and evaluation of the Hellenistic Schools as well as of all ancient philosophy in general, it has taken Plato and Aristotle as *exclusive parameters*. From Plato we have everything; from Aristotle, most of the esoteric works; from the Presocratics, as well as from the founders of the Hellenistic Schools, we have only fragments. Moreover, the Presocratics were read, and for the most part they still are, according to the canons fixed by Aristotle in the first book of the *Metaphysics*, which presents the first systematization of them. Therefore, it was almost fatal that the theoretic arrangement of Plato-Aristotle appeared as the only expression of Greek philosophy. Also, the various renaissances of the Greek philosophical proposals have been always and only renaissances of Plato and Aristotle, so that such a conviction seemed for a long time an indestructible dogma.

Actually, the influence of Plato and Aristotle in Greece and on the Greeks, before Neoplatonism, was not in any way comparable to the influence which they had in the first centuries of the Christian Era, in the Middle Ages, in the Renaissance, and in the modern age. As we have tried to demonstrate, Plato and Aristotle were not completely understood, even in their Schools, and the generations following were not able to understand them any better. The esoteric Aristotle was almost unknown until the edition of Andronicus of Rhodes.

Also whatever of Plato and Aristotle was circulated in the three final centuries of the Pagan Era was understood only within the philosophical

perspective of the Hellenistic Age.

However, there is no comparison with the influence of the Hellenistic Schools in the spiritual life of the Greeks: their influence, which encompassed entire centuries, endured uninterruptedly for half a millenium.

It is therefore historically erroneous to claim to interpret the entire development of ancient philosophy exclusively in function of Platonic and Aristotelian parameters. In Plato and Aristotle, in fact, the epistemological and ontological components predominate, while ethics is a consequence arising from these components: *the vision of being dominates and regulates, to a great extent, the vision of life.* In the philosophical systems of the Hellenistic Age the exactly opposite situation prevails. There is an absolute predominance of the ethical component, while the epistemo-logical and ontological components are mostly investigated as conditions which ethics presupposes in order to have a foundation. *The vision of life dominates and regulates in notable measure the vision of being.*

Certainly the loss of the theoretical component and its regulative function (in particular the neglect of the Platonic "second voyage" and the Aristotelian results connected to it), to which we have often called the attention of the reader in the course of this work, is a very notable limit; nevertheless, from an hermeneutic viewpoint this is to be understood as a structural feature, and not as a presupposed judgment of their validity which absolutely conditions them. In fact, if in the reading of the Hellenistic philosophers the peculiar angle of their way of philosophizing is not grasped and accepted, then there is an obstinate attempt to find the theoretical moment as both predominant and autonomous, and these philosophers in the main are silent. It is likewise true that from the viewpoint of evaluation we can, and in fact we must, criticize their inversion of the philosophical perspective. We can and must remark at the series of aporias and contradictions which it produced; but not withstanding this *in primis et ante omnia* we must grasp its meaning and reasons. If they are placed in the correct perspective, these systems of the Hellenistic Age become incomparably more enriched, more enlivened, and truer than has been thought for many centuries.

c) There is also another prejudice which for a long time has been an obstacle to the correct reading of Hellenistic philosophy. We may define it as "classicistic." It is indubitable that the Greek spirit of the Classical Age is dominated by a sense of harmony, limit, and measure which is probably unique in the spiritual history of the West. And it is likewise indubitable that in the Hellenistic Age the Greek sense of harmony and measure changes and assumes proportions which, in some aspects, are or seem to be discontinuous with classical values. We have stressed it many times: contrarily to classical philosophy, the philosophy of the Hellenistic Age is open to Eastern influences. It absorbs these influences and recomposes them in a Greek way, but the new and different equilib-

riums which it reconstitutes can be or seem a lack of equilibrium according to the classical parameters.

Pyrrho, the founder of Scepticism, had learned much from the magicians and the fakirs of the East following the expedition of Alexander. Zeno, the founder of the Porch, was a Jew and had brought from his native land elements of the Jewish spiritual heritage which he made use of; Chrysippus as well, the second founder of the Stoa, was of Jewish origin.

The influence of the Roman spirit is evident in the Middle Stoa and yet more in eclecticism.

Epicurus himself, who was of Greek origin, precisely Athenian, broke openly with the classical attitude by rejecting the political and civic component which in the classical period was the *axis* of all the *values* and therefore overturned the classical table of *values*.

This is a very important element *to grasp*: the philosophical thought of the Hellenistic Schools is a revolutionary thought which subverts most of the values which the Greeks had maintained as untouchable. But it is a thought which is able to achieve *its own* equilibrium, *its own* measure, its own *peras*, due to its almost unlimited trust in the *logos*.

d) Another impediment to the correct comprehension of the philosophy of the Hellenistic Schools can be found in the excessive stress on the elements that they take from the Presocratics, from the minor Socratics and, in a more limited way, from the Academy and from the Peripatos. It is very true that, by supplanting Plato and Aristotle, the Hellenistic Schools recover the requirements of the minor Socratic Schools and, beyond them, the categories of the Presocratic science of nature.

Epicurus recovers the hedonism of the Cyrenaics and the atomism of the Abderites; Zeno recovers the Cynic idea of the self-sufficiency of virtue and the rejection of the so-called physical and external goods as well as the Heraclitean idea of the fire-logos; Pyrrho and chiefly the later Sceptics recover, in a negative sense, the dialectic of the Megarics, and some elements of the Sophists. But it is likewise true that on the basis of these renewals there were original and very fruitful intuitions which transform considerably the elements taken from the preceding thought by making them assume new connotations and meanings.

In fact, on the one hand, the categories of the Presocratic *physis* are recovered, not only in their ontological meaning but also and chiefly in their integral deontological significance, in order to found ethics, whereas in the Presocratics they are used exclusively for a reconstruction of the cosmos. On the other hand, the ethical ideals of the minor Socratic Schools are recovered, but they are corrected in one of their most essential aspects. In fact, contrary to the Socratic Schools, the Hellenistic Schools maintain that the theoretical-ontological and the epistemo-logical elements are absolutely necessary, although they do not consider these elements autonomous, but only as a foundation of ethics.

II. The Significance of the Philosophy of the Hellenistic Age

Once the chief prejudices have been removed, it is easier to make a more correct evaluation as far as the significance of the philosophy of the Hellenistic Schools.

The philosophy of the Hellenistic Schools strove essentially to be, and was actually, a *philosophy of life*, a philosophy which tried to teach *the art of living*, that is, not a *sophia* in the Aristotelian sense, but a *phronesis*, a practical wisdom, a knowledge terminating in practical moral activity.

A careful analysis of the positions of the various Schools, as we have amply seen, reveals in fact a jutting out of ethics into ontology and logic, not only quantitatively but qualitatively. Quantitatively ethics juts out into physics and logic because it is the object of greater concern, while qualitatively ethics juts out beyond them because of its novelty, because of its freedom toward the logico-ontological premises and because of its humanness.

The ethical doctrines of the Hellenistic systems do not arise even from the ontological and logical tenets, which are still considered as their foundations, as we have tried to show, but they do arise fundamentally from *original intuitions of the sense and meaning of life.* To say it in modern terms, which are anachronistic but very clear if understood correctly, at the roots of the Hellenistic systems (as moreover at the roots of every form of philosophy understood as philosophy and art of living) there is an immediate feeling of life, a vision of life intuitively grasped and then rationally developed, grounded, and motivated. Expressing it in Schelerian terms, we could say that the fundamental nucleus from which Scepticism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism developed, is a *felt intuition of values.* We will say more. The well-known tenet which Jean Piaget thought suitable for any kind of philosophy without distinction fits instead perfectly the systems of the Hellenistic Age. They are forms of practical wisdom, that is, *reasoned faiths*, and they are *life attitudes rationally developed.* They are *reasoned syntheses between the original intuitions of the sense of life and values and the conditions of being and knowledge.*

Epicurus discovered through a felt intuition the meaning of life in the catastematic pleasures, that is, in physical aponia and in imperturbability of spirit. Then he developed this intuition and tried to ground it rationally by atomism and sensism. Zeno discovered intuitively the meaning of life in virtue as straightforward and self-sufficient actuation of the logos. Then he constructed a system of the logos in its logical, ontological sense. In contact with the Eastern world, Pyrrho found through a felt intuition the meaning of life in renunciation and indifference. Then he supported this intuition with the appropriate logical grounds of a sceptical nature.

This point, which we have now clarified (we have simplified the problem by stressing only the essential elements, but the reader must rigorously avoid understanding it in a simplistic manner), provides a reason also for the really exceptional vitality of these systems as far as their diffusion, the intensity of the convictions which they were able to communicate, and their duration (more than five centuries). In fact these philosophies have the vigor and the power of a secular faith, of an immanent faith, of a faith circumscribed by ***physis***, that is, by nature; although denying supernature they still maintain unyieldingly the force which is proper to any faith. It explains, also, the reason why all the founders of these Schools were exalted by their followers and proclaimed similar to Gods: they are the secular saints of an immanent faith; they are the incarnate models of a way of perfect living, of a way of living yielding complete happiness.

Epicurus said that if a philosophy is not able to treat some passion of the human soul, it is useless. All the Hellenistic philosophers agree with this statement. In conclusion, these philosophical Schools understood, as few others, that the affections of the soul determine the happiness of man. Concordantly, these Schools also understood that passions are not cured or softened by giving vent to them, since the venting increases and makes them stronger. Consequently they understood that the venting of the passions cannot bring happiness, precisely because the vented passion generates further and more impelling passions or, at the most, venting gives only a brief respite, preparing for a further outbreak, but never for peace of the soul. Therefore, the remedy can be only a radical reduction of passions or even their elimination and total emptying. Peacefulness and calm have to be found in the elimination of the passions, and happiness is *peace of spirit.*

Certainly, it is natural to ask whether the peace proposed by the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Sceptics is the peace of death rather than the peace of life. But this means to go into the aporias of these systems about which we have already spoken and we do not wish to repeat ourselves. However, it is necessary to point out that the aporias arise from the conflict between the unlimited trust in logos professed by these systems which would require spiritual premises and their materialistic and immanentistic presuppositions, as we have many times emphasized.

In this way we make a point which we think to be essential as far as the philosophy of the Hellenistic Schools. The Epicureans do not believe in a hereafter and proclaim tenaciously the mortality of the soul. The Sceptics, naturally, eliminate the problem at its roots. The Stoics admit a limited survival of the soul (until the universal conflagration as extreme limit), but they do not give it a morally relevant significance, insofar as they deny that the meaning of life depends on the hereafter: in fact, for them the only true life is the life which we live right here.

Therefore, the destiny of man is totally accomplished on earth: hell is here and paradise is here, in the sense that all the possible unhappiness and happiness are here.

Well then, the tenet on which all these philosophers agree is the following. *What can give happiness is present in human beings, understood as individuals.*

After the decline of the polis and of all the civic virtues, the social structure was profoundly changed. The Greek classical man did not believe that he could live outside the polis and its social structure; on the contrary, the Hellenistic man wished to show that man can be sufficient to himself as an individual and can be wholly self-sufficient.

Moreover, after the great adventure of Alexander, in the following period of political instability the Hellenistic man fully understood also the non-necessary character of external goods, of material possessions which can be destroyed at any moment and suddenly taken away. Hence life, in order to be happy, ought not to need them. Far from giving peace of spirit, the external goods produce cares, anxieties, and upset. In this way, the philosophers of the Hellenistic Age conclude concordantly that *all external things are devoid of any authentic value or have very little value.* A man is not rich by having much, but by being able to free himself from the desire to possess much. True wealth is the wealth of the soul that is within ourselves. This kind of wealth cannot be taken away by anyone because it is a necessary possession and it is inalienable from the self.

Finally, the Hellenistic Schools understood that not even the goods of the body were essential like health, beauty, strength, and similars, *because man can be happy, that is, he can achieve peace of soul even without them.*

Hence man, to be happy, has no need either of a God who helps him, or of an immortal soul and life hereafter, or of a politically organized society defending him, or of external things (possessions and wealth) which give him assurance and even beyond that of particular physical endowments. Man only needs his reason, the logos which reasons correctly, the logos which shows him the way to reach peace of spirit, which is true happiness. *It is the renunciation accomplished, as far as possible, of all those things which do not depend on us, and our withdrawal into ourselves and towards things which depend on us into the impregnable fortress of our logos.*

The ideal man of these Schools is the man who is able to put himself above everything else: he is a man who is profoundly convinced that the true good and the true evil do not arise from things but only from the opinions which we have about things. Gods, other men, all things, and even destiny *can touch us only if and as far as our opinion about them makes this possible. The correct evaluation of things makes us invulnerable.*

The self understood as logos and as correct reason is therefore the real absolute of these philosophies. We are confirmed by the so often repeated

affirmations by all the Hellenistic Schools according to which *the sage has nothing to envy in Zeus*, but is a mortal being living a divine life.

Even considering the numerous aporias rising from these positions of thought and about which we have, little by little, called to the attention of the reader, it is not possible to misunderstand their greatness.

These schools, besides the centuries which they influenced directly, preserve their teachings also for the man of today: for the man who has gotten lost in the "structures," for the man who becomes a slave of things and of their laws, for the man who thought that he would be made happy by possessing the world and its objects through "science," and who on the contrary risks being swallowed up by them. Their teachings tell us that the route followed by modern man has to be reversed. In fact their principle is still true: on our happiness *the opinion which we have about things* weighs more than things and the possession of things. The authentic dominion is not the dominion over the world and things, but is the *dominion over ourselves* and, in any case, it is not possible to rule things without ruling ourselves.

ABBREVIATIONS

BB Kindstrand, J. F., *Bion of Borysthenes, A Collection of Fragments with Introduction and Commentary* (Uppsala, 1976).

DFEK Lasserre, F., *Die Fragmente des Eudoxos von Knidos* (Berlin, 1966).

D-K Diels, H. and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin; Weidemann, 1952[6]).

DL Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, trans. R. D. Hicks (London-Cambridge, 1958).

DM Döring, K., *Die Megariker, Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien* (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1972).

DPG Zeller, E., *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, 3 vols. (1844-52); ed. W. Nestle (Leipzig, 1920[6]; Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1963).

HC Dudley, D. R., *A History of Cynicism, From Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D.* (London, 1937; Hildesheim, 1967[2]).

LCL *The Loeb Classical Library* (Cambridge-London; Heinemann-Harvard University Press) various dates and translators.

ML *The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers*, ed. by W. J. Oates, (New York; The Modern Library, 1957). The section on Epicurus is translated by Cyril Bailey.

PG Gomperz, T., *Greek Thinkers. A History of Ancient Philosophy*, trans. L. Magnus and G. G. Berry, 4 vols. (London; J. Murray, 1906-12).

RE *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, ed. Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll-Mittelhaus-Zeigler (Stüttgart, 1984 and following years).

SP Rist, J.M., *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1969).

SR Giannantoni, G., *Socraticorum reliquiae* (Rome-Naples, 1983).

NOTES

(*Notes to pages* 1-15 [1-7])

1. Ettore Bignone *Il Libro della letteratura greca* (Florence, 1942[3]), 413.
2. Speaking of Pyrrho, M. Conche *Pyrrhon ou l'apparence* (Villers sur Mer: Éditions de Mégare, 1973) has made some remarks which are completely correct as well as worthy of note about all the philosophers of this era: "The Greek requirement of wisdom indicates what is essential to philosophy. Actually any theory has to be proposed as creditable. Now whatever is said does not become

creditable by adding words on top of words indefinitely. It is necessary to switch levels, to provide experiential proof, to show that one is a philosopher in the way one lives and dies. Philosophy is placed on the horns of a dilemma: either it is about words—in which case it vanishes into mere verbal dexterity—or it is a wisdom concerned with life and it is something one lives. A doctrine or philosophical theory either is nothing, or ultimately it is a practical life. Philosophical possibilities grasped in their truth are nothing other than the possibility of living them. *The truth of philosophy is wisdom, and the wise man is the philosopher whose life is his proof"* (p. 25). (M. Conche adds again, note 1: "A philosopher is anything but an intellectual. Moreover if we let stand what we mean today by an intellectual we must say that in Greece there were no intellectuals.")

3. *DL* 9.65; *LCL* 2:479.
4. Sextus Empiricus *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 3.281; *LCL* 1:513.
5. Epicurus *Maxims* 36; *DL* 10.36; *LCL* 2:675.
6. Lucretius *De rerum natura* 5.1ff.; *LCL,* 341. See also verses 12-55 which follow, in which there is a turnaround of a view analogous to what we read in the passage from Epictetus which exalted Chrysippus.
7. Epictetus *Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus* 1.4.29-32; *LCL* 1:35, 37.

FIRST PART

(Notes to pages 21-38 [1-91])

1. Cf. Vol. 1 [Third Part, Second Section, 3, "Antisthenes and the Foundation of the Cynic School"]. Remember that the edition for references to the testimonies and the fragments of Diogenes as well as the other ancient Cynics is that contained in G. Giannantoni *Socraticorum reliquiae* (Rome-Naples, 1983) 5B-5N.
2. Diogenes was born at Sinope. His father, Hicesius, was a banker and according to some sources was responsible for having adulterated the coinage and was forced into exile with his family. (Cf. *DL* 6.20; *LCL* 2:23; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.2). According to other sources, Diogenes himself adulterated the coinage (he admitted it) and consequently he was condemned to exile, or before he could be condemned, he fled (ibid.). He stayed for a time at Athens but also at Corinth, where he died. The chronology of Diogenes is fairly controversial. The most reliable dates are, however, those indicated by Diogenes Laertius, who informs us that our philosopher "was old in the 113th Olympiad (328/325 BCE)" (*DL* 6.79; *LCL* 2:81; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.92), that he died "at around 90 years of age" (*DL* 6.76; *LCL* 2:81; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.90), and then right away he

says "he died at Corinth on the same day on which Alexander died in Babylonia [= 323 BCE]" (*DL* 6.79; *LCL* 2:81; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.92). According to some scholars, the information that Diogenes was sold as a slave (cf. *DL* 6.29ff.; *LCL* 2:31; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.70) is an invention of the Cynic Menippus (cf. below, note 75). The ancient sources say clearly that Diogenes was a follower of Antisthenes and they are quite creditable (cf. Giannantoni *SR* 5B.17-24). Diogenes writes about the meeting between the two philosophers: "On reaching Athens he met Antisthenes, but because he never accepted students Antisthenes rejected him but by sheer persistence Diogenes wore him down. Once when Antisthenes raised his staff to hit him Diogenes offered him his head to strike, saying, 'Hit, you will not find wood hard enough to keep me away from you, so long as I think you have something to say.' From that time on he became his auditor and exile as he was, he set out to live a life of moderation" (*DL* 6.21; *LCL* 2:25; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.19). Doubts about the reliability of these sources are aroused by those scholars who deny that Antisthenes was the founder of Cynicism. Cf. D. R. Dudley *A History of Cynicism* (London 1937, reprinted Hildesheim, 1967²), 1ff. and 23ff.; but this thesis is not correct, as we have previously pointed out in Vol. 1 [Third Part, Second Section, 3,5]. Antisthenes was the founder of Cynicism, while Diogenes lived it radically. It can also be said that Antisthenes is the founder of Cynic theory and Diogenes of Cynicism in practice, but the essential nucleus of the thought of Diogenes (and even some of his behavioral attitudes) is already present in Antisthenes. There are many writings attributed to him, none of which have come down to us (cf. Giannantoni *SR* 5B.117ff.).

3. Cf. *DL* 6.41; *LCL* 2:43; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.272.
4. *DL* 6.44; *LCL* 2:45; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.322.
5. Cf. Vol. 1, Third Part, First Section, 2.2, 3.
6. Cf. Vol. 1, Third Part, Second Section, 2.1.
7. *DL* 6.27, 58, 65, 70; *LCL* 2:29, 59, 61, 67, 71, 73; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.291, 319, 374, 397.
8. Cf. section 3, pp. 25-6.
9. *DL* 6.73; *LCL* 2:75; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.370.
10. The criticism of Diogenes is the same which previously moved Antisthenes (cf. Vol. 1, Third Part, Second Section, 2.1): "As Plato was discoursing about the Ideas and using *tableness* and *cupness*, Diogenes said: 'I see, Plato, the table and the cup; but the Idea of table and of cup I do not see.' And Plato said: 'You are correct. You have eyes to see the cup and the table. But you do not have the mind

to see the Ideas of table and cup'" (*DL* 6.53; *LCL* 2:56; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.62).

11. *DL* 6.64; *LCL* 2:65, 67; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.267.
12. *DL* 6.22; *LCL* 2:25; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.172.
13. *DL* 6.22; *LCL* 2:25; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.174.
14. He said that all tragic curses were upon him insofar as he was "without a city, without a roof, dead to his country, a beggar, a wanderer who searches for his daily bread" (*DL* 6.38; *LCL* 2:39, 41; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.263). But he said this with evident irony, since for him these misfortunes did not constitute unnatural privations, but the natural condition of man when he is rid of superfluity.
15. *DL* 6.71; *LCL* 2:73; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.291.
16. His attitude of confrontation and unconventional behavior is most frequently dictated by a frustrated desire for unlimited freedom.
17. *DL* 6.69; *LCL* 2:71; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.473.
18. *DL* 6.43; *LCL* 2:45; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.27.
19. *DL* 6.69; *LCL* 2:71; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.147.
20. *DL* 6.58; *LCL* 2:59, 61; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.186.
21. *DL* 6.69; *LCL* 2:71; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.147.
22. *DL* 6.46; *LCL* 2:47, 49; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.234.
23. *DL* 6.32; *LCL* 2:33, 35; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.236.
24. *DL* 6.69; *LCL* 2:71; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.147 and *DL* 6:46; *LCL* 47, 49; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.234.
25. Cf. Volume 1, Third Part, Second Edition, 2, 3.
26. *DL* 6.72; *LCL* 2:73, 75; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.353.
27. *DL* 6.73; *LCL* 2:75; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.353 and 132.
28. *DL* 6.73; *LCL* 2:75; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.353 and 132.
29. Cf. above, note 7.
30. *DL* 6.70ff.; *LCL* 2:71, 73; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.291 also see *DL* 6.23, 34; *LCL* 2:25, 27 and 2:35, 37; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.174, 176.
31. *DL* 6.66; *LCL* 2:67, 69; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.318.
32. *DL* 6.104; *LCL* 2:107, 109; Giannantoni *SR* 5A.135.
33. *DL* 6.29; *LCL* 2:31; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.297.
34. *DL* 6.37; *LCL* 2:39; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.158.
35. *DL* 6.38; *LCL* 2:39, 41; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.33.
36. *DL* 6.54; *LCL* 2:55, 57; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.200.
37. *DL* 6.72; *LCL* 2:73, 75; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.353.
38. *DL* 6.72; *LCL* 2:73, 75; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.353.
39. *DL* 6.63; *LCL* 2:65; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.355.

40. *DL* 6.37; *LCL* 2:39; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.344.
41. *DL* 6.46; *LCL* 2:47, 49; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.234.
42. *DL* 6.37; *LCL* 2:39; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.344; cf. also *DL* 6.72; *LCL* 2:73, 75; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.353.
43. *DL* 6.60; *LCL* 2:61, 63; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.143.
44. *DL* 6.55; *LCL* 2:57; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.143.
45. *DL* 6.78; *LCL* 2:81; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.108.
46. Lucian *Vitarum auctio* 7-11; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.80.
47. Crates was born at Thebes. According to a chronological indication referred to by Diogenes Laertius (6.87; *LCL* 2:91; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.2), he "lived in the 113th Olympiad," 328-325 BCE. Because our sources speak of a relationship between Crates and Stilpo (*DL* 2.117; *LCL* 1:245, 247; Giannantoni *SR* 2O.6) and Menedemus of Eretria (*DL* 2.131 and 6.91; *LCL* 1:263 and 2:95; Giannantoni *SR* 3F.11; cf. above pp. 50ff. and 55ff.), it is probable that our philosopher lived at the beginning of the third century BCE. He composed *Poetic Jokes* (παίγνια), a *Diary*, *Letters*, and *Tragedies*, which were widely known. In addition to indirect evidence, some actual fragments have come down to us which give us a lively enough picture of Crates's thought and art. (These fragments are collected in E. Diehl *Anthologia lyrica graeca* 1. *Poetae elegiaci* [Leipzig, 1949^3] and in H. Diels *Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta* 1 [Berlin, 1901] 217ff., and recently in Giannantoni *SR* 5H.67-87).
48. *DL* 6.87; *LCL* 2:91; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.4.
49. *DL* 6.93; *LCL* 2:97; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.31. In this regard the polemical position of Crates in opposition to Aristotle is a typical one. In the *Protrepticus* Aristotle is presented as saying to Themison, King of Cyprus, that no one had more disposition to philosophize than he, insofar as he was rich and famous, whereas Crates held exactly the opposite position. Let us read the testimony in this regard, because it is clear enough: "Zeno said that Crates, as he sat in a shoemaker's workshop, read aloud the *Protrepticus* which Aristotle had written to Themison, King of Cyprus, saying that no one had greater wealth, so that he could well afford to spend money on philosophy and he had a reputation as well. As he read, the shoemaker listened and he went on with his stitching and Crates said: 'I think, Philiscus, that I shall dedicate a Protrepticus to you. For I see that you have more advantages for the study of philosophy than were his for whom Aristotle wrote'" (Giannantoni *SR* 5H.42; Aristotle *Protrepticus* frag. 1.26 Ross).
50. *DL* 7.93; *LCL* 2:201; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.31.
51. *DL* 6.98; *LCL* 2:101, 103; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.80.

52. *DL* 6.86; *LCL* 2:89, 91; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.74.
53. Marcus Aurelius *Recollections* 6.13.
54. *DL* 6.86; *LCL* 2:89, 91; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.83.
55. The structure of the argument has been transmitted by the Cynic Teles (of whom we will speak below), who expressly attributes it to Crates (cf. O. Hense *Teletis reliquiae* [Hildesheim, 1969²], 5.49.4ff.; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.45.
56. *DL* 6.86; *LCL* 2:89, 91; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.79.
57. *DL* 6.96; *LCL* 2:99, 101; Giannantoni *SR* 5I.1.
58. *DL* 6.88; *LCL* 2:91, 93; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.19.
59. *DL* 6.93; *LCL* 2:97; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.26.
60. *DL* 6.86; *LCL* 2:89, 91; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.18.
61. Apuleius *Florida* 22 (42, 20ff. Helm); Giannantoni *SR* 5H.18.
62. Plutarch *Quaest. conv.* 2.1.6.632E; *LCL* 8:127; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.18.
63. Julian *Discourses* 9(6).201b-c; cf. also what is said at 200b Rochefort; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.17.
64. Plutarch *De an. tranq.* 4.466e; *LCL* 6:179; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.46.
65. Julian *Discourses* 7.213b-d; 9(6).199d-200a; Giannantoni *SR* 5H.84.
66. Cf. *DL* 6.73; *LCL* 2:75; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.128; *DL* 6.80; *LCL* 2:81, 83; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.128.
67. Cf. Strabo 15.715ff.; Giannantoni *SR* 5C.1-4.
68. *DL* 6.84; *LCL* 2:87, 89; Giannantoni *SR* 5C.1.
69. Monimus was born at Syracuse. He was in the service of a banker of Corinth but he was a strong supporter of the ideas of Diogenes to the point of feigning madness in order to be dismissed by the banker from his service. He also followed Crates (*DL* 6.82; *LCL* 2:85; Giannantoni *SR* 5G.1).
70. *DL* 6.83; *LCL* 2:85, 87; Giannantoni *SR* 5G.1.
71. On Metrocles, cf. *DL* 6.94; *LCL* 2:97, 99; Giannantoni *SR* 5L.1.
72. *DL* 6.95; *LCL* 2:99; *Adesp.* frag. 285 Nauck; Giannantoni *SR* 5L.1.
73. *DL* 6.95; *LCL* 2:99; Giannantoni *SR* 5L.1.
74. Diogenes Laertius (4.46-58; *LCL* 1:423-35; I. F. Kindstrand *Bion of Borysthenes. A Collection of Fragments with Introduction and Commentary* [Uppsala, 1976], 103ff. hereinafter *BB*) lists Bion among the Academics insofar as he began as a follower of the Academic Crates. But Diogenes himself informs us that "in succession (Bion) turned to the Cynic discipline and took on the cloak and wallet" (*DL* 4.51; *LCL* 1:429; Kindstrand *BB* T19), even if he immediately adds that "only with this exterior change did he yield to the fundamental principle of insensibility ἀπάθεια" (4.52; *LCL*

1:429, 431; Kindstrand *BB* T19). He also followed Theodorus, the Cyrenaic philosopher of whom we will speak shortly (cf. immediately, pages 42-43 of the text). He was quite handy at ridiculing anything, using even vulgar expressions. Son of a slave and a prostitute, he did not hesitate to make known to all the circumstances of his birth, thus showing that he considered it as indifferent, if not even as positive, according to the Cynic attitude of *anaideia*. Here is how Diogenes Laertius (4.46ff.; *LCL* 1:423, 425; Kindstrand *BB* F1A) describes him: "Bion was from Borysthenes by birth; who his parents were, and what his circumstances were before he took to philosophy, he himself revealed to Antigonus. In fact when the king asked him: 'Who among men are you and from where? What is your city and your parents?' (Homer *Odyssey* 10.5.325). Bion, knowing that he had already been maligned, gave this reply to him: 'My father was a freedman, who cleans his nose on his sleeve—meaning to say that he was a fish-dealer—a native of Borysthenes, not having a face to show, but only the writings on his face, a sign of the severity of his master. My mother was the kind of woman that a man like my father would marry, she came from a brothel. Then my father did not pay his taxes and was sold together with all his family. And I was young and, not lacking in looks, was purchased by a certain rhetorician, who at his death left me his goods. And I burned his books, scraped everything together and came to Athens where I concerned myself with philosophy. 'This is the stock and this the blood from which I can boast to have sprung' (Homer *Iliad* 6.211). Such is my story, such that Persaeus and Philonides should leave off recounting it. Judge me by my own words." On Bion, cf. O. Hense *Teletis reliquae* xlviff., Dudley *HC* 62-69. And especially I. F. Kindstrand *BB* in which the fragments are collected and arranged. This is the edition used in our references [see above in this note].

75. Diogenes Laertius writes that Menippus was (6.99; *LCL* 2:103) "by descent from Phoenicia, he was a slave, as Achaicus says in his *Ethics*. Diocles further states that his master was from Pontus and was named Baton." Among his works in which the derisory and burlesque spirit abound we can note *Nekyia*, or the *Subterranean World* (in which probably he parodied Homer, evoking the spirit of his adversaries and ridiculing them), and the *Diogenes for Sale*. That Menippus was a slave from the beginning was an invention consistent with the legend of the sale of Diogenes as a slave, which exemplified that being a slave is an indifferent thing for a wise man. This thesis is maintained by modern scholars. It is not impossible *per se*, but it is not a demonstrable one (on Menippus, see D. R. Dudley *A History of Cynicism* [London, 1937; Hildesheim, 1967²] 69-74; hereinafter *HC*).

76. Cercidas lived in the second half of the third century BCE. He was well-known as a politician in his native city of Megolapolis. He wrote *Iambics* and *Meliambics*, of which a few fragments have survived. Cf. Dudley *HC* 74-84.
77. Teles deals with Cynic themes with very little originality. The fragments of Teles preserved by Stobaeus are very consistent and chiefly useful in the reconstruction of the thought of other Cynics to whom he expressly refers. See the excellent modern edition of his fragments in the above cited edition of O. Hense.
78. Menedemus lived in the second half of the third century BCE. We know very little about him. Diogenes Laertius (6.102; *LCL* 2:105, 107; Giannantoni *SR* 5N.1) tells us that he was a follower of Colotes of Lampsacus, an Epicurean against whom he argued.
79. The prayer that we quoted above on page 34 of the text is a most eloquent proof of this conclusion.
80. *DL* 4.53; *LCL* 1:431; Kindstrand *BB* T3.
81. *DL* 6.99; *LCL* 2:103.
82. Cf. Cercidas frag. 1 Diehl.
83. Cf. *DL* 4.47, 49, 53ff.; *LCL* 1:425, 427, 431; Kindstrand *BB* 103ff.
84. Cf. Cercidas frags. 2 and 9 Diehl.
85. Cf. D.R. Dudley *HC* 69, 75ff.
86. E.g., *DL* 6.37; LCL 2:39; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.326; *DL* 6.42; *LCL* 2:43, 45; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.334.
87. *DL* 4.54ff.; *LCL* 1:431, 433; Kindstrand *BB* T3.
88. On the characteristics of Cynic literature and its influence see Dudley *HC* 121ff. Kindstrand *BB* passim, seems to have an opposite view.
89. On Meleagro see Dudley *HC* 121ff.
90. Cicero *De officiis* 1.41.148; *LCL* 141; Giannantoni *SR* 5B.515.
91. Cf. *DL* 6.104; *LCL* 2:107, 109; Giannantoni *SR* 5A.135.

(*Notes to pages* 39-44 [1-28])

1. Cf. Vol. 1, Third Part, Second Section, 3.1.fin. The edition to which we refer for the fragments of the Cyrenaics is the new one of Giannantoni contained in the above-mentioned *Socraticorum Reliquiae*.
2. Eusebius *Praep. evang.* 14.18.31.763d; Giannantoni *SR* 4A.173.
3. Eusebius *Praep. evang.* 32.764a-b; Giannantoni *SR* 4B.5.
4. Concerning Hegesias and his followers there is very little testimony extant, but among the fullest is that of Diogenes Laertius (2.93-96; *LCL* 1:223, 225; Giannantoni *SR* 4F.1). Hegesias was a contemporary

of King Ptolemy I, which is derived from the fact that he was one of those who was forbidden to teach because his students were being moved to suicide, as Cicero tells us in his *Tusc. disp.* 1.34.83; *LCL* 97, 99; Giannantoni *SR* 4F.3.

5. *DL* 2.93; *LCL* 1:223; Giannantoni *SR* 4F.1.
6. *DL* 2.94; *LCL* 1:223; Giannantoni *SR* 4F.1.
7. *DL* 2.94; *LCL* 1:223; Giannantoni *SR* 4F.1.
8. *DL* 2.94; *LCL* 1:223; Giannantoni *SR* 4F.1.
9. *DL* 2.94; *LCL* 1:223; Giannantoni *SR* 4F.1.
10. Cf. Epiphanes *Adv. Haeres.* 3.2.9; Giannantoni *SR* 4F.2. Cicero informs us also that Hegesias wrote a book entitled *For Those Who Wish to Kill Themselves by Fasting* (Ἀποκαρτερῶν) "in which a man, at the point of dying by fasting, is saved by his friends, and in response to them he makes a list of all the evils of life" (*Tusc. disp.* 1.34, 84; *LCL* 99; Giannantoni *SR* 4F.4).
11. *DL* 2.95; *LCL* 1:223, 225; Giannantoni *SR* 4F.1.
12. *DL* 2.95; *LCL* 1:223, 225; Giannantoni *SR* 4F.1.
13. *DL* 2.95; *LCL* 1:223, 225; Giannantoni *SR* 4F.1.
14. Concerning Anniceris we have very little evidence, but the most solid is that of Diogenes Laertius (2.96ff.; *LCL* 1:225; Giannantoni *SR* 4G.3).
15. *DL* 2.96; *LCL* 1:225; Giannantoni *SR* 4G.3.
16. *DL* 2.97; *LCL* 1:225, 227; Giannantoni *SR* 4G.3.
17. Theodorus was a follower of Anniceris (*DL* 2.98; *LCL* 1:227; Giannantoni *SR* 4H.13). Expelled from Cyrene, probably for political reasons, he went to Athens, where he stayed for a certain time. Thence he returned to Cyrene, where he lived until his death and enjoyed great honors (2.103; *LCL* 1:231; Giannantoni *SR* 4H.13). He was a friend of famous and powerful men like Demetrius of Phalerum, who saved him from a charge of atheism (2.101; *LCL* 1:229; Giannantoni *SR* 4H.13), and of King Ptolemy, son of Nagus, who welcomed him at his court (2.102; *LCL* 1:229, 231; Giannantoni *SR* 4H.13). Concerning his views there are numerous testimonies (about fifty), among which the most illuminating are those of Diogenes Laertius (2.97-103; *LCL* 1:225, 227, 229, 231; Giannantoni *SR* passim).
18. *DL* 2.98; *LCL* 1:227; Giannantoni *SR* 4H.13.
19. *DL* 2.98; *LCL* 1:227; Giannantoni *SR* 4H.13.
20. *DL* 2.99; *LCL* 1:227, 229; Giannantoni *SR* 4H.13.
21. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.43.102; *LCL* 123; Giannantoni *SR* 4H.8.
22. Philo of Alexandria *Quod omn. prob. lib. sit.* 129; Giannantoni *SR* 4H.9.

23. *DL* 2.97; *LCL* 1:225, 227; Giannantoni *SR* 4H.13.
24. Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.1.2; *LCL* 3, 5; Giannantoni *SR* 4H.19. See in addition all the evidence from testimonies 13-25 of *SR* of Giannantoni. Actually, Gomperz (*PG* 2:707 n. 1) has said that in spite of the tone of the statements of Diogenes and of Cicero it cannot be said that Theodorus had had the aim of purely and simply negating belief in God, but rather, as Sextus Empiricus said (*Adv. math.* 9.55; *LCL* 3:33; Giannantoni *SR* 4H.23), that he had destroyed "all that *the Greeks had said about* deity." It is difficult to see how the negation of *all* that the Greeks had said about deity could still leave room for some belief in God. It is clear, in any case, that the ancients did not see, in the work *Concerning the Gods* by Theodorus, any positive or small opening in the sense suggested by Gomperz.
25. Cf. above, pages 36-37.
26. Many scholars include Evemerus of Messina in Sicily, who lived between the fourth and third century BCE, as a follower of Theodorus and of the Cyrenaic school. He wrote *Sacred Writings* (translated into Latin by the poet Ennius). But this connection was contested for some time with good reason. Gomperz writes (*PG* 2.709 n. 2): "We cannot agree with the tradition which places Evemerus in the Cyrenaic school which is still made without any kind of reservation or restriction. 'There does not exist the smallest shred of evidence—as Erwin Rohde also observed from that period—speaking in favor of such an assumption' (*Der Griechische Roman*^{2} 241 n. 1)." Evemerus does not seem to deserve the epithet of "the famous Greek rationalist" given by Zeller (*DPG* 2.1.343), since his work was a fiction and the idea that the Gods would have deified men blends into the fantastic and is abundantly mixed with fable.
27. Zeller *DPG* 2.1.383.
28. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.34.83; *LCL* 99; Giannantoni *SR* 4F.3.

(Notes to pp. 45-53 [1-37])

1. Vol. 1, Third Part, Second Section, 4 1-5. Let us remember that the reference edition for this philosopher is that of Döring, to which may be added the edition by Giannantoni *Socraticorum Reliquiae*, cited many times, from 2A to 2S.
2. Gomperz *PG* 2:611.
3. Eubulides, born at Miletus (*DL* 2.108; *LCL* 1:237; frag. 50 Döring; Giannantoni *SR* 2B.1). He was a contemporary of Aristotle (but was probably older than him) and argued with him many times (cf. frags. 59-62 Döring; Giannantoni *SR* 2B.8-11).
4. *DL* 2.108; *LCL* 1:237; frag. 51A Döring; Giannantoni *SR* 2B.1.

5. Gomperz *PG* 2:634ff.
6. Cf. Vol. 1, First Part, Fourth Section, 3, 3.
7. Cf. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.16.49; 28.92ff.; Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.416; *LCL* 2:223; Sextus Empiricus *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 2.253; *LCL* 1:319, 321; Oratio *Epist.* 2.1.45-47.
8. Cf. Aristotle *Soph. Ref.* 25.180b2ff.; Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.29.95. We agree with the interpretation of A. Levi *Le dottrine filosofiche della scuola di Megara* 484ff.
9. Cf. Lucian *Vitarum auctio* 22; frag. 287 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
10. Cf. *DL* 7.187; *LCL* 2:295, 297 and *DL* 2.35; *LCL* 1:267; Gellius *Noctes Atticae* 6.2.9-10; *LCL* 2:9; also Gellius *Noctes Atticae* 18.2.9; *LCL* 3:301.
11. Cf. Vol. 1, Second Part, Second Section, 6.1.
12. *DL* 2.109; *LCL* 1:237, 239; frag. 73 Döring; Giannantoni *SR* 2C.1. Alexinus was a contemporary of Zeno against whom he argued (cf. *DL* 2.109; *LCL* 1:237, 239; frag. 92 Döring, cf. frag. 117).
13. Diodorus Cronos was a disciple of Apollonius who was also called Cronos, who was himself a disciple of Apollonius (*DL* 2.111; *LCL* 1:239, 241; frag. 96 Döring; Giannantoni *SR* 2F.1).
14. Cf. Vol. 2, Second Part, Second Section, 1.9.
15. Aristotle *Met.* Θ.3.1046b29-32; frag. 130A Döring; Giannantoni *SR* 2B.15.
16. Aristotle, *Met.* Θ.3.1046b32ff.
17. Aristotle *Met.* Θ.4, passim.
18. Cicero *De fato* 7.13; frag. 123A Döring; Giannantoni *SR* 2F.25.
19. Cicero *De fato* 9.17; frag. 132A Döring; Giannantoni *SR* 2F.25. See also Epictetus *Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus* 2.19.1-5; *LCL* 1:359, 361; Giannantoni *SR* 2F.24.
20. Cf. Levi *Le dottrine* 492ff.
21. Concerning this problem cf. P. M. Schuhl *Le dominateur et les possibles* (Paris, 1960).
22. Cf. Aristotle *Met.* Θ.3 and 4 passim.
23. Stilpo was born at Megara (*DL* 2.113; *LCL* 1:241, 243; frag. 147 Döring; Giannantoni *SR* 2O.2). He flourished probably toward the end of the fourth century BCE. Döring conjectures that Stilpo was alive between about 360 and 280 BCE (p. 140).
24. Simplicius *In Arist. Phys.* 120.12-17; frag. 198 Döring; Giannantoni *SR* 2O.30.
25. Cf. Plutarch *Adv. colot.* 22.1119c-d, 23.1120a-b; *LCL* 14:261, 263 and 265, 267; frag. 197 Döring; Giannantoni *SR* 2O.29.

26. *DL* 2.119; *LCL* 1:247, 249; frag. 199 Döring; Giannantoni *SR* 2O.27.
27. Cf. Gomperz *PG* 2:644ff.
28. On them see Döring *DM* 62ff. and 157ff.; what Levi says seems to us to still be convincing (*Le dottrine* 476 and note 2).
29. Plato *Parmenides* 131E-132B.
30. Levi *Le dottrine* 475ff.
31. Cf. Seneca *Epist.* 9.1-3; *LCL* 1:43, 45; frag. 195 Döring; Giannantoni *SR* 2O.33.
32. Cf. Zeller *DPG* 2.1.273ff.
33. Cf. the following note.
34. Levi *Le dottrine* 472.
35. *DL* 2.113ff.; *LCL* 1:241-243; Giannantoni *SR* 2O.3.
36. Plato *Philebus* 14C.
37. Cf. Aristotle *Met.* Θ.3; Giannantoni *SR* 2B.15.

(Notes to pp. 55-56 [1-9])

1. Cf. Vol. 1. Third Part, Second Section, 5. Remember that the edition for the references for these philosophers is that contained in G. Giannantoni *Socraticorum Reliquiae*, cited many times, from 3A to 3H.
2. *DL* 2.105; *LCL* 1:233, 235; Giannantoni *SR* 3A.1.
3. *DL* 2.125-26; *LCL* 1:257; Giannantoni *SR* 3F.1.
4. *DL* 2.134; *LCL* 1:265, 267; Giannantoni *SR* 3F.18.
5. *DL* 2.135; *LCL* 1:267; Giannantoni *SR* 3F.18.
6. Simplicius *In Arist. Categ.* 216.12-14 Kalbfleisch; Giannantoni *SR* 3F.19.
7. *DL* 2.129; *LCL* 1:261; Giannantoni *SR* 3F.17.
8. *DL* 2.136; *LCL* 1:267, 269; Giannantoni *SR* 3F.13.
9. *DL* 2.130; *LCL* 1:261, 263; Giannantoni *SR* 3F.8.

(Notes to pp. 59-61 [1-7])

1. By saying this we do not want to argue, as is obvious, with those scholars who by exaggerating the analogy between the Academy and the modern university think that it is possible to find characteristics corresponding to those of the modern university. See in this regard the sound observations of H. Cherniss *The Riddle of the Early Academy* (Berkeley, 1945; reissued New York: Russell & Russell, 1965), 61ff.
2. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff *Platon* 208ff.

3. Jaeger *Aristotle* 23ff. [We will always refer to the Robinson translation and its pagination. Ed.]; cf. Plato *Letters* 7.341C-E.
4. Jaeger *Aristotle* 18.
5. Cf. in this regard Jaeger himself *Aristotle* 16-17 n. 2.
6. More exactly, the Academy developed unilaterally certain mystical-religious hints of the *Laws*, separating almost all of them from the metaphysical context of Platonism.
7. For bibliographical references consult volume five (forthcoming) *s.v.* Platonism.

(Notes to pp. 63-64 [1-6])

1. Eudoxus was born at Cnidus between the final decade of the fifth century and the first decade of the fourth century (about the chronological indications relative to Eudoxus our sources are discordant; for a discussion of the dates see F. Lasserre *Die Fragmente des Eudoxus von Knidos* [Berlin, 1966], 137-39. From Cnidus he went to Athens, attracted by the fame of Socrates (*DL* 8.86; *LCL* 2:401; frag. T7 Lasserre). He stayed in Egypt, where he had contacts with the priests and gained an acquaintance with their wisdom. Hence he founded a school at Cyzicum. From Cyzicum he left again for Athens with numerous disciples. He spent the last years of his life in his homeland. Some scholars today tend to deny that Eudoxus was admitted into the Platonic Academy. Lasserre writes: "Surely he did not enter the Academy and therefore did not study there" (p. 41). But this is certainly an extreme sceptical hypothesis. In fact Eudoxus a) has a doctrine of the Ideas; b) Aristotle speaks of him as one of the Platonists; c) his thesis on pleasure provoked a reaction in the Academy which is understandable only on the hypothesis that he, at least for a certain period, was part of the school; d) many sources confirm the fact that Eudoxus was a listener of Plato's (cf. the evidence in Zeller *DPG* 2.1.993 n. 3). It is true nevertheless that the collaboration between Plato and Eudoxus did not last and that disagreements arose which contributed to a break (cf. in addition, the explicit indications of Diogenes, 8.87; *LCL* 2:401, 403).
2. Aristotle *Met.* A.9.991a14ff. and M.5.1079b19ff.; frag. D1 Lasserre.
3. Alexander of Aphrodisias *In Arist. Met.* 79.17-19 Hayduck; frag. D2 Lasserre.
4. On the problem see: Reale *Aristotele La Metafisica* 1:199ff. Berti *La filosofia del primo Aristotele* 232-39; Lasserre *DFEK* 149ff.
5. Aristotle *E.N.* K.10.2.1172b9ff.; frag. D3 Lasserre as well as frag. D4.
6. Cf. above, note 1.

(Notes to pp. 65-66 [1-9])

1. Heraclides was born at Heraclea in Pontus of a noble and well-to-do family. He was a contemporary of Speusippus. If it is true, as has been said (Suda *s.v.*; frags. 2 and 17 Wehrli), that Plato appointed Heraclides scholarch of the school during his Sicilian journey, this happened during the last journey of the three he made, the one about 361 BCE. At this period, in order to be given such a charge, Heraclides could not have been very young. If, as has been handed down (*DL* 5.86; *LCL* 1:539; frag. 3 Wehrli), Heraclides was a listener of Aristotle's, this has to be reported, as has been noted by some scholars, to the activity of Aristotle as teaching rhetoric when he was in the Academy. The writings attributed to Heraclides would seem to be "excellent for their beautiful style and the dignity of their arguments": Diogenes affirms it (5.86; *LCL* 1:539), and gives us a long list of titles (5.86-88; *LCL* 1:539, 541; cf. frag. 22 Wehrli). After the death of Speusippus, disappointed at not being scholarch, he left the Academy and Athens and returned to his native land where he died in a way which we will describe below (cf. note 8). Diogenes lists Heraclides among the followers of Aristotle, but it is very ambiguous because Heraclides could hear, as we said, only the young Aristotle when he still was an Academic and not yet the teacher of the Peripatos. The most recent editor of his fragments includes him in the school of Aristotle (F. Wehrli *Die Schule des Aristoteles* Heft 7: *Herakleides Pontikos* [Basel, 1953; 1969^2]). Actually, in these fragments there is nothing recalling the Peripatos, while there is much evidence linking Heraclides to the Academy.
2. D. Pesce *Idea, Numero e Anima*, 50.
3. Cf. *Herakleides* frags. 118-23 Wehrli.
4. Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.13.34; *LCL* 37; *Herakleides* frag. 111 Wehrli.
5. *Herakleides* frags. 90-103 Wehrli.
6. *Herakleides* frags. 68-70 Wehrli.
7. *Herakleides* frags. 73-75 Wehrli.
8. Diogenes Laertius (5.89ff.; *LCL* 1:543, 545; *Herakleides* frag. 16 Wehrli) tells this story taken from the work of Demetrius of Magnesia: "As a boy and when he grew up he kept a pet snake and, being at the point of death, he ordered a trusted servant to conceal the corpse but to place a snake on his bier that he might seem to have departed to the Gods. All this was done. But while the citizens were in the very midst of the procession and were loud in their praise, the snake, hearing the uproar, popped up out of the shroud, creating widespread confusion. Subsequently, however, all was

revealed and they saw Heraclides not as he appeared, but as he really was." Diogenes (5.91; *LCL* 1:545, 547; *Herakleides* frag. 14a Wehrli) also reports an even more fantastic second version which he took from Hermippus: "But Hermippus recounts that when the region was devastated by a famine the people of Heraclea asked the Pythian priestess for relief. Heraclides bribed not only the sacred envoys but the aforementioned Pythian priestess to reply that they would be rid of the calamity if Heraclides, the son of Euthyphro, were crowned with a crown of gold in his lifetime and after his death received the honors of a hero. When the so-called response was delivered its authors did not realize any of the advantages because Heraclides was crowned in the theater and died of a stroke and the envoys to the oracle were stoned to death. Moreover at the same time the Pythian priestess, after she had gone to the shrine and taken her seat, was bitten by one of the snakes and died instantly" (trans. H. Tredennick with slight changes).

9. Cf. *Herakleides* frags. 104-17 Wehrli, and commentary 94ff.

(Notes to pp. 67-71 [1-27])

1. Speusippus was the son of Potone, sister of Plato. He succeeded Plato in 347/346 and headed the Academy for eight years (*DL* 4.1; *LCL* 1:375), that is, up to 339/338 BCE. It seems that being old and sick he spontaneously put an end to his life (*DL* 4.3; *LCL* 1:377). The list of his writings is given by Diogenes 4.4-5; *LCL* 1:377, 379. P. Lang has collected the fragments which are extant (*De Speusippi academici scriptis, Accedunt fragmenta* [Bonn, 1911; Frankfurt, 1964²]). This edition is now superseded by that of M. Isnardi Parente *Speusippo, Frammenti* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1980), with translation and very full commentary and by the edition of L. Tăran *Speusippus of Athens. A Critical Study with a Collection of the Related Texts and Commentary* (Leiden: Brill, 1981). We will cite the numbering of Lang's edition, as well as those of Isnardi Parente and Tăran, in our notes.
2. Aristotle *Met.* M.8.1083a20ff.; frag. 42d Lang; cf. 42c-d; frags. 73-76 Isnardi Parente; frags. 31-34 Tăran.
3. Aristotle *Met.* M.9.1086a2ff.; frag. 42e Lang; frag. 77 Isnardi Parente; frag. 35 Tăran.
4. Cf. Aristotle *Met.* Λ.1.1069a33ff.; M.1.1076a19ff.; M.6.1080b11ff.; frags. 42a-c Lang; frags. 73-75 Isnardi Parente; frags. 31-33 Tăran.
5. Aristotle *Met.* Z.2.1028b18ff.; frag. 33a Lang; cf. 33b-d; frags. 48-51 Isnardi Parenti; frags. 29a-c Tăran.

6. Aristotle *Met.* Z.2.1028b18ff.; frag. 33a Lang; cf. 33b-d; frags. 48-51 Isnardi Parenti; frags. 29a-c Tárán.
7. Cf. Aristotle *Met.* Λ.10.1075b37ff.; N.3.1090b13ff.; frags. 33e, 50 Lang; frags. 52, 86 Isnardi Parente; frags. 30, 37 Tárán.
8. Cf. Aristotle *Met.* N.3.1090b20ff.; frag. 50 Lang; frag. 86 Isnardi Parente; frag. 37 Tárán.
9. Aristotle *Met.* Λ.10.1075b37ff.; frag. 33e Lang; frag. 52 Isnardi Parente; frag. 30 Tárán.
10. Cf. Aristotle *Met.* N.1.1087b4ff.; N.5.1092a35ff.; frags. 48a-b Lang; frags. 82 and 82a Isnardi Parente; frags. 38-39 Tárán.
11. D. Pesce *Idea* 57.
12. D. Pesce *Idea* 57.
13. Aristotle *Met.* M.9.1085a31ff.; frag. 49 Lang; frag. 84 Isnardi Parente; frag. 51 Tárán.
14. Aristotle *Met.* M.9.1085a31ff.; frag. 49 Lang; frag. 84 Isnardi Parente; frag. 51 Tárán.
15. Aristotle *Met.* N.3.1090b13ff.; frag. 50 Lang; frag. 86 Isnardi Parente; frag. 37 Tárán.
16. Aristotle *Met.* Λ.7.1072b30ff.; frag. 34a Lang; cf. frags. 34b-f; frags. 54-58 Isnardi Parente; frags 42-44 Tárán.
17. Aristotle *Met.* N.4.1091b30ff.; frag. 35a Lang; cf. also frags. 35b-e; frags. 64, 65ff., 59 Isnardi Parente; frags. 45a-46b Tárán.
18. Cf. Vol. 2. First Part, Second Section, 1,6; 2,3; plus the Fifth Section, 2 fin.
19. Aetius, quoted in Stobaeus *Anth.* 1.1; Diels *DG* 303b; frag. 38 Lang; frag. 89 Isnardi Parente; frag. 58 Tárán.
20. Cf. Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.13.32; *LCL* 35; Minucius Felix *Octav.* 19.7; frags. 39a-b Lang; frags. 90-91 Isnardi Parente; frags. 56a-b Tárán.
21. With regard to the human soul, it would seem that Speusippus maintained the immortality of all its parts, as Olympiodorus says in his commentary on the *Phaedo* (frag. 55 Lang; frag. 99 Isnardi Parente; frag. 55 Tárán).
22. Cf. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.145; *LCL* 2:81; frag. 29 Lang; frag. 34 Isnardi Parente; frag. 75 Tárán.
23. Aristotle *Post. anal.* B 13.97a6ff.; frag. 31 Lang, cf. also frags. 31b-c; frags. 38-40 Isnardi Parente; frags. 63 a-d Tárán.
24. Cf. H. Cherniss *The Riddle* 37.
25. Speusippus frags. 57-59 Lang; frags. 101-7 Isnardi Parente; frags. 77, 78a-d and 79 Tárán.

26. Speusippus frags. 60a-60i Lang; frags. 108-17 Isnardi Parente; frags 80ff. Táran.
27. Cl. Alex. *Strom.* 2.22.133; frag. 57 Lang; frag. 101 Isnardi Parente; frag. 77 Táran.

(Notes to pp. 73-78 [1-22])

1. Xenocrates was born at Chalcedon, at the beginning of the fourth century. Still young, he went to Athens, where he quickly became a faithful follower of Plato. He went with Plato on one of his journeys to Sicily (*DL* 4.6, 11; *LCL* 1:381 and 385, 387). He assumed the headship of the Academy in 339/338 and held it until 315/314 BCE. He died at eighty-two years of age, according to Diogenes. He was a prolific writer: he wrote works in prose and poetry as well as exhortations of which Diogenes (4.11-14; *LCL* 1:385, 387, 389, 391) gives the titles. He had an adamantine moral character which was greatly admired. Again Diogenes Laertius (4.11; *LCL* 1:385, 387) tells us: "He was absolutely free from pride; more than once during the day he would retire into himself and meditate, and it is said that he gave a whole hour to silence." The fragments which are extant are collected and organized by R. Heinze *Xenokrates, Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente* (Leipzig, 1892; Hildesheim, 1965²) and now edited by M. Isnardi Parente, *Senocrate. Ermodoro, Frammenti* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1982), translation with full commentary and bibliography.
2. *DL* 3.56; *LCL* 1:327.
3. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.16; frag. 1 Heinze; frag. 82 Isnardi Parente.
4. In the catalog of the works of Xenocrates we read almost ten titles of works concerning this issue (cf. frag. 2.55ff. Isnardi Parente).
5. Cf. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.147ff.; *LCL* 2:81; frag. 5 Heinze; frag. 83 Isnardi Parente.
6. Cf. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.147ff.; *LCL* 2:81; frag. 5 Heinze; frag. 83 Isnardi Parente.
7. Aristotle *Met.* Z.2.1028b24ff.; frag. 34 Heinze; cf. again with frag. 34, also other passages given by Heinze; frags. 103ff. Isnardi Parente.
8. Theophrastus *Met.* 6a-b; frag. 26 Heinze, cf. also frags. 27-28; frags. 98-102 Isnardi Parente.
9. Xenocrates frags. 29ff. Heinze; frags. 119 and 104ff. Isnardi Parente.
10. Xenocrates frags. 37-39 Heinze; frags. 117, 118, 260 Isnardi Parente.
11. Xenocrates frags. 54-55 Heinze; frags. 153-60 Isnardi Parente.
12. Xenocrates frags. 60ff. Heinze; frags. 165ff. Isnardi Parente.

13. Xenocrates frags. 70ff. Heinze; frags. 205ff. Isnardi Parente.
14. Aetius *Plac.* 1.7.30; frag. 15 Heinze; frag. 213 Isnardi Parente.
15. Cf. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.149; *LCL* 2:83; frag. 5 Heinze; frag. 83 Isnardi Parente.
16. Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.13.34; *LCL* 37; frag. 17 Heinze; frag. 203 Isnardi Parente.
17. Cf. Aetius *Plac.* 1.7.30; frag. 15 Heinze; frag. 263 Isnardi Parente.
18. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 5.13; frag. 21 Heinze; frag. 220 Isnardi Parente.
19. Cf. frags. 23-25 Heinze; frags. 222-30 Isnardi Parente.
20. Cf. the ample examination of this theme by Heinze *Xenokrates* 78-123.
21. Cf. frags. 76-94 Heinze; frags. 231-51 Isnardi Parente.
22. Plutarch *Adv. Stoic.* 23.1069E; Cicero *De finibus* 4.6.15; *LCL* 407; frags. 78, 79 Heinze; frags. 233, 234 Isnardi Parente.

(Notes to pp. 79-81 [1-13])

1. Polemon succeeded Xenocrates in 315/314 BCE and was head of the Academy up to 270/269 BCE. The edition used in our references for the fragments of Polemon is that of M. Gigante, *Polemonis Academici Fragmenta.* (Naples, 1977). See this edition also in *Rendiconti dell'Accademia di Archeologia Lettere e Belle Arti di Napoli* 51 (1976): 91-144.
2. Cf. *DL* 4.16-17; *LCL* 1:393, 395; frags. 14 and 16 Gigante.
3. Cf. *DL* 4.17; *LCL* 1:395; frag. 108 Gigante.
4. Cf. *DL* 4.18; *LCL* 1:395, 397; frag. 101 Gigante.
5. Cf. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 7.6; Plutarch *Adv. Stoic.* 23.1069E; Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.42.131; *LCL* 637, 639; Cicero *De finibus* 2.11.33ff.; *LCL* 119ff.; frags. 112, 124, 125, 127 Gigante.
6. Cf. frags. 131-37 Gigante.
7. Crates was born at Athens and was first disciple of and then successor to Polemon in 270/269 BCE. He was likely scholarch for only a few years. In addition to philosophical works, his productions were also literary and rhetorical. Diogenes tells us (4.23; *LCL* 1:401): "Crates at his death, according to Apollodorus in the third book of his *Chronology*, left many books: some on philosophy, others on comedy, and speeches delivered to the people or when he was an envoy."
8. *DL* 4.21; *LCL* 1:399.
9. Crantor was born at Soli, in Cilicia. He was a follower of Xenocrates and a companion of the school of Polemon. He must have been close to being a contemporary of Polemon, possibly a little younger. He

was not a scholarch of the Academy because he died before Polemon. Diogenes says (4.24; *LCL* 1:401, 402): "...He was ill and went to the temple of Asclepius where he walked about: people came to him from all parts, believing that he was not to be found there because of illness but because he wished to found a school. Among these was also Arcesilaus, who wanted to be introduced to Polemon....However when he recovered he continued to attend the lectures of Polemon and for this he was admired by many." He left his property to Arcesilaus.

10. Cf. Proclus *In Tim.* 1.76.1ff.; 277.8ff. Diehl.
11. Cf. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 11.51ff.; *LCL* 3:411ff. especially 11.58; *LCL* 3:415.
12. *DL* 4.27; *LCL* 1:405 says that this book was "highly esteemed."
13. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 3.6.12; *LCL* 239, 241.

(Notes to pp. 87-89 [1-4])

1. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* 312.
2. Cf. Cicero *Acad. post.* 1.4.17; *LCL* 427.
3. Cf. *DL* 5.39; *LCL* 1:485, 487. The testimony and fragments of Demetrius are collected by Wehrli *Die Schule des Aristoteles* Heft 4: *Demetrios von Phaleron* (Basel, 1949).
4. *DL* 5.51ff.; *LCL* 1:503ff.

(Notes to pp. 91-99 [1-38])

1. Theophrastus was born on the island of Lesbos, in the city of Eresius. The date of his birth is difficult to determine. The date of his death that Diogenes states (5.58; *LCL* 1:509, 511) on the evidence of Apollodorus must be considered the 123d Olympiad (288/284 BCE). Even Diogenes (5.40; *LCL* 1:487) affirms that he died at eighty-five years of age, which would permit us to fix the date of birth with a relative approximation. But other sources say that he died at ninety-nine years of age and others up to one hundred seven years of age. We have already said that he was a follower and companion of Aristotle up till the period in which the Stagirite taught in Asia Minor. It is not improbable that Theophrastus had, from then onward, always followed Aristotle. In 323/322 he succeeded Aristotle in the task of head of the Peripatos which he held for thirty-five years with great success. He wrote many works, of which Diogenes Laertius (5.42-50; *LCL* 1:489, 491, 493, 495, 497, 499, 501, 503) provides us with a list. Cf. its excellent reconstruction provided by O. Regenbogen in his monograph *Theophrastos* Suppl. 7, 1940 coll., 1363ff. in the *RE* edited by Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll (this book of

Regenbogen is the best monograph about our thinker). The only complete edition of the works of Theophrastus has been done by F. Wimmer *Theophrasti Eresii Opera, quae supersunt, omnia* (Parisiis 1866) (reproduced photostatically at Frankfurt am Main, 1964), which is by now out of date.

2. This brief work of Theophrastus has been studied fully only in modern times: primarily by H. Usener ("Zu Theophrast's metaphysischem Brüchstuck," *Rheinisches Museum* 16 [1861]: 258-81), who also edited an edition (*Theophrasti De prima philosophia libellus* [Bonn, 1890]), and then by Ross (W. D. Ross-F. H. Fobes *Theophrastus Metaphysics, with Translation, Commentary and Introduction* [Oxford, 1929]). We have edited the first Italian version of it with commentary and an introductory monograph (G. Reale *Teofrasto e la sua aporetica metafisica, Saggio di ricostruzione e di interpretazione storico—filosofica con traduzione e commento della "metafisica"* [Brescia, 1964]) in which we maintain an interpretation wholly different from that of Ross. An American edition and translation of this work by J. R. Catan is forthcoming.
3. The interpretation that we give here in concise form depends on the conclusions of our work on Theophrastus cited above in note 2.
4. Cf. This series Vol. 2., Second Part, Second Section, 1ff.; also cf. G. Reale *La Metafisica* 1.10ff., and G. Reale *The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics* trans. J. R. Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), passim.
5. Theophrastus *Metaphysics* 6b17-22, trans. J. R. Catan, and in the work mentioned in note 2 above, cf. further G. Reale *Teofrasto* 138ff.
6. G. Reale *Teofrasto* 140ff.
7. Aristotle *Met.* Z.1.1028b2-7.
8. Cf. G. Reale *Teofrasto* 144ff.
9. Theophrastus *Met.* 10a5-9.
10. Theophrastus *Met.* 7b22ff.
11. Theophrastus *Met.* 10a9-19.
12. G. Reale *Teofrasto*, 151ff.
13. Theophrastus *Met.* 11b24-12a11.
14. See the bibliography concerning the argument in G. Reale *Teofrasto* 157 n. 93.
15. Theophrastus *Met.* 7a19-b5.
16. Theophrastus *Met.* 10b16-11a1.
17. Theophrastus *Met.* 11a13-18.
18. Theophrastus *Met.* 11b2-21.
19. Cf. also the conclusions of R. Mondolfo *L'infinito nel pensiero dell'*

antichità classica (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1956), 158ff.

20. A fine analysis of the physics of Theophrastus is contained in the volume of P. Steinmetz *Die Physik des Theophrast* (Berlin-Zürich: Bad Homburg, 1964).
21. Concerning the arguments see: E. Barbotin *La theorie aristotelicienne* (Louvain-Paris: 1954) (it also contains an edition of the fragments of the psychology in a French translation), and G. Movia *Anima e intelletto, ricerche sulla psicologia peripatetica da Teofrasto a Cratippo* (Padua, 1968).
22. G. Movia *Anima* 61ff.
23. Themistius *In Arist. De Anima* 108.22ff. Heinze.
24. Cf. Marcel de Corte *La doctrine de l'Intelligence chez Aristote* (Paris, 1934) 58.
25. Simplicius *In Phys.* 964.29ff. Diels.
26. A careful and systematic reexamination of the fragments and testimony concerning the logic of Theophrastus has been done by I. M. Bochenski *La logique de theophraste* (Fribourg en Suisse, 1947).
27. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias *In Arist. Anal. pr.* 69.26ff.; Bochenski *La logique*, 56ff.
28. Alexander of Aphrodisias *In Arist. anal. pr.* 67-102.
29. Cf. texts and discussion in Bochenski *La logique* 103-20.
30. I.M. Bochenski *La logique* 127.
31. *The Characters* is a work of Theophrastus of great length which has been read assiduously over the centuries, especially outside of the circle of professional philosophers, as proved by the numerous editions and various translations into modern languages.
32. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 5.9.24; *LCL* 449, 451.
33. Cf. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 5.30.85; *LCL* 513.
34. Aristotle *E.N.* A.8.1099a31.
35. Aristotle *E.N.* A.10.1101a7ff.
36. Aristotle *E.N.* H.13.1153b17-21.
37. Cf. Zeller-Plebe, 404.
38. Porphyry *De abstinentia* 3.25, 2.20ff.

(Notes to pp. 101-2 [1-13])

1. Eudemus was born at Rhodes. The tradition does not provide us with chronological data sufficient to establish the dates of his birth or death. He must have been about the age of Theophrastus. After Theophrastus became scholarch in the Peripatos, Eudemus probably returned to Rhodes. The fragments and testimony about Eudemus

are collected and commented on by F. Wehrli *Die Schule der Aristoteles* Heft 3. *Eudemos von Rhodos* (Basel, 1955; 1969[2]).

2. Cf. *Eudemos* frags. 7-24 Wehrli.
3. Cf. Simplicius *In Arist. Phys.* 1354.5ff. Diels; *Eudemos* frag. 122a Wehrli, cf. also frag. 123b.
4. Cf. the passages mentioned in the text above, page 93.
5. It is scarcely necessary to recall that the judgment of scholars of the previous century and the important ones of our century affirming an ethical similarity, Eudemus to Plato, was based on the pre-supposition that the *Eudemian Ethics* was a work of Eudemus, whereas today the majority of scholars hold that the *Eudemian Ethics* is a work of Aristotle. The attribution to Eudemus is at this time conceded by all to be based on a fallacious judgment.
6. Dicaearchus was born at Messina in Sicily. We do not know either the date of his birth or that of his death. See the few conjectures that we can make on his life in Wehrli *Die Schule* Heft 1: *Dikaiarchos* (1944; 1967[2]), 43ff. (commentary on frags. 1-4).
7. Cf. *Dikaiarchos* frags. 5-12 Wehrli.
8. Plutarch *Plac. philos.* 4.2.5; *Dikaiarchos* frag. 12a Wehrli, cf. also frags. 12b, c, d.
9. Nemesius (*De nat. hom.* 2; Migne *PL* 40.537; *Dikaiarchos* frag. 11 Wehrli) states that "Dicaearchus says that the soul is a harmony of the four elements in order to say that it is a mixture and a harmony of the elements. He does not mean in fact a harmony which springs from sounds, but the harmonic mixture in the body and the harmony of hot and cold, wet and dry. And hence evidently all those things about which we have spoken support the idea that the soul is a substance; Aristotle and Dicaearchus maintain, on the contrary, that it is not a substantial entity." (Here Nemesius is in error about Aristotle, whom he did not know, but he is correct about Dicaearchus.)
10. Some comments by Cicero are of value: "On the other hand Dicaearchus, in the discussion of which the scene is laid in Corinth and of which he gives an account in three books, introduces a number of the learned men who took part in the discussion as speakers in the first book; in the other two he represents Pherecrates, an old native of Phthiotis, descendant he says of Deucalion, as arguing that the soul is wholly non-existent and the name quite meaningless, and the terms "animalia" and "animantes" denoting "creatures and plants possessed of soul" are applied without reason; neither in man nor in beast is there a spiritual or physical principle answering to soul and all the capacity we have of action or sensation is uniformly diffused in all living bodies and cannot be separated from the

body, seeing that it has no separate existence and there is nothing apart from one single body fashioned in such a way that its activity and power of sensation are due to the natural combination of the parts" (*Tusc. disp.* 1.10.21; *LCL* 27; *Dikaiarchos* frag. 7 Wehrli). Again Cicero (*Tusc. disp.* 1.22.51; *LCL* 61; *Dikaiarchos* frag. 7 Wehrli) says: "It is true that Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus said that the soul had no existence at all because of the difficulty of understanding what the soul was or what its nature was."

11. Aristoxenus was born at Tarantum. It is not possible to be precise about the date of his birth or his death. He must have been a contemporary of Dicaearchus; he was in any case his colleague and friend. His fragments are collected and commented on by F. Wehrli *Die Schule des Aristoteles* Heft 2: *Aristoxenos* (Basel, 1945; 1967[2]).

12. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.10.19-20; *LCL* 23, 25, 27; *Aristoxenos* frag. 120a Wehrli.

13. A direct follower of Aristotle, Clearchus was a native of Soli on the island of Cyprus. (His fragments are collected and commented on by F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* Heft 3: *Klearchos* [Basel, 1948].) Some scholars hold that Clearchus was in opposition to the immanentistic and materialistic tendencies of the other Peripatetics and this is in part true. However he is certainly not the continuator of the authentic Aristotelian position. In fact his demonstrations of the immortality of the soul move from the metaphysical level to the magical and mystery religious levels. (Clearchus reminds us a little of Heraclides Ponticus.) Through him the influence of the religions of the East can be felt in a more accentuated way. It is useful to read fragment seven of Wehrli: "That the soul can enter a body and leave it is proven also by this story, as we read in Clearchus. Someone had used a 'psychagogic' club, poising it over a sleeping young man. He had convinced the divine Aristotle, as Clearchus recounts in his writing *De Somno* that the soul is separable from the body, that it enters the body and uses it like a hotel. He had in fact hit the boy with the club, drawing the soul from him; after leading it with the club far from the body, he showed that the boy was without any movement and insensible, since he did not react to the blows mangling his soulless body. Just as the soul was separated for a time from the body, he then brought the club near to the body of the boy who, after the return of the soul, recounted all that had happened. Thus, as a consequence of this experience, he convinced all those that had seen the phenomenon, even Aristotle himself, that the soul is separable from the body." The same point is made in fragment 8 Wehrli. In conclusion: Clearchus presents a type of discourse based on a particular mystico-religious experience which is very different

from Aristotelian metaphysical discourse in the same way that the practices of the mysteries are distant from the philosophical *logos*.

(Notes to pp. 103-5 [1-14])

1. The chronology of Strato is relatively specifiable at least with respect to the length of his scholarchate and the year of his death. We know from Diogenes (5.58; *LCL* 1:509, 511) that he succeeded Theophrastus in the office of scholarch of the Peripatos in the 123d Olympiad (288/284), that he held the office for eighteen years, and that he died in the 127th Olympiad (274/270 BCE). He was at the Egyptian court before 288/284. Diogenes gives us a list of his works (5.59; *LCL* 2:511, 513). His fragments are collected and commented on by F. Wehrli *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, Heft 5: *Straton von Lampsakos* (Basel, 1950, 1969^2).
2. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.38.121; *LCL* 623, 625; *Straton* frag. 32 Wehrli.
3. Plutarch *Adv. colot.* 14.1115b; *LCL* 14:237; *Straton* frag. 35 Wehrli.
4. He broke away from the Atomists by denying the infinite void and maintaining the infinite divisibility of bodies (cf. *Straton* frags. 55, 82 Wehrli).
5. *Straton* frags. 42-49 Wehrli.
6. Cf. Aetius *Plac.* 2.11.4; *Straton* frag. 84 Wehrli.
7. Cf. *Straton* frags. 50-53 Wehrli.
8. Cf. *Straton* frags. 70-83 Wehrli. A careful analysis of the physics of Strato and especially of his concept of movement has been made recently by M. Gatzemeier *Die Naturphilosophie des Straton von Lampsakos. Zur Geschichte des Problems der Bewegung im Bereich des Frühen Peripatos* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1970).
9. Cf. The fragment of Theophrastus, page 97 above.
10. Simplicius *In Phys.* 965.7ff.; *Straton* frag. 74 Wehrli.
11. *Straton* frags. 107-31 Wehrli.
12. Epiphanes *Adv. Haeres.* 3.33; *Straton* frags. 48, 117 Wehrli.
13. Wehrli *Straton* 74.
14. *Straton* frags. 122-27 Wehrli (these fragments have been handed down through Olympiodorus in his commentary on the *Phaedo*).

(Notes to p. 107 [1-2])

1. Cf. *DL* 5.52; *LCL* 1:505.
2. Strabo 13.1.54.

SECOND PART

(Notes to pp. 113-21 [1-35])

1. Epicurus was born at Samos in the third year of the 109th Olympiad, that is, in 341 BCE (cf. *DL* 10.14; *LCL* 2:543). His father Neocles was an Athenian who went to Samos as a settler. At eighteen years of age Epicurus came to Athens for the ephebate (something which, in certain respects, is similar to draft registration in preparation for military service). Xenocrates was the head of the Academy and it is quite possible "that he heard Xenocrates" (Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.26.72). Before coming to Athens, therefore, Epicurus was already familiar with philosophy and had frequented the lectures of a Platonist named Pamphilus (*DL* 10.14; *LCL* 2:543). But certainly it must have been a decisive meeting with Nausiphanes, an Atomist philosopher, who opened him to the areas of interest of Democritus, and of which we will speak later on. Consequently, at the expulsion of the Athenian colonists from Samos, Epicurus went to Colophon (*DL* 10.1; *LCL* 2:529) and hence to Mitylene and to Lampsacus (*DL* 10.15; *LCL* 2:543). A new vision of life must already have been clear to Epicurus, at Mitylene and at Lampsacus, where he taught for five years (*DL* 10.15; *LCL* 2:543). About 307/306 Epicurus went to Athens (*DL* 10.1; *LCL* 2:529) and established the Garden (about which we will speak more fully further on). He died during the second year of the 127th Olympiad, that is, in 270 BCE (*DL* 10.15; *LCL* 2:543). Epicurus was a prolific writer; Diogenes Laertius says that he was the author of about three hundred rolls (cf. *DL* 10.26ff.; *LCL* 2:555ff. where there is a catalog of the titles of the most well-known works). There remains very little of this imposing production: three letters (*To Menoeceus*, *To Herodotus*, *To Pythocles*); a collection of opinions (*Principal Doctrines*); various fragments, some of which are found in the papyri of Herculaneum.

   The direct fragments and the indirect testimonies of Epicurus were collected and organized for the first time by H. Usener *Epicurea* (Leipzig, 1887). Usener's edition still remains a landmark for citations. Further fragments came to light, especially in the papyri of Herculaneam which can be found in the edition of G. Arrighetti *Epicuro, Opere* (Turin 1960; 1973[2]), which is the most complete collection of the direct fragments, along with a good translation, in addition to the critical apparatus and notes.

   All the papyri of Herculaneum are described in the *Catalogo dei Papiri Ercolanesi*, edited by the *Centro Internazionale per lo studio dei Papiri Ercolanesi* under the direction of M. Gigante (Naples: Bibli-

opolis, 1979). A collection of the titles *The School of Epicurus* directed by M. Gigante, has been established in order to publish all the useful papyri (the first volumes have already been issued). The periodical *Cronche Ercolanesi* is very important also.

The best translations of the works of Epicurus in modern languages are in Italian (those of E. Bignone, G. Arrighetti, M. Isnardi Parente, L. Massa Positano). Many more have now been done in French (by J. and M. Bollack, A. Laks, H. Wismann, M. Conche; cf. volume 5, forthcoming, of this series, *s.v.* Epicurus. Less has been done in English; we can cite the following: C. Bailey *Epicurus, The Extant Remains, with Short Critical Apparatus, Translation and Notes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926; repr. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1970). Bailey's translation is also to be found in *The Modern Library*, ed. Whitney J. Oates (New York: Random House, 1957), 3-66. Remember that the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius contains much of the extant works of Epicurus and has been translated by R. D. Hicks in the *Loeb Classical Library Series* 2.529-677 (reprinted 1965; originally issued in 1925).

2. Cf. above, pages 57 and 85 of the text.
3. Cf. above, note 1, at the beginning.
4. *DL* 10.14; *LCL* 2:543; Usener *Epicurea* 366.
5. Ettore Bignone *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* 2 vols. (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1936; 1973[2]). This work is certainly the most important published on Epicurus in this century and remains a landmark for the accurate understanding of our philosopher.
6. In addition to the volume of Bignone cited in the previous note see also: Domenico Pesce *Saggio su Epicuro* (Bari: Laterza, 1974). We are in full agreement with the thesis of this book. Personally we are convinced that Epicurus had read some parts (probably small) of the esoteric works of Aristotle *only after the founding of the Garden*, that is, when the essential traits of his vision of the world and of life were already fixed. In fact, traces of the Aristotelian esoterica are recoverable chiefly from the large work *On Nature* (in thirty-seven books) which is the *summa* which Epicurus composed in order to give, in his position as teacher, a complete and definitive systematization of his thought.
7. Cf. Vol. 2, First Part, Second Section, 1,1.
8. Cf. Vol, 2. First Part, Fourth Section, 2.5.
9. *DL* 10.31; *LCL* 2:561; frag. 36 Usener. In this passage that Epicurus has in mind the statements of Plato in the *Phaedo* 99Cff. have been well demonstrated by D. Pesce *Saggio* 12ff.

10. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 37, *DL* 10.37; *LCL* 2:567. See also D. Pesce *Saggio* 9-12.
11. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.33.106; *LCL* 603; Proclus *In Eucl.* 1 *elem. lib.* 55.199.9 Friedlein; frag. 229a Usener.
12. Epicurus *Letter to Pythocles* 113; *DL* 113; *LCL* 2:639, 641.
13. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 6.27; *LCL* 2:385; frag. 229b Usener.
14. Cf. Vol. 2, First Part, Second Section, 1.1.
15. See the testimonies and fragments of Nausiphanes in D-K 75.A/B. 2:246-50. On the thought of Nausiphanes see Nestle-Zeller *DPG* 1.2.1191ff., the addition to note 3.
16. *DL* 9.64; *LCL* 2:477; 75.A.2 D-K 2:246; *DL* 9.69; *LCL* 2:481, 483;75.A.3 D-K 2:246; cf. also Seneca *Epist.* 88.43; *LCL* 2:375; 75.B.4 D-K 2:250.
17. Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.26.72; *LCL* 69, 71; *Epicurea* frag. 233 Usener; Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.33.93; *Epicurea* frag. 235 Usener.
18. Cf. Vol. 1, First Part, Fifth Section, 3.1.
19. Cf. G. Reale *Melisso* 18.21.278ff.
20. D. Pesce *Saggio* passim.
21. Cf. above, 11ff.
22. Epicurus *Epistle to Menoeceus* 122; *DL* 10.122; *LCL* 2:649.
23. Porphyry *Ad Marcellam* 31.297.7ff. Nauck^2; frag. 221 Usener.
24. Cf. above, pages 151ff.
25. *DL* 10.120; *LCL* 2:647; Usener *Epicurea* 30.46.
26. Epicurus *Letter to Menoeceus* 132; *DL* 10.132; *LCL* 2:657.
27. D. Pesce *Saggio* 18.
28. See below, pages 176ff.
29. *Epicurea* frags. 227-29 Usener.
30. *Epicurea* frags. 46-55 Usener.
31. Plato *Phaedrus* 230D.
32. B. Farrington *The Faith of Epicurus* (London, 1967).
33. B. Farrington (*The Faith* 18) notes that "Epicurus was more a prophet than a philosopher, more a saint than a prophet. The establishment of the Garden was his response to the evil of this world. His spiritual authority is revealed in the fact that he wisely led the brothers, as did, for example Saint Bernard of Clairveux, who took with him into the monastic life his whole family."
34. B. Farrington *The Faith* 141; also E. Bignone *L'Aristotele perduto* 1:137.
35. E. Bignone *L'Aristotele perduto* 1:111 (his expressions, which are somewhat emphatic, may be disagreeable, but it was the Bignone style in all his books).

(Notes to pp. 123-33 [1-26])

1. Cf. Vol. 2, Second Part, Fourth Section, 1. 1-9.
2. Actually it is very probable that the logical writings of Aristotle were, if not completely, at least in great part unknown to Epicurus, as well as most of the esoteric Aristotelian works, as we have already noted.
3. Cicero *De finibus* 1.7.22; *LCL* 25; frag. 243.22ff. Usener.
4. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.22; *LCL* 2:11, 13; frag. 242.24ff. Usener.
5. The Epicurean treatise on logic is entitled *On the Criterion* or *Canonic*, cf. *DL* 10.30; *LCL* 2:554; Usener *Epicurea* 104ff.
6. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 23; *DL* 10.146 [23]; *LCL* 2:671.
7. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 24; *DL* 10.147 [24]; *LCL* 2:671.
8. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.25.79; *LCL* 555; frag. 251 Usener.
9. Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.25.70; *LCL* 67, 69; frag. 251 Usener.
10. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.203-10; *LCL* 2:111, 113, 115; frag. 247 Usener.
11. *DL* 10.31ff.; *LCL* 2:561; frag. 36 Usener.
12. D. Pesce *Saggio* 24ff. and 31ff.
13. Cf. Vol. 2, First Part, Second Section, 3.2.
14. D. Pesce *Saggio* 26.
15. *DL* 10.33; *LCL* 2:563; frag. 255 Usener.
16. *DL* 10.33; *LCL* 2:563; frag. 255.8 Usener. Actually this "empirical" interpretation of the notion of *prolepsis*, as it is presented by Diogenes Laertius, has been the subject of lively debate starting in the previous century with P. Natorp (*Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnis-problems im Altertum* [Berlin, 1884; Hildesheim, 1965²] 234ff.), who instead finds a priori elements. Recently N. W. De Witt *Epicurus and his Philosophy* (Minneapolis, 1954; 1964²) has interpreted *prolepsis* as *the materialistic counterpart of Platonic anamnesis*, and he has maintained, consequently, that innatism is "part of the essential nucleus of his doctrine." Isnardi Parente also upholds that *prolepsis*, insofar as it is a *criterion*, is not purely and simply an impression, that is, "a conceptual reflection derived mechanically from the impress of a series of images or of their 'being stored up' in the mind: prolepsis as it was conceived by Epicurus must certainly contain in itself an act of actual intellectual comprehension, an act of intellectual judgment of the mind exercising itself on the images" (*Epicuro, Opere*, 24). Perhaps these interpretations, though depending on theoretical considerations, go too far beyond the letter of the text as well as beyond the intentions of our philosopher. In fact *prolepses*, for Epicurus, by the continual flow of images and by the regularity and constancy

with which they act on man, are the effects of the dynamism of the atoms. It is nevertheless to be noted that it is very difficult to categorically deny that the *prolepses* are a kind of materialistic "a priori," in the sense that nature structurally preconditions man's knowledge. The most important case, of which we will speak further, is that of the knowledge of the Gods, of whom Epicurus affirms that we have *prolepses*: and these *prolepses*—note—are not derived from sensations (since we neither see nor perceive Gods) but indeed directly from the flow of images that Gods (as well as any other existing thing) emanate continuously and which come to us and predispose us to know them. It is also true that the empiricism of Epicurus has nothing in common with the experimentalism of the modern form of empiricism: "we could not conceive," writes Isnardi Parente, "a form of empiricism more alien to experimental-scientific results" (p. 30).

17. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 75ff.; *DL* 10.75; *LCL* 2:605.
18. *DL* 10.34; *LCL* 2:563, 565; frag. 260 Usener.
19. Aristotle quoted by Eusebius *Praep. evang.* 14.21.1.768d-769a; frag. 260 Usener.
20. Epicurus *Letter of Menoeceus* 128ff.; *LCL* 2:653ff.
21. Cf. above, pages 125ff.
22. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.210-16; *LCL* 2:115, 117, 119; frag. 247.12ff. Usener.
23. E. Zeller *DPG* 3.1.406.
24. E. Zeller *DPG* 3.1.407.
25. Actually scholars have recently recognized the relevance of the *inferential process* and especially the *analogical inference* in the thought of Epicurus (in the further polemics against the Stoa the Epicurean school will analyze this point in a special way). In a particular way, in Epicurus the presence and the importance of the concept of "intuitive apprehension" or "intellectual apprehension" (ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας) has been singled out, that is, of an act which is strictly rational by which we grasp what is beyond the phenomenon, that is, the principles (see the excellent analyses and interpretations of the Epicurean texts in regard to this point by C. Bailey *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus* [New York, 1964²], Appendix 3, 559-76). Finally, scholars emphasized the significance and value of the terms ἐπιλογίζομαι and derivatives (consult especially: G. Arrighetti, "Sul valore di ἐπιλογίζομαι, ἐπιλογισμός, ἐπιλόγισις nel sistema Epicureo," *La parola del passato* 7 (1952) 119-44, indicating "the activity of the mind reflecting on the immediate data of the senses in order to bring them to another level, in order to transform sensory vision into intellectual vision" (M. Isnardi Parente *Epicuro Opere* 28). Now if this is

true, it is true as well that Epicurus introduced these epistemological schemas in a surreptious way, without justifying them and directly in contrast with his sensism. In order to justify these logical figures, he would have had to admit that the intellect and reason have an ontological status which he was far from recognizing. Certainly it is not chance that these figures are present in the Epicurean discourse without being expressly explained and without their being adduced or justified. This confirms further our position, about which we will immediately speak, concerning the extreme intuitionism which is a characteristic of the thought of Epicurus.

26. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 11; *DL* 10.142 [11]; *LCL* 2:667.

(Notes to pp. 135-60 [1-69])

1. The fragments of the περὶ φύσεως came chiefly from the discovery of the Herculaneum papyri. Cf. frags. 23-39 Arrighetti[2] 189-418.
2. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 38: «οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.»; *LCL* 2:569.
3. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 39, also 41, 55; *LCL* 2:569; *LCL* 2:571; *LCL* 2:585.
4. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 38ff.; *DL* 10.38ff.; *LCL* 2:567, 569.
5. Cf. Melissus 30.B.1. D-K 1:268; G. Reale *Melisso* 34ff. and 368ff.
6. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 39ff.; *DL* 10.39ff.; *LCL* 2:569.
7. Cf. G. Reale *Melisso* 176ff.
8. Cf. Vol. 1, First Part, Fourth Section, 2.2.
9. Plutarch had already noted with evident irony: "certainly Epicurus was a wiser man than Plato, he affirmed that all things exist in the same way, the unblemished void and the resistant body, principles and mixtures; maintaining by Zeus, that whatever is eternal and whatever comes into being participates in the same essence, and in this way is even indestructible and perishable, and those realities which are impassible and self-sufficient and immobile and never perish are in the same situation as those that have their essence subject to qualifications and change and are never in any way or time equal to themselves" (*Adv. Colot.* 16.1116d; *LCL* 14:245; *Epicurea* add. frag. 76 Usener).
10. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 41; *DL* 10.41; *LCL* 2:571.
11. Cicero *De divin.* 2.50.103; *LCL* 487; frag. 297 Usener.
12. Compare paragraph forty-one of the *Letter to Herodotus* (as well as the testimony of Cicero) with fragments three and four of Melissus. On the Epicurean notion of the infinite cf. the stimulating comments of R. Mondolfo *L'infinito nel pensiero* (Florence, 1956) 497ff.

13. Cf. above, page 135ff.
14. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 40; *LCL* 2:569, 571.
15. Cf. Vol. 1, First Part, Fourth Section, 4, 3 fin.
16. Plutarch *Adv. Colot.* 10.1112a; *LCL* 14:217; frag. 283 Usener.
17. Cf. *DL* 10.54; *LCL* 2:583, 585.
18. Cf. Vol. 1, First Part, Fifth Section, 3.2.
19. V.E. Alfieri *Atomos Idea* 94.
20. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 54ff.; *LCL* 2:583, 585.
21. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 42ff.; *DL* 10.42; *LCL* 2:571, 573.
22. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 55; *DL* 10.55; *LCL* 2:585.
23. Cf. 68.A.38 D-K 2:94 (Democritus); cf. also 67.A.9 D-K 2:74 (Leucippus).
24. The doctrine of the "minima" neglected by scholars concerned with Epicurus in the previous century is, on the contrary, the center of interest with scholars of our century. We note only two of the most ample and significant studies in this regard: D. Furley *Two Studies in the Greek Atomists* Study I: *Indivisible Magnitudes* (Princeton, 1967) 3-158, and H. J. Krämer *Platonismus und Hellenistische Philosophie* (Berlin, 1971) 231-362. The essential text is the *Letter of Herodotus* 55-59; *DL* 10.55-59; *LCL* 2:585, 587, 589, 591 (esp. *DL* 10.58ff.; *LCL* 589), where Epicurus procedes by means of analogical reasoning, summarizable as follows: since there is an (analogical) correspondence between atoms and bodies and because in perceptible bodies there is *a minimum* (a minimal perception), the atoms ought to be conceived in the same way. Here is the text: "We must consider the minimum perceptible by sense as not corresponding to that which is capable of being traversed, i.e., is extended, nor again as utterly unlike it, but as having something in common with the things capable of being traversed, though it is without distinction of parts. But when from the illusion created by this common property we think we shall distinguish something in the minimum, one part on one side and another part on the other side, it must be another minimum equal to the first which catches our eye. In fact, we see these minima one after another, beginning with the first, and not as occupying the same space; nor do we see them touch one another's parts with their parts, *but we see that by virtue of their own peculiar character (i.e., as being unit indivisibles) they afford a means of measuring magnitudes: there are more of them if the magnitude measured is greater; fewer of them if the magnitude measured is less. We must recognize that this analogy also holds of the minimum in the atom*; it is only in minuteness that it differs from that which is observed by sense, but follows the same analogy. On the analogy of things within our experience we have declared that the atom has

25. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 67; *LCL* 2:597, 599.
26. Cf. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 61; *DL* 2.61; *LCL* 2:591, 593.
27. V.E. Alfieri *Atomos Idea* 82.
28. N.W. De Witt *Epicurus* 168.
29. Cicero *De finibus* 1.6.18; *LCL* 21; frag. 281 Usener.
30. Epicurus *Letter to Menoeceus* 133ff.; *DL* 2.133; *LCL* 2:657, 659.
31. Cicero *De fato* 10.22ff.; *LCL* 217, 219; frag. 281.14ff. Usener.
32. Cicero *De fato* 20.46; frag. 281.29ff. Usener.
33. Plutarch *De animae procr.* 6.1015C; frag. 281.21ff. Usener.
34. Cf. Vol, 2. Second Part, Second Section, 2.5. Here we have documented the reasons why Aristotle maintained that the existence of an *actual* infinite is impossible.
35. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 45; *DL* 10.45; *LCL* 2:575.
36. Epicurus *Letter to Pythocles* 88; *DL* 10.88; *LCL* 2:617.
37. Epicurus *Letter to Pythocles* 89; *DL* 10.89; *LCL* 2:617, 619.
38. Pseudo-Plutarch *Plac. philos.* 1.4; Diels *DG* 289; frag. 308 Usener.
39. Cf. Vol. 2, passim, and G. Reale *Trattato sul cosmo* passim.
40. Epicurus *Letter to Pythocles* 85-87; *DL* 10.85-87; *LCL* 2:615, 617.
41. Cf. above, pages 96ff.
42. Concerning these extracts see the comments that are made in G. Reale *Trattato sul cosmo* 113ff. n. 95.
43. G. Reale *Teofrasto* passim.
44. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 76-81; *DL* 10.76-81; *LCL* 2:607, 609, 611.
45. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 63; *DL* 10.63; *LCL* 2:593, 595.
46. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 67; *DL* 10.67; *LCL* 2:597, 599.
47. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 63; *DL* 10.63; *LCL* 2:593, 595.
48. Plutarch *Adv. Colot.* 20.1118d; *LCL* 14:257; frag. 314.13ff. Usener.
49. V.E. Alfieri *Atomos Idea* 150.
50. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 46; *DL* 10.46; *LCL* 2:575.

magnitude; and this, small as it is, we have merely reproduced on a larger scale. And further, the least and simplest things must be regarded as extremities of lengths, furnishing from themselves as units the means of measuring lengths, whether greater or less, the mental vision being employed, since direct observation is impossible. For the community which exists between them and the unchangeable parts (i.e., the minimal parts of area or surface) is sufficient to justify the conclusion so far as this goes. But it is not possible that these minima of the atom should group themselves together through the possession of motion" (*LCL* 2:589, 591).

51. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 48; *LCL* 2:577, 579.
52. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 49-50; *LCL* 2:579, 581.
53. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 51; DL 10.51; *LCL* 2:581. Here is the exact quotation: "Error would not have occurred *if we had not experienced* some other movement in ourselves conjoined with (with the imaginative faculty) but *distinct from the perception of what is presented*" (R. D. Hicks translation with slight changes).
54. Epicurus *Letter to Meneoceus* 123ff.; *DL* 10.123; *LCL* 2:649, 651.
55. E. Bignone *L'Aristotele perduto* 1:284.
56. Philodemus *De pietate* frag. 104 Gomperz; frag. 33 Usener; frag. 17.3 Arrighetti^2.
57. Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.19.51; *LCL* 51, 53; frag. 352.17ff. Usener.
58. Epicurus *Letter to Herodotus* 76; *DL* 10.76ff.; *LCL* 2:605, 607, see above, 149ff.
59. Epicurus *Letter to Menoeceus* 123; *DL* 10.123; *LCL* 2:649.
60. Epicurus *Letter to Menoeceus* 123; *DL* 10.123; *LCL* 2:649; cf. also Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.16.43; *LCL* 45; frag. 352 Usener.
61. Epicurus *Letter to Menoeceus* 123; *DL* 10.123; *LCL* 2:649; cf. also Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.16.43; *LCL* 45; frag. 352 Usener.
62. Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.19.50; *LCL* 51; frag. 352.10ff. Usener.
63. Cicero *De natura deorum* 2.17.46; *LCL* 167; frag. 358.21ff. Usener. "Placet enim illi [*scil.*, Epicurus] esse deos, quia necessa erit praestantem esse aliquam naturam, quia nihil sit melius."
64. Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.18.49, also 1.25.71; *LCL* 49, 51, also 69; frag. 352.1ff. Usener, also p. 236.6ff.
65. Philodemus *De pietate* frag. 117 Gomperz; frag. 34 Usener; frag. 17.4 Arrighetti^2; cf. also Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.19.49, also 2.37.105; *LCL* 49, 51, also 233, 235; frag. 352.3ff. Usener, also 352.26ff.
66. Cf. frags. 352-66 Usener.
67. Cf. Vol. 2, Second Part, Second Section, 1.13.
68. Cf. Seneca *De benef.* 4.19; *LCL* 3:243, 245; frag. 364.4ff. Usener.
69. For a profound analysis of Epicurean theology consult A. J. Festugière *Épicure et ses Dieux* (Paris, 1946; 1968^2).

(Notes to pp. 161-82 [1-82])

1. Cicero *De finibus* 1.9.30; *LCL* 33, 35; frag 397.9ff. Usener.
2. Epicurus *Letter to Meneoceus* 128-29; *DL* 10.128-29ff.; *LCL* 2:655.
3. Atheneus *Deipnosoph.* 12.546e; *DL* 10.143.12; *LCL* 2:667; frag. 67 Usener.
4. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 3.18.41; *LCL* 275; frag. 67.18ff. Usener.

5. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 3.18.42; *LCL* 275, 277; frag. 69 Usener.
6. Frag. 396ff. Usener.
7. Cf. Vol. 1, Third Part, First Section, 2.4; Vol. 2, First Part, Third Section, 3.2.
8. Cf. Vol. 2, Second Part, Third Section, 1.8ff.
9. *DL* 10.136; *LCL* 2:661. On the position of the Cyrenaics cf. Vol. 1, Third Part, Second Section, 3.3.
10. Cicero *De finibus* 1.11.37; *LCL* 41; frag. 397.1ff. Usener.
11. The position of Epicurus in comparison with the Cyrenaics is explained still better if we keep in mind his "Eleatic" mode of reasoning which excluded the "intermediate," as has been pointed out by Pesce: "For Epicurus . . . there are two emotional states: pleasure and pain, if one corresponds to the full and the other to the void, one to being and the other to not-being, *tertium non datur*, the presumed third state of either not-pleasure or not-pain cannot exist without profound contradiction. And in fact by making not-pleasure identical to pain and not-pain identical to pleasure, the *not*-pain and the *not*-pleasure are turned into *both* pleasure *and* pain" (*Saggio* 81).
12. *DL* 10.137; *LCL* 2:661, 663; frag. 452 Usener; cf. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 5.33.95; *LCL* 521; frag. 439 Usener.
13. Cicero *De finibus* 1.17.55, 56ff.; *LCL* 59, 61; frag. 397.10ff. Usener.
14. See the passage from Cicero quoted above.
15. See the same quotation above.
16. Cicero *De finibus* 2.10.32; *LCL* 119; frag. 398.11ff. Usener.
17. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 8; *DL* 10.141.8; *LCL* 2:667.
18. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 10; *DL* 10.142.10; *LCL* 2:667.
19. Epicurus *Letter to Menoeceus* 131; *DL* 10.131; *LCL* 2:657.
20. Epicurus *Letter to Menoeceus* 130; *DL* 10.130; *LCL* 2:655, 657.
21. Epicurus *Letter to Menoeceus* 132; *DL* 10.132; *LCL* 2:657.
22. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 29; *DL* 10.149.29; *LCL* 2:673.
23. Epicurus *Letter to Menoeceus* 128; *DL* 10.128; *LCL* 2:653, 655.
24. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 21; cf. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 5.33.93; *LCL* 521; frag. 456 Usener.
25. *DL* 10.118; *LCL* 2:645.
26. Cf. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 3 and 18; *DL* 10.139.3 and 144.18; *LCL* 2:665, 669 (cf. on the limits of pleasures frag. 454ff. Usener).
27. Stobaeus *Anthol.* 3.17.33, Hense, 501; frag. 181 Usener.
28. Cicero *De finibus* 2.28.91; *LCL* 183; frag. 468 Usener.
29. Stobaeus *Anthol.* 3.17.22 Hense 495; frag. 469 Usener.

30. *Gnomologion Byzantinum* 197 n. 189 Wachsmuth; frag. 471 Usener.
31. Elianus *Varia Hist.* 4.13; frag. 473 Usener.
32. Epicurus *Sententiae Vaticanae* 68; Whitney J. Oates, ed. *ML* 44.
33. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6.2; frag. 476 Usener.
34. Porphyry *Ad Marcellam* 28.292.16ff., Nauck^2; frag. 476 Usener.
35. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 19; *DL* 10.145.19; *LCL* 2:669.
36. Cf. G. Arrighetti *Epicuro, Opere*^{2}, 550ff.
37. The analyses of this doctrine made by Bignone are especially clear and detailed in his *Epicuro* 26-32.
38. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 20; *DL* 10.145.20; *LCL* 2:669, 671.
39. Cf. E. Bignone *Epicuro* 30ff.
40. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 4; *DL* 10.140.4; *LCL* 2:665.
41. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 4; J. Whitney Oates, ed. *ML* 40.
42. Epicurus *Letter to Menoeceus* 133; *DL* 10.133; *LCL* 2:657, 659.
43. Epicurus *Letter to Menoeceus* 124-26ff.; *DL* 10.124-26; *LCL* 2:651, 653.
44. D. Pesce *Saggio* 61.
45. Atheneus *Deipnosoph.* 12.1.546e; cf. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 12; *DL* 10.143 [12]; *LCL* 2:667; frag. 67 Usener.
46. Plutarch *Adv. Colot.* 17.1117a; *LCL* 14:247, 249; frag. 116 Usener.
47. Atheneus *Deipnosoph.* 12.547a; frag. 512 Usener.
48. Epicurus *Letter to Menoeceus* 132; *DL* 10.132; *LCL* 2:657.
49. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 5; *DL* 10.140 [5]; *LCL* 2:665.
50. Cicero *De finibus* 1.15.49; *LCL* 53; frag. 397.8ff. Usener.
51. Cf. The whole passage quoted from Cicero by Usener as frag. 397.
52. Plato *Protagoras* 351Cff.; cf. G. Reale *Platone, Protagora* (Brescia, 1984^5) 166ff. and xlvff.
53. *DL* 10.117; *LCL* 2:643; cf. frag. 222a Usener.
54. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 16; *DL* 10.144 [16]; *LCL* 2:669.
55. Lactantius *Div. Instit.* 3.17.42; frag. 523 Usener; cf. in addition, frag. 525 Usener.
56. Epictetus *Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus* 2.20.6; *LCL* 1:373; frag. 523.30ff. Usener.
57. Epicurus *Sententiae Vaticanae* 58; Whitney J. Oates *ML* 43.
58. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 14; *DL* 10.143 [14]; *LCL* 2:669, cf. also frags. 570, 571 Usener.
59. Seneca *Epist.* 25.6; *LCL* 1:185; frag. 209 Usener.
60. Plutarch *De latenter vivendo* 3.1128F-1129A; *LCL* 14:327, 329; frag. 551 Usener; cf. also the other testimonies collected by Usener, again under frag. 551.

61. Plutarch *Adv. colot.* 31.1125C; *LCL* 14:299, 301; frag. 556.26ff. Usener.
62. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 31; *DL* 10.150 [31]; *LCL* 2:673, 675.
63. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 32; *DL* 10.150 [32]; *LCL* 2:675.
64. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 36; *DL* 10.151 [36]; *LCL* 2:675.
65. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 37; *DL* 10.152 [37]; *LCL* 2:675, 677.
66. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 33; *DL* 10.150 [33]; *LCL* 2:675.
67. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 34; *DL* 10.151 [34]; *LCL* 2:675.
68. Concerning Epicurean friendship see the chapter of Festugière in *Épicure et ses Dieux* 36-70.
69. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 23; *DL* 10.146 [23]; *LCL* 2:671.
70. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 39; *DL* 10.154 [39]; *LCL* 2:677.
71. *DL* 10.120; *LCL* 2:647; frag. 540 Usener.
72. Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 27; *DL* 10.148 [27]; *LCL* 2:673.
73. Epicurus *Sententiae Vaticanae* 78; Whitney J. Oates *ML* 44.
74. Epicurus *Sententiae Vaticanae* 52; Whitney J. Oates *ML* 43.
75. In the *Principal Doctrines* 78 (Whitney J. Oates *ML* 44) quoted above (note 73), friendship is directly qualified as an ***immortal good***. It is understood hence that Epicurus does not hesitate to state that "the wise man will know the need even to die for a friend" (*DL* 10.121; *LCL* 2:647).
76. *DL* 10.117; *LCL* 2:643; frag. 226 Usener.
77. *DL* 10.118; *LCL* 2:645; frag. 601 Usener. Cf. also the passages in Cicero and Lactantius which Usener quotes again at frag. 601.
78. Seneca *Epist.* 66.18; *LCL* 2:13, 15; frag. 601.35ff. Usener.
79. Seneca *Epist.* 66.18; *LCL* 2:13, 15; frag. 601.4 Usener.
80. Cf. Elianus *Var. Hist.* 4.13; frag. 602 Usener; cf. also the passages of Clement, Julian, and Cicero quoted by Usener again under frag. 602.
81. D. Pesce *Saggio* 98.
82. E. Bignone *Epicuro* 40ff.

(Notes to pp. 183-84 [1-8])

1. P. Boyancé correctly writes (*Lucrèce et l'épicureisme* [Paris 1963]; Italian edition edited by A. Grilli, [Brescia, 1970]): "Among the schools of antiquity there is none which has been dominated by the thought of only one man as was the school of Epicurus. After him no one can still be considered important. While as far as Stoicism after Zeno there was Cleanthes, and after Cleanthes there was Chrysippus and so on. The scholarchs of the Garden were only followers whose names were and had to be obscure. Seneca, who knew

this characteristic of the rival school, defined it with an incisive and typically Roman phrase: anything Metrodorus said, anything Hermarchus said has been said under the guidance and the auspices of only one man (*Epist.* 34.4; *LCL* 1:243). It is the same expression with which the imperial theory of the supreme military command is deified: all that which made the generals, all the victories which follow, develop 'under the guide and the auspices' of the chief, unique *imperator* and unique person who deserves triumph. For all the spiritual victories of Epicureanism, always, in any time, there has been and there will be only a single triumphant victor. But to the philosopher, is said without irony, it is difficult to ask for such an abnegation: we find in no one more than in them the proud conviction of being masters of themselves and of making the thought of human kind from their own intuitions and discoveries. Among the Epicureans one man alone had this audacious pride, and had it at the highest grade: after him no one" (p. 45).

2. Cf. *DL* 10.23ff.; *LCL* 2:551.
3. *DL* 10.22ff.; *LCL* 2:551.
4. Cf. *DL* 10.19 and 23; *LCL* 2:547, 551.
5. This is clearly from the title of the work reported by Diogenes Laertius, 10.25; *LCL* 2:553.
6. Cf. *DL* 10.25; *LCL* 2:553.
7. Concerning any of these philosophers the bibliographical and chronological indications collected by Zeller in his *DPG* 3:1.378ff. are still useful. You will find there references for all of the names of Epicureans of which there are additional notices.
8. Cf. Cicero *Ad fam.* 13.1. Cicero writes to C. Memmius begging him to spare the Garden of Epicurus, which Memmius had acquired from Areopagus. It means that the Garden did not house the Epicurean school any more and that, hence, it was probably moribund in Athens.

(Notes to pp. 187-89 [1-9])

1. Cf. Atheneus *Deinosoph.* 12.68.547a; Elianus *Var. Hist.* 9.12 (read Alcius in Atheneus and, in Elianus, Alceus).
2. Concerning the problem: Boyancé *Lucrezio e l'epicureismo* 17 n. 3.
3. Cf. note 1, above.
4. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 4.3.6-7; *LCL* 333, 335.
5. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 2.3.7-8; *LCL* 153, 155.
6. Concerning this problem consult H. Howe, "Amafinius, Lucretius and Cicero," *AJP* 72 (1951): 57-62.

7. Philodemus is a contemporary of Cicero born probably toward the end of the second century and died between 40 and 30 BCE.
8. Concerning the argument consult: D. Comparetti *La villa dei Pisoni in Ercolano e la sua biblioteca* (Naples, 1879).
9. A long detailed monograph treatment of all aspects of the thought of Philodemus can be found in the article, "Philodemus" by R. Philippson in *RE* Pauly-Wissowa, 19.2.2444-82. Cf. especially: M. Gigante *Ricerche filodemee* (Naples, 1969), and the catalog of the editions of the papyri of Philodemus completed by Gigante and W. Schmid, in Usener *Glossarium Epicureum* (Rome, 1977) xxi-xxxi.

(Notes to pp. 191-204 [1-38])

1. Lucretius was born at the beginning of the first century and died toward the half of it. (See the discussion of the sources from which these dates are obtained in P. Boyancé *Lucrezio e l'epicureismo.*) Very little is known about his life. From Saint Jerome we learn that Lucretius went insane from having drunk a love potion and composed his poem in the intervals of lucidity conceded by the madness. The story is considered by many a pure fable, but there are not a few scholars who see at least some truth to the story, not only because such potions were actually in use at Rome and not only because of a certain disorder in the poem, but also because of a certain poetic frenzy creating in not a few passages an exalted atmosphere and also because of the anxiety pervading the whole poem. Again from Jerome we know that Lucretius died as a suicide at forty-four years old. And again from Jerome we know that Cicero "emendavit" the poem, an expression which recent scholars interpret as "editing" (cf. Boyancé, 33ff.) In effect, Cicero in *Letter* 54 says of the *De rerum natura* that it is a work full of genius and artistic talent. He however does not consider Lucretius as a thinker and does not name him in his philosophical treatises. In modern times Lucretius has been much more studied and admired than Epicurus himself, indeed for his very profound poetry. All scholars agree, in fact, in judging *De rerum natura* as the greatest philosophical poem of all time. Instead we are concerned only with the significance of the philosophy of Lucretius.
2. Cf. E. Bignone *Storia* 2:180.
3. *De rerum natura* 5.195-234; *LCL* 353, 355, 357, trans. W. H. D. Rouse with minor changes.
4. E. Bignone *Storia* 2:183ff.
5. Cf. Galen *De usu partium* 7.14; 3:571ff. Kuhn; frag. 371 Usener.
6. Lactantius *Div. Instit.* 3.17.8; frag. 370 Usener.

7. E. Bignone *Storia* 2:185.
8. The verse of Lucretius at 3.322; *LCL* 193.
9. Cf. E. Bignone *Storia* 2:186; cf. also *L'Aristotele perduto* 2:573ff.
10. The ridiculous remedy, illustrated in the preceding verses, consists in abandoning oneself to all the illusions of men: power, riches, and the like.
11. Lucretius *De rerum natura* 2.47-61; *LCL* 89.
12. A. D. Winspear *Lucretius and Scientific Thought* (Montreal: Harvest House, 1963).
13. A. D. Winspear *Lucretius* 3.
14. A. D. Winspear *Lucretius* 1-15.
15. P. Boyancé *Lucrezio* 12ff.
16. We recommend the volume of P. Boyancé cited above, which is in our opinion one of the soundest studies.
17. *De rerum natura* 1.430-48; *LCL* 33.
18. *De rerum natura* 1.958-1013; *LCL* 71, 73, 75.
19. *De rerum natura* 2.1044-89; *LCL* 159, 161, 163.
20. *De rerum natura* 3.237-45; *LCL* 187.
21. *De rerum natura* 3.327-33; *LCL* 193.
22. *De rerum natura* 3.422-24; *LCL* 201.
23. *De rerum natura* 3.445-58; *LCL* 201, 203.
24. *De rerum natura* 3.563-65; *LCL* 209.
25. *De rerum natura* 3.794-805; *LCL* 225, 227.
26. *De rerum natura* 3.830-42; *LCL* 227, 229.
27. *De rerum natura* 3.843ff.; *LCL* 229.
28. *De rerum natura* 3.860-69; *LCL* 229, 231.
29. *De rerum natura* 2.1144; *LCL* 167.
30. *De rerum natura* 2.355ff.; *LCL* 111.
31. *De rerum natura* 3.1053-94; *LCL* 243, 245, 247.
32. *De rerum natura* 3.978ff.; *LCL* 237, 239.
33. *De rerum natura* 3.1014-23; *LCL* 241.
34. *De rerum natura* 5.174; *LCL* 353.
35. Usener *Epicurea* frag. 138.
36. Epicurus *Sententiae Vaticanae* 47; Whitney J. Oates ed. *MLG* 42.
37. *De rerum natura* 3.932-45; *LCL* 235.
38. E. Bignone *Epicuro* 41.

Part Three

(Notes to pp. 209-16 [1-30])

1. "Zeno, son of Mnaseas, was born at Citium in Cyprus, a Greek city which had received Phoenician settlers" (*DL* 7.1; *LCL* 2:111) around 333/332 BCE. There is no doubt, as Pohlenz showed (*La Stoa* 26ff., cf. under note 30), that Zeno was by birth a Jew. He went to Athens at twenty-two years of age, not because of an accidental shipwreck (Diogenes himself, after reporting the story of the shipwreck [7.2] offers an opposed version in [7.5]), but as a result of a clear choice. We will speak further on about the relations which he had with the philosophers who taught at that time in Athens and the establishment of the Stoa. Diogenes gives a wide list of his works, which are all lost to us [7.4]. Zeno died in 262 BCE. His teaching was greatly esteemed and respected, because of its elevated moral tone. His right living and moderation were proverbial. Notwithstanding that he was a foreigner, the Athenians bestowed great honors on him: "They deposited with him the keys of the city walls, and they honored him with a golden crown and a bronze statue" (*DL* 7.6; *LCL* 2:117). The fragments of Zeno, as well as those of all the ancient Stoics, have been collected and arranged by Hans von Arnim *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* 4 vols. (Leipzig 1903-24). The first volume contains the fragments of Zeno and his followers (Ariston, Apollophanus, Herillus, Diogenes of Heraclea, Perseus, Cleanthes, Sphero); the second volume contains the fragments of the logical and physical works of Chrysippus; the third contains the fragments of the moral philosophy of Chrysippus and of his successors (Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylonia, Antipatrus of Tarsus, Apollodorus of Seleucia, Archedemus of Tarsus, Boethius of Sidon, Basilides, Eudromus, Crinus); the fourth contains the indices edited by M. Adler. All the references in the citations refer to the collection of von Arnim which title now is the only one. Some of the volumes have been translated into Italian. There is no English translation of von Arnim's work.
2. *DL* 7.31 *LCL* 2:143; frag. 6.10 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
3. Cf. above, pages 30ff.
4. *DL* 7.2; *LCL* 2:111, 113; frag. 1 von Arnim *SVF* 1. On Stilpo see text above, pages 50ff.
5. Cf. *DL* 7.2; *LCL* 2:111, 113; frag. 1 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
6. Aetius *Plac.* 1.10.5; frag. 65 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
7. Stobaeus *Anth.* 1.136.21; frag. 65 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
8. Nemesius *De nat. hom.* 32; frag. 518 von Arnim *SVF* 1.

9. *DL* 7.157; *LCL* 2:261; frag. 135 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
10. Epiphanes *Adv. haeres.* 3.2.26; frag. 146 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
11. Plato *Sophist* 246E-247B; *LCL* 375, 377.
12. Cf. below, pages 238ff.
13. *DL* 7.2; frag. 1 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
14. Cf. 22.B.90 D-K 1:171 (Heraclitus).
15. Cf. 22.B.30 D-K 1:157-8 (Heraclitus).
16. Cf. 22.B.64 D-K 1:165 (Heraclitus).
17. Cf. 22.B.41 D-K 1:160 (Heraclitus).
18. Cf. 22.B.72 D-K 1:167 (Heraclitus).
19. *DL* 7.156; *LCL* 2:261; frag. 171 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
20. Cicero *De natura deorum* 2.22.57ff.; *LCL* 177, 179; frags. 171ff. von Arnim *SVF* 1.
21. Cf. text pages 240ff.
22. Cf. text pages 119ff.
23. *DL* 7.5; *LCL* 2:115, 117; frag. 2 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
24. Cleanthes, native of Assos, after having been a member of the Stoa for almost twenty years, succeeded Zeno in the direction of the Porch in 262 and was head of the school for thirty years. He died between 233 and 231 BCE. Before becoming a follower of the Stoa he was a fighter (*DL* 7.168; *LCL* 2:273; 463 frag. von Arnim *SVF* 1:103.2). After meeting Zeno, his passion for philosophy grew. In order to nourish it he did not hesitate, as he was poor, to work in a very hard and humble condition, at night by drawing water and crushing meal for a woman selling it (*DL* 7.168; *LCL* 2:273). The liberty of discussion which Zeno had allowed to his followers, contrary to Epicurus, produced a notable break-up in the school and hence a crisis which Cleanthes did not completely control. He had neither the geniality of the founder, nor the acuity and ability of Chrysippus. Diogenes says that he "left some very fine writings" and listed fifty-five titles (*DL* 7.174ff.; *LCL* 2:281, 283). The chewed-up fragments are collected by von Arnim *SVF* 1:103-39. A complete reconstruction of the thought of our philosopher is given by G. Verbeke *Kleanthes van Assos* (Brussels, 1949).
25. Chrysippus was born at Soli, in Cilicia, between 281 and 277 and he died between 208 and 204 BCE, as reported by Diogenes Laertius (*DL* 7.184; *LCL* 2:293; frag. 1.16ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2), who took this information from Apollodorus. As Pohlenz emphasized (*La Stoa* 1:39ff.), Chrysippus must have been of Jewish origin: we can say this from the fact that he learned Greek when he was already an adult, and that he committed errors in his use of language consistent with his

background (cf. frags. 24 and 894 von Arnim *SVF* 2). He was a disciple of Cleanthes, after spending a certain period in the Academy and listening to Arcesilaus and Lacydes (*DL* 7.183; *LCL* 2:293; frag. 1.8ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2), from whom he learned the art of dialectic, for which he was really inclined: "So reknowned was he for dialectic—Diogenes tells us (*DL* 7.180; *LCL* 2:289; frag. 1.12ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2)—that most people thought if the Gods took to dialectic they would adopt no other system than that of Chrysippus." And because of these exceptional dialectical capacities, he could say to his teacher Cleanthes that [all] he "wanted was to be told what the doctrines were [of the Stoa]; he would find out the proofs for himself" (*DL* 7.179; *LCL* 2:289). Despite some differences with Cleanthes in regard to tenets, the awareness of his superiority and the notable success of his lessons, Chrysippus remained loyal to his teacher and the school, and at Cleanthes's death he became head of the Stoa. Under the guidance of Chrysippus the Porch overcame all the internal crises and imposed itself on external affairs in a decisive manner, so much so that it is frequently said of him: "Without Chrysippus, there had been no Stoa" (*DL* 7.183; *LCL* 2:293; frag. 6 von Arnim *SVF* 2). Chrysippus was a very prolific writer. Diogenes Laertius (7.189ff.; *LCL* 2:299ff.; frag. 13 von Arnim *SVF* 2) provides us with an imposing list of the titles of his works, which are totally lost today. His immense production eclipsed the works of Zeno and Cleanthes and the formulation of Stoic doctrine given by Chrysippus is fixed as paradigmatic. The surviving fragments are collected in volumes two and three of the work of von Arnim (volume 2, fragments 1-1216; volume 3, fragments 1-777). For a reconstruction of the thought of Chrysippus see: E. Bréhier *Chrysippe* (Paris, 1910); republished in 1951 under the title *Chrysippe et l'ancien stoïcisme*, and J. B. Gould *The Philosophy of Chrysippus* (Leiden, 1970).

26. Concerning individual exponents of the Middle and New Stoa we will speak later on after we have explained the doctrine (pages 462ff.).
27. Cf. above, note 25.
28. The fragments of Ariston of Chios are collected in frags. 333-403 von Arnim *SVF* 1; on Ariston cf. the article by von Arnim in *RE* Pauly-Wissowa 2:957 and especially: A. M. Ioppolo *Aristone di Chio e lo stoicismo antico* (Bibliopolis: Naples, 1980).
29. The fragments of Herillus of Carthage are to be found also in the collection of frags. 409-21 von Arnim *SVF* 1, as well as von Arnim's article in *RE* Pauly-Wissowa 8:683.
30. After the collection of von Arnim the most outstanding contributions to the correct comprehension of Stoicism have been made by Max Pohlenz, who has been concerned in his whole scholarly career

with Stoicism, publishing a series of works culminating in his magnificent synthesis, previously cited, *Die Stoa, Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*, finished in 1943 and published in 1947. The work of Pohlenz has superseded and, to a great extent made no longer usable, many preceding works beginning with the synthesis of Zeller including the successful one of P. Barth, which had various editions (*Die Stoa*, sechste Auflage, vollig neu bearbeitet von A. Goedeckemayer [Stüttgart, 1946]). Pohlenz approached the Stoics with a new sensibility and with a notably sympathetic interest and was able to overcome the old prejudices, which saw in Stoicism (as well as all the Hellenistic currents of thought) nothing other than a "post-Aristotelian philosophy," that is, a philosophy of imitators; this prejudice was strictly connected to the classicistic one which saw in the Hellenistic Age only the decadence of the Greek spirit. The synthesis of Pohlenz stood out chiefly by reason of its concern for the reconstruction of the ancient Stoa; its weakest point is the reconstruction of the Middle Stoa, for the reasons which we will see. After Pohlenz there have been solid studies on individual aspects of Stoic philosophy, which we will gradually take into account, but there has not been a synthesis comparable to that of Pohlenz, the only exception being the book by John M. Rist *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1969) which ends with but includes Middle Stoicism, and contains very good points. The collection of essays by various authors edited by A. A. Long, *Problems in Stoicism* (The Athlone Press of the University of London, 1971), is also very useful.

(Notes to pp. 217-18 [1-2])

1. Cf. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.16ff.; *LCL* 2:9; frag. 38 von Arnim *SVF* 2; *DL* 7.40; *LCL* 2:151; frag. 38 von Arnim *SVF* 2; Philo *De agricultura* 14; frag. 39 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
2. M. Pohlenz *La Stoa* 1:54ff. The book of M. Heinze on the concept of logos still remains useful, *Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie* (Oldenburg, 1872; Aalen, 1961^2).

(Notes to pp. 219-34 [1-54])

1. *DL* 7.40; *LCL* 2:151; frag. 46 von Arnim *SVF* 1; frag. 43 von Arnim *SVF* 2: "Others give the first place to logic, the second to physics, the third to ethics: and among those who do so are Zeno in his treatise, *On Logic*, Chrysippus..."
2. Cf. E. Zeller *DPG* 3:1.117-118 and Prantl *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1927^2) 1:408.
3. M. Mignucci in *Il significato della logica stoica* (Bologna, 1965), 19ff.

summarizes the essential stages of this reevaluation. Other studies of importance to the discussion are: A. Virieux Reymond *La logique et épistémologie des Stoïciens* (Lausanne, 1949); Benson Mates *Stoic Logic* (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1961[2]).

4. Frag. 75 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
5. Cf. *DL* 7.41; *LCL* 2:151, 153.
6. Diocles of Magnesia, quoted in *DL* 7.48; *LCL* 2:158-59; frag. 52 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
7. Aetius *Plac.* 4.11; Diels *DG* 400.4ff.; frag. 83 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
8. *DL* 7.45; *LCL* 2:155; frag. 53 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
9. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.227ff.; *LCL* 2:123; frags. 58, 484 von Arnim *SVF* 1; frag. 56 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
10. Cicero *Acad. post.* 1.41; *LCL* 449, 451; and *Acad. pr.* 2.144; *LCL* 653; frags. 60 and 66 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
11. Cicero *Acad. post.* 1.40; *LCL* 449; 61 frag. von Arnim *SVF* 1.
12. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 8.397; *LCL* 2:447; frag. 91 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
13. Epictetus *Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus* 1.17.22; *LCL* 1:119.
14. *DL* 7.46; *LCL* 2:155, 157; frag. 53.12ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
15. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.248; *LCL* 2:133; frag. 59.5ff. von Arnim *SVF* 1.
16. Cf. above, note 12.
17. For a critical analysis of the Stoic problematic on presentation and assent consult Bréhier *Chrysippe* 80-107; Rist *SP* 133-51; F. H. Sandbach "Phantasia Kataleptike" in A. A. Long *Problems* 9-21.
18. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.38; *LCL* 2:21; frag. 132 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
19. Cf. above, pages 123ff.
20. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 8.56; *LCL* 2:265; frag. 88 von Arnim *SVF* 2. The term περίπτωσις is very difficult to translate and is rarely understood. We have chosen the translation proposed by M. Mignucci (*Il significato della logica stoica* 81); Mignucci states (p. 84 n. 48): "the expression 'contact through sensation'...ought not lead to any errors in conceiving what the author intended by referring to sensible knowledge. The expression can be explained by showing that intellection through contact is different than all the others, it consists in a re-elaboration that works directly on the content of the sensation."
21. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 3.40; *LCL* 4:263, 265. Cf. also *DL* 7.52ff.; *LCL* 2:161; frag. 87 von Arnim *SVF* 2, and Cicero *De finibus* 3.10.33; *LCL* 253.

22. *DL* 7.54; *LCL* 2:163, 165.
23. Aetius *Plac.* 4.11.3ff.; frag. 83 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
24. Cf., e.g., frag. 473.29 von Arnim *SVF* 2 and frag. 218 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
25. Cf. von Arnim *SVF* 3, p. 69. For a critical analysis of these doctrines cf. F. H. Sandbach "Ennoia and Prolepsis in the Stoic Theory of Knowledge" in A. A. Long *Problems* 22-37.
26. Cf. above, pages 127ff.
27. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 8.11ff.; *LCL* 2:245, 247; frag. 166 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
28. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 8.70; *LCL* 2:273; frag. 187 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
29. This is a doctrine which has no precedents.
30. Arius Didymus frag. 18 Diels; frag. 89 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
31. Arius Didymus frag. 18 Diels; frag. 336 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
32. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 9.211; *LCL* 3:107; frag. 341 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
33. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 8.9.26; frag. 488 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
34. Cf. frag. 92 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
35. Cf. *DL* 7.64; *LCL* 2:173, 175; frag. 183 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
36. The most critical analysis and explanation of the Stoic conception of the incorporeal is provided by E. Bréhier *La théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien stoïcisme* (Paris 1962[3]) (in a shortened form the content of this work can be seen in another of Bréhier's works, *Études de philosophie antique* [Paris 1955], 105-16), even if the account is onesided. The clarifications of M. Mignucci are useful in *Il significato* 88-103.
37. *DL* 7.42; *LCL* 2:153; frag. 48 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
38. *DL* 7.62; *LCL* 2:173; frag. 122 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
39. A good concise exposition of the Stoic teaching on language can be found in M. Pohlenz *La Stoa* 1:58-81.
40. Cf. *DL* 7.55-62; *LCL* 2:165-71.
41. *DL* 7.63; *LCL* 2:173.
42. For a comprehensive analysis of this point see E. Bréhier *La théorie des incorporels* 20ff.
43. The proposition is indicated by the term ἀξίωμα which the Stoics thought derived from the term ἀξιόω which means "to esteem" or "to judge" (in Aristotle the *axioms* were first principles); see *DL* 7.65; *LCL* 2:175.
44. *DL* 7.66; *LCL* 2:175.

45. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.38; *LCL* 2:21; frag. 132 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
46. Concerning the Stoic doctrine of the proposition and judgment see M. Mignucci *Il significato* 119-55.
47. See frags. 231-69 von Arnim *SVF* 2. For an analysis of the anapodictics see Mignucci *Il significato* 166-78.
48. E. Bréhier *La théorie des incorporels* 35ff.
49. *DL* 7.42; *LCL* 2:153.
50. *DL* 7.47; *LCL* 2:157; frag. 130.28ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
51. See Plato *Gorgias* passim.
52. *DL* 7.43; *LCL* 2:153.
53. E. Bréhier *La théorie des incorporels* 63.
54. E. Bréhier *La théorie des incorporels* 63.

(Notes to pp. 237-59 [1-103])

1. On the Stoic physics there is a work of S. Sambursky *Physics of the Stoics* (London, 1959) which we warmly advise reading because it assisted us in seeing the diverse implications involved in the Stoic physics if read in a "scientific" way, or better, in a scientistic way. The author interprets the physics of the Porch with the mind-set of a modern scientist, and the results of his research show with clarity and precision that from this perspective it is impossible to grasp the authentic doctrines of he Stoa.
2. Léon Robin *Greek Thought* trans. R. M. Dobie (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967) 346.
3. See Plato *Sophist* 247Dff.
4. See also Vol. 2, First Part, Second Section, 1.7 fin.
5. See the presentation above of the foundations of the Epicurean physics. Pohlenz (*La Stoa* 1:120) correctly notes that Stoic materialism is grounded on the overturning of the position of Plato but he does not recognize that this was already accomplished by Epicurus (see, for example, the *Letter to Herodotus* 67; *DL* 2.67; *LCL* 2:597, 599).
6. See frag. 90.36ff. von Arnim *SVF* 1 and frag. 84.73 von Arnim *SVF* 3; also frags. 342, 363, 387 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
7. See frag. 329.5ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
8. See frag. 359.17ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
9. Seneca *Epist.* 106.2; *LCL* 3:219, 221; frag. 84.29ff. von Arnim *SVF* 3. See also Seneca *Epist.* 113; *LCL* 3:282-99.
10. Seneca *Epist.* 65.2; *LCL* 2:445; frag. 303 von Arnim *SVF* 2.

11. See frags. 306ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
12. Chalcidius *In Tim.* chap. 292; frag. 88 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
13. *DL* 7.134; *LCL* 2:239; frag. 85 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
14. Themistius *In Arist. de Anim.* 35.32ff. Heinze; frag. 158 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
15. On the conception of the total commingling of bodies and the penetrability of bodies see frags. 463-81 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
16. *DL* 7.148; *LCL* 2:253; frag. 163 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
17. *DL* 7.137; *LCL* 2:241; frag. 526 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
18. Arius Didymus, quoted in Eusebius *Praep. Evang.* 15.15; Diels *DG* 29. 464; frag. 528 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
19. See text Section 2.
20. See frag. 90.35ff. von Arnim *SVF* 1.
21. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 8.263; *LCL* 2:375, 377; frag. 363 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
22. See above, pages 226ff.
23. See Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 10.218; *LCL* 3:319; frag. 331 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
24. See above, pages 227ff.
25. See frags. 501-8 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
26. On the Stoic theory of "place," cf. E. Bréhier *La théorie des incorporels* 37-44.
27. See frag. 93 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
28. See frags. 509-21 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
29. On the Stoic doctrine of "time," cf. E. Bréhier *La théorie des incorporels* 44-53.
30. On the "void," cf. the fragments cited in note 25 above.
31. On the Stoic conception of the "void," cf. E. Bréhier *La théorie des incorporels* 44-53.
32. Alexander of Aphrodisias *In Arist. Topica* 301.19 Wallies; frag. 329 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
33. Basilides and his followers even rejected the admission of the existence of incorporeals so understood, as Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. math.* 8.258; *LCL* 2:373; von Arnim *SVF* 3, p. 268.5-8) tells us.
34. Seneca *Epist.* 58.12 and 15; *LCL* 1:393, 395, and 397; frag. 332 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
35. Plotinus *The Enneads* 6.1.25; cf. frag. 371 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
36. On the Stoic categories, cf. frags. 369ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
37. On these two categories, cf. frags. 399-404 von Arnim *SVF* 2.

38. Cf. E. Bréhier *La théorie des incorporels* 43. (For a thorough analysis of the Stoic categories, cf. J. M. Rist "Categories and their Uses" in A. A. Long *Problems* 38-57.)
39. On the Stoic physics and its different meanings, see E. Grumach *Physis und Agathon in der alten Stoa* (Berlin, 1932); Heinrich and Mary Simon *Die Alte Stoa und ihr Natur Begriff* (Berlin, 1956); M. Pohlenz *La Stoa* 1:126ff.
40. Hyppolitus *Philosoph.* 21.1; Diels *DG* 571; frag. 153 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
41. Ps. Galen *Hist. Philos.* 16; Diels *DG* 608; frag. 153 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
42. Cf. 22.B.64 D-K 1:165 (Heraclitus).
43. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias *De anima.* 26.13; frag. 786 von Arnim *SVF* 2; Alexander of Aphrodisias *De mixtione* 224.32ff. and 224.14; frags. 310.35ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2 and frag. 442 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
44. Cicero *De natura deorum* 2.9.23ff.; *LCL* 145, 147 (the text is quoted in part by frag. 513 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
45. Cicero *De natura deorum* 2.9.28; *LCL* 151.
46. Alexander of Aphrodisias *De mixtione* 216.14; frag. 473 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
47. See the indices compiled by M. Adler for the *SVF* of von Arnim, vol. 4, p. 124bff.
48. See frags. 92, 613, 685, 1027, 1076 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
49. *DL* 7.151; *LCL* 2:255, 257; frag. 1102 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
50. Plutarch *De comm. not.* 31.1066A; frag. 536 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
51. *DL* 7.147; *LCL* 2:251, 253; frag. 1021 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
52. Cf. frag. 537 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
53. Cicero *De natura deorum* 2.14.37ff.; *LCL* 159ff.; partially reported in frag. 1153 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
54. Seneca *Epist.* 113.15ff.; *LCL* 3:291.
55. Xenophon *Memorabilia* 1.4 and 4.3; *LCL* 53-65 and 297-325.
56. Cf. especially the text of the *Timaeus* 29E-30B as well as *Laws* 10.
57. Cicero *De natura deorum* 2.22.57ff.; *LCL* 177, 179; frags. 171, 172 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
58. Cicero *De natura deorum* 3.39.92; *LCL* 379; frag. 1107 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
59. Only in the final phase of Stoicism will the prevalence of the religious interest carry over to an opening in that sense, but it will not be theoretically grounded. The logos = fire = *physis* or nature = soul of the world is an impersonal principle and can therefore only be *impersonal providence*, that is, impersonal law, impersonal reason which cannot foresee the individual in any other way than

as a moment or as a member of the totality, leveling it absolutely with respect to all the other moments or members of the totality.

60. Stobaeus *Anth.* 1.78.18ff.; frag. 176 von Arnim *SVF* 1, and frag. 913 von Arnim *SVF* 2; Diels *DG* 322.5 and 323.3.
61. *DL* 7.149; *LCL* 2:253; frag. 175 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
62. Cicero *De divin.* 1.55.125; *LCL* 361; frag. 921 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
63. Cf. frag. 1187ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
64. Cf. M. Pohlenz (*La Stoa* 1:215ff.). In the preface to the Italian edition, xixff., Pohlenz asks firmly for the attention of the reader so that there is no misunderstanding of his thesis (as some had done); he does not claim in fact to make the thought of the Stoa a product of Judaism, but only to emphasize some Stoic components which are or can be of Jewish origin. Moreover, it is a characteristic of Hellenism to make use of Eastern ideas and Hellenize them. The passages of the *Memorabilia* 1.4 and 4.3; *LCL* 53-65 and *LCL* 297-325 to which we made reference, have been reported by us in Vol. 1, and they are considered as faithful testimonies of Socratic teleological thought.
65. Cicero *De fato* 19.43; *LCL* 2:239, 241; frag. 974.24ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
66. Cicero *De fato* 17.39 to 20.46; *LCL* 2:235-43.
67. See text Section 10 above, pages 256ff.
68. Reported in Epictetus *Manual* 53; *LCL* 2:537; frag. 527 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
69. Hyppolitus *Philosoph.* 21; Diels *DG* 571; frag. 975 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
70. Seneca *Epist.* 107.10; *LCL* 3:292.
71. Aetius *Plac.* 1.7.33; Diels *DG* 305ff.; frag. 1027.19ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
72. *DL* 7.136; *LCL* 2:241; frag. 102.26 von Arnim *SVF* 1; cf. also frag. 98.17ff. von Arnim *SVF* 1.
73. The element fire, which we know, is not fire as a principle but an element derived from the first principle, as are the other elements. Aristocles quoted in Eusebius (*Praep. evang.* 15.14.1; frag. 98 von Arnim *SVF* 1) says: "The fire is a universal element *whose principles are God and matter* both of which are corporeal."
74. Cf. S. Sambursky *Physics of the Stoics* 5.
75. Frags. 458-62 and 714-16 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
76. Frag. 500 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
77. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 9.332; *LCL* 3:161; frag. 524.10ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
78. For the anthropocentric conception, cf. frags. 1153-67 von Arnim *SVF* 2.

79. Cf. frags. 527.11ff., 528.21ff., 529.39ff., von Arnim 2.
80. Cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* 1.4 and 4.3; *LCL* 53-65 and 297-325; Aristotle *Politics* 1.8.1256b.
81. M. Pohlenz *La Stoa* 1:197.
82. Cf. frags. 98ff. and 497 von Arnim *SVF* 1; frags. 585ff. and 596ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
83. Nemesius *De nat. hom.* 38.277; frag. 625 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
84. Tatian *Adv. Gr.* 5; frag. 109 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
85. *DL* 7.143; *LCL* 2:247; frag. 633.39ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
86. Cf. frags. 137, 142, 518 von Arnim *SVF* 1; frags. 790ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
87. Varro *De lingua lat.* 5.59; *LCL* 1:55, 57; frag. 126 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
88. *DL* 7.157; *LCL* 2:261; frag. 135 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
89. Galen *De plac. Hipp. et Pl.* 2.8; frag. 140.32ff. von Arnim *SVF* 1.
90. Cf. frags. 143ff. von Arnim *SVF* 1; frags. 823ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
91. Cf. frag. 143ff. von Arnim *SVF* 1; frags. 837ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
92. Cf. frags. 138, 145, 146 von Arnim *SVF* 1; frags. 790ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
93. Cf. Plato *Phaedo* 67D.
94. *DL* 7.156; *LCL* 2:259, 261; frag. 774 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
95. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.31.77; *LCL* 91; frag. 822 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
96. *DL* 7.157; *LCL* 2:261; frag. 522 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
97. *DL* 7.157; *LCL* 2:261; frag. 811 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
98. Aetius *Plac.* 4.7.3; frag. 810 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
99. Cf. frag. 815 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
100. Cf. Tertullian *De anima* 54ff.; frag. 814 von Arnim *SVF* 2; cf. also Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 9.71; *LCL* 3:41; frag. 812 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
101. DL 7.151; *LCL* 2:255, 257; frag. 1102 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
102. Lactantius *Div. Inst.* 7.7.20; frag. 147 von Arnim *SVF* 1; cf. also frag. 813 von Arnim *SVF* 2.
103. On the problem of immortality in Stoic philosophy, in the past never treated with appropriate detail, there now exists a detailed and accurate study by R. Hoven, *Stoïcisme et Stoïciens face au problème de l'au-delà* (Paris, 1971), which we recommend to the reader. Let us remember, in addition, that Pohlenz on this problem of Stoic philosophy is somewhat evasive and tends to give it a decidedly minor role compared to that which the Porch actually attributed to it.

(Notes to pp. 261-88 [1-85])

1. Cf. frags. 2-19 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
2. Cf. with respect to this issue the already cited study of Grumach *Physis and Agathon in der alten Stoa* passim, and Pohlenz *La Stoa* 1:223-27.
3. Seneca *Epist.* 76.9; *LCL* 2:151, 153; frag. 200a von Arnim *SVF* 3.
4. Cicero *De finibus* 3.7.23; *LCL* 241, 243; frag. 11 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
5. Cf. frags. 199ff. von Arnim *SVF* 1, frags. 178ff. *SVF* 2. The *oikeiosis* together with the form of *elf-knowledge* which it implies (*synaisthesis* συναίσθησις) and the satisfaction and love of the self which it involves in every living being, is explained by Pohlenz as follows: "Living beings differ from plants because of the soul, the primary manifestation of which is perception. As far as a living being perceives something white or hot, it also is aware of internal process with which it is struck by the impression of white or of heat. The external impression is hence connected, since our birth, with a *synaisthesis*, an internal "co-perception," an awareness of the self; from this perception of the self arises the first active movement of the soul in the direction of an object, that is, the first instinct. It is a turning around of the subject toward its own being, a being which it feels as belonging to itself, οἰκεῖον, and which he appropriates. This is the *oikeiosis*. But because the perception of the self is necessarily accompanied by a sense of satisfaction (εὐαπέστησις), even the love of the self is innate in living beings and this love is manifested practically in the instinct of self-preservation, which receives anything favoring its own being and avoids its contrary. Something analogous can be observed also in the vegetative world: the vine climbs as with hands around a pole and avoids the closeness of the cabbage harmful to its development. But in these cases it is providence of a universal nature which directly rules the development. In a living being, instead, it has been infused together with the awareness of the self, also, instinct provides for itself in the preservation and development proper to its being" (*Die Stoa* 1:228ff.; cf. also 104ff.). For a critical analysis of the concept of *oikeiosis*, cf. S. G. Pembroke "Oikeiosis" in A. A. Long *Problems* 114-49.
6. *DL* 7.85; *LCL* 2:193; frag. 178 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
7. Cicero *De finibus* 3.5.16; *LCL* 233; frag. 182 von Arnim *SVF* 3. For the *sensus sui* (self-knowledge) cf. note 5 above.
8. Seneca *Epist.* 121.14; *LCL* 3:403, 405; frag. 184 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
9. Cicero *De finibus* 3.6.20; *LCL* 237, 239; frag. 188 von Arnim *SVF* 3.

10. Cf. frags. 72ff. von Arnim *SVF* 3.
11. *DL* 7.102; *LCL* 2:207, 209; frag. 117 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
12. Stobaeus *Anthol.* 2.57.19; frag. 190 von Arnim *SVF* 1; frag. 70 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
13. The recent attempt by Rist (*SP* 1-21) to understand the Stoic doctrine of the good in relation to the ethics of Aristotle, in our view, makes it lose that biting feeling in which its originality properly consists.
14. Cicero *Acad. post.* 1.10.36; *LCL* 445; frag. 191 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
15. Stobaeus *Anthol.* 2.83.10 and 84.4; *DL* 7.105; *LCL* 2:211; frags. 124-26 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
16. Stobaeus *Anthol.*, 2.84.21; frag. 192 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
17. *DL* 7.106; *LCL* 2:211, 213; frag. 127 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
18. See above, page 418 n. 28.
19. See above, page 418 n. 29.
20. Cf. frag. 117ff. von Arnim *SVF* 3.
21. Cf. above, note 3.
22. Stobaeus *Anthol.* 2.77.16; frag. 16 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
23. *DL* 7.89; *LCL* 2:197; frag. 39 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
24. Stobaeus *Anthol.* 2.98.20; frag. 54 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
25. Stobaeus *Anthol.* 2.100.15; frag. 208 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
26. Remember also the different conceptual meaning which the Greek term *arete* has with respect to our term *virtue*, about which we have often called attention in the course of this work.
27. Keep in mind the admission that Epicurus himself made in relation to the practical virtue of *phronesis*, that is, of practical wisdom.
28. Cf. frags. 255, 256 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
29. Seneca *Epist.* 95.57; *LCL* 3:93, 95; frag. 517 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
30. Cf. frags. 373ff. von Arnim *SVF* 1.
31. Cf. frag. 255 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
32. Cf. Plato *Meno* 72A, B.
33. Stobaeus *Anthol.* 2.59.4; frag. 262 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
34. Stobaeus *Anthol.* 2.60.9; frag. 264 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
35. Olympiodorus *In Plat. Alcib. pr.* 214 Creuzer; frag. 302 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
36. Cf. frags. 295ff. von Arnim *SVF* 3.
37. Cf. frags. 200ff. von Arnim *SVF* 1.
38. Lactantius *Div. Instit.* 3.25; frag. 253 von Arnim *SVF* 3. Actually, Plato had attempted in the *Meno* to restore the identity of virtue

in all men and to affirm that man, woman, old, young, slave, free, if they have virtue, have the same virtue. But then his argument changed in the *Republic*. Finally, the educational program of the Academy is decidedly aristocratic and quite at the antipodes both to that of the Stoics and the Epicureans.

39. Seneca *De beneficiis* 3.18; *LCL* 3:141, 143; frag. 508 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
40. Cf. frags. 245ff. von Arnim *SVF* 3.
41. Cf. frag. 252 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
42. Cicero *De finibus* 3.9.32; *LCL* 251, 253; frag. 504 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
43. Stobaeus *Anthol.* 2.7.1; frag. 203 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
44. Cf. frags. 204, 234 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
45. Cicero *De finibus* 3.7.24; *LCL* 243; frag. 11 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
46. Cicero *De finibus* 3.9.32; *LCL* 251, 253; frag. 504 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
47. Philo of Alexandria *De Sacrif. Abel et Cain* 115; *LCL* 2:393, 395; frag. 505 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
48. Seneca *De beneficiis* 2.31; *LCL* 3:113, 115; frag. 507 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
49. M. Pohlenz *La Stoa* 1:26.
50. *DL* 7.107; *LCL* 2:213; frag. 493 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
51. *DL* 7.108; *LCL* 2:213, 215; frag. 495 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
52. Cicero *De finibus* 3.17.58; *LCL* 277; frag. 498 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
53. Cf. frags. 519ff. von Arnim *SVF* 3.
54. M. Pohlenz *La Stoa* passim.
55. Cicero *De legibus* 1.6.18; *LCL* 317; frag. 315 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
56. Cicero *De legibus* 2.8; *LCL* 379, 381; frag. 316 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
57. Plutarch *De Stoic. repugn.* 9.1035c; frag. 326 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
58. *DL* 7.128; *LCL* 2:233; frag. 308 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
59. Cf. frag. 114 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
60. Cicero *De finibus* 3.19.62ff.; *LCL* 281, 283; frag. 340 von Arnim *SVF* 3 and Cicero *De finibus* 3.20.65; *LCL* 285, 287; frag. 342 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
61. Cf. M. Pohlenz *La Stoa* 1:232ff. and 233 n. 11.
62. Dio Chrysostom *Orat.* 36.20; frag. 329 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
63. M. Pohlenz *La Stoa* 1:280.
64. Cf. frags. 333ff. von Arnim *SVF* 3.
65. Dio Chrysostom *Orat.* 36.23; frag. 334 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
66. Cicero *De legibus* 1.7.23; *LCL* 2:321, 323; frag. 339 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
67. Plutarch *Pers. de nob.* 12; frag. 350 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
68. Cf. frag. 343 von Arnim *SVF* 3.

69. Cf. frag. 352 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
70. Cf. frags. 349-66 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
71. The two testimonies are, respectively, *DL* 7.110; *LCL* 2:215, 217; and Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 4.5.11; *LCL* 339; frag. 205 von Arnim *SVF* 1.
72. Cf. the passage of Galen in the next note.
73. Galen *De plac. Hipp. et Pl.* 5.1; frag. 461 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
74. Plutarch *De virtute morali* 7.446F; *LCL* 6:49, 51, 53, 55; frag. 459 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
75. Cf. frags. 377ff. von Arnim *SVF* 3.
76. Cf. frags. 378. 394 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
77. Cf. frags. 205ff. von Arnim *SVF* 1; also frags. 443ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
78. On the Stoic doctrine of the passions, see Pohlenz *La Stoa* 1:284-309.
79. Stobaeus *Anthol.* 2.7.99.14; frag. 567 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
80. Concerning the wise man see frags. 544-656 von Arnim *SVF* 3.
81. Cf. frags. 657ff. von Arnim *SVF* 3.
82. Cf. frags. 657ff. von Arnim *SVF* 3.
83. Cf. frags. 213ff. von Arnim *SVF* 1.
84. *DL* 7.28; *LCL* 2:139, 141.
85. On suicide, see Rist *SP* 233-55.

(Notes to pp. 291-96 [1-27])

1. An accurate reconstruction of this phase of the Stoa will be found in M. Pohlenz *La Stoa* 1:359-83.
2. Panaetius was born at Rhodes, about 185 BCE, of a noble family. He went to Athens (after having heard the doctrines of Crates perhaps at Pergamum); he especially listened to the lessons of Diogenes of Seleucia, who was head of the Porch, and became an ardent believer in the Stoic doctrine (this must have happened between 160 and 150); he remained linked to the school even when it came under the direction of Antipater. He also listened to the lectures of Polemon, who was older than he, and probably also those of Carneades. He visited Rome and stayed there probably many times, and he was welcomed as an appreciated guest in the circle of Scipio, perhaps through the good offices of the historian Polybius. In 140-139 Panaetius took part with Scipio in a journey to the Orient which, together with the Roman period, must have strongly been impressed on his spiritual development. In 129 BCE he became head of the Stoa succeeding Antipater. He died towards the beginning of the first century (Posidonius says that Panaetius

lived thirty years after the publication of his chief work *De officiis*; it happened immediately after his becoming head of the Porch [cf. Cicero *De officiis* 3.2.8; *LCL* 277]). It seems in any case that Panaetius did not continue his lectures up to the end of his life (probably for reasons of health), at least for certain periods; in fact in 109 when Lucius Crasso went to Athens, Mnesarchus, a follower of Panaetius, gave lectures at the Stoa (Cicero *De orat.* 1.11.45). None of the works of Panaetius survived. The fragments were collected, first by H. N. Fowler *Panaetii et Hecatonis librorum fragmenta* (Bonn, 1885), and more recently by M. van Straaten *Panètius, ses écrits et sa doctrine avec un édition des fragments* (Amsterdam, 1946); see especially M. van Straaten *Panaetii Rhodii fragmenta* (Leiden, 1952, 1962[3]). Very appropriately, the work of van Straaten was limited to testimonies in which the name of Panaetius is expressly mentioned and hence solidly attributable. The fine synthesis of Pohlenz concerned with the Stoa on Panaetius (as well as Posidonius) is unfortunately not solidly grounded: in fact, the author tends to inflate their number (as do, moreover, many students of Panaetius) by attributing to him doctrines which were not attested to as his and drawing thence a series of uncritical inferences.

3. The term was introduced by A. Schmekel *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa* (Berlin, 1892). Pohlenz thought the term inappropriate and rejected it, arguing that antiquity had a clear concept of a "Middle Academy" but not of a "Middle Stoa," and what is more, there was no group of closely related thinkers which would ground the term. But Pohlenz must recognize what follows: "It is indubitable that with Panaetius begins a new phase in the history of the Stoa, which in the Imperial Age will be substituted for by a changed attitude of spirit: and because of this *we can speak of a middle period in the history of the school.* In it we find present the most different currents. Here it is because we will do better to avoid the term 'Middle Stoa'" (*La Stoa* 1:388). But, as is clear, what Pohlenz says is more than sufficient to ground the use of the term introduced by Schmekel, so much that the expression the "period of the middle of the Stoa" preferred by Pohlenz says the same thing.
4. Cf. frags. 64-69 van Straaten.
5. Cf., in this regard, the interesting observations of B. N. Tatakis *Panètius de Rhodes, le fondateur du moyen stoïcisme, sa vie et son oeuvre* (Paris, 1931) 102-10.
6. Cf. frags. 64, 69 van Straaten.
7. Cf. frags. 68, 73 van Straaten.

8. Cf. frags. 70, 71 van Straaten.
9. Cf. B.N. Tatakis *Panètius* 110ff.
10. Cf. frag. 74 van Straaten.
11. On the psychology of Panaetius see Tatakis *Panètius* 120ff. and Rist *SP* 179-86.
12. Cf. frags. 84-86a van Straaten.
13. Cicero *De officiis* 1.28.101; *LCL* 103; frag. 87 van Straaten.
14. Cicero *De officiis* 1.36.132; *LCL* 133, 135; frag. 88 van Straaten.
15. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.18.42; *LCL* 51; frag. 82 van Straaten.
16. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.32.79; *LCL* 93; frag. 83 van Straaten. Actually, the passage from Cicero does not say that Panaetius had maintained the thesis that the soul dies *immediately*, together with the body. R. Hoven, in a recent work previously cited, *Stoïcisme et Stoïciens* 51ff., maintains that Panaetius could have professed the same doctrine as the ancient Stoa. In fact Cicero opposes him to Plato, not to other Stoics, and the thesis of Panaetius assumes a specific sense in this very counterpositing. (In other words, if compared with the Platonic thesis, even the thesis of the ancient Stoa about the soul affirms the mortality of the soul.) In any case, for Panaetius it must not have been very important *when* the soul dies; he must have insisted chiefly *on the fact that it dies.*
17. *DL* 7.128; *LCL* 2:233; frag. 110 van Straaten.
18. Cf. Vol. 2, Second Part, Third Section, 1, 2.
19. Seneca *Epist.* 116.5; *LCL* 3:335; frag. 114 van Straaten.
20. At least—it seems certain—in the first of the two books.
21. Cf. Cicero *De officiis* 1.5.15-17; *LCL* 17, 19; frag. 103 van Straaten.
22. Cf. Cicero *De officiis* 1.4.11-14; *LCL* 13, 15, and 17; frag. 98 van Straaten.
23. Cf. Cicero *De officiis* 1.63.152ff.; *LCL* 155ff.
24. Cf. M. Pohlenz *La Stoa* 1:418ff. and especially A. Grilli *Il problema della vita contemplativa nel mondo greco-romano* (Milan-Rome, 1953) 137-61.
25. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 2.21.129; frag. 96 van Straaten.
26. Cf. on these points the analysis of Rist *SP* 186ff.
27. Cf. B.N. Tatakis *Panètius* 226.

(Notes to pp. 297-304 [1-40])

1. See in this regard the indications and detailed discussions of K. Reinhardt in the monograph *Poseidonios von Apameis der Rhodier*

genannt in *RE* Pauly-Wissowa, 22.558-826 and also available as an extract (Stüttgart, 1954); cf. coll. 570-624.

2. See M. Laffranque *Poseidonios d'Apamée* (Paris, 1964) chap. 1, 1-44, where the most complete and exhaustive *status quaestionis* is to be found. Cf. in addition J. F. Dobson "The Posidonius Myth," *CQ* 12 (1918): 179ff.
3. An old edition of the fragments of J. Bake, *Posidonii Rhodii reliquiae* (Lugduni Batavorum, 1810) has only partially filled in the lacuna. The edition of L. Edelstein and I. G. Kidd, *Posidonius* vol.1, *The Fragments* (Cambridge University Press, 1972) is instead superior and methodologically excellent. A new edition, ten years after the edition of Edelstein and Kidd, has been published by W. Theiler, *Poseidonios Die Fragmente* 2 vols. (Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 1982).
4. Cf. J.M. Rist *SP* 201.
5. W. Jaeger *Nemesios von Emesa, Quellenforschungen zum Neuplatonismus und seinen Anfangen bei Poseidonios* (Berlin, 1914).
6. K. Reinhardt *Poseidonios* (Munich, 1921) as well his other works, especially *Kosmos und Sympathie, Neue Untersuchungen über Poseidonius* (Munich, 1926); *Poseidonios uber Ursprung und Entartung* (Heidelburg, 1928) (Orient und Antike, 6); and *Poseidonios von Apameia* cited in note 1.
7. I. Heinemann *Poseidonios' metaphysiche Schriften* 2 vols. (Breslau, 1921; 1928; Hildesheim, 1968).
8. M. Pohlenz *La Stoa* 1:421-93.
9. The collection of fragments with a German translation completed by Pohlenz is a model of excellence in this regard; Pohlenz, *Stoa und Stoiker: Die Grunder, Panaitios, Poseidonios* (Zurich, 1950) 257-357.
10. See above, note 2.
11. The uncritical criterion according to which scholars very frequently are ruled is thus taken up schematically by Laffranque: "Here there is an unidentified influence, here there is a trace of an unknown author; perhaps it is a Stoic author; or rather one of the Middle Stoa. And who will it be, if not Posidonius?" (*Poseidonios* 7).
12. Posidonius was born in the eastern city of Apamea in Syria, between 140 and 130 BCE (cf. the documentation on the basis of which the date is reconstructed in Laffranque *Poseidonios* 46ff.). He completed his study at Athens, where he became a disciple of Panaetius. In 86 BCE he journeyed to Rome, sent as an ambassador by the Rhodians. He entered into contact with Roman aristocratic circles, with whom he developed good relations. About the dates

of his voyages in the East and in the West we know nothing. The imposing knowledge acquired by Posidonius in his studies and travels united with his intellectual charm, and his teaching ability guaranteed to the Stoic school of Rhodes a success which obscured that of the Athenian Porch. The Roman nobles would go to Rhodes and no longer to Athens in order to complete their studies. In 78/77 BCE Cicero attended the lectures of Posidonius. In 67 and 62 he visited Pompei. He died a little after 51 BCE. Nothing remains but fragments, as we have already seen, of his imposing historical scientific and historical work. See the list of the titles of the works of Posidonius cited by ancient authors in Laffranque *Poseidonios* 100ff.; for a detailed and full reconstruction of all which we can know of the life and the formation of Posidonius again, consult Laffranque *Poseidonios* 45-97.

13. Cf. M. Laffranque *Poseidonios* 49ff.
14. For the voyages of Posidonius consult Laffranque *Poseidonios* 78ff.
15. Arius Didymus frag. 20; Diels *DG* 458.8ff.; frag. 92 Edelstein-Kidd; frag. 267 Theiler.
16. Aetius *Plac.* 1.7.19; Diels *DG* 302.22ff.; frag. 101 Edelstein-Kidd; frag. 349 Theiler.
17. Aetius *Plac.* 1.28.5; Diels *DG* 324.11ff.; frag. 103 Edelstein-Kidd; frag. 382a Theiler.
18. Cf. frags. 912ff. von Arnim *SVF* 2.
19. Cf. J.M. Rist *SP* 202ff.
20. *DL* 7.138ff.; *LCL* 2:241, 243; frags. 21, 23 Edelstein-Kidd; frags. 345, 347 Theiler.
21. *DL* 7.140; *LCL* 2:245; frag. 8 Edelstein-Kidd; frag. 260 Theiler.
22. *DL* 7.135; *LCL* 2:239, 241; frag. 16 Edelstein-Kidd; frag. 311 Theiler.
23. J.M. Rist *SP* 205ff.
24. Cf. Plutarch *De an. procr. in Tim.* 22.1023b; frag. 141a Edelstein-Kidd; frag. 391a Theiler.
25. In such a case, therefore, Fate cannot be identified further with providence, which hence also continues to coincide for Posidonius with God. Cf. in this regard Laffranque *Poseidonios* 329ff.
26. Cf. also Pohlenz *La Stoa* 1:438ff., who gives an interpretation completely similar to Reinhardt; see *Kosmos und Sympathie* passim.
27. Cf. M. Laffranque *Poseidonios* 429.
28. Galen *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 5.6.448; frag. 460 von Arnim *SVF* 3; frag. 187 Edelstein-Kidd; frag. 417 Theiler.
29. Seneca *Epist.* 92.10; *LCL* 2:458; frag. 184 Edelstein-Kidd; frag. 449 Theiler.

30. M. Laffranque *Poseidonios* 431.
31. *DL* 7.103; *LCL* 2:209; frag. 171 Edelstein-Kidd; frag. 425a Theiler.
32. *DL* 7.128; *LCL* 2:233; frag. 173 Edelstein-Kidd; frag. 425c Theiler.
33. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 2.25.61; *LCL* 215, 217; test. 38 Edelstein-Kidd; test. 18 Theiler.
34. Cf. R. Miller-Jones "Posidonius and Solar Eschatology" *CQ* 27 (1932): 113ff., and Laffranque *Poseidonios* 519-27.
35. Cicero *De divin.* 1.30.64; *LCL* 295; frag. 108 Edelstein-Kidd; frag. 373a Theiler.
36. *DL* 7.142; *LCL* 2:247 says clearly that concerning the genesis and the dissolution of the cosmos Posidonius treats it in the first book *On the Cosmos*. And from Aetius we know that Posidonius maintained "that the void outside the cosmos is not infinite, but *so much as is sufficient for the dissolution* of the cosmos" (2.9.3 Diels *DG,* 338.18ff.); cf. frags. 99a, 97ab Edelstein-Kidd; frags. 302, 304 Theiler.
37. M. Laffranque *Poseidonios* 109-284.
38. Cf. especially Pohlenz *La Stoa* 1:433ff., 444ff., 493.
39. M. Laffranque *Poseidonios* passim.
40. M. Laffranque *Poseidonios* 516ff.

FOURTH PART

(Notes to pp. 309-28 [1-92])

1. Pyrrho was born at Elis, perhaps between 365 and 360 BCE, in the city in which Phaedo had founded a Socratic school of which we have spoken above (cf. Vol. 1, Third Part, Second Section, 5 and Vol. 3, above, 80ff.). At the beginning he was poor and in order to live he painted (*DL* 9.62; *LCL* 2:475, 477). He then discovered philosophy, hearing at first the teachers of the Socratic schools, especially the Megarics, and then Anaxarchus of Abdera, who introduced him to Democritus. Together with Anaxarchus, Pyrrho took part in the expedition of Alexander to the East (324/323 BCE.), an event which left a deep impression on him, as we will see (cf. *DL* 9.61; *LCL* 2:475). Around 324/323 BCE Pyrrho returned to Elis, where he stayed and taught his new vision of life with success. He died between 275 and 270 BCE. He did not write anything (except a poem in honor of Alexander). Fortunately, his disciple Timon wrote down his sceptical doctrine and the ancients drew from Timon. We owe to Diogenes Laertius (9.61-69; *LCL* 2:475, 77, 79, 81, 83), especially, the detailed information we possess (it seems that Diogenes, in his turn, has drawn from a Pyrrhonian biography by

Antigonus of Carystus, a learned man of the end of the third century BCE, as Wilmowitz-Moellendorff supposed in *Philol. Unters.* (1881) 28ff. All the testimonies concerning Pyrrho have been collected, translated, and commented upon in an accurate way by F. Decleva Caizzi *Pirrone, Testimonianze* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1981) and now this scholarly tool is most important for the study of our philosopher. The following studies are basic for Pyrrho and Scepticism and we will often refer to them in our exposition: V. Brochard *Les Sceptiques Grecs* (Paris 1953[3]; 1887[1], 1923[2]); A. Goedeckermeyer *Die Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus* (Leipzig, 1905; Aalen, 1968); L. Robin *Pyrrhon et le scepticisme grec* (Paris, 1944); M. Dal Pra *Lo scetticismo greco* 2 vols. (Milan-Rome, 1950; Bari: Laterza, 1975[2]); C. L. Stough *Greek Scepticism: A Study in Epistemology* (Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969); A. Verdan *Le scepticisme philosophique* (Paris, 1971). Concerning Pyrrho in particular, there is the previously cited stimulating work of M. Conche, *Pyrrhon ou l'apparence* (Villers sur Mer, 1973). Cf. also our own work, "Ipotesi per una rilettura della filosofia di Pirrone di Elide," in *Lo scetticismo antico* Atti del Convegno organizzato del Centro di Studio del Pensiero Antico del C. N. R. Roma 5-8 novembre 1980, ed. G. Giannantoni (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1981) 243-336.

2. Cf. above, page 9.

3. The testimonies and fragments of Anaxarchus are collected in Diels-Kranz *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[7], 72 A and B, 2:235-40 and are translated in Diogenes Laertius (9.58-60; *LCL* 2:471ff.; 72.A.1 D-K 2:235), where he says of Anaxarchus: "He studied under Diogenes of Smyrna, and the latter under Metrodorus of Chios, who used to declare that he knew nothing, not even the fact that he knew nothing; while Metrodorus was a pupil of Nessas of Chios, though some say that he was taught by Democritus" (trans. R. D. Hicks). He was at his acme, as Diogenes says in the 110th Olympiad, that is, 340-337 BCE. He was very famous for the statement with which he received the order of Nicocreon to put him in a mortar and pounding him to death with iron pestles: "Pound, pound the pouch containing Anaxarchus; you pound not Anaxarchus" (*DL* 9.59; *LCL* 2:473; 72.A.1 D-K 2: 235).

4. M. Conche *Pyrrhon* 9. This author reads Pyrrho influenced by the Heideggarian school and frequently makes the philosopher say what the texts do not say. However it is a fairly acute reading which, if used with good sense, helps to solve the enigmas of our philosopher better than many others.

5. Cf. above, pages 34ff.

6. *DL* 9.61; *LCL* 2:475; test. 1A Decleva Caizzi.
7. *DL* 9.63; *LCL* 2:475; test. 10 Decleva Caizzi.
8. Plutarch *Life of Alexander* 69; *LCL* 7:417, 419.
9. M. Conche *Pyrrhon* 21. The influence of the East on Pyrrho can be correctly maintained as a result of modern philosophic historiography.
10. Cf. above, note 3.
11. *DL* 9.58; *LCL* 2:471, 473; 72.A.1 D-K 2:235.
12. *DL* 9.67; *LCL* 2:479, 481; test. 20 Decleva Caizzi.
13. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.87, 88; *LCL* 2:45, 47; 70.A.25 D-K 2:233; also 70.B.1 D-K 2:233; Cicero *Acad.pr.* 23.73; Eusebius *Praep. Evang.* 14.19.8.
14. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.137; *LCL* 2:75, 77; 68.B.6 D-K 2:138.
15. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.137; *LCL* 2:75, 77; 68.B.7 D-K 2:138, 139.
16. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.137; *LCL* 2:75, 77; 68.B.8 D-K 2:139.
17. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.135; *LCL* 2:75; 68.B.9 D-K 2:139.
18. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.135; *LCL* 2:75; 68.B.10 D-K 2:139.
19. See vol. 2, p. 166 of D-K 69.B.117; *DL* 9.72; *LCL* 2:485.
20. Cf. Vol. 1. First Part. Fifth Section. 3.1-4.
21. Cf. above, pages 45-54.
22. *DL* 9.65; *LCL* 2:479; Timon frag. 48 Diels; test. 60 Decleva Caizzi.
23. Cf. Vol. 2. passim and especially First Part. Second Section. 1.1ff. and Second Part. Second Section. 1.7ff.
24. Plato *Cratylus* 385E.
25. Aristocles quoted in Eusebius *Praep. evang.* 14.18.3; test. 53 Decleva Caizzi.
26. Cf. further on, Section seven, pages 317ff.
27. *DL* 9.61; *LCL* 2:475; test. 1 Decleva Caizzi.
28. Cf. for example, Vol. 1. First Part. Fourth Section. 2.1ff. and 4.3ff.
29. Cf. for example, Vol. 2. First Part. Fourth Section. 2.5ff.
30. *DL* 9.105; *LCL* 2:515, 517; Timon frag. 69 Diels; test. 63A and test. 63B Decleva Caizzi. Cf. the observations in this regard proposed by Conche *Pyrrhon* 21ff.
31. Aristotle *Met.* Z.1.1028b1-7.
32. Cf. 28.B.2 and 6-8 passim D-K 2:132 and 138, 139.
33. Cf. Aristotle *Met.* Γ.3ff. (and our comments in *La metafisica* 1:332ff.
34. Cf. Aristotle *Met.* Γ.7 passim.
35. Cf. Aristocles, quoted in Eusebius *Praep. evang.* 14.18.3; test. 53 Decleva Caizzi.

36. Cf. Volume 1. Second Part. Second Section. 2.1ff.
37. Cf. Volume 1. Second Part. Second Section.2.6ff. and especially 3.6ff.
38. *DL* 9.67; *LCL* 2:479, 481; test. 20 Decleva Caizzi. The two verses of Homer cited are taken from the *Iliad* 6.146 and 21.106ff.
39. Aristocles quoted in Eusebius *Praep. evang.* 14.18.26.1-4; test. 53 Decleva Caizzi.
40. Cf. C. L. Stough *Greek Scepticism* 21ff.; Dal Pra *Lo scetticismo greco* 1:61-64. Cf. also our work "Ipotesi per una rilettera..." cited above in note one, passim.
41. *DL* 9.61; *LCL* 2:475; test. 1A Decleva Caizzi.
42. Cf. Volume 2, Second Part, Second Section, 1, 7ff.
43. *DL* 9.61 and 76; *LCL* 2:475 and 489, 491; test. 1A, 54 Decleva Caizzi.
44. *DL* 9.105; *LCL* 2:515, 517; Timon frag. 74 Diels.
45. *DL* 9.105; *LCL* 2:515, 517; test. 63A and 63B Decleva Caizzi
46. Conche *Pyrrhon* 49.
47. *DL* 9.65; *LCL* 2:479; Timon frag. 67 Diels; tests. 61A and 61B Decleva Caizzi.
48. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 11.20; *LCL* 3:395; Timon frag. 68 Diels; test. 62 Decleva Caizzi.
49. M. Conche *Pyrrhon* 88ff., who wants to reject this testimony since it treats of affirmations that Timon *made speaking* to Pyrrho; but also in the testimony of Aristocles things are no different. In reality Conche insists on the Pyrrhonean atheism based on the foundation of his Heideggarian convictions not on the texts.
50. Cf. above, note 48.
51. E. Bréhier *Histoire de la philosophie* (Paris, 1963) 1.2.373.
52. Cf. *DL* 9.64; *LCL* 2:477, 479; test. 11 Decleva Caizzi.
53. Cf. above, note 48.
54. Cf. Seneca *Epist.* 9.1-3; *LCL* 1:43, 45; frag. 195 Döring; Giannantoni *SR* 20.33.
55. Cf. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.42.130; *LCL* 647; test. 69A Decleva Caizzi.
56. Cf. Cicero *De finibus* 2.13.43; *LCL* 129, 131; test. 69B Decleva Caizzi. On Ariston cf. A. M. Ioppolo *Aristone di Chio e lo stoicismo antico* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1980).
57. Cicero *De finibus* 4.16.43; *LCL* 347, 349; test. 69C Decleva Caizzi. Here is a passage of the same work (5.8.23; test. 69I Decleva Caizzi): "Again, the discredited and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Ariston, and Erillus cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn, and so we have not been concerned to consider them at all. For the whole of this enquiry into the ends or, so to speak, the

limits of goods and evils must begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted and suited to *nature and which is the earliest object of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere of things which contain no element of moral worth or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing should be preferred to any other, and who consider these things to be absolutely indifferent*, and Erillus also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action and every clue to right conduct" (*LCL* 415, 417, trans. H. Rackham).

58. Cf. *DL* 9.68; *LCL* 2:481; test. 42 Decleva Ciazzi: this scholarch was named Numenius (cf. also 9.102; *LCL* 2:513; test. 44 Decleva Caizzi).
59. Aristotle, *Met.* Γ.4.1008a30-33.
60. Aristocles, quoted in Eusebius *Praep. evang.* 14.18.3ff.; test. 53 Decleva Caizzi.
61. M. Conche *Pyrrhon* 35, maintains that between 334 and 332 BCE Pyrrho had listened to Aristotle at Athens; but this does not seem possible, because in those years Pyrrho had probably already gone off with Alexander. It is, on the contrary, plausible what Conche (*Pyrrhon* 35) underlines: "Nothing forbids in any case that Pyrrho knew about the content of Aristotle's lectures at Assos, whether at Athens or during the expedition of Alexander, through Callisthenes; nephew of Aristotle, who participated in the expedition, who precisely at Assos had been taught by his uncle." For an analysis of the antitheses which we have featured between Aristotle and Pyrrho, see also Conche's emphasis on 36ff.
62. *DL* 9.66; *LCL* 2:479; test. 14 Decleva Caizzi.
63. Aristotle *Met.* Γ.4.1008b14-19.
64. *DL* 9.62; *LCL* 2:475, 477; test. 6 Decleva Caizzi.
65. *DL* 9.63; *LCL* 2:477; test. 10 Decleva Caizzi.
66. Cf. Aristotle *Met.* Γ.4-6.
67. Aristocles quoted in Eusebius *Praep. evang.* 14.18.4.; test. 53 Decleva Caizzi.
68. Sextus Empiricus *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.192; *LCL* 1:111, 113.
69. Aristocles quoted in Eusebius *Praep. evang.* 14.18.4; test. 53 Decleva Caizzi.
70. Cf. above, note 48.
71. Posidonius quoted in *DL* 9.68; *LCL* 2:481; frag. 287 Edelstein-Kidd; frag. 453 Db Theiler; test. 17A Decleva Caizzi.
72. *DL* 9.67; *LCL* 2:479, 481; test. 16 Decleva Caizzi.

73. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.42.130; *LCL*, 637; test. 69A Decleva Caizzi.
74. *DL* 9.108; *LCL* 2:519.
75. M. Conche *Pyrrhon*, 63ff.
76. *DL* 9.66; *LCL* 2:479; test. 15A Decleva Caizzi.
77. *DL* 9.64; *LCL* 2:477, 479; test. 11 Decleva Caizzi.
78. *DL* 9.65; *LCL* 2:479; Timon frag. 67 Diels; test. 61 AB Decleva Caizzi.
79. Cf. above, what we said about this philosopher, pp. 116ff.
80. Timon was born at Phlius between 325 and 320 BCE (cf. in Brochard *Les sceptiques grecs* 97 n. 7) the elements on the basis of which he calculated these dates. He was at first a dancer, then he went on to philosophy and he heard the Megaric Stilpo. In a second phase he became a disciple of Pyrrho at Elis, where he remained some years. Successively (referring to Diogenes Laertius [9.110; *LCL* 2:521]), "he was constrained by necessity to procure for himself some means of support, and sailed to the Hellespont and Propontis. Living now at Chalcedon as a sophist, he increased his reputation still further, and having made his fortune he went to Athens where he lived until his death except for a brief period which he spent at Thebes" (trans. R. D. Hicks). He died between 235 and 230 BCE at ninety years of age (*DL* 9.112; *LCL* 2:523). He wrote a dialogue entitled *Python* (in which he tells of his meeting with Pyrrho and his conversion to Pyrrhonism); the *Silloi*, *Lampoons* (of which we spoke in the text); the poem "Appearances;" a treatise *On Sensations*; a polemic work *Against the Physicists*. A good collection of the fragments has been edited by H. Diels *Poetarum philosophorum fragmenta* (Berlin, 1901) 133-206; also cf. G. Voghera *Timone di Fliunte e la poesia silligrafica* (Padua, 1904).
81. Cf. frags. 8-11, 32, 48, 67 Diels.
82. G. Voghera (*Timone* 11) thus defines the *Sillos*: "The poetry of the Sillos is...satiric poetry. It is clearly determined by special characteristics of content and form: of content, because...it is satirical especially about dogmatic philosophy; of form, because it takes verses which are parodies of other poets, primarily of Homer." *Sillos* (σίλλος) is derived from ἴλλος (= ὀφθαλμός, the eye) and indicates the act of moving the eyes in order to deride someone, hence the metaphoric meaning of derision and derisory poetry (cf. Voghera *Timone* 9ff.). Voghera (*Timone* 15) also ventures the hypothesis that we have reported above according to which the taste for derision comes from the experiences which Timon had during his youth with a group of tumblers.
83. The more plausible reconstruction is by Diels *Poetarum philoso-*

phorum fragmenta 182ff.

84. Frag. 38 Diels.
85. A privileged treatment is reserved for Xenophon; cf. frag. 59 Diels. The Eleatics are recorded with approval for the criticism they directed against sense knowledge; cf. frags. 44, 45 Diels. See also the respectful treatment accorded to Democritus; cf. frag. 46 Diels.
86. Cf. frag. 54 Diels (cf. also frags. 19, 64).
87. Frag. 36 Diels.
88. Frags. 13, 14, 38, 39, 65, 66 Diels.
89. Frags. 7 and 51 Diels.
90. Cf. frags. 31, 32, 34 Diels. After the death of Arcesilaus Timon composed a *Funeral Banquet* in his honor, of which Diogenes Laertius (9.115; *LCL* 2:525; frag. 73 Diels) writes: "Yet while attacking Arcesilaus in the *Silloi*, he has praised him in his work entitled the *Funeral Banquet of Arcesilaus*" (trans. R. D. Hicks).
91. Menodotus quoted in *DL* 9.115; *LCL* 2:525.
92. See the list in *DL* 9.116; *LCL* 2:527.

(Notes to pp. 329-34 [1-25])

1. Arcesilaus was born around 315 BCE at Pitane in Aeolis (cf. V. Brochard *Les sceptiques grecs* 100 n. 1). He came to Athens perhaps at the beginning of the third century. At first he attended the Peripatos and listened to Theophrastus (*DL* 4.29; *LCL* 1:407); then he went on to the Academy and became a disciple first of Crantor and then of Polemon and Crates. In addition he studied the dialectic of the Megaric school and perhaps he knew Pyrrho. He succeeded Crates in the direction of the Academy, where he held lectures with great success. Diogenes Laertius writes (*DL* 4.37; *LCL* 1:415): "He was very fertile in invention, he could meet objection acutely or bring the course of discussion back to the point at issue, and fit it to every occasion. In persuasiveness he had no equal, and this all the more drew pupils to the school, although they were in terror of his pungent wit. But they willingly put up with that; for his goodness was extraordinary and he inspired his pupils with hopes." He died around 240 BCE.
2. Cf. V. Brochard *Les sceptiques grecs* 99-122; Gödeckermeyer *Die Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus* 30-47; Dal Pra *Lo scetticismo greco*^{2} 1:115ff. Also very useful is L. Credaro *Lo scetticismo degli Accademici* 2 vols. (Rome 1889-93).
3. Cf. *DL* 9.114; *LCL* 2:525.
4. Cf. *DL* 9.115; *LCL* 2:525, 527.

5. Sextus Empiricus *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.232; *LCL* 1:143.
6. Cicero *Acad. post.* 1.12.45; *LCL* 455.
7. It is therefore impossible to affirm with Brochard, *Les sceptiques grecs* 97, that "if Pyrrho had not existed, the Academy would have been, more or less, what it was" (cf. Robin *Pyrrhon* 42ff.), precisely because the sceptic deductions, which Arcesilaus drew from Socraticism and from Platonism, are *against* the Socratic Platonic spirit and presuppose the shift to another plane. It is true, on the contrary, that inserted within the Academic tradition scepticism, originally concerned with ethics, becomes concerned with dialectic.
8. Cicero *Acad. post.* 1.12.44ff.; *LCL* 453.
9. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.154; *LCL* 2:85.
10. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.156; *LCL* 2:85ff.
11. Cf. Sextus Empiricus *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.232ff.; *LCL* 1:143ff.
12. On the problem cf. P. Couissin, "L'origine et l'évolution de l'époché," *REG* 42 (1929): 373-97; cf. also by the same author, "Le stoïcisme de la nouvelle Académie," *RHP* (1929): 241-76.
13. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.158; *LCL* 2:87.
14. Cf. L. Robin *Pyrrhon* 61ff. and Dal Pra *Lo scetticismo greco* 1:147ff.
15. Sextus Empiricus *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.234ff.; *LCL* 1:143, 145.
16. Sextus Empiricus *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.232ff.; *LCL* 1:143ff.
17. *DL* 4.32ff.; *LCL* 1:409ff.
18. *Iliad* 6.181.
19. See above, page 55.
20. Timon frag. 31 Diels.
21. Timon frag. 32 Diels.
22. Numenius quoted in Eusebius *Praep. Evang.* 14.6.6; frag. 25 des Places.
23. Cf. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.18.60; *LCL* 543, 545; cf. also Saint Augustine *Contra Acad.* 3.43.
24. Cf. text, pages 79-81.
25. See the observations (in our view correct) which Dal Pra makes in the first edition of *Lo scetticismo* 117 (in the new edition they have been removed).

(Notes to pp. 335-39 [1-24])

1. We have adopted the distinctions of the periods of the Academy referred to by Sextus Empiricus *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.220; *LCL* 1:133.

2. Cf. Dal Pra *Lo scetticismo*^{2} 1:165ff.
3. Carneades was born at Cyrene around 219 BCE (cf. the documents from which the date is settled in Brochard *Les sceptiques grecs* 124 n. 2). He went to Athens, studied extensively the philosophic thought of the schools then in vogue, especially the thought of Chrysippus, but in a critical manner. In fact almost immediately he preferred the Academy of which he became a follower, and when Hegesius died, he became the scholarch. Cicero (*Acad. post.* 1.12.46; *LCL* 455) mentions his great philosophical erudition admiringly (cf. also *DL* 4.62; *LCL* 1:437, 439). In 156/155 he was sent as an ambassador to Rome, together with two other scholarchs of the great Athenian schools (Critolaus, scholarch of the Lyceum, and Diogenes of Babylonia, scholarch of the Porch). At Rome Carneades achieved success and admiration, holding in two different days two discourses of opposed positions concerning justice, and offering in this way an exemplary display of his dialectical abilities (cf. Plutarch *Cato major* 22). He died at almost ninety years of age in 129 BCE (Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.6, 16; *LCL* 487).
4. Cf. the preceding note.
5. *DL* 4.62; *LCL* 1:437, 439.
6. A good exposition of these arguments can be found in Brochard *Les sceptiques grecs* 127ff., and Dal Pra *Lo scetticismo*^{2} 1:174-270.
7. Cf. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.159; *LCL* 2:87.
8. Cicero *Acad. post.* 2.25.79; *LCL* 567.
9. Cf. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.159ff. and 7:411ff.; *LCL* 2:87 and 221.
10. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.31.99; *LCL* 593, 595.
11. Cf. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.165; *LCL* 2:91.
12. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.166; *LCL* 2:91. For further discussion of the Italian translation see G. Reale *Storia* 3:514 n. 12.
13. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.166-75; *LCL* 2:91, 93, 95.
14. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.176-81; *LCL* 2:95, 97.
15. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.182; *LCL* 2:97, 99.
16. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.184; *LCL* 2:99, 101.
17. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.185-89; *LCL* 2:101, 103.
18. For the out-dated positions of scholars in this regard see Zeller *DPG* 3:1.531ff.; Brochard is more nuanced, *Les sceptiques grecs* 127ff.
19. Cf. P. Couissin *Le stoicisme* 259ff.; Robin *Pyrrhon* 95ff.; Dal Pra *Lo scetticismo*^{2} 1:270ff.
20. *DL* 7.76; *LCL* 2:185.
21. *DL* 7.75; *LCL* 2:183, 185.

22. Cf. P. Couissin *Le stoïcisme* 264ff.; Dal Pra *Lo scetticismo*^{2} 1:270-81.
23. Dal Pra, in the first edition of *Lo scetticismo greco* 217, evaluated the position of Carneades very well, in our view: "The sceptical attitude is a position brought to the limit which cannot determine itself as other than a negation. The Stoic criticism itself can only assume an hypothetical value; it cannot be provided with an absolute value without returning to dogmatic Stoicism. Yet as criticism, scepticism is therefore on the point of being able to renounce philosophy, since it rejects any dogmatism. On the other hand it does not see how the philosophic problem can be resolved without any *dogmatic solution*. Therefore scepticism does not live its own life but is like a parasite, which because of its own constitution is destined to die with the host organism which it destroys. This is the limit of the position of Carneades; he struck at the roots of Stoicism till he finally destroyed it; and then? Carneades did not go beyond Stoicism, except insofar as he destroyed Stoicism; but there is nothing in front of the founder of the new Academy except an empty horizon; actually also the destruction of Stoicism is empty insofar as it could not have any positive significance."
24. For the exponents of the sceptical Academy between Carneades and Philo, cf. Dal Pra *Lo scetticismo*^{2} 1:287, 299.

(Notes to pp. 343-45 [1-3])

1. Naturally the denomination is due to modern historiography. The philosophers whom we call "eclectics" are self-identified with the traditional name of the School to which they belonged. Diogenes Laertius speaks of the eclectic school but only speaks about the one founded by the obscure Potams of Alexandria, "who made a selection from the tenets of all the existing sects" (*DL* 1.21; *LCL* 1:21, 23). A fundamental point has to be emphasized in this regard: all the thinkers showing *eclectic influences* are *not* eclectics in the true and proper sense but only those thinkers in which a unitary inspiration capable of balancing those influences is absent.
2. Cf. E. Zeller *DPG* 3:1.549.
3. Cf. E. Zeller *DPG* 3:1.560ff.

(Notes to pp. 347-51 [1-15])

1. Sextus Empiricus *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.220; *LCL* 1:133.
2. Cicero (*De orat.* 3.18.67; *Acad. post.* 2.12.46; *De finibus* 5.3.7; *LCL* 397, 399) distinguished only two Academies and recognized himself as a follower of the "new one." He could not hence have that "historical" detachment permitting him to recognize as we do

that the real history of the Academy was much more complex.

3. Philo was born at Larissa around the middle of the second century BCE. He went to Athens, entering the Academy where he was a disciple of Clitomachus, and at his death became scholarch (about 110 BCE). Because of the spread of the Mithridatic war against the Romans, Philo left Athens and fled to Rome where, probably, he remained until his death. His teaching was greatly appreciated at Rome and many illustrious Romans frequented his lectures; Cicero was his student, calling him a "magnus vir" (*Acad. post.* 1.4.13; *LCL* 423), and he was greatly admired by him since he considered himself his successor (cf. Cicero *Ad famil.* 9.8).
4. Cicero (*Acad. pr.* 2.4.11) says that Antiochus, who was a very gentle man, on reading these books (of Philo) became "nauseated."
5. Sextus Empiricus *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.235ff.; *LCL* 1:145.
6. Cf. for an analysis Dal Pra *Lo scetticismo*^{2} 1:306ff.
7. But actually with a great deal of sympathy for Arcesilaus and Carneades, cf. *Acad.pr.* passim.
8. Brochard's thesis, therefore, according to which Philo was a faithful disciple of Carneades, has no foundation (*Les sceptiques grecs* 204).
9. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.34.111; *LCL* 609, 611.
10. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.3.7-8; *LCL* 473, 475.
11. Cf. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.11.34; *LCL* 511, 513.
12. E. Zeller *DPG* 3.1.617.
13. Cicero *Acad. post.* 1.4.13; *LCL* 423.
14. Stobaeus *Anthol.* 2.40.
15. V. Brochard *Les sceptiques grecs* 207.

(Notes to pp. 353-56 [1-13])

1. Antiochus was born at Ascalon (Strabo 16.2.29) between the end of the third decade and the beginning of the second decade of the second century BCE (cf. G. Luck *Der Akademiker Antiochus* [Bern-Stüttgart, 1953], 13). He was for a long time a disciple of Philo (cf. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.22.69; *LCL* 555). We do not know if he left Athens together with Philo and then went with him to Rome. We know, instead, that he was at Alexandria between 87 and 84 BCE, together with Lucullus. He went to Athens and became scholarch of the Academy. In 79 BCE Cicero (during the dictatorship of Sulla) went to Athens, where he followed for some months the lectures of Antiochus (cf. Cicero *Brut.* 91.315). Next, Antiochus followed Lucullus on the occasion of the second Mithridatic war into Syria,

and in 69 BCE was involved in the battle of Tigranocerta. He died a little while after (cf. Plutarch *Luc.* 28; Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.19.61; *LCL* 545). Cicero, though he yielded to Philo, was sincere in his admiration of Antiochus (cf. *Acad. pr.* 2.2.4; *LCL* 469, 471; 2.35.113; *LCL* 611, 613). No work of Antiochus has survived. The testimonies in which our philosopher is expressly mentioned by name are collected by Luck in the volume cited above, 73-94.

2. Cf. Cicero *Acad. post.* 1.4.17 and 6.22; *LCL* 427; Cicero *Acad. post.* 2.5.15; *LCL* 485, 487; *De finibus* 5.3.7; 5.14; 8.21; *LCL* 397, 399; 405, 407; 413, 415.
3. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.43.132; *LCL* 639, 641.
4. Sextus Empiricus *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.235; *LCL* 1:145.
5. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.46.142ff.; *LCL* 651ff.; cf. Cicero *Acad. post.* 1.8.30ff.; *LCL* 441ff.
6. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.6-15 and passim.
7. Cf. pages 348ff.
8. Cf. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.46.142ff.; *LCL* 651ff.
9. See above, especially Cicero *Acad. post.*, passim.
10. Cicero *De finibus* 5.9.26; *LCL* 415-21.
11. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.43.134; *LCL* 641, 643; *De finibus* 5.24.72; *LCL* 473, 475.
12. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.43.133; *LCL* 641.
13. Concerning Antiochus see the recent excellent reconstruction of J. Glucker *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (Göttingen, 1978). For the relations between Antiochus and Middle Platonism consult vol. 4 (forthcoming).

(Notes to pp. 357-65 [1-28])

1. Cicero was born in 106 BCE at Arpino. He was interested in philosophy from youth; he pursued it with constancy and interest. Moreover the love of philosophy was far from absorbing all of Cicero's energies and interests. In fact he was chiefly involved in public, political, and forensic life. Therefore his preference was for rhetoric and oratory. His oratorical career began in 81 and in 76/75 he began his political activity with his eloquence as quaestor. From then on, Cicero's name was frequently linked to turbulent events and important political happenings. He died in 43 BCE, killed by the soldiers of Mark Antony. We have already spoken of his teachers in philosophy, and we will do so again in the text. The numerous philosophical works of Cicero extant were written by him in the final period of his life. In 46 he wrote *Paradoxa Stoicorum*;

in 45 the *Academica* (two dialogues entitled *To Catallus* and *To Lucullus*; he completed a second edition in which Atticus and Varro appear as interlocutors: of the *Academica priora* there remains the second book [Lucullus], of the *Academica posteriora* Book I and fragments remain). In 45 he also wrote *De finibus bonorum et malorum*. In 44 he published the *Tusculanae disputationes* and the *De natura deorum*, and in 44 the *De officiis*. To these works he added later the *De fato*, the *De divinatione*, the *Cato maior de senectute*, and the *Laelius de amicitia*. We have to remember also the political works *De re publica* and *De legibus*. Of the *De re publica* we have the first two books incomplete, and fragments of the third, fourth, and fifth, and a great deal of the sixth book which already in antiquity had an autonomous life with the title of *Somnium Scipionis*.

2. Cf. E. Zeller *DPG* 3:1.672ff. and Göedeckermeyer *Die Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus* 130ff., where all the references for the sources can be found.
3. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 2.3.9; *LCL* 155.
4. Cicero *De natura deorum* 1.5.12; *LCL* 15; cf. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.31.98ff.; *LCL* 593.
5. Cicero *De officiis* 2.2.7-8; *LCL* 173, 175, 177.
6. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 4.4.7; *LCL* 335.
7. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.9.29; *LCL* 503, 505.
8. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.31.99; *LCL* 593, 595.
9. E. Zeller *DPG* 3:1.683.
10. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 3.1.2; *LCL* 225, 227.
11. Cicero *De finibus* 5.21.59; *LCL* 461.
12. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.39.122; *LCL* 625.
13. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.41.127; *LCL* 631.
14. Cicero *Acad. pr.* 2.41.127; *LCL* 631.
15. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.13.30; *LCL* 37.
16. Cf. Cicero *De natura deorum* passim.
17. In *De natura deorum* 2.37.93 (*LCL* 213) we read: "At this point must I not marvel that there should be anyone who can persuade himself that there are certain solid and indivisible particles of matter borne along by the force of gravity, and that the fortuitous collision of those particles produces this elaborate and beautiful world? I cannot understand why he who considers it possible for this to have occurred should not also think that, if a countless number of copies of the one and twenty letters of the alphabet, made of gold or what you will, were thrown together into some

receptacle and then shaken out on to the ground, it would be possible that they should produce the *Annals* of Ennius, all ready for the reading. I doubt whether chance could possibly succeed in producing even a single verse!" (trans. H. Rackham).

18. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.27.66; *LCL* 77, 79.
19. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.26.65; *LCL* 75, 77.
20. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.14.31; *LCL* 37, 39.
21. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.22.50ff.; *LCL* 61ff.
22. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.27.66; *LCL* 77, 79.
23. Cicero *Tusc. disp.* 1.26.65; *LCL* 75, 77.
24. Cicero *De officiis* 1.43.153; *LCL* 157, 159 (in the passage omitted after the ellipse, Cicero speaks of the superiority of *sophia* over *phronesis*, but he contradicts himself in an impressive manner).
25. Cicero *De amicitia* 5.18; *LCL* 127, 129.
26. Cicero *De officiis* 1.31.110; *LCL* 113.
27. C. Marchesi *Storia della letteratura latina* (Milan-Messina, 1971[8]), 1.317.
28. Varro Reatino (116-27 CE) was a man of wide philosophical knowledge. He was an encyclopedia (moreoever his contemporaries judged him the most cultured of the Romans). Rather than the philosophy of Varro, it is better to speak of the philosophical implications of his general culture. Contrary to Cicero, who as we have seen followed Philo, he drew on Antiochus and remained in large measure faithful to him. His conception of the soul as *pneuma* and of the divine as *soul of the world* are in complete harmony precisely with Antiochus's stoicizing eclecticism. Also his moral ideas do not present any novelties. Philosophical doctrine for him, as is well known, consists in the distinction of three forms of theology (a distinction which has very ancient roots): *a*) *mythical* or *fabulous theology* proper to poets, *b*) *natural theology* proper to philosophers, *c*) *civil theology*, which is expressed in the beliefs and in the culture of the State. It is without doubt that Varro maintained the second form of theology as the truest. However Boyance states the following: " ... at times a few philosophers were forced to give a place to the theology of the poets and of the State. It was a matter of the historical tradition of the Greeks, both Rome and Varro had a respect which was wholly Roman for this tradition. The erudition in him respected in particular the history of words, he believed that the truths of the philosophers could be based on them... . Everything did not happen in Varro without hesitations, doubts, and setbacks, of which he was conscious. But he was sustained by the fervor of his convictions and by the vastness

of his knowledge..." ("Les implications philosophiques des recherches de Varron sur la religion romaine," in *Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi Varroniani* [Rieti, 1976] 1:161). Cf. for further bibliographical references Volume 5, *s.v.*, forthcoming.

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Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 11; *DL* 10.142 [11]; *LCL* 2:667, ***133 n. 26***.
Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 14; *DL* 10.143 [14]; *LCL* 2:669; frags. 570, 571 Usener, ***177 n. 58***.
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Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 20; *DL* 10.145 [20]; *LCL* 2:669, 671, ***171-72 n. 38***.
Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 21; *DL* 10.146 [21]; *LCL* 2:671, ***169 n. 24***.
Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 23; *DL* 10.146 [23]; *LCL* 2:671, ***124 n. 6***.
Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 23; *DL* 10.146 [23]; *LCL* 2:671, ***179 n. 69***.
Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 24; *DL* 10.147 [24]; *LCL* 2:671, ***124 n. 7***.
Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 27; *DL* 10.148 [27]; *LCL* 2:673, ***179 n. 72***.
Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 29; *DL* 10.149 [29]; *LCL* 2:673, ***168-69 n. 22***.
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Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 32; *DL* 10.150 [32]; *LCL* 2:675, ***177 n. 63***.
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Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 36; *DL* 10.151 [36]; *LCL* 2:675, ***177 n. 64***.
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Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 58; W. J. Oates *ML* 43, ***176 n. 57***.
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Epicurus *Principal Doctrines* 78; W. J. Oates *ML* 44, ***412 n. 75***.

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Lucretius *De rerum natura* 2.47-61; *LCL* 89, ***193-94 n. 11***.
Lucretius *De rerum natura* 2.355ff.; *LCL* 111, ***415 n. 30***.
Lucretius *De rerum natura* 2.1044-89; *LCL* 159, 161, 163, ***198-99 n. 19***.
Lucretius *De rerum natura* 2.1144; *LCL* 167, ***415 n. 29***.

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Lucretius *De rerum natura* 3.794-805; *LCL* 225, 227, ***200 n. 25***.
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Lucretius *De rerum natura* 3.843ff.; *LCL* 229, ***415 n. 27***.
Lucretius *De rerum natura* 3.860-69; *LCL* 229, 231, ***201 n. 28***.
Lucretius *De rerum natura* 3.932-45; *LCL* 235, ***203-04 n. 37***.
Lucretius *De rerum natura* 3.978ff.; *LCL* 237, 239, ***415 n. 32***.

Lucretius *De rerum natura* 3.1014-23; *LCL* 241, ***202-03 n. 33***.
Lucretius *De rerum natura* 3.1053-94; *LCL* 243, 245, 247, ***201-02 n. 31***.

Lucretius *De rerum natura* 5.1ff.; *LCL* 341, ***14 n. 6***.
Lucretius *De rerum natura* 5.174; *LCL* 353, ***203 n. 34***.
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Plotinus

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Plutarch *Adv. Colot.* 10.1112A; *LCL* 14:217; frag. 283 Usener, ***137-38 n. 16***.
Plutarch *Adv. Colot.* 14.1115B; *LCL* 14:237; *Straton* frag. Wehrli, ***400 n. 3***.
Plutarch *Adv. Colot.* 16.1116D; *LCL* 14:245, ***406 n. 9***.
Plutarch *Adv. Colot.* 17.1117A; *LCL* 14:247, 249; frag. 116 Usener, ***318-319 n. 46***.
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Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.16; frag. 1 Heinze; frag. 82 Isnardi Parente, ***393 n. 3***.

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Sextus Empiricus *Adv. math.* 7.248; *LCL* 2:133; frag 59 von Arnim *SVF* 1:18, 5ff., ***224 n. 15***.
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Giovanni Reale

THE SYSTEMS OF THE HELLENISTIC AGE: A HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY, VOLUME III

John R. Catan, Editor and Translator

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A volume in the SUNY Series in Philosophy
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State University of New York Press

ISBN 0-88706-027-7 hc